Hodges, Judge. These cases come before us following the Morgan County Superior Court’s denial of a petition to validate taxable revenue bonds in an amount up to $15,000,000,000 in connection with the proposed development and construction of an electric vehicle manufacturing facility by Rivian Horizon, LLC (“Rivian”) in Morgan and Walton Counties (the “Project”). As discussed in more detail below, the State and the Joint Development Authority of Jasper County, Morgan County, Newton County, and Walton County (the “JDA”) entered into numerous, complex agreements with Rivian which were structured so as to eliminate any obligation for Rivian to pay ad valorem taxes as a way to induce Rivian to locate its facilities in Georgia. Several residents of the impacted counties (the “Intervenors”) intervened in the action to oppose validation of the bonds and other aspects of the Project. The superior court denied validation of the bonds. It also found that Rivian’s interest in the land for the Project would constitute a taxable estate for years and that its interest in the personal property for the Project would not be a bailment for hire, effectively rendering Rivian liable for ad valorem taxes. The JDA and the State now appeal, and we have consolidated the cases for issuance of an opinion. The JDA and the State both allege the same enumerations of error, specifically, that the superior court erred (1) in denying validation of the bonds based on improper consideration of the Project’s economic feasibility; (2) in denying validation of the bonds because of concerns that local infrastructure costs may offset the Project’s benefits; (3) in denying validation of the bonds on the ground that the Bond Resolution waived performance audit requirements; (4) in finding that the rental agreement between the parties does not create a bailment for hire; and (5) in finding that the rental agreement does not create a usufruct. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the superior court’s finding that the nature of Rivian’s interest in the equipment of the Project is not a bailment for hire. We reverse the superior court as to its other findings. The evidence in this case is undisputed, although the parties strongly disagree about the implications of that evidence. The JDA is a public body corporate and politic created pursuant to the Development Authorities Law of the State of Georgia (OCGA § 36-62-1 et seq.). It was created for the public purpose of developing and promoting, for the public good and general welfare, trade, commerce, industry and employment opportunities in its area of operation. In April 2022, it adopted a bond resolution permitting it to issue bonds to Rivian in connection with the Project. It also reached several agreements with the State and Rivian in furtherance of this Project, including, as is relevant to this case, an Economic Development Agreement (“EDA”) and a Rental Agreement concerning the real and personal property involved with the Project. The documents extensively cross-reference each other as part of a comprehensive scheme. The Bond Resolution In April 2022, the JDA adopted a Bond Resolution in which it made a finding that the Project will increase employment in the territorial area of the [JDA] and thereby develop and promote trade, commerce, industry and employment opportunities for the public good and the general welfare within the territory of the [JDA] and will promote the general welfare of the State; that the Project, and the use thereof will each further the public purposes of the Act for which the [JDA] was created, and that the Project and the [bonds] will each be sound, feasible, and reasonable. Through the Bond Resolution, the JDA agreed to issue taxable revenue bonds in one or more series, under such provisions, in aggregate principal amount of up to $15,000,000,000 [ ], and to apply the proceeds of the sale of the [b]onds (whether derived directly or indirectly from the issuance of the [b]onds) to finance, directly, in whole or in part, the acquisition, construction, and improvement of certain vehicle manufacturing and research, development, training, sales and/or service facilities, including potential battery manufacturing facilities, and related facilities on [particular land]. . . Each bond bears interest at the rate of 6 percent annually and matures on December 1, 2047. The Bond resolution provides that the bonds and interest thereon shall not be deemed to constitute a debt or liability of the State, or any political subdivision thereof, and its issuance shall not, directly or indirectly or contingently, obligate the [JDA], the State or any political subdivision thereof, including without limitation Jasper County, Morgan County, Newton County or Walton County, to levy any form of taxation therefor or make any appropriation for their payment. Nothing in the bonds or in the Bond Resolution or the proceedings of the [JDA] authorizing the issuance of the bonds or in the Act shall be construed as creating a debt of the State, or any political subdivision thereof, including without limitation Jasper County, Morgan County, Newton County or Walton County, within the meaning of any constitutional or statutory provision of the State. . . . The bonds and any interest due thereon shall not be a general obligation, debt, or a liability of the [JDA] and does not constitute or give rise to any pecuniary liability or charge against the general credit of the [JDA], but shall be a limited obligation of the issuer payable solely from and secured by the security, all as described in and subject to limitations set forth in this Bond Resolution. (Emphasis omitted.) The Bond Purchase Agreement Through this agreement, the JDA “proposes to issue its revenue bonds . . . in the form of up to four (4) draw-down instruments in a maximum aggregate principal amount of $15,000,000,000.” Advances for these bonds may only be made with respect to costs of the Project, including the costs of construction and purchasing equipment, and costs of issuing the bonds. The Economic Development Agreement In April 2022, Rivian, the State, and the JDA agreed to the EDA.[1] Through the EDA, Rivian will commit to construct an electric vehicle manufacturing plant, create 7,500 new jobs with an average annual wage of $56,000, and make a capital investment of at least $5,000,000,000. The JDA, several agencies of the State, and Rivian also agreed to performance and accountability standards related to Rivian’s promises under the EDA. If Rivian fails to meet certain performance thresholds within a set time frame, it would be required to relinquish certain financial incentives received from the various agencies. In exchange, the State and the JDA agreed to make available the facility site, which would be owned by the State, leased to the JDA, and then rented to Rivian pursuant to the Rental Agreement. The facility site consists of nearly 2,000 acres which spans Walton and Morgan Counties. The State and the JDA have obligations under the EDA to perform certain infrastructure work on the site, provide workforce training facilities and programs, and to provide certain financial incentives to Rivian. The State, through the Georgia Department of Economic Development, committed to a grant of $21,320,000 to the JDA for Rivian’s benefit and a $111,307,760 grant directly to the JDA to offset some of the costs, as well as providing certain state tax incentives for Rivian. The EDA further provides that Rivian, in its capacity as a tenant of the Project, would be responsible for repayment of the project bonds and it specifies that the project bonds shall not be a general obligation of the JDA, Jasper County, Morgan County, Newton County, or Walton County. Instead, Rivian and the JDA agreed that the project bonds “shall be a special and limited obligation payable solely from the payments (actual or constructive) received from [Rivian] under the Rental Agreement.” The EDA acknowledges the language from the Bond Resolution that provides that payment of the bonds is not the responsibility of the State, the JDA, or any of the JDA’s member counties, and that project bonds are not a debt of those entities nor are they backed by the faith and credit of those entities. So that the relevant taxing authorities are not deprived of revenue as a result of the parties’ attempt to structure the deal to avoid ad valorem taxation on Rivian’s part, the EDA also contains an agreement that Rivian would make payments in lieu of taxes, which is memorialized in a separate agreement (the “PILOT Agreement”). In the PILOT Agreement, the tax assessors of Morgan and Walton Counties would represent that they have determined Rivian’s interest in the Project to be exempt from ad valorem taxation during the period of the Rental Agreement with the JDA. The first PILOT payment scheduled for 2023 is for $1,500,000. Over 25 years Rivian would pay $300,000,000 in PILOT payments pursuant to the agreement. The EDA provides, however, that “[i]n the event that [Rivian] is required to pay any ad valorem taxes on any property interests in the Project, such amount of ad valorem taxes paid by [Rivian] shall be deducted from the PILOT Payments due from [Rivian].” The current annual ad valorem revenue for the undeveloped property at issue is $80,000. The Rental Agreement The JDA and Rivian also agreed to a Rental Agreement for the real and personal property involved with the Project.[2] Through the Rental Agreement, Rivian “agrees to acquire, construct, improve and install the Project, and to provide the Project to the State and to [the JDA] . . . [Rivian] agrees to expend on the Project an amount at least equal to the greater of $5,000,000,000 or the amount of the [b]onds issued for the development of the Project.” The Rental Agreement provides that the real property for the Project will be owned by the State, leased to the JDA, and then made available to Rivian. It further provides that the personal property involved in the Project will be owned by the JDA and made available to Rivian. The Rental Agreement states that it is the intention of the parties that the interest of Rivian under the agreement as to any real property included in the Project be that of a usufruct pursuant to OCGA § 44-7-1 (a) and that its interest in the personal property included in the Project to be a bailment for hire pursuant to OCGA § 44-6-101. The Rental Agreement explicitly disclaims any intention to create an estate for years. As discussed further below, the Rental Agreement provides various restrictions on the manner in which Rivian can use the property. The initial term of the Rental Agreement is through December 1, 2027, but it automatically extends for five year terms through December 1, 2047 unless explicitly terminated. The Rental Agreement provides for Rivian to pay rent to the JDA accordingly: On or before each date provided in the Bond Resolution for the payment of principal or interest on the [b]onds, until the principal of, and interest on the [b]onds shall have been paid in full, [Rivian] shall pay or cause to be paid to or as directed by the [JDA], as Basic Rent for the Project, a sum equal to the amount payable on such date as principal of and interest on the [b]onds . . . . Rivian’s obligation to make these rental payments is unconditional. As to personal property, the Rental Agreement provides that [i]n any instance where [Rivian] determines that any items of Equipment are not necessary at the facility or facilities that are the subject of this [Rental] Agreement, [Rivian] may remove such items of Equipment and transfer, sell, trade-in, exchange or otherwise dispose of them (as a whole or in part), and thereupon such removed Equipment shall no longer be subject to this [Rental] Agreement and shall not be considered a part of the Project. If requested by [Rivian], the [JDA] shall deliver a quitclaim bill of sale for such removed Equipment to [Rivian]. The respective Boards of Tax Assessors of Walton and Morgan Counties reviewed the proposed Rental Agreement between the JDA and Rivian and received legal counsel regarding it. Both boards determined Rivian’s interest in the real and personal property under the Rental Agreement to be exempt from ad valorem taxation. They both also authorized and approved the payments to be made pursuant to the PILOT Agreement. Pursuant to the Revenue Bond Law, OCGA §§ 36-82-60 through 36-82-85, in July 2022, the State filed a petition to validate the bonds and other aspects of the Project. Relevant to this appeal, the State sought a bond validation order declaring that the Bond Resolution and the agreements reached by the parties are confirmed and validated; “that the Rental Agreement will create in [Rivian] a usufruct in the real property comprising part of the Project and a bailment for hire as to the personal property comprising part of the Project, which interests are not subject to ad valorem property taxes”; that none of the agreements create a tangible property interest of Rivian in the Project which would be subject to ad valorem property taxation; that the public notice of the bond validation was sufficient to exempt the JDA from compliance with performance audit review and period reports with respect to the expenditure of bond proceeds; and that the undertaking for which the bonds are issued and the security therefor are sound, feasible, and reasonable. A public notice was filed concerning the petition to validate the bonds as well as related agreements. The notice specified in bold-face capital letters that no performance audit or performance reviews (as such terms are defined in OCGA § 36-82-100) would be performed. Intervenors were permitted to intervene in the action without objection, and they filed an answer contesting the averments of the State in the petition and resisting validation of the bonds and other related agreements. See OCGA § 368277 (a). The superior court held an evidentiary hearing at which two witnesses testified: Jerry Silvio, the Chair of the JDA, and Andrew Capezzuto, the Chief Administrative Officer and General Counsel of the Georgia Department of Economic Development. The Intervenors cross-examined these witnesses, but did not call any witnesses of their own. As will be discussed more fully below, these witnesses testified as to the contents of the agreements with Rivian as well as the anticipated benefits of the agreements. They were also cross-examined about cautionary representations made by Rivian in filings made to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) as well as the rate at which Rivian was spending the capital it raised. Following the hearing, the superior court entered an order in which it refused to validate the bonds. Specifically, the superior court found that the Project and the bonds were not sound, feasible, and reasonable based on the superior court’s concern with Rivian’s ongoing financial stability, the scope of investigation performed by the JDA and the State into Rivian’s stability, and the decision to waive audit requirements for the project (even though this waiver was authorized by statute). The superior court also found that the JDA failed to demonstrate that the Project would promote the general welfare of the local communities within its territory because there had been no analysis of the corresponding cost to the local communities in adjusting to the new development. Lastly, as is relevant to this case, the superior court found that the Rental Agreement creates a taxable estate for years and does not create a bailment for hire. The JDA and State timely appealed. Case No. A23A0574 1. The JDA argues that the trial court erred by denying validation of the bonds because it improperly considered the Project’s economic feasibility. Specifically, the JDA argues that the economic wisdom of the Project based on Rivian’s financial status was beyond the scope of what the superior court could consider in deciding whether to validate the bonds. We agree that the superior court erred in denying validation of the bonds and the Project based on a finding that the JDA and the State did not make a prima facie case that the bonds were sound, feasible, and reasonable. “In a bond validation hearing, the role of the trial court is to determine whether the bond proposal is sound, feasible, and reasonable.”[3] (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Berry v. City of East Point, 277 Ga. App. 649, 650 (1) (627 SE2d 391) (2006). The superior court’s “findings about soundness, feasibility, and reasonableness must be sustained on appeal if there is any evidence to support them.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Franzen v. Downtown Dev. Auth. of Atlanta, 309 Ga. 411, 430 (3) (f) (845 SE2d 539) (2020). Admittedly, the specifics of this standard are not well-defined, but the law is clear that “the economic feasibility of the [bonds or the Project] is not required to be shown by the state in its petition.” Nations v. Downtown Dev. Auth. of the City of Atlanta, 255 Ga. 324, 330 (3) (a) (338 SE2d 240) (1985), citing Rich v. State of Georgia, 237 Ga. 291, 295 (2), n. 2 (227 SE2d 761) (1976). Moreover, our Supreme Court has recognized that the decision to issue bonds “is a legislative matter subject to the most limited review by the courts.” Rich, 237 Ga. at 295 (2). The wisdom of this limited review is obvious — agencies tasked with promoting economic development are in a better position to assess the economic pros and cons of development deals than are the courts. Our Supreme Court has held that [i]f the petition of the [State] has alleged the facts required by the statute, and citizens are made parties for the purpose of contesting the validation of the bonds, necessarily they stand as quasi defendants. When they deny the substantial allegations of the petition of the [State], this places upon [the State] the burden of proving such allegations. In certain cases, where citizens who have become parties raise objections which do not appear in the pleadings between the [State] and the [development authority], but which depend for their support upon [evidence from another source], the burden of sustaining such allegation is upon the citizens alleging them. This may be analogized to the affirmative pleading of a defendant in an ordinary action at law. In ordinary lawsuits, an allegation by the plaintiff and a denial by the defendant puts the burden upon the plaintiff. If the defendant sets up an additional affirmative plea as to it the burden is upon him. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Brown v. City of Atlanta, 152 Ga. 283 (3) (109 SE 666) (1921); see also Rich, 237 Ga. at 295 (2) (“Since the burden is on the intervenor to come forward with evidence to support any affirmative defenses interposed by him against the petition by the state setting forth the validity of the bond issue, and the intervenor produced none, the trial court did not err in finding the program ‘sound, reasonable, feasible and practical.’”) (citations omitted). Here, the superior court erred in finding that the State and the JDA did not make a prima facie case that the bonds and the Project are sound, feasible, and reasonable. Notably, the superior court did not find anything illegal about the structure of the bonds or the Project, and, in fact, rejected Intervenors’ arguments attacking their legality. See Reed v. State, 265 Ga. 458, 459 (2) (458 SE2d 113) (1995) (affirming superior court’s finding of feasibility where “the payments from the county under the intergovernmental contract represent a lawful source of revenue for the project” and finding that “[b]ecause the contractual payments are a lawful source of income, and the trial court had the contract before it, there was evidence to support the trial court’s finding of feasibility [and the intervenor] . . . has shown no violation of the Georgia Revenue Bond Law.”). Nor did the superior court find that the bonds or the Project were legally impossible. Compare Hicks v. State, 99 Ga. App. 302, 303 (3), 306-307 (108 SE2d 187) (1959) (reversing validation of bonds to be used to purchase a system that was not actually for sale). The superior court’s decision was rooted in the economic feasibility of the bonds and the Project, which the State did not need to establish in its petition. Before the superior court was evidence that shortly before the bond validation hearing, Rivian had over $21,000,000,000 in assets and $16,400,000,000 of cash on hand. The State and the JDA demonstrated that the bonds will be privately funded, will not be a debt of any government entity, and that they will not subject the State or any political subdivision to any pecuniary liability. They presented evidence of billions of dollars of economic investment from Rivian, millions of dollars of PILOT payments from Rivian, and a promise to create 7,500 new jobs with an average annual salary of $56,000. They further demonstrated that the State had committed to providing millions of dollars in subsidies to defray costs of the Project. Two witnesses, with extensive background in development deals, testified about the benefits to the local community which will come from this deal. Indeed, one witness called projects with manufacturers such as Rivian the “holy grail” of economic development projects due to the creation of new jobs, additional tax revenue, and likelihood of suppliers of the manufacturer locating nearby. This witness also testified about indirect economic benefit to the community that comes as a result of increased construction jobs as well as the need for increased housing and retail as a result of such projects. This was sufficient for the State to meet its burden to establish a prima facie case that the bonds and the Project are sound, feasible, and reasonable, which did not need to include a showing of economic feasibility. See Nations, 255 Ga. at 330 (3) (a). Indeed, although the superior court found that the State and the JDA did not establish a prima facie case, it did not make any factual findings which could support such a conclusion. For instance, the superior court did not find that the structure of the bonds was illegal or unconstitutional, it did not find that the bonds would subject taxpayers to liability, it did not find that the various agreements did not impose on Rivian the obligations claimed by the JDA and the State, and it did not question the reliability of the witnesses or find their testimony not credible. To rebut this prima facie case, the Intervenors had the burden of introducing evidence that the bonds and the Project are not sound, feasible, and reasonable. Intervenors attempted to attack the economic feasibility of the bonds and the Project, but to do so all they did was introduce SEC filings containing cautionary language and demonstrate that Rivian has spent a lot of the capital it initially raised. The only testimony concerning the impact of these documents on the soundness, feasibility, or reasonableness of the bonds or Project was testimony from the State’s witnesses that the information in the SEC filings did not alarm them. The superior court was not presented with any conflicting evidence on which it could rely to find that the financial condition of Rivian rendered the project unfeasible. Instead, the superior court impermissibly speculated as to what Rivian’s financial standing could mean for its ability to support the bonds and the Project. “Findings of fact based on mere conjecture can not be upheld because mere conjecture does not constitute evidence upon which findings may be based.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) In re Sharee Baps Corp., 346 Ga. App. 434, 439 (816 SE2d 412) (2018). Accordingly, despite the deference owed to the superior court in these matters, here, there was no evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the bonds and the Project are not sound, feasible, and reasonable due to economic infeasibility. The State and the JDA made a prima facie case which was not rebutted by the Intevenors. It was concern about the economic feasibility of the bonds and the Project which caused the superior court to find it to be not sound, feasible, or reasonable for the Project to be exempted from public audits pursuant to OCGA § 36-82-100 (c), despite finding that the JDA “without question” complied with the requirements of that statute. Generally, “[w]hen bonds are issued by a county, municipality, or local authority in the amount of $5 million or more, the expenditure of bond proceeds shall be subject to an ongoing performance audit or performance review[.]” OCGA § 3682100 (b). The issuer of the bonds, however, can waive such a requirement by “ includ[ing] in a legal advertisement in bold print contained within requisite public notice soliciting public preapproval of the applicable bond issue [language] which expressly states that no performance audit or performance review shall be conducted with respect to such bond issue.” OCGA § 36-82-100 (d). It is without dispute that the JDA complied with this procedure provided to it by the General Assembly, and neither the Intervenors nor the trial court have pointed to any legal authority to permit this to be a basis for refusing to validate a bond. Indeed, the Intervenors did not argue to the superior court that this was a basis upon which the bond validation should be denied. Accordingly, the superior court erred in relying on this as a basis to find that the bonds were not sound, feasible, and reasonable. 2. Next, the JDA contends that the trial court erred by denying bond validation based on its concerns that it failed to establish a prima facie case that the Project will promote the general welfare of the local communities in its territory. Again, we agree. In permitting the creation of development authorities, the Georgia Constitution recognizes that “[t]he development of trade, commerce, industry, and employment opportunities [is] a public purpose vital to the welfare of the people of this state[.]“ Ga. Const. Art. IX, Sec. 6, Par. III. Indeed, the General Assembly provided that [t]he purposes of this chapter [concerning development authorities] are to develop and promote trade, commerce, industry, and employment opportunities for the public good and the general welfare and to promote the general welfare of the state. No bonds or bond anticipation notes, except refunding bonds, shall be issued by an authority under this chapter unless its board of directors adopts a resolution finding that the project for which such bonds or notes are to be issued will promote the foregoing objectives and will increase or maintain employment in the territorial area of such authority. OCGA § 36-62-9. After the JDA made such a finding, the State filed its petition to validate the bonds and the Project in which the State specifically requested a finding that the Project will “develop and promote trade, commerce, industry, and employment opportunities for the public good and general welfare within the territory of the [JDA].” In light of this request, as discussed above, the State was required to establish a prima facie case, which it did for the reasons discussed in Division 1. The Intervenors then had the burden to demonstrate that the bonds and the Project would not, in fact, benefit the community. The Intervenors attempted to do so by cross-examining the witnesses at the hearing concerning the lack of studies or evidence regarding the cost the community would bear in supporting the Project, such as infrastructure costs. Importantly, however, the Intervenors introduced no evidence concerning the cost to the local community to support the Project, let alone evidence demonstrating that the cost would exceed the benefit from the economic development or that the State’s grant would not adequately offset the costs to the community. Our Supreme Court has recognized that appellate courts should defer to the findings of local development authorities that a “project will provide public benefits, particularly where those findings do not appear unreasonable and [Intervenors] have presented no actual evidence to the contrary.” Savage, 297 Ga. at 637 (4) (c); see also Smith v. Bd. of Commissioners of Roads & Revenues of Hall County, 244 Ga. 133, 141 (3) (259 SE2d 74) (1979) (“Whether the contract now in question is one which will benefit the taxpayers and residents of the Hall County Fire District is a question properly for determination in the first instance by the County Commission and finally by actual experience. We are bound by the appellate decisions holding that unless there is an abuse of discretion superior courts should not substitute their judgment or interfere with governing authorities in the [p]roper exercise of their judgment concerning such matters.”). Here, the Intervenors did not meet their burden to overcome the showing made by the State. Accordingly, the superior court erred in refusing to validate the bonds and the Project on this basis.[4] 3. The JDA contends that the superior court erred in finding that the Rental Agreement does not create a bailment for hire. We disagree. “As applied to personalty, an estate for years differs from a contract of hiring, which is a bailment conveying no interest in the property to the bailee but merely the right of use.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 446101. “A bailment is a delivery of goods or property upon a contract, express or implied, to carry out the execution of a special object beneficial either to the bailor or bailee or both and to dispose of the property in conformity with the purpose of the trust.” OCGA § 441240. “[A] bailment relationship is created when one party is involved in an undertaking for a consideration to safeguard the personal property of another and exercises complete dominion at all times over the property.”[5] Park ‘N Go of Georgia, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 266 Ga. 787, 790 (471 SE2d 500) (1996). Here, the Rental Agreement provides that “title to all additions, modifications or improvements constituting Equipment which are a part of the Project and are paid for with proceeds of the [b]onds shall be in the [JDA] and shall be subject to [the Rental] Agreement.” It further provides “[i]t is the intention of the parties that the interest of [Rivian] hereunder shall be . . . a bailment for hire under OCGA § 44-6-101, as to the personal property of the Project[.]]” Despite stating this intent, the Rental Agreement grants Rivian an interest in the equipment beyond mere use; it provides Rivian rights in the equipment of the Project which are inconsistent with a lack of ownership and it deprives the JDA of rights which are consistent with ownership. Specifically, the Rental Agreement provides: Removal of Equipment. The [JDA] shall not be under any obligation to renew, repair or replace any inadequate, obsolete, worn-out, unsuitable, undesirable or unnecessary Equipment. In any instance where [Rivian] determines that any items of the Equipment are not necessary at the facility or facilities that are the subject of this [Rental] Agreement, [Rivian] may remove such items of Equipment and transfer, sell, trade-in, exchange, or otherwise dispose of them (as a whole or in part), and thereupon such removed Equipment shall no longer be subject to this [Rental] Agreement and shall not be considered part of the Project. If requested by [Rivian], the [JDA] shall deliver a quitclaim bill of sale for such removed Equipment to [Rivian]. . . . [Rivian] from time to time shall cause to be redeemed an amount of the [b]onds corresponding to the book value of Equipment removed and not replaced (rounded to the nearest $5,000) pursuant to the provisions [of this section], but [Rivian] shall not be required to do so for so long as the aggregate book value with respect to which corresponding redemptions have not been made does not exceed $15,000,000. [Rivian] will promptly report from time to time such removal, substitution, sale and other disposition; provided that no such report need be made until the amount on account of all such sales, trade-ins or other dispositions not previously reported
