Hodges, Judge. Aubrey Adams-Knowlden sued Augusta Mall, LLC, Amy Dalton, and Andy Frain Services, Inc. (“AFS”) after she sustained a gunshot wound during an altercation inside the mall. Dalton and Augusta Mall (collectively, “Augusta Mall”), in turn, filed a cross-claim against AFS seeking defense and indemnification based upon Augusta Mall’s security agreement with AFS. The Superior Court of Richmond County granted Augusta Mall’s motion for summary judgment on the issues of defense and indemnification, and AFS appeals,[1] arguing that the trial court’s judgment renders an impermissible advisory opinion and is based upon unresolved factual issues. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part. It is well-settled that “[a] de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 355 Ga. App. 82 (842 SE2d 530) (2020). So viewed, the record demonstrates that AFS contracted with Augusta Mall in February 2019 to provide onsite security services at the mall (the “Security Agreement”).[2] Paragraph 3 (b) of the Security Agreement defined the scope of AFS’s role at Augusta Mall: Security Functions. [AFS] personnel assigned to the Property shall be responsible for promoting a pleasant shopping atmosphere and crime prevention efforts through patrol of the Property; seeking out and providing appropriate customer service to patrons; reasonable inspection of the Property for safety hazards and enforcement of the Property’s rules and regulations; appropriate response to incidents and emergencies; preliminary investigation and appropriate disposition of incidents; access control/physical security as appropriate during operating and non-operating hours; official reporting of activities, incidents, and inspection logs; and any special assignments and/or events related to the security/safety function of the Property as agreed upon by the parties. Relevant to this appeal, Paragraph 8 (b) of the Security Agreement provided that AFS “agrees to furnish and keep in force the following insurance . . . :” Liability Insurance. Commercial General Liability Insurance with limits of Five Million Dollars ($5,000,000) per occurrence and aggregate applying on a “per location basis” which shall contain coverage for bodily injury, property damage, premises operations, completed operations, contractual liability and contingent liability naming [Augusta Mall] and such other entities as [Augusta Mall] shall reasonably require from time to time as additional insureds. The foregoing insurance limits may be satisfied by any combination of primary and excess coverage. In addition, Paragraph 8 (e) stated that: Indemnification. [AFS] agrees that it shall defend, indemnify, and hold harmless [Augusta Mall], its respective direct and indirect parents and subsidiaries, any of its affiliated entities, successors and assigns and any current or future officer, director, employee, partner, member or agent of any of them (“Indemnitees”) and the agents, officers and employees of all of the Indemnitees from and against claims, liabilities, losses, damages, actions, causes of action, or suits to the extent caused by (A) any actual or alleged negligent or grossly negligent act or omission or willful misconduct of [AFS] or its agents or employees at the Property or in connection with this Agreement or breach thereof in any way, (B) [AFS's] failure to purchase and maintain all insurance required by this Agreement and (C) negligence or willful misconduct of [AFS] or its agents or employees while operating a Security Vehicle under this Agreement. It is intended that all claims and demands, legal proceedings and lawsuits in which any party to this Agreement or additional insured under this Agreement is named or described as a defendant which alleges or describes any claim in which [AFS] or a security officer has done or has failed to do any act or thing required pursuant to this Agreement or failed to provide the Services at the Property shall be a claim tendered to, accepted by or defended by [AFS]. [Augusta Mall] shall within thirty (30) days after notice of any incident, potential claim or suit, or service of legal process, provide [AFS] . . . with written notice that an action has been brought and, in the event [AFS's] obligations of indemnification, defense and hold harmless apply, [AFS] shall, at its own expense, employ such attorneys as [AFS] may see fit to employ, and as reasonably approved by [AFS's] insurance carrier, to defend such claim or action on behalf of the Indemnitees. If [AFS] or its insurer refuses a tender of defense and/or indemnity, or if a defense is provided under any reservation of rights and [Augusta Mall] does not consent to such refusal or reservation of rights, [AFS] shall pay liquidated damages in the sum of $2,000 to [Augusta Mall] for the amount of the added internal expense incurred by the Indemnitees in dealing with the claim or action for which tender was refused or rights reserved. It is intended that this liquidated damages provision will not be triggered until such time as both [AFS] and [Augusta Mall] have determined that no defense or indemnity is owed to [AFS]. This liquidated damages provision shall be in addition to the Indemnitees’ actual costs of defense, investigation, litigation, litigation management expenses for in-house counsel, costs of trial and/or settlement of the claim which are incurred by the Indemnitees which shall be billed to [AFS] as incurred until the tender is accepted without reservation. The provisions of this paragraph shall survive the termination or expiration of this Agreement and shall not be construed to provide for any indemnification which would, as a result thereof, make the provisions of this paragraph void or to reduce or eliminate any other indemnification or right which the indemnified parties have by law. On October 3, 2020, Adams-Knowlden was working at a jewelry kiosk at Augusta Mall. At approximately 2:54 p.m. that day, four men began arguing near the kiosk. The argument quickly escalated, and two of the men — Tony Burton and Derell Little — began fighting. During the fight, Burton pulled a handgun from Little’s waistband and began firing, striking Little three times. Little collapsed near the jewelry kiosk and later succumbed to his injuries. During the melee, a stray bullet struck Adams-Knowlden in the right knee. Following the October 3 shooting, Augusta Mall tendered indemnification from Adams-Knowlden’s potential claim to AFS on October 7 and 12. AFS rejected the tender, claiming that “[t]here are currently no allegations, nor implication, of negligence, misconduct, or breach of contract by or with respect to [AFS]” and that, as a result, “ the indemnification or insurance obligations under the [Security] Agreement have [not] been triggered.” Thereafter, Adams-Knowlden sued Augusta Mall, Dalton,[3] and AFS for damages resulting from the shooting. In particular, Adams-Knowlden alleged that “Defendants failed to keep its premises safe by failing to provide adequate security and safety measures to protect patrons and employees, including [Adams-Knowlden], from being harmed by criminal activity at Augusta Mall.”[4] (Emphasis supplied.) Augusta Mall answered, filed a cross-claim against AFS for defense and indemnification, and, after discovery, filed a summary judgment motion on those issues.[5] The trial court conducted a hearing and granted Augusta Mall’s motion, finding that Adams-Knowlden’s complaint included “allegations of negligence as to both Augusta Mall and AFS breaching their duties and causing her injuries.” The trial court concluded that the Security Agreement imposed on AFS “a duty to defend Augusta Mall to the extent of any alleged breaches of duty by AFS” and ordered AFS “to provide a defense to Augusta Mall and . . . Dalton. . . .” The trial court also ordered AFS “to indemnify Augusta Mall to the extent of any alleged or actual breaches of duty by AFS under Paragraph 8 (e)” and to “provide commercial general liability insurance coverage to Augusta Mall as an additional insured under Paragraph 8 (b).” This appeal follows. 1. First, AFS argues that the trial court’s order granting Augusta Mall’s summary judgment motion is an impermissible advisory opinion. “It is well settled that appellate courts will not consider new arguments in opposition to a motion for summary judgment raised for the first time on appeal.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Simmons v. Universal Protection Svcs., 349 Ga. App. 374, 381 (3) (825 SE2d 858) (2019). As this argument was not raised in the trial court, we do not consider it here. 2. In two related enumerations of error, AFS contends that the trial court’s order “relies upon unresolved facts still pending in this case.” The true substance of these enumerations appears to be that Adams-Knowlden’s complaint does not contain any factual allegations which implicate AFS’s work at Augusta Mall and, therefore, AFS has no duty to defend or indemnify Augusta Mall. In the same vein, AFS argues that the question of its own potential negligence has not been resolved in the trial court, such that any finding as to its duty to defend or indemnify, either now or at some point in the future, is premature. In part, we agree. Of course, our analysis begins with the Security Agreement. [T]he cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain the intention of the parties. If that intention is clear and it contravenes no rule of law and sufficient words are used to arrive at the intention, it shall be enforced irrespective of all technical or arbitrary rules of construction. Moreover, no construction is required or even permitted when the language employed by the parties in the contract is plain, unambiguous, and capable of only one reasonable interpretation. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Crown Series, LLC v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, 357 Ga. App. 523, 526-527 (1) (a) (851 SE2d 150) (2020). “Stated differently, if the terms of a contract are plain and unambiguous, the contractual terms alone determine the parties’ intent.” (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Id. at 527 (1) (a).[6] Here, Paragraph 3 (b) of the Security Agreement required AFS, in a section entitled “Security Functions,” to promote “crime prevention efforts through patrol of [Augusta Mall]” and to provide “ reasonable inspection of the [Augusta Mall] Property for safety hazards and enforcement of [Augusta Mall]‘s rules and regulations[.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Paragraph 8 (e) of the Security Agreement defines AFS’s duty to defend and to indemnify Augusta Mall. In particular, the Security Agreement states that “ [AFS] agrees that it shall defend, indemnify, and hold harmless [Augusta Mall] . . . from and against claims, liabilities, losses, damages, actions, causes of action, or suits to the extent caused by (A) any actual or alleged negligent or grossly negligent act or omission or willful misconduct of [AFS] or its agents or employees at the [Augusta Mall] Property or in connection with this Agreement or breach thereof in any way[.]” Finally, Adams-Knowlden’s complaint alleged that the defendants — which, of course, included AFS — failed “ to keep the premises of Augusta Mall . . . in a safe condition” and “failed to keep its premises safe by failing to provide adequate security and safety measures to protect patrons and employees . . . from being harmed by criminal activity at Augusta Mall.” (a) Duty to Defend. “Under Illinois law, an insurer has a duty to defend the insured if the underlying complaint alleges facts that fall within, or potentially within, the policy’s coverage.” Menard, Inc. v. Country Preferred Ins. Co., 992 NE2d 643, 648 (I) (Ill. Ct. App. 2013).[7] Accordingly, Illinois law provides that “[i]n determining an insurer’s duty to defend an insured in an underlying suit, [courts] compare the allegations in the underlying suit with the relevant policy language[,]” and courts “ liberally construe the underlying complaint and policy in the insured’s favor.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) General Cas. Co. of Wisconsin v. Burke Engineering Corp., 174 NE3d 561, 567 (Ill. Ct. App. 2020); see also Landmark American Ins. Co. v. Khan, 307 Ga. App. 609, 611 (1) (705 SE2d 707) (2011) (“An insurer’s duty to defend is determined by comparing the allegations of the complaint with the provisions of the policy.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). “The threshold to trigger the duty to defend is low,” General Cas. Co., 174 NE3d at 567, and, to that end, Illinois law is well established that where an underlying complaint alleges facts within or potentially within policy coverage, the insurer is obliged to defend its insured even if the allegations are groundless, false, or fraudulent. The insurer may not refuse to defend unless it is clear from the face of the underlying complaint that the allegations fail to state facts which bring the case within, or potentially within, the policy’s coverage. (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis omitted and supplied.) Bd. of Managers of Roseglen Condo. Assn. v. Harleysville Lake States Ins. Co., 2022 IL App. (1st) 210265, *P58, 2022 Ill. App. LEXIS 360 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022); compare JNJ Foundation Specialists v. D. R. Horton, Inc., 311 Ga. App. 269, 271 (1) (a) (717 SE2d 219) (2011) (“[A]n insurer can refuse to defend only when the allegations ‘unambiguously exclude coverage under the policy.’ If the facts as alleged in the complaint even arguably bring the occurrence within the policy’s coverage, the insurer has a duty to defend the action.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). Here, regardless of whether they will ultimately prevail, the allegations of Adams-Knowlden’s complaint against AFS, which was responsible for promoting “crime prevention efforts” among its many other duties, are sufficient to require AFS to defend Augusta Mall and Dalton pursuant to Paragraph 8 (e) of the Security Agreement.[8] This also comports with AFS’s responsibilities under the Security Agreement, which provides: It is intended that all . . . lawsuits in which any party to this Agreement or additional insured under this Agreement is named or described as a defendant which alleges or describes any claim in which [AFS] or a security officer has done or has failed to do any act or thing required pursuant to this Agreement or failed to provide the Services at the Property shall be a claim tendered to, accepted by or defended by [AFS]. Paragraph 8 (e). Therefore, we affirm that portion of the trial court’s order granting Augusta Mall’s motion for summary judgment.[9] (b) Duty to Indemnify. We reach a different conclusion with the trial court’s holding that AFS “has a duty to indemnify Augusta Mall to the extent of any alleged or actual breaches of duty by AFS under Paragraph 8 (e).” We again look first to Illinois law to resolve this issue. “The duty to defend is much broader than the duty to indemnify because the duty to defend is triggered if the complaint potentially falls within a policy’s coverage, whereas the duty to indemnify is triggered only when the resulting loss or damage actually comes within a policy’s coverage.” (Emphasis in original.) Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bible Pork, Inc., 42 NE3d 958, 963 (I) (Ill. Ct. App. 2015). In other words, the question of whether the insurer has a duty to indemnify the insured for a particular liability is only ripe for consideration if the insured has already incurred liability in the underlying claim against it. If so, the duty to indemnify arises if the insured’s activity and the resulting loss or damage actually fall within the . . . policy’s coverage. (Citations and emphasis omitted.) Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 NE2d 1204, 1221 (III) (B) (Ill. 1992); see also Stoneridge Dev. Co. v. Essex Ins. Co., 888 NE2d 633, 643-644 (II) (B) (Ill. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that “[a] duty to indemnify arises only if the insured has a judgment against it on any underlying claim” and the damage is covered by the policy at issue) (emphasis omitted and supplied).[10] In this case, there has been no finding of liability against AFS,[11] and whether AFS will prove successful in its defense against Adams-Knowlden’s claims is unknown to us.[12] Ultimately, there may be nothing for AFS to indemnify. See Outboard Marine, 607 NE2d at 1221 (III) (B); Stoneridge, 888 NE2d at 643-644 (II) (B). For that reason, we conclude that the trial court was premature in finding that AFS had a duty to indemnify Augusta Mall “to the extent of any alleged or actual breaches of duty by AFS under Paragraph 8 (e).” Therefore, we reverse that portion of the trial court’s order.[13] 3. Finally, AFS asserts that the trial court’s statement in its order granting Augusta Mall’s summary judgment motion — that “[AFS] has a duty to provide commercial general liability insurance coverage to Augusta Mall as an additional insured under Paragraph 8 (b)” — is “improper” because the “only evidence of record shows that required insurance coverage was provided.” AFS’s argument necessarily posits that only a certain limited form of insurance was required by the Security Agreement and that such insurance was provided — although, contrary to AFS’s argument, there is no such evidence in the record. At the outset, AFS cites no authority in support of this enumeration[14] and includes only a single citation to an “Additional Insured” endorsement to a commercial general liability insurance policy. The endorsement contains no identifying information and does not list any additional insureds, much less Augusta Mall or Dalton specifically. Paragraph 8 (b) of the Security Agreement requires AFS to provide a $5,000,000 commercial general liability policy that must “contain coverage for bodily injury, property damage, premises operations, completed operations, contractual liability and contingent liability naming [Augusta Mall] and such other entities as [Augusta Mall] shall reasonably require from time to time as additional insureds.” AFS may well have the sort of insurance it is contractually obligated to maintain. However, AFS has not cited to any evidence of record or to any statements in the pleadings demonstrating that this requirement has been satisfied, as it now suggests. Even assuming that the trial court’s statement is a discrete ruling that supported its summary judgment order,[15] “[a] party alleging error carries the burden of showing it affirmatively by the record, and when that burden is not met, the judgment is assumed to be correct and will be affirmed.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) McCalla Raymer, LLC v. Foxfire Acres, Inc., 356 Ga. App. 117, 124 (3) (846 SE2d 404) (2020). As a result, we affirm that portion of the trial court’s order granting Augusta Mall’s summary judgment motion. In sum, “even if [an] insurer may not ultimately be obligated to indemnify, if the allegations in a complaint state a cause of action that gives rise to the possibility of a recovery under the policy, the insurer’s duty to defend is called into play.” (Emphasis supplied.) West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sundance Homes, Inc., 606 NE2d 326, 327 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992). To that end, we conclude that the allegations of Adams-Knowlden’s complaint were sufficient to trigger AFS’s duty to defend Augusta Mall and Dalton. We further conclude that AFS has failed to show error in the record related to the trial court’s statement that AFS “has a duty to provide commercial general liability insurance coverage to Augusta Mall as an additional insured. . . .” We also conclude, however, that the trial court erred in finding that AFS has a duty to indemnify Augusta Mall, as the question of AFS’s liability has not been determined and this finding is premature under Illinois law. Therefore, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s order granting Augusta Mall and Dalton’s motions for summary judgment. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Miller, P. J., and Mercier, J., concur.
