Dillard, Presiding Judge. Rhonda White appeals a jury verdict in favor of Kelli Stanley[1] and Jason Cartee in her negligence action against them arising from an automobile accident. Specifically, White argues the trial court’s jury instruction on the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applicable in civil cases was an incorrect statement of law that requires a new trial of this case. For the following reasons, we affirm.[2] Viewed in the light most favorable to Stanley and Cartee,[3] the record shows that on May 4, 2017, on her drive home from taking her husband to work, White saw a bicyclist—later identified as Cartee—on the shoulder of the side of the road opposite hers. And right after that, Stanley was driving around a curve in the opposite direction of White when she saw Cartee in the road in front of her, which caused her to immediately slam on the brakes and swerve into oncoming traffic. As Stanley did so, she collided with one vehicle before crashing into White’s car. Two witnesses at the scene reported to law enforcement that the “bicyclist caused the accident[,] but he left the scene.” While all three drivers complained of injuries, only White was transported to the hospital. Once there, the doctor took x-rays to determine if she had any injuries, and he did not “find anything in particular that day.” But later, White sought treatment from a chiropractor, who determined she had issues with her neck and back; and White believed she had stiffness in those areas due to the “stress and the impact of the hit . . . .” Eventually, White filed a negligence action against Stanley and Cartee, alleging their actions either completely or partially caused the accident, which resulted in her injuries. The case then proceeded to trial, after which the jury entered a verdict in favor of Stanley and Cartee. This appeal by White follows. White argues the trial court’s jury instruction regarding the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard was inaccurate and misleading; and as a result, she asks us to direct the trial court to grant her a new trial. And although we agree with White that the challenged instruction was erroneous, she is, nevertheless, not entitled to a new trial on this ground. We review de novo an allegedly erroneous jury instruction, which is “a legal question.”[4] And in assessing the assertion of an erroneous jury instruction, the instruction “must be evaluated in the context of the trial court’s jury instructions as a whole.”[5] Indeed, the only requirement regarding jury charges is that they were, as given, “correct statements of the law and, as a whole, would not mislead a jury of ordinary intelligence.”[6] Additionally, and importantly, an erroneous charge “does not warrant a reversal unless it was harmful and, in determining harm, the entirety of the jury instructions must be considered.”[7] That said, we have held that “erroneous charges are presumed to be prejudicial and harmful, but this is not conclusive because the presumption of harm which arises from a charging error may be overcome by a review of the record as a whole.”[8]. 1. White contends the trial court’s jury instruction regarding the challenged preponderance-of-the-evidence standard was erroneous and misleading. In civil cases, a plaintiff must “prove liability (i.e., duty, negligence, proximate cause) by a preponderance of the evidence”[9]—i.e., evidence showing that “something is more likely true than not.”[10] And here, over White’s objection, the trial court gave an instruction almost identical to Georgia’s suggested pattern jury instruction on the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applicable in civil cases: The plaintiff has the burden of proof, which means the plaintiff must prove whatever it takes to make his case, except for any admissions in the pleadings by the defendant. The plaintiff must prove his case by what is known as preponderance of the evidence; that is, evidence upon the issues involved, while not enough to wholly free the mind from a reasonable doubt, is yet sufficient to incline a reasonable and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.[11] Relevant here, about 12 years ago, the General Assembly adopted our current evidence code, which applies in cases tried on or after January 1, 2013.[12] And under our prior evidence code (which is inapplicable in this case), “‘preponderance of the evidence’ [was] statutorily defined [under former OCGA § 24-1-1 (5)] as that superior weight of evidence upon the issues involved, which, while not enough to free the mind wholly from a reasonable doubt, is yet sufficient to incline a reasonable and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than to the other.”[13] But when the current evidence code became effective in 2013, it no longer included a statutory definition of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.[14] Needless to say, we must assume the General Assembly’s decision to repeal the former evidence code’s statutory definition of preponderance of the evidence was a matter of considered choice.[15] Importantly, in the preamble to the legislative act adopting the current evidence code, the General Assembly explained that in doing it sought “to revise, modernize, and reenact the general laws of this state relating to evidence while adopting, in large measure, the Federal Rules of Evidence.”[16] Indeed, the Supreme Court of Georgia has explained that “[m]any provisions of the new [e]vidence [c]ode were borrowed from the Federal Rules of Evidence, and when we consider the meaning of these provisions, we look to decisions of the federal appellate courts construing and applying the Federal Rules, especially the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit.”[17] And because our General Assembly’s codified intent in enacting the current evidence code was to, for the most part, model it after the Federal Rules of Evidence (which do not provide a definition of preponderance of the evidence), we agree with White that we must look to federal caselaw in determining Georgia’s legal definition of this evidentiary standard. In this regard, many federal courts—including the Supreme Court of the United States and the Eleventh Circuit—have explained that “[t]he burden of showing something by a ‘preponderance of the evidence’ . . . simply requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence . . . .”[18] And after our prior evidence code’s statutory definition of preponderance of the evidence was repealed, the Supreme Court of Georgia provided a similar, straightforward, and brief definition of this evidentiary standard, holding that “[p]roof by a preponderance simply requires that the evidence show that something is more likely true than not.”[19] With these guiding principles and statutory backdrop in mind, we turn to White’s claim of error. White objects to the entire jury instruction at issue; and in doing so, primarily focuses on the trial court’s reference to the reasonable-doubt burden of proof applicable in criminal cases and its somewhat vague statement that the plaintiff “must do whatever it takes to make his case.” According to White, the court’s instruction on her burden of proof suggested to the jury that a much higher burden than the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applied. We agree. Applying the definition of preponderance of the evidence provided by the Supreme Court of the United States (as well as the Supreme Court of Georgia’s similar definition in White), we conclude the trial court’s jury instruction was improper even though it tracked the language of former OCGA § 24-1-1 (5) and Georgia’s current suggested pattern jury instruction. Significantly, the definitions of preponderance of the evidence provided by federal courts, as well as our Supreme Court, make no mention of the inapplicable and much higher reasonable-doubt burden of proof.[20] And at least one federal circuit’s jury instruction on the burden of proof applicable to civil cases expressly (and helpfully) explains the difference between the civil and criminal burdens of proof, emphasizing that the familiar criminal reasonable-doubt standard does not apply in civil cases.[21] In stark contrast, the trial court’s instruction drew the jury’s attention to the reasonable-doubt standard without explaining the important differences between the civil and criminal standards of proof or making clear that the higher burden applied in criminal cases did not apply in this particular civil case.[22] Indeed, the trial court’s lengthy explanation of the burden of proof applicable in civil cases bears almost no relation to the simple and straightforward definition of preponderance of the evidence provided by federal courts and our Supreme Court. Regardless, even if the trial court’s instruction on preponderance of the evidence could somehow be forgivingly construed as a correct statement of law, its reference to a much higher burden of proof and failure to expressly instruct the jury that it did not apply in this case posed a significant risk of confusing or misleading the jury as to the applicable (and much lower) burden of proof. Suffice it to say, a request to charge, “although it contains a correct abstract principle of law, is properly refused, where it may be misleading or confusing in its application to the facts of the particular case.”[23] Nevertheless, Stanley and Cartee contend the Supreme Court of Georgia approved of the language in former OCGA § 24-1-1 (5) because when it provided the simple and precise definition of preponderance of the evidence in White v. State[24] it cited Zwiren v. Thompson,[25] which was decided before our current evidence code was in effect. But in Zwiren, our Supreme Court did not substantively rule on whether the then-statutory definition of preponderance of the evidence was erroneous. Instead, the Zwiren Court merely referenced Georgia’s pattern jury instruction on preponderance of the evidence in the context of considering whether any error in a different jury instruction constituted reversible error.[26] Similarly, in White—which involved an appeal from the defendant’s sentence in a criminal case—our Supreme Court also did not interpret or rule upon the repealed language in former OCGA § 24-1-1 (5). Instead, the White Court merely explained that the State must prove “permanent incorrigibility” only by a preponderance of the evidence;[27] and in doing so, held that “[p]roof by a preponderance [of the evidence] simply requires that the evidence show that something is more likely true than not,” with a general citation to Zwiren but no substantive discussion of that case or the language in OCGA § 24-1-1 (5). Under the foregoing circumstances, we disagree with Stanley and Cartee’s contention that White’s general, passing citation to Zwiren—after providing its brief, easy-to-understand definition of preponderance of the evidence largely mirroring the definition given by federal courts—constituted a substantive ruling that the language contained in former OCGA § 24-1-1 (5) was still legally viable. Indeed, neither White nor Zwiren ruled upon that issue and the statute has since been repealed. In sum, given the unnecessary and confusing reference to the criminal (and much higher) reasonable-doubt standard of proof that bears no relation to the straightforward definitions of preponderance of the evidence provided by our Supreme Court and federal courts,[28] we agree with White that the trial court’s instruction on preponderance-of-the-evidence standard was erroneous. 2. Next, White claims the trial court’s erroneous jury charge on her burden of proof warrants a new trial. On this point, we disagree. In Georgia, to show reversible error, there “must be harm as well as error.”[29] And relevant here, the mere fact that an accident happened and the plaintiff may have sustained injuries or damages “affords no basis for recovery against a particular defendant unless the plaintiff carries the burden of proof and shows that such accident and damages were caused by specific acts of negligence on the part of that defendant.”[30] In other words, a plaintiff cannot rest on “generalized allegations, but must come forward with specific facts establishing negligence.”[31] Importantly, when asked about the accident at trial, White expressly testified under oath that neither Stanley nor Cartee “did anything wrong.” And given White’s own admission to the jury that neither defendant committed any specific negligent act, it is highly unlikely the trial court’s erroneous jury instruction on her burden of proof contributed to its verdict. As a result, she cannot establish that the erroneous instruction given by the trial court was harmful such that it constituted reversible error.[32] For all these reasons, we affirm the jury’s verdict in favor of Stanley and Cartee. Judgment affirmed. Rickman and Pipkin, JJ., concur.
