Markle, Judge. Donna Surratt appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing her personal injury complaint against the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) on the ground that she failed to show she exercised diligence in perfecting service after the statute of limitations had run. Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm. We review the trial court’s ruling that a plaintiff failed to act diligently to perfect service for abuse of discretion. UHS of Peachford v. Brady, 361 Ga. App. 290, 291-292 (864 SE2d 129) (2021); see also Swain v. Thompson, 281 Ga. 30, 32 (635 SE2d 779) (2006) (“the question of whether Swain exercised proper diligence . . . was one for the trial court’s discretion, which will not be disturbed absent abuse.”). So viewed, the record shows that Surratt filed her complaint against MARTA on November 10, 2021, one day before the statute of limitations expired. See OCGA § 9-3-33. Although she identified the registered agent by name and address in the complaint, she did not serve MARTA at that time, and in fact did not serve it over the next three months. On February 8, 2022, the trial court sua sponte issued an “order requiring service,” directing Surratt to perfect service within 30 days; otherwise, the court would dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. On March 2, 2022, within the court’s deadline, Surratt served MARTA. Thereafter, MARTA filed a special appearance answer and motion to dismiss on the ground that the statute of limitations had run since the filing of the complaint, and Surratt had not acted diligently to perfect service. The trial court ultimately agreed, and dismissed the complaint, noting that Surratt had offered no explanation or any evidence to show her diligence in perfecting service during the nearly four-month period after she filed her complaint. Surratt now appeals. It is well-settled that [a]lthough a plaintiff must file [her] complaint within the applicable period of limitation, the law allows the same to be served beyond that applicable period. If the timely filing of the pleading is followed by timely service perfected as authorized by law, the subsequent service will relate back to the initial filing even though the statute of limitation has run in the interim. . . . [But] the relation back of the service to the date of filing is dependent upon the diligence exercised by the plaintiff in perfecting service. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Van Omen v. Lopresti, 357 Ga. App. 9, 10-11 (2) (849 SE2d 758) (2020); see also McFadden v. Brigham, 358 Ga. App. 400, 402 (855 SE2d 409) (2021). The burden was on Surratt to show that she acted diligently.[1] UHS of Peachford, 361 Ga. App. at 291. And, when a trial court evaluates a plaintiff’s diligence, it considers all the facts. See id. at 292 (“Peachford Hospital’s identity and address for service were no mystery to Brady[.]“); Parker v. Silviano, 284 Ga. App. 278, 279 (1) (643 SE2d 819) (2007). Here, the record reflects that Surratt made no attempts whatsoever to perfect service on a corporate defendant whose place of business and registered agent were readily discernable and easily located until she was directed to do so by the court.[2] And, as the trial court noted, by the time the trial court issued its dismissal order, four months had passed since the filing of the complaint. At no time has Surratt offered any explanation for the delay, nor has she shown any attempt to act diligently either before or after the trial court’s order to perfect service.[3] See Parker, 284 Ga. App. at 279280 (1) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing complaint where defendant was not served until 18 days after the filing of the complaint and 10 days after the statute of limitation expired, and plaintiff failed to account for the delay); Scott v. Taylor, 234 Ga. App. 543 (507 SE2d 798) (1998) (plaintiff failed to show diligence when he took no action to serve defendant for 32 days after statute of limitation expired). The record, therefore, supports the trial court’s conclusion that Surratt failed to act with diligence.[4] Accordingly, we must affirm the dismissal of her complaint.[5] UHS of Peachford, 361 Ga. App. at 291; see also Swain, 281 Ga. at 32 (2) (“the high regard in which appellate courts hold the exercise of discretion by trial courts dictate that we uphold the trial court’s determination that the failure to effect timely service of appropriate process in this case requires dismissal[.]“). Judgment affirmed. Brown, J., concurs. McFadden, P. J., dissents. In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A23A0935. Surratt v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority.
