Dillard, Presiding Judge. Allison Bozovich sued Signature Day Spa, alleging that she was injured when one of Signatures’s employees performed a Brazilian bikini wax on her. Thereafter, Travelers Casualty Insurance Company of America—which insured Signature—filed a declaratory judgment action to determine whether it had a duty to defend and indemnify the spa in Bozovich’s underlying lawsuit. Bozovich moved to dismiss the declaratory-judgment action, and the trial court summarily granted her motion. Travelers now appeals, arguing the trial court (1) erred in dismissing its declaratory-judgment action because the policy exclusions applied to the allegations in Bozovich’s complaint, and (2) improperly considered discovery responses at the motion-to-dismiss stage. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the declaratory-judgment action, and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is well established that we review the trial court’s “grant of a motion to dismiss de novo.”[1] Importantly, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought.[2] And in deciding a motion to dismiss, all pleadings are to be “construed most favorably to the party who filed them, and all doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the filing party’s favor.”[3] So viewed, the record shows that Bozovich filed suit against Signature, alleging that spa employee Phuong Dang severely injured her vaginal area during a July 2019 Brazilian bikini wax. Bozovich claimed that Signature (1) was negligent in (a) hiring, training, supervising, and retaining its employees; (b) failing to have the proper policies and procedures in place, and failing to follow proper procedures; (c) employing an unlicensed esthetician to perform waxing;[4] (d) engaging in practices exposing clients to harmful conditions; and (e) engaging in other negligent conduct; and (2) committed negligence per se due to its failure to adhere to the regulations of the Georgia State Board of Cosmetology and Barbers, as well as applicable state statutory requirements.[5] During the relevant time period, Signature was insured by Travelers. The relevant policy covered occurrences of bodily injury, and it obligated Travelers to defend against any suit seeking damages for such an occurrence. The policy also provided an endorsement for beauty or spa professional services, which covers injuries due to treatment by an esthetician.[6] But importantly, the policy expressly excluded services performed by someone who is not licensed and conduct violating a statute or governmental rule or regulation. And based on these exclusions, Travelers filed this declaratory-judgment action, seeking to determine whether it had a duty to defend and indemnify Signature in Bozovich’s lawsuit.[7] Bozovich moved to dismiss the declaratory-judgment action, arguing that her claims arose under the theory of premises liability based on Signature’s own negligence in creating an unsafe environment, and therefore, the exclusions did not apply. Bozovich later supplemented her motion with Travelers’s answers to her requests to admit. Specifically, she pointed to Travelers’s response that she was seeking damages for negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and the failure to have proper policies in effect; and that the employee who performed the waxing was not a defendant in the underlying suit. At a hearing on Bozovich’s motion, Travelers argued the trial court could not consider discovery responses without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment, and that the exclusions applied because the underlying lawsuit and the declaratory-judgment action both pleaded that the employee who performed the waxing was unlicensed. Nevertheless, the trial court summarily granted the motion to dismiss the declaratory-judgment action, and this appeal follows. 1. Travelers first contends the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss because Bozovich cannot circumvent the policy exclusions simply by characterizing her claims as a premises-liability action. It further contends the trial court was required to take as true the allegation that the esthetician was unlicensed, as Bozovich alleged in the underlying lawsuit. We conclude the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss the declaratory-judgment action. When coverage is in question, the insurer may seek a declaratory judgment to confirm its obligation to provide coverage and a defense.[8] And suffice it to say, the duty to defend is “determined by the contract; and since the contract obligates the insurer to defend claims asserting liability under the policy, even if groundless, the allegations of the complaint are looked to [in order to] determine whether a liability covered by the policy is asserted.”[9] Thus, an insurer’s duty to defend is “determined by comparing the allegations of the complaint with the provisions of the policy.”[10] In that regard, it is well established that “[c]onstruction and interpretation of a contract are matters of law for the court.”[11] Indeed, in Georgia, insurance is “a matter of contract, and the parties to an insurance policy are bound by its plain and unambiguous terms.”[12] Accordingly, when faced with a conflict over coverage, a trial court must “first determine, as a matter of law, whether the relevant policy language is ambiguous.”[13] But a policy which is susceptible to “two reasonable meanings is not ambiguous if the trial court can resolve the conflicting interpretations by applying the rules of contract construction.”[14] Significantly, we consider the “policy as a whole, to give effect to each provision, and to interpret each provision to harmonize with each other.”[15] And when the policy would not provide coverage for the injury, there is no duty to defend.[16] With these guiding principles in mind, we turn now to Travelers’s specific arguments on appeal. (a) Whether Bozovich can circumvent the policy by labeling her claims as arising under premises liability and negligent hiring. Travelers argues Bozovich cannot avoid the policy exclusions by framing her claims as arising under premises liability and negligent hiring. We agree. The policy provides coverage for bodily injury “caused” by an “occurrence,” which is defined as an act or omission by Signature or its employees in providing services. Although Bozovich characterizes her claims as negligent hiring, supervision, and training, and the failure to enact procedures, she nevertheless contends Signature’s actions—including employing unlicensed estheticians—”caused” her injury. Additionally, her allegations directly relate to and involve the act of providing spa services. As a result, Bozovich’s allegations constitute “occurrences” as defined in the policy. And given these circumstances, Signature’s conduct falls within the insurance coverage regardless of the label given in the underlying complaint.[17] But this conclusion does not end our inquiry. (b) Whether the exclusions could possibly apply. We next consider whether any policy exclusion could possibly apply that would relieve Travelers of any duty to defend Signature. Significantly, we are mindful that this analysis is being done in the context of a motion to dismiss.[18] So, here, the policy contains two exclusions that Travelers claims would apply and relieve it of any obligation to defend Signature. The first exclusion provides that there is no coverage for professional services by “[a]ny person who is not licensed to provide such services, if the law requires a license to provide such services,” and the second one provides that there is no coverage for “[t]he violation of any statute, or governmental rule or regulation.” With regard to the exclusion for unlicensed employees, both the underlying complaint and the declaratory action alleged that the esthetician was unlicensed. And importantly, under Georgia law, estheticians are required to be licensed to perform such services.[19] It is unlawful, then, to employ an esthetician who does not hold a license.[20] The parties spend considerable time arguing as to whether the esthetician was licensed in another state, despite the absence of any such evidence in the record. And although Georgia law allows for reciprocity for those licensed elsewhere, the statute nevertheless requires registration in Georgia.[21] Regardless, if the trial court intended to consider that the esthetician was licensed, it would be considering evidence outside the complaint, which is improper at the motion-to-dismiss stage of these proceedings.[22] So, on these facts and at this stage of the litigation, we simply cannot say as a matter of law that Travelers is not entitled to a declaratory judgment. And at the motion-to-dismiss stage, our review is limited to whether—considering the allegations in the complaint as true—there could be no evidence to support Travelers’s claim.[23] In other words, we can only decide if the trial court should have rendered a declaratory judgment, “not how that declaratory judgment should have been rendered.”[24] Based on the allegations in the underlying complaint, it is possible that Travelers could show Signature violated the relevant statutes and regulations regarding esthetician licensing; and thus, an applicable policy exclusion would relieve Travelers of a duty to defend Signature in Bozovich’s underlying action. This conclusion is reinforced by the summary nature of the trial court’s order. We do not know if that court considered evidence outside the pleadings, if it believed Travelers waived its argument, or if it granted the motion because it concluded the policy exclusions did not apply. And taking the facts as alleged as true (as we must), we cannot say there is a lack of evidence to support Travelers’s claim that the exclusion applies. As a result, the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss Travelers’s declaratory-judgment action.[25] Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order granting the motion to dismiss, and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 2. Having concluded the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss, we need not address Travelers’s argument that the trial court erred by considering evidence outside the complaint. Judgment reversed and case remanded. McFadden, P. J., and Brown, J., concur.
