Dillard, Presiding Judge. Tommy Lamar Thomas appeals the trial court’s denial of his special demurrer to several counts of the State’s indictment against him on various charges, including weapon-related charges. Specifically, Thomas argues that two counts of the indictment lack sufficient detail and thus are too vague when describing the firearms he allegedly unlawfully possessed. For the reasons set forth infra, we agree with Thomas and reverse.[1] The record shows Thomas was indicted by a Floyd County grand jury on nine different counts, including five weapon-related counts. Counts Two and Three of the indictment charged Thomas with possession of illegal weapons. And several months later, following arraignment, Thomas filed a special demurrer to those counts of the indictment, arguing that its descriptions of the weapons were too vague and thus did not provide sufficient detail to apprise him of what he must be prepared to defend at trial. More precisely, in Count Two of the indictment, Thomas was charged with possession of an illegal weapon in violation of OCGA § 16-11-123 in that, “on or about the 25th day of November, 2021, [he] did knowingly have in his possession a sawed-off rifle having a barrel length of less than 16 inches and an overall length of less than 26 inches, the acts in this count being separate and distinct from any other count in this indictment . . .”[2] Likewise, in Count Three, he was charged with another violation of OCGA § 16-11-123, in that, “on or about the 25th of November, 2021, [he] did knowingly have in his possession a sawed-off shotgun having a barrel length of less than 18 inches and an overall length of less than 26 inches, the acts in this count being separate and distinct from any other count of this indictment . . .”[3] Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied the special demurrer on the foregoing counts but granted Thomas’s petition for a certificate of immediate review. We granted Thomas’s application for interlocutory appeal, and this appeal follows. And once again, as to Counts Two and Three of the indictment, Thomas contends the descriptions of the firearms at issue are too vague to withstand a special demurrer. We agree. In filing a special demurrer, an accused “claims not that the charge in an indictment is fatally defective and incapable of supporting a conviction, but rather that the charge is imperfect as to form or that the accused is entitled to more information.”[4] And when we review an indictment on interlocutory appeal prior to a trial, we must apply the rule that “a defendant who has timely filed a special demurrer is entitled to an indictment perfect in form as well as substance.”[5] To that end, we review a trial court’s ruling on a special demurrer de novo.[6] Importantly, in order to withstand a special demurrer, an indictment need not contain every detail of the crime; but it must state the essential elements of the charged offense and allege the underlying facts in enough detail to sufficiently apprise the defendant of what he or she must be prepared to defend against at trial.[7] The purpose of the indictment, then, is to “allow [the] defendant to prepare his defense intelligently and to protect him from double jeopardy.”[8] As the Supreme Court of the United States has explained, “[i]t is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.”[9] Nevertheless, this recitation “must be accompanied with such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform the accused of the specific offense, coming under the general description, with which he is charged.”[10] Here, the State’s inclusion of “separate and distinct from any other count of this indictment” suggests the weapons at issue in Counts Two and Three are different from the weapons referenced in the other weapon-related counts of the indictment that do provide additional details by which to identify the firearm, such as the make and model.[11] Indeed, Counts Two and Three merely track the language of OCGA § 16-11-123 by referring to each weapon as a “sawed-off shotgun” and a “sawed-off rifle” and providing an approximate measurement of each weapon’s barrel and overall length in conformity with OCGA § 16-11-121.[12] As a result of the foregoing, Thomas contends the State has not done enough to inform him of the specific offenses for which he is charged, and urges us to apply to these unlawful-possession-of-a-weapon counts the same standard applied to indictments for the unlawful possession of other items (e.g., stolen property)—thus requiring the unlawfully possessed weapons to be described with particularity.[13] We agree the reasoning of those cases should apply in this (similar) context, and, as a result, that such particularity is required in this case. So, in order to intelligently prepare a defense and protect against double jeopardy, the weapons referred to in Counts Two and Three must be described with greater particularity—such as their appearance (e.g., color), make, model, caliber, exact barrel measurement, serial number, and any other distinguishing characteristics.[14] In reaching this conclusion, we are unpersuaded by the State’s suggestions that Thomas need only look to the pretrial discovery to learn additional details about the firearms referenced in Counts Two and Three. Indeed, the State described firearms with greater particularity elsewhere in the indictment, and then curiously noted in Counts Two and Three that the generally described firearms referenced in those counts were “separate and distinct” from the other counts.[15] We are likewise unpersuaded by the State’s reliance on Blockburger v. United States[16] to assert that—because it is charging Thomas with offenses related to only two firearms (something that is not at all clear from the indictment)—subsequent prosecution would be barred. As explained supra, [t]he true test of the sufficiency of an indictment is not whether it could have been made more definite and certain, but whether it contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and, in case any other proceedings are taken against him for a similar offense, whether the record shows with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction.[17] For all these reasons, the indictment fails this sufficiency test because it does not apprise Thomas of what he must be prepared to defend against as to Counts Two and Three—i.e., it fails to describe with particularity the firearms he allegedly unlawfully possessed and thus does not show “with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction” should other proceedings be taken against him for a similar offense.[18] Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Thomas’s special demurrer as to Counts Two and Three of the indictment.[19] Judgment reversed. Mercier and Markle, JJ., concur.
