Colvin, Justice. The lawsuit giving rise to this appeal challenges the Living Infants Fairness and Equality Act (“LIFE Act”),[1] which regulates abortion procedures in Georgia. Although Appellees claimed in the trial court that the LIFE Act violates the due-process, equal- protection, and inherent-rights provisions of the Georgia Constitution, see Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Pars. I, II, XXIX, those claims were not ruled on below and are not part of this appeal because the trial court concluded that Appellees were entitled to relief on a different ground. Specifically, the trial court concluded that certain provisions of the LIFE Act were void ab initio — that is, “[n]ull from the beginning”[2] — because, when the LIFE Act was enacted in 2019, those provisions violated the United States Constitution as interpreted by then-controlling-but-since-overruled decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Here, we are concerned only with that ruling, and we conclude that the trial court erred. The holdings of United States Supreme Court cases interpreting the United States Constitution that have since been overruled cannot establish that a law was unconstitutional when enacted and therefore cannot render a law void ab initio. Because the trial court reached the opposite conclusion, we reverse its ruling, and we remand the case to the trial court to consider in the first instance Appellees’ other challenges to the LIFE Act. 1. In 2019, the General Assembly passed, and the Governor signed, H.B. 481, also known as the LIFE Act. See Ga. L. 2019, p. 711, § 1. As relevant here, Section 4 of the LIFE Act amended OCGA § 16-12-141 to criminalize, with certain exceptions, abortion procedures “performed if an unborn child has been determined . . . to have a detectable human heartbeat”[3]; and Section 11 of the LIFE Act amended OCGA § 31-9B-3 to require a physician who performs an abortion after detecting a heartbeat to report to the Department of Public Health which exception to Section 4′s ban on abortions justified the procedure.[4] In 2019, many of the Appellees in the litigation now before us filed a challenge to the LIFE Act in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. See SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Justice Collective v. Kemp, 472 FSupp.3d 1297, 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2020). In 2020, in the course of that litigation, the federal district court concluded on summary judgment that the LIFE Act’s “pre-viability abortion ban . . . directly conflicted] with binding [United States] Supreme Court precedent,” including Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (93 SCt 705, 35 LE2d 147) (1973), and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (112 SCt 2791, 120 LE2d 674) (1992), which held that the United States Constitution protected a right to pre-viability abortion. SisterSong, 472 FSupp.3d at 1314 (II) (B) (2) (i). See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (VIII) (holding that a “right of privacy” under the United States Constitution “is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (I) (reaffirming “Roes essential holding” that a woman has a constitutional right “to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State”). Accordingly, the federal district court entered an order declaring portions of the LIFE Act unconstitutional and permanently enjoining enforcement of the Act “in its entirety.” SisterSong, 472 FSupp.3d at 1328 (III). In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 142 SCt 2228 (213 LE2d 545) (2022), however, the United States Supreme Court overruled Roe and Casey, holding that “the [United States] Constitution does not confer a right to abortion.” Dobbs, 142 SCt at 2279 (IV). Following Dobbs, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated the federal district court’s order enjoining enforcement of the LIFE Act and reversed the district court’s judgment. See SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Justice Collective v. Governor of Ga., 40 F4th 1320, 1328 (IV) (11th Cir. 2022). Appellees then filed a new lawsuit against the State of Georgia in the Superior Court of Fulton County, challenging certain provisions of the LIFE Act both as void ab initio, based on federal constitutional precedent in force at the time of the LIFE Act’s enactment, and as invalid under the due-process, equal-protection, and inherent-rights provisions of the Georgia Constitution. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Pars. I, II, XXIX. The State filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing in relevant part that the LIFE Act was “not void ab initio.” Appellees, in turn, filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, arguing in relevant part that Sections 4 and 11 of the LIFE Act were void ab initio because those provisions would have been deemed unconstitutional under Roe and Casey when the LIFE Act was enacted. On November 15, 2022, following a bench trial, the trial court issued an order declaring Sections 4 and 11 of the LIFE Act void ab initio and enjoining the State from enforcing those provisions.[5] The trial court reasoned that “controlling Georgia precedent” required it to assess the LIFE Act’s constitutionality based on “the legal environment that existed when H.B. 481 was enacted” — that is, based on Roe and its progeny, rather than based on Dobbs. It further reasoned that, because Section 4 of the LIFE Act banned post- heartbeat, pre-viability abortions, and because such a ban “was unequivocally unconstitutional” under Roe and its progeny, Section 4 of the LIFE Act “was void ab initio,” “did not become the law of Georgia when it was enacted,” and “is not the law of Georgia now.” Likewise, the court concluded that Section 11 of the LIFE Act was “void ab initio” because, under pre-Dobbs precedent, it “ was unconstitutional” to “require [ ] that medical providers somehow publicly justify their decision to comply with their patients’ wishes for a pre-viability procedure.” Accordingly, the court granted Appellees’ motion for partial judgment on the pleadings as to their constitutional challenges to Sections 4 and 11 and denied as moot the State’s motion to dismiss Appellees’ constitutional attacks on those provisions.[6] The State timely appealed from the trial court’s order. The State then filed an Emergency Petition for Supersedeas, seeking a stay of the trial court’s order pending appeal, which we granted. 2. On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in relying on overruled decisions of the United States Supreme Court (Roe and Casey) to conclude that portions of the LIFE Act violated the United States Constitution when enacted and were therefore void ab initio. We agree. To explain why, we begin where the trial court did — with the Georgia Constitution’s Judicial Review Clause and our void ab initio precedent. (a) The Georgia Constitution’s Judicial Review Clause provides that “[l]egislative acts in violation of this Constitution or the Constitution of the United States are void, and the judiciary shall so declare them.” Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 428 (III) (B) (801 SE2d 867) (2017) (quoting Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. V). As we have explained, when a version of this Clause first appeared in the Georgia Constitution, “its text would have been understood quite clearly to embody the familiar doctrine of judicial review.” Id. at 429 (III) (B) (citing Ga. Const. of 1861, Art. I, Sec. XVII). Thus, as relevant here, “[t]he Judicial Review Clause is . . . a constitutional recognition of the inherent authority of a court to resolve conflicts between the Constitution itself and the statutory law, when the resolution of such conflicts is essential to the decision of a case already properly before the court.” Id. at 432 (III) (B). When a conflict exists between the United States or Georgia Constitutions and a statute, and when such a conflict is presented to a court in a proper case, the Judicial Review Clause provides that “the judiciary shall . . . declare” the unconstitutional statute “void.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. V. As a corollary of the principle that an unconstitutional statute is void, we have clarified that a statute is void if it violates either the Constitution that governed when the statute was enacted or another Constitution or constitutional amendment ratified after the statute’s enactment date. See Bldg. Auth. of Fulton County v. State of Ga., 253 Ga. 242, 243 (321 SE2d 97) (1984) (“The constitutionality of a law is to be determined by the constitution in effect on the date the law became effective and by the constitution now in effect,” where there has been a change to the relevant constitutional text between the statute’s enactment date and the constitutional challenge to the statute.). In cases where a statute violated the Constitution in effect on “the date of its passage,” we have sometimes referred to the statute as void ab initio. Jones v. McCaskill, 112 Ga. 453, 455-456 (37 SE 724) (1900) (referring to such a law as “ab initio absolutely void”), overruled on other grounds by Bldg. Auth., 253 Ga. 242.[7] See also, e.g., Lawrence v. Lawrence, 254 Ga. 692, 693 (2) (333 SE2d 610) (1985) (referring to such a law as “void ab initio”); Strickland v. Newton County, 244 Ga. 54, 55 (1) (258 SE2d 132) (1979) (“The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute is wholly void and of no force and effect from the date it was enacted.”); Jamison v. City of Atlanta, 225 Ga. 51, 51 (1) (165 SE2d 647) (1969) (holding that a statute was “void when passed” because it violated the Georgia Constitution in effect when the statute was passed). (b) Relying on the Judicial Review Clause and our void ab initio precedent, the trial court concluded that portions of the LIFE Act were void when enacted in 2019 because they “were plainly unconstitutional [under the United States Constitution] when drafted, voted upon, and enacted.” According to the trial court, this was true even though the LIFE Act would comply with the United States Constitution if enacted today and the same United States Constitution governs today as governed when the LIFE Act was enacted.[8] This incorrect conclusion rests on a faulty premise — that, in Dobbs, the United States Supreme Court changed not only its interpretation of the United States Constitution but also the meaning of the Constitution itself.[9] This could be true, however, only if (1) the United States Supreme Court, as opposed to the United States Constitution, is the source of the Constitution’s meaning or (2) the United States Supreme Court has the power not only to interpret the Constitution but also to amend it. As explained below, both of these propositions conflict with well-established, foundational principles of law that are essential to our system of government. First, although the United States Supreme Court has the ultimate authority to interpret the United States Constitution and to require other courts to apply its interpretation, see Nordahl v. State, 306 Ga. 15, 20 (1) (829 SE2d 99) (2019), the Court is not the source of the Constitution’s meaning. Rather, a written constitution itself has a meaning that is fixed upon ratification and cannot change absent a constitutional amendment. See Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 235 (2) (c) (i) (806 SE2d 505) (2017) (noting that it is a “fundamental principle that a constitutional provision means today what it meant at the time that it was enacted”); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (26 SCt 110, 50 LE 261) (1905) (noting that the United States Constitution’s “meaning does not alter,” and “[t]hat which it meant when adopted, it means now”), overruled on other grounds by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (105 SCt 1005, 83 LE2d 1016) (1985). Thus, when a court engages in judicial review, the court does not supply the Constitution with a meaning the Constitution does not already have, but instead attempts to discern the meaning of the Constitution through interpretation so it can, among other things, “resolve conflicts between the Constitution itself and the statutory law.” Lathrop, 301 Ga. at 432 (III) (B) (emphasis supplied). This is true whether a court of last resort is interpreting constitutional text for the first time or instead revisiting its prior interpretation of that text.[10] Indeed, judicial review is a legitimate, rather than an arbitrary, exercise of judicial power only because “a written constitution” has a meaning of its own “established” not by the courts but by “the people” who ratified it, which courts must then “interpret” and “apply . . . to particular cases.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176-177 (2 LE 60) (1803). See also State v. SASS Group, LLC, 315 Ga. 893, 898 (II) (a) n.7 (885 SE2d 761) (2023) (noting that constitutional interpretation is an “objective” inquiry into the “public” meaning of constitutional language, not a “subjective” inquiry into what constitutional language means to a select few); Olevik, 302 Ga. at 236 (2) (c) (i) (“A provision of the constitution is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the framers and the people at the time of its adoption.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). It is therefore well established that the United States Supreme Court is not the source of the United States Constitution’s meaning. Second, because “courts . . . are bound by” written constitutions, Marbury, 5 U.S. at 180 — not the other way around — the United States Supreme Court can no more amend the United States Constitution than this Court can amend the Georgia Constitution. See Barrow v. Raffensperger, 308 Ga. 660, 673 (3) (c) n.11 (842 SE2d 884) (2020) (noting “this Court has no legitimate authority to effectively amend our current Constitution by judicial opinion”); Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179, 216-217 (IV) (C) (ii) (824 SE2d 265) (2019) (noting that court decisions issued “after the adoption of [a provision in Georgia's 1877 Constitution] could not change [that provision's] original public meaning”); Lester v. United States, 921 F3d 1306, 1312-1313 (11th Cir. 2019) (W. Pryor, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc) (noting that there is a “difference between a change in judicial doctrine,” that is, a change in “judges’ understanding of the law,” and a “change in law,” which can only be accomplished by “a legislative act or constitutional amendment”). See also Letter from James Madison to N. P. Trist (Dec. 1831), in 9 The Writings of James Madison 471, 477 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (“There has been a fallacy . . . in confounding a question whether precedents could expound a Constitution, with a question whether they could alter a Constitution]. This distinction is too obvious to need elucidation. None will deny that precedents of a certain description fix the interpretation of a law. Yet who will pretend that they can repeal or alter a law?”). Cf. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries **69-70 (noting that, when a court overrules a prior interpretation of the law, the court “do[es] not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation”). Only ratification of a constitutional amendment or a new constitution can change the meaning of the United States or Georgia Constitutions. See U.S. Const., Art. V (describing the procedures required for amending the United States Constitution); Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. X (describing the procedures required for amending or replacing the Georgia Constitution). See also Camden County v. Sweatt, 315 Ga. 498, 506 (2) (b) n.16 (883 SE2d 827) (2023) (noting that, in order to change the Georgia Constitution’s meaning, the “only option was to propose a constitutional amendment”); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 226-227 (40 SCt 495, 64 LE 871) (1920) (“The framers of the Constitution realized that it might in the progress of time and the development of new conditions require changes, and they intended to provide an orderly manner in which these could be accomplished; to that end they adopted the Fifth Article. . . . It is not the function of courts or legislative bodies, national or state, to alter the method [of changing the Constitution] which the Constitution has fixed.”). Thus, the United States Supreme Court has no power to change the Constitution’s meaning through constitutional interpretation. In sum, then, the United States Constitution, not the United States Supreme Court, is the source of the Constitution’s meaning; the United States Supreme Court has no power to amend the Constitution through interpretation; and the text of the United States Constitution has not been amended since the LIFE Act was enacted. Thus, the United States Constitution means today what it meant when the LIFE Act was enacted in 2019, even if the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution has changed. As a result, the trial court erred in concluding that, even though the LIFE Act complies with the United States Constitution today, the LIFE Act violated the United States Constitution when the LIFE Act was enacted. And, as explained below, because it is settled under Georgia law that Georgia courts are bound to apply now-controlling United States Supreme Court precedent on the meaning of the United States Constitution, we conclude that the trial court erred in relying on since-overruled United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the United States Constitution when determining that the LIFE Act was void ab initio. (c) While “[i]t is the role of this Court, not the United States Supreme Court, . . . to construe the meaning of the Georgia Constitution,” Elliott, 305 Ga. at 202 (III) (B) (iv), the same cannot be said about the United States Constitution. “[I]t is a fundamental principle that this Court is bound by the Constitution of the United States as its provisions are construed and applied by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Nordahl, 306 Ga. at 20 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted). Thus, when the United States Supreme Court announces its interpretation of the United States Constitution, we are bound to apply that interpretation unless and until the decision is overruled. See, e.g., Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. McCall, 312 Ga. 422, 434 (2) (863 SE2d 81) (2021) (noting that, “[u]nless and until the United States Supreme Court overrules . . . [its] federal due process precedent[, that] precedent remains binding on this Court and lower federal courts”). And when the United States Supreme Court overrules its own precedent interpreting the United States Constitution, we are then obligated to apply the Court’s new interpretation of the Constitution’s meaning on matters of federal constitutional law. See, e.g., Young v. State, 312 Ga. 71, 87-88, 90-91 (25) (a), (c) (i) (860 SE2d 746) (2021) (disapproving our prior decisions that conflicted with the United States Supreme Court’s binding interpretation of the United States Constitution, where the Supreme Court had more recently held that the United States Constitution prohibited a state from imposing the death penalty on an intellectually disabled individual, overruling its prior decision that had reached the opposite conclusion); Sermons v. State, 262 Ga. 286, 287 (1) (417 SE2d 144) (1992) (noting that the United States Supreme Court had overruled in part its own prior decision interpreting the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and applying the United States Supreme Court’s most recent constitutional interpretation to the extent that it conflicted with overruled United States Supreme Court precedent). It is clear from these well-established principles of Georgia law that a Georgia court must look to Dobbs — not Roe — in determining whether the LIFE Act was void ab initio when enacted in 2019. In Dobbs, the United States Supreme Court overruled its earlier decision in Roe, declaring that “Roe was egregiously wrong from the start,” Dobbs, 142 SCt at 2242-2243, and Georgia courts are “not permit[ted] . . . to persist in an error of federal constitutional law” when that error is clear under controlling United States Supreme Court precedent, Lejeune v. McLaughlin, 296 Ga. 291, 297-298 (2) (766 SE2d 803) (2014) (emphasis in original) (holding that we could not adhere to our precedent interpreting the United States Constitution, even though our interpretation had been based on a decision of the United States Supreme Court, because a subsequent Supreme Court decision clarified that our precedent was “simply wrong”). Accordingly, the trial court erred in analyzing whether the LIFE Act was void ab initio under now-overruled Roe-era precedent that controlled before Dobbs issued, rather than under the now- controlling Dobbs decision. (d) Appellees and the dissenting opinion resist this conclusion. They argue that Georgia law, which requires courts to consider the constitutionality of a legislative act as of the time of its enactment, compels Georgia courts to determine whether a statute is void ab initio based on court precedent that was controlling when the statute was enacted — even when that precedent has since been overruled. But the authorities on which Appellees rely provide no support for this proposition. And the dissenting opinion fails to explain why Georgia courts have authority to ignore now-controlling United States Supreme Court precedent on a matter of federal constitutional interpretation. (i) First, Appellees point to the text of the Georgia Constitution’s Judicial Review Clause, which, as noted above, provides that “[l]egislative acts in violation of this Constitution or the Constitution of the United States are void, and the judiciary shall so declare them.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. V. Appellees assert that this provision requires a court to “look to court interpretations of the period when the law was adopted” to determine whether the statute violates the United States or Georgia Constitutions. (Punctuation omitted.) But Appellees have not shown that the text of this constitutional provision, which does not specify how the judiciary should determine a statute’s constitutionality, supports their position. Appellees argue only that the original version of this constitutional provision[11] was added to the Georgia Constitution “on the heels of’ our decision in Beall, where we remarked that judicial review operates as “a noble guard against legislative despotism” by “render[ing] vain and fruitless” legislative “transgression[s] of [constitutional] bounds.” Beall, 8 Ga. at 220 (citation and punctuation omitted). As explained above in subdivision 2 (a), the Judicial Review Clause plainly preserves the validity of judicial review. But expressly vesting the courts with the power of judicial review does not establish that judicial decisions interpreting the Constitution somehow supply or change the meaning of the Constitution itself. Nor does it give overruled judicial opinions binding effect after the date they were overruled.[12] (ii) Second, relying on language from Botts v. Southeastern Pipe-Line Co., 190 Ga. 689 (10 SE2d 375) (1940), and two cases quoting the same language from Botts, Appellees argue that a court must assess the constitutionality of a statute based on “the existing condition of the law,” including “decisions of the courts.” Botts, 190 Ga. at 700-701. This language, however, appears in the context of describing a canon of construction used to determine what a statute means, not whether a statute complies with the United States or Georgia Constitutions. See id. (“All statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it. They are therefore to be construed in connection and in harmony with the existing law, and as a part of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence, and their meaning and effect is to be determined in connection, not only with the common law and the constitution, but also with reference to other statutes and the decisions of the courts.” (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied)); Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. City of Bremen, 227 Ga. 1, 9 (178 SE2d 868) (1970) (quoting Botts, 190 Ga. at 700-701); Retention Alternatives, Ltd. v. Hayward, 285 Ga. 437, 440 (2) (678 SE2d 877) (2009) (quoting Botts, 190 Ga. at 700-701). Because this appeal does not present any dispute about the substantive meaning of Sections 4 and 11 of the LIFE Act, these cases are inapplicable. (iii) Finally, Appellees argue that our decision in Adams v. Adams, 249 Ga. 477 (291 SE2d 518) (1982), requires a court to evaluate the constitutionality of a statute based on “court interpretations of th[e enactment] period.” Adams, 249 Ga. at 479 (1). Appellees’ reliance on this language from Adams, however, is misplaced. In Adams, we considered the constitutionality of the 1979 version of the year’s support statute, which gave a widow or widower a right to financial support from a decedent spouse’s estate. See Adams, 249 Ga. at 478 (1). The year’s support statute was first enacted in 1838, long before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in 1868, and, as Adams stated, the statute was “superseded by” a 1958 act. Id. at 479 (1).[13] In 1979, following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (99 SCt 1102, 59 LE2d 306) (1979), “which held the gender classification of the Alabama alimony law to be a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,” the General Assembly revised the year’s support statute again, this time to ensure that it did not include sex-based distinctions that would violate Orr’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Adams, 249 Ga. at 478 (1). “The superior court ruled that the year’s support law, prior to the 1979 amendment,” discriminated on the basis of sex and therefore “was unconstitutional based on the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Orr.” Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, the superior court concluded that the 1979 version of “the year’s support statute must be declared unconstitutional on the theory that an amendment cannot breathe life into a statute void ab initio.” Id. On appeal, we reversed the superior court’s ruling, holding “that the year’s support statute as amended [in 1979 was] not unconstitutional.” Adams, 249 Ga. at 479 (1). We explained that, [w]hile we have declared statutes to be void from their inception when they were contrary to the Constitution at the time of enactment, those decisions are not applicable to the present controversy, as the original year’s support statute, when adopted, was not violative of the Constitution under court interpretations of that period. The earlier year’s support laws were enacted before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1868, and similar acts have remained in force for more than a century before Orr. Id. (citations omitted). According to Appellees, Adams assessed the constitutionality of the “original” 1958 year’s support statute “based on what the U.S. Constitution meant as of 1958,” not “based on Orrs 1979 constitutional analysis,” and this Court held “that the 1958 statute was valid because it was consistent with ‘court interpretations of that period’ — even though the judiciary would later conclude that the Constitution prohibits such gendered classifications.” (Citation and emphasis omitted.) By analogy, Appellees contend that we must assess the constitutionality of the LIFE Act based on what the United States Constitution meant when the LIFE Act was enacted in 2019, not based on Dobbs s 2022 constitutional analysis, and we must hold that the LIFE Act was void because it was inconsistent with “court interpretations of that period,” namely, Roe-era precedents. There may be more than one plausible way to interpret Adams, but Appellees’ interpretation of the case is not one of them.[14] Appellees’ interpretation of the case is implausible for three reasons. First, as Appellees read Adams, the case represents a serious departure from the settled law described above in subdivisions 2 (b) and (c). Specifically, if Appellees’ interpretation of Adams were correct, this Court in Adams would have failed to appreciate that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution had a meaning even before it was interpreted; erroneously concluded that a judicial interpretation changed the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s text, even though that text had not changed; and disregarded controlling United States Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, Appellees’ heavy reliance on the phrase “court interpretations of t[he enactment] period” is inconsistent with the Adams decision as a whole. Adams, 249 Ga. at 479 (1). This is because, if “court interpretations of t[he enactment] period” had governed Adamss analysis, as Appellees contend, the fact that Orr did not issue until 1979 and no other court decisions called into question the statute’s constitutionality would have been dispositive in determining whether the 1958 statute was constitutional when enacted. Id. There would have been no reason for Adams to go on to emphasize in the next sentence that earlier versions of the statute existed “before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. The presence of that language clearly indicates that Adams did not view the absence of relevant constitutional precedent prior to Orr as dispositive in its analysis. Finally, Appellees’ interpretation of Adams cannot be squared with our body of void ab initio precedent. Specifically, the notion that Appellees advance — that Adams held that a statute’s constitutionality when passed must be evaluated based on then- controlling decisions interpreting a constitutional provision — is belied by our cases holding statutes void ab initio without engaging in any such analysis. See, e.g., Jamison, 225 Ga. at 51 (1); Jones, 112 Ga. at 454-455. Accordingly, Appellees’ reliance on Adams is misplaced.[15] (iv) Although the United States Supreme Court has clearly held that “the [United States] Constitution does not confer a right to abortion” and never did because “Roe was egregiously wrong from the start,” Dobbs, 142 SCt at 2242-2243, 2279 (IV), the dissenting opinion asserts that the trial court correctly relied on Roe and its progeny in concluding that the LIFE Act was void ab initio. See Dissent Op. at 14-16. But the dissenting opinion fails to adequately explain why Georgia law permitted, much less required, the trial court to apply now-overruled Roe-era precedent in making this determination. The dissenting opinion “freely concede[s] that, after the United States Supreme Court overrules its own precedent interpreting the United States Constitution, Georgia courts must follow the United States Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on that Constitution’s meaning.” Dissent Op. at 16. Yet, the dissenting opinion asserts that this interpretive rule, which it concedes is legally correct, does not apply when determining whether the LIFE Act was void ab initio. See Dissent Op. at 16-17. According to the dissenting opinion, this is because Georgia law contains a constitutional “doctrine” under which state courts must determine whether a statute was void ab initio based on “[b]inding decisional law” that existed when the statute was enacted, even when that decisional law has since been overruled. Dissent Op. at 7-9, 11-12 n.13, 15-17, 23-24. But, like Appellees, the dissenting opinion fails to cite any authority establishing the existence of such a doctrine.[16] At root, the dissenting opinion’s contention that the void ab initio analysis is controlled by binding decisional law existing when a statute was enacted suffers from the same problems discussed above. See Dissent Op. at 8-9. It disregards the fact that the same United States Constitution governs today as governed when the LIFE Act was enacted. See Dissent Op. at 8-9, 14-17. It treats Roe, rather than the text of the United States Constitution, as the source of the Constitution’s meaning. See Dissent Op. at 14-16. And it views Dobbs as changing the Constitution’s meaning, rather than as having interpreted that meaning. See Dissent Op. at 15-17. As explained above, however, the LIFE Act was enacted against the backdrop of the same United States Constitution that governs today. The United States Supreme Court does not supply meaning to, and has no power to change, the independent and fixed meaning of the United States Constitution. And we have no authority to defy now-controlling United States Supreme Court precedent interpreting the United States Constitution when determining whether the LIFE Act violated the Constitution at the time of its enactment. The dissenting opinion is wrong to suggest otherwise. 3. For the reasons explained above, the trial court erred in relying on overruled decisions of the United States Supreme Court to conclude that portions of the LIFE Act violated the United States Constitution when enacted in 2019. The same United States Constitution governs today as when the LIFE Act was enacted, and Georgia courts are required to look to the United States Supreme Court’s now-controlling interpretation of the United States Constitution when determining whether a statutory law violates that Constitution. Because Dobbs is controlling precedent on whether the United States Constitution confers a right to abortion, and because the parties and the trial court do not dispute that the LIFE Act complies with Dobbs, it follows that the LIFE Act did not violate the United States Constitution when enacted in 2019. Accordingly, the trial court erred in ruling that portions of the LIFE Act were void ab initio. We recognize, of course, that the timing of the litigation underlying this appeal and the United States Supreme Court’s decision to overrule its prior precedent combine to produce what at first glance might appear to be an unusual result. Because Roe and its progeny were controlling authority on the meaning of the United States Constitution when the LIFE Act was enacted, one reasonably could have expected at that time that the constitutionality of the LIFE Act would be evaluated under Roe-era precedent. Indeed, had a claim that the LIFE Act violated the United States Constitution reached this Court and been ruled on before Dobbs issued, we would have applied Roe and its progeny in assessing whether it was void ab initio. But we are not addressing a pre-Dobbs challenge to the LIFE Act. Because the United States Supreme Court clearly ruled in Dobbs that Roe and its progeny no longer control, we are not at liberty to apply Roe-era precedent in determining whether the LIFE Act was void ab initio. Rather, we must “faithfully apply” Dobbs, which is now the controlling “decision[ ] of the United States Supreme Court as to the meaning of [the United States Constitution].” Elliott, 305 Ga. at 187 (II) (C). See also Pearson v. State, 311 Ga. 26, 29 (2) n.5 (855 SE2d 606) (2021) (“Georgia courts have continued, as we are obliged to do on matters of federal constitutional law, to follow [a] holding of the United States Supreme Court . . . .”). Doing so “is not an act of judgment on our part” but rather a simple “act of obedience,” which is required of us by virtue of our position in the constitutional order. Elliott, 305 Ga. at 187 (II) (C). We therefore reverse the trial court’s determination that Sections 4 and 11 of the LIFE Act were void ab initio; reverse the trial court’s grant of Appellees’ motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and denial of the State’s motion to dismiss on that basis; and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Judgment reversed and case remanded. All the Justices concur, except Ellington, J., who dissents, Peterson, P. J., disqualified, and Pinson, J., not participating. Ellington, Justice, dissenting. 1. The trial court correctly granted in part the plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that Section 4 and Section 11 of the Living Infants Fairness and Equality Act, Ga. L. 2019, p. 711, Act No. 234 (HB 481) (“the 2019 Act”) were void on the date enacted and can never be enforced, despite the subsequent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. ___ (142 SCt 2228, 213 LE2d 545) (2022). I therefore dissent. The United States Constitution did not when ratified, and does not now, expressly provide for judicial review of the validity of statutory law. Rather, in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch) (2 LE 60) (1803), the Supreme Court of the United States famously found that such authority was necessarily implied in the authority of courts to render judgment in particular cases. The Georgia Constitution, on the other hand, since 1861 has expressly provided for judicial review of legislative acts as a fundamental principle of self-government.[17] Under this provision, Georgia courts have an affirmative duty to declare Georgia laws that violate the United States Constitution or our state Constitution void. See Aycock v. Martin, 37 Ga. 124, 127 (1867) (Because the Georgia Constitution provides that “legislative acts in violation of the Constitution are void, and the judiciary shall so declare them[,]” if the act at issue “ is in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the State of Georgia, or either of them, then this Court is bound so to declare, by its judgment, under the most solemn obligations that can be imposed; indeed, it has no discretion in the matter but to obey the stern mandate of the supreme law of the land.”); id. at 136 (“[I]f a legislative act oppugns a constitutional principle, the former must give way and be rejected on the score of repugnance. It is a position equally clear and sound, that in such cases it will be the duty of the Courts to adhere to the constitution, and to declare the act null and void.” (emphasis in original)).[18] This provision was altered slightly in the 1865 Constitution,[19] altered again in the 1868 Constitution (the first to expressly reference both the federal and state constitutions), and has remained unchanged in every successive constitution.[20] This provision appears to be unique among state constitutions.[21] Although the judicial declaration of unconstitutionality does not accomplish the legislative action of repealing any statute, a statute that is judicially declared to be unconstitutional is unenforceable.[22] Judicial review of the constitutionality of a legislative act occurs in the context of a particular case and controversy. See Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Henry County Bd. of Commrs, 315 Ga. 39, 49-53 (2) (b) (880 SE2d 168) (2022). Dating back to Georgia’s first constitution – even before judicial review was incorporated into our constitution – “the people, from whom all power originates, and for whose benefit all government is intended,”[23] have expressly limited the law-making authority that is delegated to our representatives in the state legislature. Specifically, the people of Georgia have prohibited the General Assembly from enacting unconstitutional laws. Our 1777 Constitution provided: “The House of Assembly shall have power to make such laws and regulations as may be conducive to the good order and well being of the state; provided such laws and regulations be not repugnant to the true intent and meaning of any rule or regulation contained in this constitution.” Ga. Const. of 1777, Art. VII. Our next constitution, in line with other changes to the organization of the government, provided: “The General Assembly shall have power to make all laws and ordinances, which they shall deem necessary and proper for the good of the state, which shall not be repugnant to this constitution.” Ga. Const. of 1789, Art. I, Par. XVI. This provision was carried forward in successive constitutions, with the requirement that Georgia laws not be repugnant to the United States Constitution being added in 1865 as part of Georgia’s return to the Union.[24] See Sears v. State, 232 Ga. 547, 554 (3) (208 SE2d 93) (1974) (The General Assembly “is absolutely unrestricted in its power to legislate, so long as it does not undertake to enact measures prohibited by the State or Federal Constitution. This power of the legislature is set forth in our Constitution[.]” (citations omitted)). Under well-settled Georgia law, a legislative act that is unconstitutional on the date it is enacted is void from its inception and forever afterward.[25] See Strickland v. Newton County, 244 Ga. 54, 55 (1) (258 SE2d 132) (1979) (“The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute is wholly void and of no force and effect from the date it was enacted.”). “The time with reference to which the constitutionality of an act is to be determined is the date of its passage by the enacting body; and if it is unconstitutional then, it is forever void.” Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 209 Ga. 613, 617 (2) (75 SE2d 161) (1953).[26] Binding decisional law informs any consideration of whether an act is constitutional when enacted.[27] A legislative enactment that is void ab initio, even though any statute it creates or amends may remain “on the books,” cannot spring to life because of any subsequent change in the law, even a constitutional amendment or revision. See Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 751 (5) (452 SE2d 476) (1994) (“A statute declared unconstitutional is deemed void from its inception and is not revived merely because the constitutional infirmity is subsequently eliminated.”); In the Interest of R. A. S., 249 Ga. 236, 237 (290 SE2d 34) (1982) (“[W]here a statute is held to be unconstitutional and void in part, a subsequent constitutional amendment cannot revive the void portion.”); see also Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. X (“No . . . retroactive law . . . shall be passed.”).[28] Nor can an unconstitutional act be corrected by amending the act. See City of Atlanta v. Gower, 216 Ga. 368, 372 (116 SE2d 738) (1960).[29] Under Georgia law, a void legislative act can be made effective only by re- enactment, or, more precisely, a statute created or amended by a legislative act that was void at its inception can become effective only by passage of a new legislative act that is not void. See Commrs. of Roads & Revenues of Fulton County v. Davis, 213 Ga. 792, 793 (102 SE2d 180) (1958); Grayson, 209 Ga. at 613; id. at 617 (2). Georgia’s void ab initio doctrine operates in harmony with the presumption that an act of the General Assembly is constitutional and with the rules of constitutional avoidance. A court may declare an act void ab initio only if resolution of a case turns on whether an act is unconstitutional and only when the unconstitutionality is very clear.[30] And members of the public are entitled to presume that legislative acts are constitutional unless and until there is a judicial determination to the contrary. Consequently, at this point in this litigation, the essential question is: When the 2019 Act was enacted, was the Act in violation of the Constitution of the United States?[31] As the trial court correctly held, Section 4 of the 2019 Act was void when passed because its ban on most abortions after embryonic cardiac activity can be detected, which the parties agree occurs at approximately six weeks after a woman’s last menstrual period,[32] would unduly interfere with a woman’s then-protected right under the United States Constitution to terminate a pregnancy before viability. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (93 SCt 705, 35 LE2d 147) (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (112 SCt 2791, 120 LE2d 674) (1992); Etkind v. Suarez, 271 Ga. 352, 354-355 (2) (519 SE2d 210) (1999) (recognizing the Casey Court’s reaffirmation of “the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State” and noting that “Georgia itself cannot unduly interfere with a woman’s constitutional right to obtain an abortion” (citation omitted)). Under clear, controlling precedent, the 2019 Act’s six- week abortion ban, when enacted, violated the United States Constitution. In short, the six-week abortion ban was void ab initio.[33] And, as the trial court found, Section 11′s requirement that medical providers report to the government the exception applicable to any abortion after the development of embryonic cardiac activity makes no sense without Section 4′s general ban of such abortions. Therefore, Section 11 falls along with Section 4. I freely concede that, after the United States Supreme Court overrules its own precedent interpreting the United States Constitution, Georgia courts must follow the United States Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on that Constitution’s meaning. But the General Assembly, under the Georgia Constitution, must also follow that Court’s most recent pronouncement on the United States Constitution’s meaning. Thus, after the Dobbs Court ended any protection under the United States Constitution of a right to terminate a pregnancy before viability, whatever restrictions on abortion that the General Assembly may see fit to pass will not be subject to review under pre-Dobbs federal precedent, provided that the legislative act was not void ab initio under Georgia’s constitutional limits on legislative power. Because the 2019 Act was moribund when enacted, however, the change in doctrine subsequently wrought by the Dobbs decision cannot resuscitate it. To answer the majority opinion’s challenge, see Slip Op. at 22 (2) (d); id. at 32-35 (2) (d) (iv), Georgia courts may not defy now-controlling United States Supreme Court precedent on a matter of federal constitutional interpretation, but, in deciding the specific question of whether a legislative act was void when enacted, Georgia courts may not ignore that the General Assembly defied then-controlling United States Supreme Court precedent on a matter of federal constitutional interpretation. The State tries to flip the script and argues that the void ab initio doctrine actually supports its position and requires that the trial court’s ruling be reversed. Dobbs is retroactive under federal law, the State argues, and therefore Dobbs “applies to events of 2019″ when the Act at issue was passed “just as much as it applies to events in 2022″ and beyond. The State argues that “[t]he basis of the void ab initio principle is that courts do not, by their decisions, amend the constitution or other governing law; they simply say what the law is, and therefore always has been.” This argument falls apart immediately. The Roe Court held that a right to personal privacy that is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether to terminate her pregnancy before viability is protected under the United States Constitution, limiting the authority of states in regulating abortions. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; id. at 16456 166. The Roe Court relied primarily on the Fourteenth Amendment and also relied in part on the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments and cases interpreting those provisions. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-153. Under the State’s argument, the Roe Court simply stated what the law under those constitutional provisions always has been. The Dobbs Court held that Roe was “egregiously wrong from the start”[34] and that the Fourteenth Amendment does not to any extent prohibit state regulation of abortion – how can this opposite holding too be “what the law always has been”? Plainly, the Dobbs decision did not mean that Roe had been written in magical disappearing ink. Otherwise, why would Justice Alito in the majority opinion in Dobbs, and Justice Kavanaugh in his concurring opinion, together state seven times that the Court, in accord with states’ requests, was “return[ing]” the issue to “ the people” and their “elected representatives” by allowing the states to regulate or prohibit pre-viability abortions?[35] In 1973, the Roe Court – rightly or wrongly – took the issue of pre-viability abortion regulation away from the states, and in 2022 the Dobbs Court, expressly acknowledging that history,[36] reversed course and returned the issue to the states. In the intervening 50 years, Roe and its progeny were controlling law and, under the 14th Amendment, bound the states to protect women’s constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy before viability. See Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 412 (30 SCt 287, 54 LE 536) (1910) (“Whenever [the Federal Constitution's] protection is invoked, the courts of the United States, both state and Federal, are bound to see that rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution are not violated by legislation of the state. One of the provisions of the 14th Amendment, thus binding upon every state of the Federal Union, prevents any state from denying to any person or persons within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. If [a state] statute, as it is interpreted and sought to be enforced in the state [,] . . . deprives the plaintiff of the equal protection of the laws, it cannot stand.”). The Dobbs Court did not (and could not) amend the United States Constitution, but it is sheer sophistry to maintain that it did not change that controlling law. The majority opinion embraces the premise that the meaning of a constitutional provision is “fixed upon ratification” and is “independent” of judicial construction.[37] As we saw with the Dobbs Court, this premise, when coupled with a weakened adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis, allows a court’s current majority to impose its view of the meaning of a constitutional provision, as if the slate has been entirely blank, not merely purporting to supersede precedent – decades of precedent in the case of Dobbs – but to erase it. Such unrestrained disregard of precedent undermines the stability of the law and public confidence in the impartiality of judicial review.[38] Regrettably, the premise that the Constitution has a meaning independent of judicial construction, together with the Dobbs Court’s conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment never protected a woman’s decision whether to terminate a pregnancy before viability, leads the majority in this case to allow the 2019 Act to shed the voidness that attached when it was enacted. See Slip Op. at 31-32 (2) (d) (iv). But Georgia’s void ab initio doctrine, our unique bulwark against legislative overreach, prevents subsequent judicial constructions from peeling away a legislative act’s voidness-from- inception. To legislate in the post-Dobbs legal landscape, the General Assembly must legislate post-Dobbs. The State side-steps the application of Georgia’s void ab initio doctrine to the 2019 Act – a Georgia law – arguing that, if the void ab initio doctrine applies in this case, then the Mississippi statute that the Supreme Court upheld in Dobbs would itself be void ab initio, because, “[a]fter all, when Mississippi passed the statute [at issue in Dobbs], it was allegedly unconstitutional (at least in part) under Roe and its progeny.”[39] The State does not even attempt to support its argument by showing that the authority of Mississippi’s legislature is restricted by a void ab initio doctrine anything like the constitutional limitations on the authority of Georgia’s General Assembly. The citizens of Georgia have every right to place greater limitations on the authority of its legislative body than the citizens of other states might judge desirable or necessary.[40] The State then raises the specter that Georgia’s void ab initio doctrine subjugates the legislative branch of government to the judicial branch, arguing: The superior court’s rule [in this case] would even deprive states of standing to appeal rulings that a statute is unconstitutional. Legislatures could never contest disputed court opinions by enacting new laws. Those laws would by definition be “void,” leaving a court no appellate remedy to grant, no actual controversy to decide, and no way to reconsider whether its prior judicial holdings were incorrect. States would lack any redress and thus would lack standing. This bleak warning is misguided and misleading. Affirming the trial court’s void ab initio ruling in this case would not mean that the General Assembly is barred from passing a law to test existing precedent. The General Assembly may pass any law for the welfare of the state that it believes is not inconsistent with the constitution of Georgia, and “not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States” – even if there is existing precedent to the contrary. The General Assembly can do so based on a good faith belief of the requisite number of its members that the existing precedent should be revisited and overruled. When such a law is challenged in the courts on the basis that it is unconstitutional, and the precedent under which the law is alleged to be unconstitutional is then reconsidered, then the General Assembly has successfully tested that precedent – whether the challenged precedent is affirmed or overruled. If the challenged precedent is affirmed, the law enacted to test the precedent is void. If, on the other hand, the precedent under which the new law was unconstitutional is overruled, the General Assembly is then free to enact a law with the same ends as the void-when-enacted law. The effect of Georgia’s unique void ab initio doctrine is simply that the void-when-enacted law does not take effect after the constitutional impediment is removed; instead, the law will take effect only if and when it is re-enacted. The very act before the Court now demonstrates that Georgia’s void ab initio doctrine does not prevent the General Assembly from contesting disputed court opinions by enacting new laws. In the case of the 2019 Act, which facially violated firmly established precedent on federal constitutional limitations on states’ authority to regulate or prohibit pre-viability abortions, the General Assembly passed a law that would test that precedent. It turned out to be Mississippi’s 15-week abortion ban that the United States Supreme Court decided to hear to revisit Roe and Casey, but the 2019 Act enacted by the Georgia General Assembly could have been the vehicle for overruling those cases. As the trial court found, Sections 4 and 11 of the 2019 Act cannot be enforced, as those provisions of that Act are void. To criminalize most abortions occurring after an embryo or fetus has detectable cardiac activity, and to mandate that physicians report to the government the exception relied upon to justify providing any abortion after that development, the General Assembly must re-enact those provisions now that the Dobbs decision has removed the federal constitutional impediment to regulation of pre-viability abortions. Commrs. of Roads &c., 213 Ga. at 793; Grayson, 209 Ga. at 613; id. at 617 (2).[41] As a matter of public policy, requiring re-enactment is healthy for our democracy. It promotes public civic engagement, and it requires our legislators to be responsive to public opinion in light of new precedent and to consider the will of the people when making policy decisions that will profoundly affect them. In this case, the public may have understood, based on well-settled precedent, that the 2019 Act would have been struck down in whole or in part under Roe.[42] The Dobbs decision, however, dramatically changed the post-Roe legal landscape. The re-enactment requirement integral to Georgia’s void ab initio doctrine affords its citizens an opportunity to communicate to their elected representatives their preferences in light of such a drastically altered legal landscape. The re-enactment requirement also comports with the separation of powers. See In re Judicial Qualifications Commn. Formal Advisory Opinion No. 239, 300 Ga. 291, 298 (2) (794 SE2d 631) (2016) (“[T]he judicial discernment of constitutional, statutory, or common law is an exercise of judicial power, and in Georgia, the judicial power is vested exclusively in the [courts.]” (citation and punctuation omitted)).[43] Because Sections 4 and 11 of the 2019 Act violated the United States Constitution, were void when enacted, and remain void, it is premature for the judiciary to be asked to consider, now that the Dobbs decision has removed the federal constitutional impediment to regulation of pre-viability abortions, whether a six-week abortion ban that the General Assembly may enact in the future would violate the Georgia Constitution. Whether a six-week abortion ban is consistent with Georgia’s Constitution should be debated and decided in the first instance by Georgia’s legislature, in light of existing precedent regarding the liberty interests the Georgia Constitution protects, including a right to privacy. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court’s ruling that Sections 4 and 11 of the 2019 Act were void ab initio. 2. Because the majority opinion in this case is reversing the trial court’s judgment that the 2019 Act’s six-week abortion ban was void ab initio, the case will be returned to the trial court for resolution of the question whether, as the plaintiffs’ argue, the six- week ban violates the due-process, equal-protection, and/or inherent-rights provisions of the Georgia Constitution. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Pars. I, II, and XXIX. Provided the trial court distinctly rules on any of these novel constitutional questions, we can expect this issue to return to this Court.[44] In addressing whether the 2019 Act’s six-week ban infringes any of these rights under the Georgia Constitution, the trial court will need to grapple with Georgia’s historical recognition of a liberty interest, often shorthanded as “a right to privacy,” to be let alone to live according to one’s own preferences, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190 (50 SE 68) (1905).[45] The trial court’s consideration will not be limited by cases interpreting the United States Constitution, because the “right to be let alone” guaranteed by the Georgia Constitution has long been recognized to be “far more extensive” than any right to privacy protected by the United States Constitution. Powell v. State, 270 Ga. 327, 330 (3) (510 SE2d 18) (1998).[46] The right to privacy guaranteed by the Georgia Constitution is a fundamental individual right.[47] Therefore, if the trial court determines that the 2019 Act’s six-week abortion ban in Section 4 infringes on the right to privacy, the trial court will need to determine whether the criminalization of most abortions after embryonic cardiac activity can be detected serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to effectuate only that interest.[48] Likewise, for Section 11, the trial court will need to determine whether requiring providers of some abortion services to report to a state agency the justification for certain abortions serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to effectuate only that interest. In determining whether Sections 4 and 11 of the 2019 Act serve a compelling state interest, the trial court must interrogate, and not assume as a given, the state’s claimed interest in preserving human life from the time of conception.[49] A clear enunciation of the basis for and scope of the interest the legislation is intended to protect is necessary to the determination of whether the state’s interest is compelling and whether the legislation is narrowly tailored to serve only that interest.[50] Undoubtedly, challenges to other sections of the 2019 Act will turn in part on the definition of the government’s interest that will shape this case.[51]
