Boggs, Chief Justice. Appellants Sarah Thompson, Kevin Muldowney, and Edward T. Metz filed three, virtually identical complaints in their respective counties on December 6, 2022, alleging that the voting system used that day in the runoff election for a United States Senate seat did not comply with Georgia law. The trial courts entered orders either dismissing the complaints or denying relief. Because the complaints did not name any defendant and because Appellants failed to serve any defendant, the trial courts correctly determined that they had no authority to grant the relief sought. Accordingly, we affirm. In their pro se complaints, which were filed in the superior courts of Bulloch, Cobb, and Fulton counties, Appellants requested that the trial court declare the runoff election in each county to be “void” and “uncertifiable by the Elections Superintendent” of the county. They each alleged that they had cast a ballot on an electronic ballot marking device that failed to meet the statutory requirements for a lawful ballot and that the use of this voting system forced all voters to cast unofficial ballots. They sought relief under OCGA § 21-2-412, which requires that a superior court judge in each judicial circuit be available on election day from 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. to address election-related issues.[1] Appellants also sought to have each trial court enter an order requiring the counties to hold referenda at some unspecified time on the adoption of voting machines, citing OCGA § 21-2-321, which authorizes a municipality that conducts elections by paper ballot to hold a referendum on the use of voting machines. The complaints did not name any county’s Board of Elections and Registration (collectively “the Boards”)[2] or any other person or entity as defendant, and, accordingly, the clerks of the superior courts did not issue summons. See OCGA § 9-11-4 (a); OCGA § 212-524 (f). Nor did the complaints ask the trial courts to order a new runoff election or otherwise seek any relief with respect to the election. Citing various reasons, each trial court either dismissed the complaint or denied relief.[3] Appellants filed discretionary applications, which this Court granted under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). It is axiomatic that in order for a trial court to grant relief against a party, that party must be named in a proper pleading and must have submitted to the court’s jurisdiction voluntarily or been brought within the jurisdiction of the court through compliance with the rules governing service of process. See Webb & Martin, Inc. v. Anderson-McGriff Hardware Co., 188 Ga. 291, 294 (3 SE2d 882) (1939) (person named in record as party is not in fact a party unless he has been brought in by legal process or has voluntarily appeared and submitted himself to jurisdiction of court). See also Schmitz v. Barron, 312 Ga. 523, 530 (863 SE2d 121) (2021) (“[F]ailure to diligently pursue service as required by OCGA § 21-2-524 (f) provides grounds for dismissal of an election contest . . . .”). But no person, entity, or party has been served as a defendant here.[4]Moreover, Appellants have cited no legal authority that would authorize this Court in these circumstances to reverse the trial courts’ refusal to grant the requested extraordinary relief of voiding an election. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial courts did not err in their rulings below. Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur.
