Brown, Judge. A jury returned a verdict in favor of appelleeplaintiff, Miguel Angel Molina, III, as executor of the estates of Miguel Angel Molina, Jr. and Juan Carlos Molina, against appellantsdefendants, Athens Heart Center, P.C. and Subodh Agrawal (collectively “Athens Heart”), in the amount of $4,363,000, and judgment was entered accordingly. After Athens Heart filed a motion for new trial, Molina filed a motion for supersedeas bond pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-62 (b), requesting a bond in the amount of the judgment plus interest. The trial court granted Molina’s motion after a hearing. Athens Heart has filed a direct appeal of the trial court’s bond order, contending that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a $4,687,000 bond despite their affidavit of indigency and inability to pay. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction over the appeal. The record shows that following the jury trial, the trial court entered judgment on February 9, 2023, against Athens Heart in the amount of $4,363,000 plus court costs and post-judgment interest. Ten days later, Athens Heart filed a motion for new trial, and Molina filed an “Emergency Motion for Supersedeas Bond” under OCGA § 9-11-62 (b).[1] Athens Heart filed a response to Molina’s motion along with Agrawal’s affidavit of indigence pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-47 (a), stating that neither he nor Athens Heart Center could obtain a bond in the amount requested by Molina. After a hearing, the trial court issued an order granting Molina’s motion and finding that good cause existed to require Athens Heart to post bond in the amount of judgment plus ten months of interest while pending the motion for new trial.[2] While the trial court noted it “may not be required to consider indigence, . . . the best practice is to consider the filing as made.” The court then concluded that under both OCGA §§ 5-6-47 (a) and 9-15-2 (a) (1), a party must be unable to pay or post bond due to his level of poverty or financial hardship, and Athens Heart had not established that they could not pay the bond amount due to indigence, poverty, or financial hardship. Alternatively, the court found that even if “indigence” simply should be interpreted to mean “unable to fund a bond if ordered,” as asserted by Athens Heart, Athens Heart failed to establish it was unable to fund the bond. Athens Heart filed a direct appeal in this Court, contending that the trial court (1) erred in construing “indigence,” as used in OCGA § 5-6-47, to mean “a level of poverty or financial hardship” rather than a party’s inability to post the required bond; (2) erred in failing to determine whether they actually had the ability post the bond; and (3) abused its discretion in fixing the bond amount at $4,687,000. Molina has filed a motion to dismiss Athens Heart’s appeal, contending that we lack jurisdiction because the bond order is not a directly appealable final order. Conversely, Athens Heart asserts that the bond order qualifies as a final order under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), because it “fully resolves the issue of a supersedeas bond.” We agree with Molina. “OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) authorizes direct appeals only from final judgments of the trial court, that is to say, where the case is no longer pending in the court below.” (Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Rivera v. Washington, 298 Ga. 770, 773 (784 SE2d 775) (2016). Thus, the pertinent inquiry is whether “the case is no longer pending in the court below.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1). And, as Athens Heart admits, its motion for new trial remains pending in the trial court. Cf. Auld v. Weaver, 196 Ga. App. 782, 782-783 (397 SE2d 51) (1990) (“A notice of appeal from the judgment, filed while a motion for new trial is pending, and unaccompanied by a proper certificate for immediate review, confers no jurisdiction in the appellate court and results in a dismissal of the appeal.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). Athens Heart cites Winchell v. Winchell, 352 Ga. App. 306, 313 (3), n.10 (835 SE2d 6) (2019), for the proposition that this Court has considered an appeal from a supersedeas bond to be a final order. However, Winchell dealt with an appeal bond set pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-46, not a bond pending a motion for new trial.[3] Id. at 308. Moreover, in Winchell, the matter still pending below was a motion for reconsideration rather than a motion for new trial, and we recognized that “[w]hile it is true that a notice of appeal filed during the pendency of a motion for new trial confers no jurisdiction on this Court, the same rule does not apply to motions for reconsideration.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 313 (3), n.10.[4] We conclude that the trial court’s order setting a supersedeas bond pending Athens Heart’s motion for new trial is not a final order subject to direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1).[5] Rather, a party who is ordered to pay a supersedeas bond pending a motion for new trial can seek to immediately appeal that order through the interlocutory appeal procedures established in OCGA § 5-6-34 (b).[6] See BucknerWebb v. State, 314 Ga. 823, 827 (2) (a) (878 SE2d 481) (2022) (“as a general rule, when a party seeks to appeal a nonfinal order issued by a trial court before the case is fully adjudicated below, Georgia courts require adherence to the interlocutory procedures of OCGA § 5634 (b) for appellate review”). Cf. Byelick v. Michel Herbelin U.S.A., 260 Ga. App. 111, 112 (578 SE2d 907) (2003) (noting that the appellant’s direct appeal from a supersedeas bond order set pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-62 (c) had been dismissed by this Court for lack of jurisdiction because the appellant failed to secure a timely certificate of immediate review). Athens Heart alternatively argues that it has a right to directly appeal the bond order under the collateral order doctrine. We disagree. To qualify for immediate appeal under [the] collateral order doctrine, an interlocutory order must be effectively final— a status we assess by examining whether the order resolves an issue that is substantially separate from the basic issues to be decided at trial; would result in the loss of an important right if review had to await final judgment; and completely and conclusively decides the issue on appeal such that nothing in the underlying action can affect it. (Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) BucknerWebb, 314 Ga. at 828 (2) (a). In Buckner-Webb, our Supreme Court held that “orders denying a counsel’s motion to withdraw based on an alleged conflict of interest are not ‘effectively final,’ even as to counsel’s interest, in the sense needed to justify application of the collateral order doctrine [because] counsel will still have ways to obtain review of the interest at issue in such orders[.]” Id. at 830 (2) (b). The Court went on to explain that “ an attorney who is denied permission to withdraw as counsel based upon an alleged conflict of interest can seek to immediately appeal that order through the interlocutory appeal procedures established by OCGA § 5634 (b).” Id. Similarly, and as stated above, a party ordered to post a supersedeas bond pending a motion for new trial can seek to appeal the order through an interlocutory appeal. As such, we conclude that such orders do not fall within the “very small class” of trial court orders that are appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Duke v. State, 306 Ga. 171, 172 (1) (829 SE2d 348) (2019). Because Athens Heart failed to follow the interlocutory appeal process, we lack jurisdiction over the appeal. Eidson v. Croutch, 337 Ga. App. 542, 543 (788 SE2d 129) (2016) (“when the order appealed from is an interlocutory order, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction unless the procedure of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b) for interlocutory appeal is followed”) (citation and punctuation omitted).[7] Appeal dismissed. McFadden, P. J., and Markle, J., concur.
