Dillard, Presiding Judge. Terrance Kyle Alexander and Capital Gains, LLC, appeal from the trial court’s denial of their motion to open default, demand for a jury trial, and motion for partial involuntary dismissal of certain claims brought by Khori Francis, arguing that it erred in doing so. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On February 25, 2022, Francis filed a verified complaint against Alexander and his company, Capital Gains, seeking a constructive trust, an equitable lien, and an equitable accounting; making claims of unjust enrichment, fraud, conversion, and breach of contract; and requesting an award of punitive damages, attorney fees, and litigation expenses. The key allegations of the complaint were that Francis provided Alexander and Capital Gains with $5,000 for credit-monitoring services and $37,500 to invest in a luxury van business, but that they did neither and failed to repay him. By stipulation, the trial court extended the time for Alexander and Capital Gains to answer the complaint through April 14, 2022, and a second stipulation extended the time to do so through April 18, 2022. On April 18, 2022, a Notice of Substitution of Counsel was filed on behalf of both Alexander and Capital Gains, replacing the attorney of record with Alexander as the pro se representative for both parties. The next day, April 19, 2022, Alexander filed an answer to the complaint on behalf of himself. Francis then filed a motion for default judgment against Capital Gains, noting that it had not yet filed an answer. Francis also filed a motion to strike Alexander’s answer and sought default judgment against him because his answer was filed one day after the stipulated deadline and his counsel of record had not properly withdrawn from the case, and so his purported pro se answer was subject to being stricken as a nullity. Eventually, new counsel entered an appearance on behalf of Capital Gains and Alexander, and both moved to open the default on July 15, 2022, as a “proper case” for doing so. In an attached affidavit, Alexander averred that he filed his pro se answer on April 19 because he believed up until April 18 that the case would settle. He further averred that he did not file an answer on behalf of Capital Gains because he thought it was unnecessary due to the corporation having been administratively dissolved.[1] In response, Francis argued that Alexander and Capital Gains failed to set forth a meritorious defense that would allow the trial court to exercise its discretion to open the default under the “proper case” standard. More specifically, Francis asserted that Alexander and Capital Gains failed to proffer any facts suggesting a meritorious defense and instead merely relied on conclusory denials. Francis also pointed to Alexander and Capital Gains’s failure to timely move to open the default within 15 days. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to strike and the request for default judgment as to Alexander. The court struck Alexander’s answer because it was belatedly filed and done without the necessary fee to open the default. The court further ordered that it would hold a hearing to determine the amount of damages. Likewise, the court granted the motion for default judgment as to Capital Gains with the amount of damages to be determined at a later hearing. Separately, the trial court denied the motion from Alexander and Capital Gains to open the default judgment. In doing so, the court concluded both parties failed to present a meritorious defense that would allow it to exercise discretion to open the default judgment because they did not provide facts beyond conclusory statements of denial. Alternatively, the court concluded Alexander and Capital Gains failed to move to open the default with reasonable promptness. Thereafter, Alexander and Capital Gains filed a demand for a jury trial on the issue of damages. The trial court denied the demand, concluding that it was untimely and that they failed to place the issue of damages into question through the filing of a pleading. Alexander and Capital Gains then moved for a partial involuntary dismissal after Francis presented evidence at the final hearing on the matter. The court ultimately denied that motion, finding that it was not made at the appropriate time, and awarded the requested damages to Francis. This appeal follows. 1. Alexander and Capital Gains argue the trial court erred in denying their motion to open default.[2] We disagree. When this Court reviews the denial of a motion to open default judgment, we are charged with determining “whether the trial court abused its discretion based on the facts peculiar to each case.”[3] And under OCGA § 9-11-55, [a]t any time before final judgment, the court, in its discretion, upon payment of costs, may allow the default to be opened . . . [when] the judge, from all the facts, shall determine that a proper case has been made for the default to be opened, on terms to be fixed by the court. In order to allow the default to be thus opened, the showing shall be made under oath, shall set up a meritorious defense, shall offer to plead instanter, and shall announce ready to proceed with the trial.[4] Here, the trial court denied the motion to open the default under this standard after concluding Alexander and Capital Gains failed to present a meritorious defense. In order to present a meritorious defense, a defendant must “set forth facts that show the existence of the essential elements of such defense even though there is no requirement that the affidavit or other sworn statement contain in great detail the factual basis of the proposed defense.”[5] Put another way, a defendant meets this requirement by “showing that if relief from default is granted, the outcome of the suit may be different from the result if the default stands”;[6] and to do so, the defendant must “provide factual information and may not rely solely on conclusions.”[7] Indeed, an affidavit framed under this rule “must be very full and explicit.”[8] Once again, Francis’s key allegations were that he paid Alexander and Capital Gains $5,000 for credit repair and monitoring services and provided them with $37,500 to invest in a luxury van business, but they did neither with these funds and failed to repay Francis when he requested they do so. Even so, in an affidavit attached to the motion to open default, Alexander admitted Francis provided the alleged amounts but claimed the $5,000 was used for credit services and the $37,500 was invested into a luxury van purchase. He further asserted that he did not personally receive any portion of the money Francis provided to Capital Gains. General denials are, of course, “insufficient to establish a meritorious defense.”[9] So, while a defaulting party need not provide “great detail,” they must provide some detail beyond general denials.[10] And here, Alexander and Capital Gains did not provide sufficient detail in either Alexander’s affidavit or the proposed answer attached as an exhibit to the motion to open default.[11] Instead, Alexander’s assertions—that the money provided to Capital Gains was used for credit services and an investment in luxury vans—at best amount to general denials of Francis’s claims and do not factually establish a meritorious defense.[12] Indeed, neither the affidavit nor attached proposed answer explained in some detail how Francis’s money was used (e.g., exactly what services were provided, dates of when services were rendered) or invested (e.g., when investments were made, how many vans were purchased).[13] As a result, because the failure to plead a meritorious defense is “alone fatal to the opening of a default,”[14] we agree with the trial court that it was without discretion to grant Alexander and Capital Gains’s motion to open the default. 2. Next, Alexander and Capital Gains contend the trial court erred in denying their demand for a jury trial on damages. Again, we disagree. The trial court denied Alexander and Capital Gains’s demand for a jury trial on damages because it was untimely and they were no longer “in default” at the time of filing it—a judgment having been already entered on the matter of liability. We review the trial court’s conclusion in this regard de novo for plain legal error by looking to the language of the relevant statute.[15] We necessarily begin our analysis with “familiar and binding canons of construction.”[16] And in considering the meaning of a statute, our charge as an appellate court is to “presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.”[17] As a result, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning,[18] consider the text contextually,[19] read the text “in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would,”[20] and seek to “avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage.”[21] Simply put, when the language of a statute is “plain and susceptible of only one natural and reasonable construction, courts must construe the statute accordingly.”[22] Looking to the statute at issue, OCGA § 9-11-55 provides, in relevant part, that “in the event a defendant, though in default, has placed damages in issue by filing a pleading raising such issue, either party shall be entitled, upon demand, to a jury trial of the issue as to damages.”[23] And in this case, at the point in which Alexander and Capital Gains filed their demand for a jury trial on damages, the trial court had already denied their motions to open default and entered default judgment against them on the issue of liability. As a result, Francis argues—and the trial court agreed—that both were no longer “in default” at the time they demanded a jury trial on damages. Even so, Alexander and Capital Gains rely on Follmer v. Perry[24] in support of their demand for a jury trial on damages being timely under OCGA § 9-11-55 (a), despite being filed after entry of default judgment on liability. But Francis contends this case is inapposite because the defendant in Follmer filed a demand for jury trial on damages prior to the entry of default judgment.[25] And while we agree with Francis that this case is factually inapposite, we do not believe Follmer forecloses Alexander and Capital Gains’s argument on this particular question.[26] Our analysis begins with OCGA § 9-11-55 (a), which must be read in pari materia with OCGA § 9-11-55 (b).[27] Under OCGA § 9-11-55 (b), “[a]t any time before final judgment, the court, in its discretion, upon payment of costs, may allow the default to be opened”[28] for various reasons upon appropriate showings by the defaulting party. And looking to the plain language of OCGA § 9-11-55 (b), a defendant remains “in default” before final judgment. Indeed, as we have repeatedly held, the entry of default judgment on the issue of liability alone is not a final judgment for purposes of OCGA § 9-11-55 (b).[29] So, while Francis is correct that once a default judgment is set aside, “the case returns to the posture it occupied prior to the entry of the default judgment, which posture is usually that of being in default,”[30] we do not agree that entry of default judgment as to liability alone means a defendant is no longer “in default.” To the contrary, in the cases in which we have used the foregoing language, a final judgment as to both liability and damages was set aside, thereby placing a party back “in default” for purposes of OCGA § 9-11-55 (b).[31] Thus, looking to both the plain language of OCGA § 9-11-55 (a) and (b) and our precedent in this area of law, we conclude Alexander and Capital Gains were still “in default” for purposes of filing a demand for a jury trial on damages under OCGA § 9-11-55 (a) because at the time the demand was filed, default judgment had only been granted on the issue of liability. Nevertheless, even if the demand had been timely filed, there is still a question of whether Alexander and Capital Gains “placed damages in issue by filing a pleading raising such issue.”[32] We conclude they did not. Capital Gains never filed an answer even belatedly, and the belated pro se answer filed by Alexander did not place damages “in issue” as that phrase is contemplated by our cases.[33] As we have previously explained, the plain language of OCGA § 9-11-55 (a) dictates that a defendant in default is “entitled to a jury trial if (1) he has placed damages in issue by filing a pleading raising that issue, and (2) he has made a demand for a jury trial.”[34] Here, no such pleading was actually filed.[35] Although a proposed answer was attached to Alexander and Capital Gains’s motion to open default judgment as an exhibit, that motion was denied, and the proposed answer was never filed as a separate pleading.[36] Nevertheless, Alexander and Capital Gains contend that under Follmer v. Petty,[37] the proposed answer attached to their motion to open default was a sufficient pleading under OCGA § 9-11-55 (a). But we are unpersuaded by the vague language from Follmer upon which they hinge their argument. In Follmer, we explained that the party in default “placed damages in issue by filing his motion to open default with his proposed answer and by filing a demand for jury trial on the issue of damages [the next day].”[38] But nothing in Follmer explicitly says the “proposed answer” was attached as an exhibit rather than separately—though belatedly—filed. And more importantly, under the plain language of our Civil Practice Act, “[n]o other pleadings may be allowed,” save for those delineated by OCGA § 9-11-7 (a), which provides as follows: There shall be a complaint and an answer; a thirdparty complaint, if a person who is not an original party is summoned under Code Section 91114; and a thirdparty answer, if a thirdparty complaint is served. There may be a reply to a counterclaim denominated as such and an answer to a crossclaim, if the answer contains a crossclaim. No other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court may order a reply to an answer or a thirdparty answer. Suffice it to say, an exhibit attached to a motion cannot possibly be a pleading within the meaning of OCGA § 9-11-7 (a) when motions are not even considered pleadings under the statute.[39] Accordingly, no pleading placing damages in issue was filed as required by OCGA § 9-11-55 (a);[40] and so, the trial court did not err in denying Alexander and Capital Gains’s demand for a jury trial on damages. 3. Finally, Alexander and Capital Gains argue the trial court erred in denying their motion for a partial involuntary dismissal as to punitive damages and “certain attorney’s fees” under OCGA § 9-11-41 (b). But because they do not contest the court’s denial of this motion as to the other matters raised in that motion, we only address the two specific issues they do argue on appeal.[41] OCGA § 9-11-41 (b) provides that “[a]fter the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.”[42] And here, the record shows that after Francis presented evidence at the final hearing on the question of damages, Alexander and Capital Gains presented no evidence but orally moved for partial involuntary dismissal of claims under OCGA § 9-11-41 (b). The trial court did not rule on damages at the hearing and instead asked the parties to submit written arguments on the issue along with proposed orders. As a result, Alexander and Capital Gains filed a written motion under OCGA § 9-11-41 (b) after the final hearing. In its final order on the matter, in which it awarded the requested damages and attorney fees, the trial court denied Alexander and Capital Gains’s motion under OCGA § 9-11-41 (b) because it was an “improper procedural vehicle at this stage of the proceedings.” In the alternative, the trial court found they were not entitled to dismissal because Francis’s claims were “properly supported by factual allegations” that were admitted by virtue of default. Alexander and Capital Gains claim the trial court erred in reaching both of these conclusions. (a) Punitive damages. We have previously considered denials of motions for new trial made on the issue of damages awarded in default judgments,[43] and so we conclude Alexander and Capital Gains were not procedurally barred from challenging (during the hearing) whether a request for punitive damages was well pleaded such that those damages were warranted.[44] Indeed, in any case in which punitive damages are claimed, the trier of fact “shall first resolve from the evidence produced at trial whether an award of punitive damages shall be made.”[45] Here, the issue of punitive damages was well pleaded. Francis’s complaint included a separate count for punitive damages that incorporated by reference all previous counts in the complaint and alleged, inter alia, that Alexander and Capital Gains’s refusal to properly invest Francis’s funds or return them, and to provide the credit services or return the funds provided for those services, “demonstrate[s] willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression or a conscious indifference to the reasonable and foreseeable consequences of their actions within the meaning of OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b).” Francis also requested such damages “in an amount to be determined at trial based upon [Alexander and Capital Gains's] actions.” As a result, punitive damages were permitted.[46] But Alexander and Capital Gains also maintain the trial court’s award of punitive damages is unsupported by the evidence.[47] Specifically, they assert Francis failed to present sufficient evidence in support of an award of punitive damages—namely, evidence of their “income or assets or anything else that would allow the Court to determine an appropriate amount of punitive damages”—and that the court instead arbitrarily granted Francis a $13,000 award of such damages. But this is not the standard applied to awards for punitive damages. Instead, when punitive damages are to be awarded, the trier of fact is to “assess evidence regarding what amount of damages will be sufficient to deter, penalize, or punish the defendant in light of the circumstances of the case.”[48] Thereafter, the proper amount of punitive damages is “based on the enlightened conscience of the trier of fact, and on appeal, an award will not be disturbed unless it is so excessive or inadequate as to shock the judicial conscience to the degree that a judgment entered thereon constitutes an error of law.”[49] Here, Alexander and Capital Gains do not argue the punitive damages imposed by the trial court are excessive, and we conclude the award does not meet the high standard necessary for disturbing such an award.[50] This portion of the enumerated error, then, is without merit. (b) Attorney fees. The trial court also awarded Francis attorney fees and costs of litigation under OCGA § 13-6-11 in the amount of $18,345.47. And just as they did below, Alexander and Capital Gains solely argue that there was no evidence that $5,000 of that award was reasonable when that portion was for the services of “an unnamed project attorney.”[51] To begin with, because Francis placed Alexander and Capital Gains on notice that he would be seeking attorney fees and costs of litigation under OCGA § 13-6-11 in his complaint, and default judgment was subsequently entered against them for their failure to answer, Francis was “entitled to an award of attorney fees and expenses as a matter of law from the defendant having caused unnecessary trouble and expense.”[52] The court did not err, then, in awarding fees under OCGA § 13-6-11. As to the total amount awarded, Alexander and Capital Gains contend there was no evidence that the alleged $5,000 Francis’s attorney paid to a project attorney for research was reasonable. More specifically, they assert there was no evidence of the unnamed attorney’s qualifications, experience, hours worked, or rate charged. At the hearing, Francis’s attorney testified that her requested amount of fees and expenses included “project attorney expenses of about $5,000 . . . that were passed through directly as [an] expense for Mr. Francis for research and writing assistance.” She further testified, on cross examination, that the project attorney conducted research because she does not have an associate. Francis’s attorney did not know the number of hours the project attorney worked because they gave her a fixed rate per project. She believed the project attorney charged “approximately [$]1,500 relating to the jury demand” with “the remaining research . . . related to issues more specific to the default motions.” Finally, counsel said she “could provide a specific breakdown” of the project attorney’s work but that she could not recall further details at that time. No such breakdown appears in the record.[53] Francis responds by asserting the project attorney’s involvement amounted to an expense and thus the cost was not attorney fees for which a showing of reasonableness was necessary. But his sole citation in support of this proposition, Garland, Samuel & Loeb, P.C. v. American Safety Casualty Insurance Co.,[54] is inapposite. That case concerned an alleged breach by a professional liability insurer.[55] Indeed, Francis relies only on the first sentence of the following paragraph from that case: “[e]xpenses incurred by a lawyer for maintaining his office, hiring secretaries, investigators, consultants, expert witnesses, and associates are incidental to a lawyer’s business. His failure to pay either the cost of, or reasonable value for, such business expenses cannot rationally be deemed a failure to provide legal advice or assistance to others in his professional capacity as a lawyer.”[56] Needless to say, we are unconvinced that a project attorney who is hired to conduct legal writing and research should be treated differently from an associate or paralegal employed full time by a law firm and assigned the same tasks. In the alternative, Francis claims the testimony from his counsel was sufficient to show the reasonableness necessary to support the entire award, including the portion attributable to the project attorney. We disagree. Looking again to the evidence regarding attorney fees and expenses, Francis’s attorney testified that she personally spent 38.4 hours working on the case at a rate of $350 per hour. That amounts to $13,440 of the requested $18,345.47, leaving $4,905.47 unaccounted for. This remaining amount aligns with counsel’s estimation that the project attorney accounted for “about $5,000″ of the total requested award; but nevertheless, no testimony or other evidence, such as billing records, accurately accounted for the remaining $4,905.47. Accordingly, we agree with Alexander and Capital Gains that there was insufficient evidence to support the amount of attorney fees and expenses awarded with regard to this specific portion of the award (which again is the only portion of the attorney fees and expenses award being challenged on appeal[57]).[58] As a result, we vacate the award of attorney fees and expenses and remand to the trial court for further evidentiary findings as to this particular aspect of the requested amount.[59] For all these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Alexander and Capital Gains’s motion to open the default judgment, demand for jury trial on damages, and award of punitive damages. But we vacate the trial court’s award of attorney fees and expenses of litigation and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion on that issue alone.[60] Judgment affirmed in part, vacated in part, and case remanded. Rickman and Pipkin, JJ., concur.
