Warren, Justice. In October 2015, Norris Owens was convicted of felony murder based on possession of a firearm by a first-offender probationer and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Randolph Williamson. On appeal, Owens argues that the trial court erred by not merging the count for felony murder based on unlawful possession of a firearm by a first-offender probationer into the voluntary manslaughter verdict. Seeing no error, we affirm.[1] As relevant to Owens’s enumeration on appeal, the evidence presented at trial showed the following. On October 18, 2015, Owens, a first-offender probationer, was socializing with friends in the parking lot of an apartment complex. Tucked into Owens’s waistband was a loaded 9mm handgun he had acquired two weeks earlier. Williamson drove into the parking lot and got out of the car in front of Owens with his hands in his pants. In front of several onlookers, Williamson challenged Owens to a fistfight and pulled his hand out of his pants. Owens pulled out his gun and shot Williamson twice, once in the head and once in the chest, killing him. As noted in footnote 1 above, Owens was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser offense of malice murder, but that verdict was vacated by operation of law because the trial court sentenced Owens for felony murder based on possession of a firearm by a first-offender probationer. Owens contends that this was error, and that the trial court should have instead merged the felony murder verdict into the voluntary manslaughter verdict and sentenced him for voluntary manslaughter. Owens’s contention fails. In Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865 (414 SE2d 463) (1992), this Court adopted a “modified” merger rule that “precludes a felony murder conviction only where it would prevent an otherwise warranted verdict of voluntary manslaughter.” Id. at 867. We explained: [I]f there is but one assault and that assault could form the basis of either felony murder or voluntary manslaughter, a verdict of felony murder may not be returned if the jury finds that the assault is mitigated by provocation and passion. To hold otherwise would eliminate voluntary manslaughter as a separate form of homicide since, in that event, every voluntary manslaughter would also be a felony murder. Id. at 866. We have extended the modified merger rule to situations in which “the felony murder is premised on another underlying felony that is equally integral to the homicide and susceptible of mitigation by the sort of provocation and passion that voluntary manslaughter involves.” See Griggs v. State, 304 Ga. 806, 808 (822 SE2d 246) (2018) (noting that this Court has extended the modified merger rule in past cases, but declining to extend Edge in that case) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also, e.g., Sanders v. State, 281 Ga. 36 (2006) (extending Edge to aggravated battery and arson). But we have explained that the modified merger rule does not apply “‘if the underlying felony is independent of the killing itself.’” Griggs, 304 Ga. at 808 (citing Edge, 261 Ga. at 867 n.3). Thus, this Court “repeatedly has declined to extend the modified merger rule of Edge to felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.” Id. See also Sims v. State, 265 Ga. 35, 36 (453 SE2d 33) (1995) (first deciding this question).[2] Owens acknowledges this precedent, but argues that we should nevertheless extend Edge to apply here, citing Ford v. State, 262 Ga. 602 (423 SE2d 255) (1992). But that would require us to overrule almost three decades of consistent precedent, and Owens does not offer a stare decisis argument that persuades us to do so. See Crayton v. State, 298 Ga. 792, 800-801 (784 SE2d 343) (2016) (declining to overrule this Court’s holdings “for the past two decades that the modified merger rule announced in Edge is inapplicable to felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon”). We thus affirm Owens’s conviction for felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a first-offender probationer. Judgement affirmed. All the Justices concur.
