McFadden, Presiding Judge. Eric Walker committed suicide while being held at the Hancock County jail. Cijii Lundy, as Walker’s surviving spouse and as administratrix of his estate (collectively, “Lundy”), filed a complaint asserting claims of negligence against Hancock County, Hancock County Sheriff’s Office, Sheriff Terrell Primus, Captain Pat Williams, Jail Administrator Steve Mayweather, Sergeant Marlin Primus, Deputy John Nelson, and Jail Officers Gregory Phillips, Joel Kemp, and Jacqueline Foster. Hancock County and the sheriff’s office moved for judgment on the pleadings based on sovereign immunity and the individual defendants moved for summary judgment based on, among other things, official immunity. After a hearing on the motions, at which Lundy conceded that the sheriff’s office was not a legal entity capable of being sued,[1] the trial court granted both motions in separate orders, finding that the claims against Hancock County were barred by sovereign immunity and that the claims against the individual defendants in their individual capacities were barred by official immunity. Lundy has filed two related appeals challenging the trial court’s rulings. In Case No. A23A0301, we affirm the grant of judgment on the pleadings because Hancock County’s sovereign immunity has not been waived. In Case No. A23A0423, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to jail officers Phillips and Kemp because there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether they negligently failed to perform the ministerial task of checking on Walker every 15 minutes. But we affirm the grant of summary judgment to the other individual defendants because Lundy has failed to point to evidence showing that they performed a discretionary act maliciously or a ministerial act negligently. Case No. A23A0301. 1. Standard for judgment on the pleadings. Lundy claims that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in ruling on the motion for judgment on the pleadings. But she has not identified any incorrect standard the court purportedly applied, nor has she cited evidence in the record supporting her claim or otherwise showing that the court applied the wrong standard. And contrary to her claim, a review of the trial court’s order reveals that the court cited OCGA § 9-11-12 (c), the code section governing motions for judgment on the pleadings, and stated that the motion was being considered under the standards detailed in Rolling Pin Kitchen Emporium v. Kaas, 241 Ga. App. 577 (527 SE2d 248) (1999). As that case correctly provides: In deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the issue is whether the undisputed facts appearing from the pleadings entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, all wellpleaded material allegations of the opposing party’s pleading are to be taken as true, and all allegations of the moving party which have been denied are taken as false. But this applies to factual allegations. The trial court need not adopt a party’s legal conclusions based on these facts. OCGA § 91112 (c). Id. at 578 (2) (citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted). Given that the trial court’s order references the correct standards and that Lundy has failed to point to any “affirmative evidence of an error, we will not rely on speculation. . . . Instead, we will rely on the presumption in favor of the regularity and legality of all proceedings in the trial court.” Nix v. State, 354 Ga. App. 47, 58 (8) (839 SE2d 687) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2. Matters outside the pleadings. Lundy enumerates that to the extent the trial court considered matters outside the pleadings and treated the motion as one for summary judgment, she was denied due process and an opportunity to be heard. But once again, she has failed to support her enumeration with any reference to the record and she has not identified any particular matter outside the pleadings that the trial court purportedly considered in ruling on the motion. Accordingly, “[t]his enumeration presents nothing for review[.]” Anderson v. Barrow County, 256 Ga. App. 160, 163 (2) (568 SE2d 68) (2002). See Court of Appeals Rule 25 (d) (1) (i) (“Each enumerated error shall be supported in the brief by specific reference to the record or transcript. In the absence of a specific reference, the Court will not search for and may not consider that enumeration.”). 3. Sovereign immunity. Lundy contends that the trial court erred in granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings because Hancock County waived its sovereign immunity. We disagree. “As provided in Georgia’s constitution, sovereign immunity extends to the counties, and a county’s sovereign immunity can only be waived by an Act of the General Assembly which specifically provides that sovereign immunity is thereby waived and the extent of such waiver.” McCobb v. Clayton County, 309 Ga. App. 217 (1) (a) (710 SE2d 207) (2011) (citations and punctuation omitted). “Whether a county has waived sovereign immunity is a threshold issue and not a mere defense to liability. A waiver of sovereign immunity must be established by the party seeking to benefit from that waiver, and when a litigant fails to bear this burden, the trial court must dismiss the complaint . . . for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction.” Ramos v. Owens, 366 Ga. App. 216, 217-218 (881 SE2d 464) (2022) (citations and punctuation omitted). Accord Fulton County School Dist. v. Jenkins, 347 Ga. App. 448, 450 (820 SE2d 75) (2018) (waiver of sovereign immunity must be established by the party seeking to benefit from such waiver). “Hence, the burden was on [Lundy] to show that [there has been a] waiver of [the] county’s sovereign immunity.” Marshall v. McIntosh County, 327 Ga. App. 416, 417 (1) (759 SE2d 269) (2014). (a) OCGA §§ 42-4-4 and 42-5-2 (medical aid to inmates). Lundy first argues that Hancock County’s sovereign immunity was waived by OCGA §§ 42-4-4 and 42-5-2, concerning the provision of medical aid to inmates. But “[t]he plain language of [those code sections] does not provide for a specific waiver of governmental immunity nor the extent of such a waiver, and therefore, no waiver can be implied or shown.” Ga. Dept. of Natural Resources v. Center for a Sustainable Coast, 294 Ga. 593, 603 (2) (755 SE2d 184) (2014). See Marshall, supra (“Sovereign immunity can only be waived pursuant to a legislative act which specifically provides that sovereign immunity is waived and describes the extent of such waiver.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Fulton County School Dist., supra at 450 (implied waivers of sovereign immunity are not favored). Indeed, this court has held that neither of the code sections cited by Lundy waives sovereign immunity. “While OCGA § 4252 (a) imposes upon the county the duty and cost of medical care for inmates in its custody, it does not waive sovereign immunity of the county or its agents or employees.” Graham v. Cobb County, 316 Ga. App. 738, 742 (1) (b) (i) (730 SE2d 439) (2012). Accord Gish v. Thomas, 302 Ga. App. 854, 862863 (4) (691 SE2d 900) (2010) (OCGA § 42-5-2 does not waive sovereign immunity). Likewise, while “OCGA § 4244 (a) (2) . . . places certain duties on a sheriff to provide an inmate with medical care, that statute also fails to include language waiving [sovereign] immunity[.]” Tattnall County v. Armstrong, 333 Ga. App. 46, 52 (1) (775 SE2d 573) (2015), overruled in part on other grounds, Rivera v. Washington, 298 Ga. 770, 778 n. 7 (784 SE2d 775) (2016). We note that Lundy’s reliance on MaconBibb County Hosp. Auth. v. Houston County, 207 Ga. App. 530, 532 (3) (428 SE2d 374) (1993) is misplaced since that case, unlike the instant case, involved a medical provider’s claims against a county for reimbursement of medical expenses. Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not err in concluding that Lundy failed to carry her burden of showing a waiver of sovereign immunity by relying on statutes which do not specify any such waiver or the extent thereof. See Ga. Dept. of Corrections v. James, 312 Ga. App. 190, 193-194 (1) (718 SE2d 55) (2011) (no waiver of sovereign immunity by OCGA § 42-2-5 and other code sections because they did not provide for a specific waiver of sovereign immunity or describe the extent of such waiver), overruled in part on other grounds, Rivera, supra. (b) Insurance. Lundy claims that Hancock County waived its sovereign immunity by purchasing liability insurance that covers the incident in this case. However, “the defense of sovereign immunity to tort liability cannot be waived by the mere purchase of insurance coverage.” Woodard v. Laurens County, 265 Ga. 404, 405 (1) (456 SE2d 581) (1995). Moreover, Lundy has cited no evidence of the purported insurance policy or anything else in the record from which we could determine its existence or a waiver of sovereign immunity. The only record citation Lundy makes is to the response she filed in the trial court to the defense motion for judgment on the pleadings. “To the extent that [Lundy] is attempting to incorporate by reference . . . additional arguments into [her] appellate brief, that practice is not approved by this [c]ourt, and we decline to look in the record for matters which should have been set forth in the brief.” R&G Investments & Holdings v. American Family Ins. Co., 337 Ga. App. 588, 591 (1) (787 SE2d 765) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Fleming v. Advanced Stores Co., 301 Ga. App. 734, 735 (688 SE2d 414) (2009) (“It is not the function of this [c]ourt to cull the record on behalf of a party in search of instances of error.”) (punctuation omitted); cf. Court of Appeals Rule 23(a) (“Parties may adopt, and are encouraged to adopt, all or a portion of another brief in the same case or from another case pending in this Court. The party adopting language from another brief shall specify precisely what portion of the other brief the party is adopting and list the case number, if different.”) (emphasis added). Accordingly, this claim provides no basis for finding reversible error. See Bomia v. Ben Hill County School Dist., 320 Ga. App. 423, 425 (1) (740 SE2d 185) (2013) (appellant cited no evidence in record showing the existence of alleged liability insurance policy and failed to demonstrate a waiver of sovereign immunity). 4. Federal claims. Lundy argues that the court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings because Hancock County does not have sovereign immunity against claims for federal constitutional violations. But as the trial court correctly found, Lundy’s complaint, which alleged negligence claims under state law, did not assert federal claims under 42 USC § 1983. A county is liable only when the county’s official policy causes a constitutional violation. . . . What is required to be proved, directly or circumstantially, is that a governing body has worked constitutional deprivation of a citizen pursuant to an impermissible or corrupt policy which is intentional and deliberate. In her complaint, [Lundy] does not allege [any constitutional deprivation or] that an officially promulgated policy or custom of [Hancock] County caused [any] injury. Accordingly, [she] has failed to allege conduct that would state a claim for liability under 42 USC § 1983[.] Conway v. Jones, 353 Ga. App. 110, 113 (3) (836 SE2d 538) (2019) (citations and punctuation omitted). 5. Remaining enumerations. Because of our holdings above, we need not address Lundy’s additional claims of error in this case. Case No. A23A0423. 6. Summary judgment standard. Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). In reviewing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, we view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to Lundy as the non-moving party. See In the Matter of Tapley, 308 Ga. 577 (842 SE2d 36) (2020). So viewed, the evidence shows that on July 31, 2020, Sergeant Marlon Primus and Deputy John Nelson responded to a 911 call of a public disturbance at a school, arrested Walker for disorderly conduct, and took him to the Hancock County jail. At the jail, Officers Phillips and Kemp placed Walker, who smelled of alcohol, into a cell to let him “detox” before completing his booking. The officers subsequently allowed Walker to make a telephone call to his mother, during which Walker made a comment about getting his death certificate ready because he was going to die in the jail that night. After the telephone call, Walker was returned to the holding cell and the officers finished booking another inmate into the jail. During two subsequent checks of Walker in his cell, Officers Phillips and Kemp found him sitting on the bunk bed with fabric wrapped around his neck and tied to a bedpost. On each occasion, the officers removed the fabric and other items from the cell, leaving Walker in the cell wearing his underwear, socks, and a wave cap. Approximately twenty minutes later, Officer Phillips checked on Walker again and found that he had hanged himself from the corner of the bunk using his wave cap. 7. Official immunity. As to tort claims against governmental officials and employees, the threshold question, rather than sovereign immunity, is official immunity. “Official immunity is applicable to government officials and employees sued in their individual capacities.” Stone v. Taylor, 233 Ga. App. 886, 888 (2) (506 SE2d 161) (1998) (citation and punctuation omitted). “[O]fficial . . . immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial rather than a mere defense to liability. The issue of a government employee’s official immunity must therefore be resolved as [a] threshold issue in a suit against the employee in his personal capacity.” Roberson v. McIntosh County School Dist., 326 Ga. App. 874, 876 (1) (755 SE2d 304) (2014). “Individual government employees are shielded by official immunity from damages suits unless the plaintiff can establish that the official negligently performed a ministerial act or performed a discretionary act with malice or an intent to injure.” Glass v. Gates, 311 Ga. App. 563, 574 (2) (716 SE2d 611) (2011). A ministerial act is commonly one that is simple, absolute, and definite, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and requiring merely the execution of a specific duty. A discretionary act, however, calls for the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment, which in turn entails examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on them in a way not specifically directed. Lowe v. Etheridge, 361 Ga. App. 182, 184 (1) (862 SE2d 158) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). 8. Jail Officers Phillips and Kemp. In granting summary judgment to Officers Phillips and Kemp, the trial court found that there was no evidence that either of them had acted with actual malice, so they were entitled to official immunity unless they had negligently performed a ministerial act. The court rejected Lundy’s contention that the officers had negligently failed to perform the ministerial duty of conducting a visual surveillance of Walker at least every 15 minutes. The court found that “[t]he requirement of checking the cell [of a suicidal inmate] not less than every 15 minutes (or continuously) would be a ministerial act.” But the court concluded that this ministerial duty had not been triggered because Walker’s booking process had not been completed. The trial court’s conclusion was incorrect. (a) Hancock County policies. The Hancock County Jail Operations Manual establishes “the official departmental policy to which all Jail division personnel shall conform in performance of their official duties[.]” Policy 2.5 in the manual, governing suicide prevention, states that the detention facility, as caretaker, has a special relationship with a detainee, that the jail has a legal burden to protect the “ safety and health of the detainee,” and that “[h]eightened security measures are necessary to ensure the detaineee’s suicidal ideation cannot be executed.” Subsection (E) of that policy, entitled “Levels of Supervision,” provides: 1. Close Observation is reserved for the detainee who is not actively suicidal, but expresses suicidal ideation and/or has a recent prior history of self-destructive behavior. This detainee should be observed by detention officers at staggered intervals not to exceed every 15 minutes.
