Dillard, Presiding Judge. In Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Henry County Board of Commissioners (Sons of Confederate Veterans II),[1] the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed in part and vacated in part this Court’s opinion in Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Newton County Board of Commissioners (Sons of Confederate Veterans I).[2] Accordingly, we vacate our former opinion and adopt the judgment of the Supreme Court as our own. But because the Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the portion of our opinion pertaining to Tiffany Humphries in Case No. A21A0735 by concluding she has standing to bring an action against the Newton County Board of Commissioners under OCGA § 50-3-1, we must now consider whether her action for injunctive relief is barred by sovereign immunity (an issue which the Supreme Court understandably did not address).[3] The underlying facts have been thoroughly discussed in both of the published opinions in this matter, but what is germane for purposes of this appeal is that Humphries is a resident of Newton County and filed a complaint for damages on July 13, 2020, against that county’s board of commissioners. Humphries sought to recover based on the Board’s violation of OCGA § 50-3-1 by holding a special meeting to vote on the removal of a Confederate monument located in Covington, Georgia. She sought to recover treble and exemplary damages, and requested injunctive relief to prevent the statue’s removal. In September 2020, the trial court concluded that Humphries lacked standing and, alternatively, that even if she had standing, her claims were barred by sovereign immunity. And so now, we return to and address the issue of whether Humphries’s claims are barred by sovereign immunity. She asserts they are not, but we disagree. This Court, of course, reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss “based on sovereign immunity de novo because it is a matter of law,”[4] but factual findings made by that court are “sustained if there is evidence to support them, and the party seeking the waiver of immunity has the burden of proof.”[5] Specifically, suits brought against the State which are barred by sovereign immunity are subject to OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1) dismissal for lacking subject-matter jurisdiction;[6] and like the State, counties are also protected by sovereign immunity.[7] Suffice it to say, sovereign immunity is a threshold determination because—like various other rules of jurisdiction and justiciability—it is “concerned with the extent to which a case properly may come before a court at all.”[8] Importantly, sovereign immunity may only be waived “by an act of the General Assembly specifically providing for waiver and delineating the extent of that waiver,” and implied waivers of sovereign immunity are “not favored.”[9] Of note, the Supreme Court of Georgia held in Georgia Department of Natural Resources v. Center for a Sustainable Coast, Inc.[10] that “sovereign immunity is a bar to injunctive relief at common law.”[11] But in November 2020, effective January 1, 2021, the Georgia Constitution was amended to waive sovereign immunity such that citizens may now seek declaratory relief and—after obtaining a favorable declaratory ruling—then seek injunctive relief to enforce the favorable judgment.[12] Even so, we are required to consider whether OCGA § 50-3-1 waived the county’s sovereign immunity such that the trial court improperly dismissed Humphries’s suit seeking injunctive relief months before this constitutional amendment became effective.[13] And as our Supreme Court has explained, “[u]nder Georgia law, a waiver of sovereign immunity occurs at the time that the cause of action arises.”[14] Here, Humphries argues the plain language of OCGA § 50-3-1 (b) demonstrates that sovereign immunity was waived as to appellees’ alleged violation of that statute because, under OCGA § 50-3-1 (b) (2), “[n]o officer or agency shall remove or conceal from display any [statutorily protected] monument for the purpose of preventing the visible display of the same.”[15] Additionally, under OCGA § 50-3-1 (b) (5), “any person, group, or legal entity shall have a right to bring a cause of action for any conduct prohibited by this Code section for damages as permitted by this Code section.” That portion of the statute further provides that “[s]uch action shall be brought in the superior court of the county in which the monument was located.”[16] These are the statutory provisions she claims amount to a waiver of sovereign immunity. Needless to say, when interpreting statutory language, we necessarily begin our analysis with “familiar and binding canons of construction.”[17] And in considering the meaning of a statute, our charge as an appellate court is to “presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.”[18] Toward that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning,[19] consider the text contextually,[20] read the text “in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would,”[21] and seek to “avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage.”[22] Simply put, when the language of a statute is “plain and susceptible of only one natural and reasonable construction, courts must construe the statute accordingly.”[23] Here, Humphries maintains the above-quoted portions of OCGA § 50-3-1 waive the county’s sovereign immunity from injunctive relief sought in actions brought under this Code section because any such suit must be filed in superior court, and superior courts (unlike state courts) are authorized to grant injunctive relief. But the plain language of the statute does not waive sovereign immunity for injunctive relief.[24] Indeed, nowhere do the words enjoin, injunction, or injunctive appear within the statute—in fact, in 2019, the General Assembly removed language explicitly permitting such relief.[25] And that is the proverbial nail in the interpretive coffin. Again, implied waivers of sovereign immunity are generally (and rightly) disfavored,[26] and the rules of statutory interpretation demand that we attach considerable significance to the General Assembly’s removal of language permitting injunctive relief under OCGA § 50-3-1 prior to the filing of Humphries’s action.[27] It strains credulity, then, to claim this statute encompasses an implied waiver of sovereign immunity for injunctive relief when the General Assembly deliberately removed language explicitly permitting injunctive relief under that statute[28]—a fact our Supreme Court has at least implicitly acknowledged.[29] Indeed, this legislative choice can only be understood as eliminating any suggested waiver of sovereign immunity for injunctive relief, and that choice must be honored by the judicial branch.[30] Finally, as our Supreme Court has explained, “sovereign immunity is waived only to the extent of the statute, which extends no further than the remedies specifically authorized by the Act.”[31] And here, the statute does not include injunctive relief as a remedy.[32] As a result, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Humphries’s action seeking injunctive relief on the ground that it is barred by sovereign immunity.[33] Judgment affirmed. Mercier and Land, JJ., concur. Dillard, P.J., and Mercier, J., concur dubitante. Dillard, Presiding Judge, concurring dubitante.[34]1 Old habits die hard, and so do deeply entrenched notions of justiciability. Shortly after the Supreme Court of the United States articulated and refined the modern Article III standing doctrine in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,[35]2 this formulation of standing became a core component of my judicial philosophy. Lujan standing is appropriately animated by separation-of-powers concerns[36]3 and helps ensure the judiciary concerns itself with actual cases and controversies, rather than academic questions, advisory opinions, or purely political disputes.[37]4 And until recently, this state’s constitutional standing doctrine largely mirrored that of Lujan and its progeny.[38]5 But all of that changed with the Supreme Court of Georgia’s opinion in Sons of Confederate Veterans II,[39]6 and I have serious concerns about the implications of this seminal decision. So, what is standing and why does it matter? Standing is one of several doctrines of justiciability—including ripeness, mootness, and political questions—which are crucial limitations on the judicial power (be it state or federal).[40]7 As one prominent legal scholar has explained, “jusiticiability doctrines determine which matters . . . courts can hear and decide and which must be dismissed.”[41]8 Importantly, these justiciability doctrines “are closely tied to separation of powers,” and they “limit the power of the judiciary . . . and define the judicial role . . . .”[42]9 And as to standing, it is the “determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to bring a particular matter to a . . . court for adjudication.”1[43]0 Put another way, the question of standing is “whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.”1[44]1 Importantly, much like the Supreme Court of the United States, the Supreme Court of Georgia has interpreted the Judicial Power Paragraph of the Georgia Constitution to include a standing requirement of litigants.1[45]2 And rightly so. This brings us to the Supreme Court of Georgia’s opinion in Sons of Confederate Veterans II,1[46]3 which vacated in part our decision in Sons of Confederate Veterans I.1[47]4 It is a well-written, thoughtful, and scholarly opinion. That said, I am not so sure our Supreme Court’s considerable expansion of this state’s standing doctrine is necessarily required by the text, structure, and history of the Georgia Constitution;1[48]5 but I am also not sure that it is wrong.1[49]6 This case is about the fundamental and limited—albeit unquestionably important—nature of the judicial power.1[50]7 As most of us know from our middle-school civics class, the judiciary does not provide advisory opinions1[51]8 and it is not designed to answer overarching policy questions.1[52]9 Indeed, as the Supreme Court of Georgia has rightly recognized, “[c]ourts are not vehicles for engaging in merely academic debates or deciding purely theoretical questions.”2[53]0 But I fear we are treading into similar territory with Sons of Confederate Veterans II. Even so, if the Supreme Court of Georgia is correct that the relevant text, structure, and history of the Georgia Constitution are such that a community stakeholder has constitutional standing to file a lawsuit challenging a governmental decision even when he or she has not suffered an individualized injury, then that is the end of the matter. The only remedy for a deeply flawed but interpretively required standing doctrine is to amend our Constitution, not to pretend it does not exist. But again, I have serious doubts as to whether our Supreme Court is correct that such an interpretation is actually required. I will start with the relevant constitutional text. Article VI of the Georgia Constitution provides “[t]he judicial power of the state shall be vested exclusively in the following classes of courts: magistrate courts, probate courts, juvenile courts, state courts, superior courts, statewide business court, Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court . . . .”2[54]1 And as the Supreme Court of Georgia aptly notes, this text does differ from the language of Article III of the United States Constitution, in that it does not explicitly refer to “cases” and “controversies.”2[55]2 But respectfully, this seems to me to be a textual distinction without much of a difference. After all, “cases and controversies” are what courts are designed to handle. This concept is not unique to Georgia; it goes to the very heart of the American judicial power.2[56]3 And to its credit, our Supreme Court makes exactly this point in Sons of Confederate Veterans II: From the earliest days of this Court we have understood the power of courts—the judicial power—to be limited to cases involving actual controversies, which requires a showing of some injury. Our case law has been essentially consistent in reflecting this understanding, all of which informs the meaning of the Judicial Power Paragraph when it was readopted in the 1983 Constitution. Because the Judicial Power Paragraph vests the “judicial power” in state courts, and the nature of judicial power has long been understood as limited to resolving those controversies in which there is a cognizable injury, the requirement that plaintiffs have a cognizable injury in order to invoke the power of the courts is a standing requirement arising from the Georgia Constitution’s Judicial Power Paragraph.2[57]4 On this much, the Supreme Court of Georgia and I are in complete agreement. Our Supreme Court is also right that—in order to invoke a Georgia court’s “judicial power”—a plaintiff must “have a cognizable injury that can be redressed by a judicial decision.”2[58]5 I also agree courts should only “say what the law is” as is “needed to resolve an actual controversy.”2[59]6 But the devil is in the details: What constitutes an injury for purposes of standing under the Georgia Constitution? The Sons of Confederate Veterans II Court answered this question directly, concluding that—under the Georgia Constitution—an injury “need not always be individualized; sometimes it can be a generalized grievance shared by community members, especially other residents, taxpayers, voters, or citizens.”2[60]7 And to its credit, the Supreme Court of Georgia marshals a considerable amount of precedent in Sons of Confederate Veterans II to support this proposition. But our Supreme Court’s opinion leaves certain important questions unanswered; so—for now—consider me dubitante. Here is my main concern. In Sons of Confederate Veterans II, the Supreme Court of Georgia asserts that “[t]he Judicial Power Paragraph has been carried forward without material change from its initial appearance in the 1798 Constitution to the current Constitution of 1983.”2[61]8 And while it is certainly true the current version of the Judicial Power Paragraph looks a good bit like the 1798 version of that paragraph, the 1983 version added an important adverb to the text which further defined the nature and scope of the judicial power in this state—”exclusively.” This is unquestionably a material change to the plain (and possibly) original meaning of the Judicial Power Paragraph of the Georgia Constitution, and I think it is difficult to suggest otherwise. What is up for serious debate is the extent of this substantive change to the meaning of that important constitutional paragraph. Let us begin with the ordinary signification of “exclusively.” The Oxford English Dictionary—the authoritative source on the meaning of the English language—defines “exclusively” as, inter alia, “[t]o the exclusion of, without the participation of, the persons or things designated . . . [s]o as to exclude all except some particular object, subject, etc.; solely.”2[62]9 So, what does the insertion of “exclusively” into the text of the Judicial Power Paragraph mean in how we are to understand the nature of the judicial power in Georgia? Simple logic dictates it means at least three things (and possibly more): (1) to the extent the executive or legislative branches of Georgia’s government previously exercised any type of judicial power or acted in a way that directly or indirectly diminished the judicial power, they are no longer authorized to do so; (2) the fundamental nature of the judicial power (as exercised by the courts outlined in the Georgia Constitution’s Judicial Power Paragraph) has been dramatically strengthened because of this new exclusivity—as that power now resides solely with the state judiciary; and (3) the exclusivity of this judicial power unquestionably has separation-of-powers implications. What then is the net result of this strengthened, exclusive judicial power? I am not entirely sure. What I do know is that I cannot quibble with our Supreme Court’s conclusion in Sons of Confederate Veterans II that the Judicial Power Paragraph “does not purport to define what is meant by ‘[t]he judicial power,’” and “there is no explicit limitation on its scope (unlike its federal counterpart).”3[63]0 But the question remains: Is there something about the fundamental nature of the judicial power that inherently contains such a limitation?3[64]1 I think there just might be for the reasons I have already articulated. In my view, the narrow standing doctrine pronounced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Lujan and its progeny is far more consistent with the fundamental nature of the judicial power than the far more expansive standing doctrine embraced by our Supreme Court in Sons of Confederate Veterans II, and serves to insulate courts from being unnecessarily transformed into forums for settling hotly contested political disputes that are more appropriately resolved in the legislative or electoral arenas. And in the absence of irrefutable evidence that the pre-1983 caselaw relied upon by the Supreme Court in Sons of Confederate Veterans II is carried over to the 1983 version of the Judicial Power Paragraph (notwithstanding the material change noted above),3[65]2 I would stay the course with Lujan and its progeny.3[66]3 But because I am duty bound to follow our Supreme Court’s precedents,3[67]4 I concur dubitante. I am authorized to state Judge Mercier joins this concurrence.
