Colvin, Justice. Appellant Larry Edward Thomas appeals his convictions for felony murder in connection with the vehicular deaths of Krystof Krawczynski and Elizbieta Gurtler-Krawczynski.[1] On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him for two counts of felony murder (Counts 1 and 2) rather than for two counts of homicide by vehicle (Counts 7 and 8) because both sets of charges were predicated on fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, and thus the rule of lenity required that he receive the lesser penalty. See Peacock v. State, 314 Ga. 709, 723 (5) (878 SE2d 247) (2022) (explaining that, when statutes establish “different punishments for the same offense,” creating ambiguity as to which penalty applies, the rule of lenity requires that the court resolve the ambiguity “in favor of the defendant, who will then receive the lesser punishment” (citation and punctuation omitted)). For the reasons that follow, Appellant’s claim fails. The indictment charged Appellant with one count of felony murder for each of the two victims (Counts 1 and 2). See OCGA § 16-5-1 (c) (“A person commits the offense of murder when, in the commission of a felony, he or she causes the death of another human being irrespective of malice.”). Each count of felony murder was predicated on fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer as alleged in Count 13, which charged felony fleeing or eluding in violation of former OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (5) (A). See former OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (5) (A) (i)-(iii) (2012) (providing that a driver commits felony fleeing or eluding a police officer if, “while fleeing or attempting to elude a pursing police vehicle or police officer” in violation of OCGA § 40-6-395 (a), the driver, among other things, “[o]perates his or her vehicle in excess of 20 miles an hour above the posted speed limit,” “[s]trikes or collides with another vehicle or pedestrian,” or “[f]lees in traffic conditions which place the general public at risk of receiving serious injuries”).[2] Appellant was also charged with one count of first-degree homicide by vehicle for each of the two victims (Counts 7 and 8). See OCGA § 40-6-393 (a) (providing that a person commits the offense of homicide by vehicle in the first degree if he or she, “without malice aforethought, causes the death of another person through the violation of” certain enumerated traffic offenses, including a violation of OCGA § 40-6-395 (a)). Each first-degree homicide-by-vehicle count was predicated on misdemeanor fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer in violation of OCGA § 40-6-395 (a). See OCGA § 40-6-395 (a) (providing that a “driver of a vehicle” is guilty of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer if he or she “willfully . . . fail[s] or refuse[s] to bring his or her vehicle to a stop or otherwise . . . flee[s] or attempt[s] to elude a pursuing police vehicle or police officer when given a visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop”); OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (1) (2012) (providing that a violation of OCGA § 40-6-395 (a) is a misdemeanor). On appeal, Appellant contends that “[t]he rule of lenity applies because — as indicted — a single offense has been criminalized by two different statutory provisions, one of which provides for a lesser punishment than the other.” Specifically, Appellant argues that the felony-murder counts (Counts 1 and 2) and the homicide-by-vehicle counts (Counts 7 and 8) criminalized the same offense of killing the victims during the commission of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer. This argument, however, is foreclosed by our recent decision in Sosebee v. State, __ Ga. __, __ (1) (__ SE2d __) (2023) (rejecting the appellant’s rule-of-lenity argument, where he contended that, “‘as indicted[,]‘ the statute defining felony murder and the statute defining homicide by vehicle in the first degree impose ‘different punishments for identical criminal conduct’”). As we explained in Sosebee, the felony-murder and homicide-by-vehicle statutes “are not ambiguous and do not require different punishments for the same conduct” because “[t]he offense of felony murder . . . criminalizes causing the death of a human being ‘in the commission of a felony,’ but the offense of homicide by vehicle in the first degree under OCGA § 40-6-393 (a) does not.” Id. at __ (1) (footnote omitted). Elaborating on that point, we explained that homicide by vehicle under OCGA § 40-6-393 (a) “criminalizes causing the death of another person through [a] violation of . . . [OCGA §] 40-6-395 (a),” which “is a misdemeanor,” whereas felony murder predicated on felony fleeing or eluding criminalizes causing the death of another person in the commission of “[f]elony-level fleeing under former OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (5) (A), which . . . has elements in addition to those required to prove a violation of misdemeanor fleeing under OCGA § 40-6-395 (a).” Id. at __ (1). Accordingly, as in Sosebee, “[t]he rule of lenity simply has no application in this case, and this claim of error fails.” Id. at (1). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
