Warren, Justice. The Georgia Constitution directs our Court of Appeals to transfer cases to this Court “[i]n the event of an equal division of the judges.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Par. V. In this case, the Court of Appeals equally divided on an issue and transferred the case to this Court. We conclude that although the Court of Appeals was equally divided on that one issue within the case, the court was not equally divided on the disposition of the judgment that was appealed. Under our precedent, this case does not fall within our equal division jurisdiction, and we return the case to the Court of Appeals. 1. (a) Factual and Procedural Background In January 2018, Dorothy Warren, a patient in the emergency room at Clinch Memorial Hospital, died after Dr. Nirandr Inthachak, working in his office in a different county, allegedly negligently misinterpreted her CT scan. Angela Wilson, Warren’s daughter, sued Dr. Inthachak. The trial court granted Dr. Inthachak summary judgment on two bases. First, the trial court held that Wilson had shown “no clear and convincing evidence of gross negligence,” and that her claim thus failed under OCGA § 51-1-29.5, which requires a plaintiff in “an action involving a healthcare liability claim arising out of the provision of emergency medical care” to prove “gross negligence” by “clear and convincing evidence.”[1] The court concluded that OCGA § 51-1-29.5 applied to Wilson’s claim—even though Dr. Inthachak was not physically present in the emergency room—because Dr. Inthachak “interpreted] the CT [scan] from the emergency department and fax[ed] his interpretation to the emergency department” where Warren was being treated, and Warren was “emergent,” meaning she needed “emergency medical care.”[2]Second, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Inthachak based on causation, concluding that Wilson had not shown that “the outcome would have been different” had Dr. Inthachak provided an allegedly correct interpretation of Warren’s CT scan. (b) The Court of Appeals Opinions[3] Wilson appealed, and all 14 voting members of the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was improper on both OCGA § 51-1-29.5 and causation grounds. As to the first ground, the Court of Appeals divided evenly (7 to 7) on the question of why summary judgment was improper based on OCGA § 51-1-29.5. On one side of the ledger, the putative majority agreed with the trial court that OCGA § 51-1-29.5 could apply in this case even though Dr. Inthachak was not in the emergency room, but then disagreed with the trial court’s conclusion that OCGA § 51-129.5 must be applied at the summary judgment stage here and concluded that summary judgment based on OCGA § 51-1-29.5 was improper because a fact question existed as to whether Warren was in need of “emergency medical care.” On the other side of the ledger, the putative dissent concluded that summary judgment based on OCGA § 51-1-29.5 was improper because the statute cannot be applied in this case where “Dr. Inthachak examined the CT scans in the relative quiet of his office,” rather than in an emergency room. As to the second ground on which the trial court granted summary judgment, all 14 judges of the Court of Appeals—all 7 in the putative majority and all 7 in the putative dissent—agreed that the trial court erred by concluding that no factual question existed as to causation. Based on the above analysis, the putative majority concluded that the trial court’s order granting summary judgment should be vacated and the case remanded, and the putative dissent concluded that the trial court’s order should be reversed. The Court of Appeals then transferred the case to this Court, citing our equal-division jurisdiction under Article VI, Section V, Paragraph V of the Georgia Constitution. After careful consideration of the text of the Georgia Constitution, our case law interpreting the Georgia Constitution, and the briefing and argument from the parties, we conclude that we do not have equal- division jurisdiction over this case and we return the case to the Court of Appeals. 2. Georgia’s Constitution says about the Court of Appeals: “In the event of an equal division of the Judges when sitting as a body, the case shall be immediately transmitted to the Supreme Court.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Par. V.[4] Citing this constitutional provision or its predecessors, the Court of Appeals has transferred, and this Court has decided, many cases in which the Court of Appeals was equally divided as to whether the judgment being appealed should be affirmed or reversed. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 205 Ga. 532, 532 (54 SE2d 395) (1949) (explaining that the case was transferred from the Court of Appeals because the judges “were equally divided, [three judges] being of the opinion that the judgment complained of should be affirmed, and [three judges] being of the opinion that it should be reversed”); Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. Grimes, 216 Ga. 74, 75 (114 SE2d 421) (1960) (“This case comes to this court because there was an equal division of the Judges of the Court of Appeals as to the judgment that should be rendered, [three judges] being for affirmance, and [three judges] being for reversal.”); Ford Motor Co. v. Conley, 294 Ga. 530, 536 & n.5 (757 SE2d 20) (2014) (explaining that the Court of Appeals transferred the case because it “divided equally on the disposition of the appeal,” with “[f]ive judges vot[ing] to reverse the trial court’s judgment, and a total of five judges vot[ing] to affirm”). But here we do not have an equal division between judges voting to affirm or reverse the appealed judgment. Instead, all 14 judges agreed that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment should not be affirmed on either ground given by the trial court for summary judgment. What they disagreed about was why summary judgment was not proper on one of those grounds and whether to “vacate” or to “reverse” the trial court’s judgment. So the question we must answer is whether this type of disagreement invokes our equal-division jurisdiction. (a) Rodriguez and Related Cases This Court has never been confronted with precisely this situation before, but our recent discussion about our equal-division jurisdiction in Rodriguez v. State, 295 Ga. 362 (761 SE2d 19) (2014), is instructive. In that case, Rodriguez appealed the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress. Rodriguez, 295 Ga. at 362. The Court of Appeals equally divided on whether the trial court’s judgment should be set aside—”six judges of the Court of Appeals were of the opinion that the denial of the motion to suppress should be affirmed, and six were of the opinion that it should not,” id. at 364-365—but did not transfer the case to this Court. When Rodriguez petitioned for certiorari, this Court held that the Court of Appeals should have transferred the case because it invoked our equal-division jurisdiction: “[W]hen the full bench of the Court of Appeals has considered every claim of error that might cause the judgment of the trial court to be set aside, and when the full bench is equally divided about whether that judgment must be set aside, there is an ‘equal division,’ and the case must be transferred to this Court.” Id. at 364. Notably, the six Court of Appeals judges voting against affirming the denial of the motion to suppress disagreed on why and on whether the judgment should be reversed as opposed to vacated: “four were of the opinion that the denial should be reversed entirely, one was of the opinion that it should be vacated and remanded for further proceedings on the motion, and one did not say whether she would reverse or vacate, nor did she say what should happen next in the trial court, only that she dissented from the decision to affirm.” Id. at 365. However, Rodriguez explained that “for purposes of the Equal Division clause, differences of opinion in this case about whether the judgment of the trial court should be set aside as ‘reversed’ or instead as ‘vacated’ are not dispositive,” id. at 365, and treated the judges voting to reverse the judgment being appealed and the judges voting to vacate the judgment being appealed as votes on the same side of the judgment.[5] Rodriguez likewise explained that “differences of opinion in this case among the six dissenting judges about what ought to happen next in the trial court [are not] dispositive” for purposes of the Equal Division clause. Id.[6] In support of this analysis, we cited in Rodriguez three of our precedents in which this Court held that our equal-division jurisdiction was not invoked when the question on which the Court of Appeals was equally divided was not necessarily dispositive to the outcome of the judgment being appealed: Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Godard, 211 Ga. 41 (83 SE2d 591) (1954); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Clinard, 211 Ga. 340 (86 SE2d 1) (1955); and Ford v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 270 Ga. 730 (514 SE2d 201) (1999). See Rodriguez, 295 Ga. at 364. In the first of those cases, Godard, this Court returned to the Court of Appeals a case that had been transferred under the 1945 Georgia Constitution, reasoning that although the judges of that court were equally divided on whether the trial court’s denial of a new trial should be affirmed or denied based on “whether the evidence authorized the verdict,” the court had not made “any determination” on other potentially dispositive grounds raised in the appeal. 211 Ga. at 42. We explained that “if, upon consideration it should be determined there were erroneous rulings requiring the grant of a new trial, there would be no necessity to pass on the general grounds of the motion for new trial.” Id. Thus, this Court held that “the case as it now stands is not subject to be transferred to this court.” Id. In the second case, Clinard, which was also decided under the 1945 Georgia Constitution, this Court returned a case to the Court of Appeals under similar circumstances, explaining that because the judges of the Court of Appeals were “not equally divided in the case at bar on all questions presented by the writ of error which would either require an affirmance or a reversal of the judgments excepted to, but only as to one of the questions in the case, it necessarily follows that the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction of the case.” 211 Ga. at 343. Finally, in Ford, this Court explained that the Court of Appeals was not required to transfer the case to this Court under the 1983 Constitution where a majority of the Court of Appeals judges had voted to reverse the judgment being appealed on one ground but had equally divided as to whether another issue was also a ground for reversal. See 270 Ga. at 731 n.4 (“Because the Court of Appeals was not equally divided on all questions presented, it was not required that the case be transmitted to this Court for resolution of the joinder issue under [the Equal Division clause].”) (emphasis in original).[7] (b) Applying Rodriguez Examining the division between the judges in the Court of Appeals presented in this case in light of Rodriguez[8] and the discussion above of this Court’s precedents construing our equally- divided jurisdiction, we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction in this case under Article VI, Section V, Paragraph V of the Georgia Constitution of 1983. Here, the judgment being appealed was the grant of summary judgment to Dr. Inthachak. Given that all of the judges of the Court of Appeals voted to either vacate or reverse the grant of summary judgment, they all agreed that the grant of summary judgment could not stand on either ground the trial court provided, and that it therefore must be set aside. They disagreed only about why one of the two grounds was faulty. This disagreement affects only “what ought to happen next in the trial court,” not “whether [the trial court's] judgment must be set aside.” See Rodriguez, 295 Ga. at 365.[9] And the difference in the Court of Appeals’s putative judgment line between vacating and reversing does not convince us that a jurisdiction-invoking equal division exists. To the contrary, Rodriguez indicates that this division—that is, of 7 judges voting to vacate and 7 judges voting to reverse the trial court’s order—is in fact no division at all for purposes of Article VI, Section V, Paragraph V.[10] Accordingly, we conclude that this case does not invoke our jurisdiction under Article VI, Section V, Paragraph V of the Georgia Constitution of 1983, and we return it to the Court of Appeals. Case returned to the Court of Appeals. All the Justices concur, except Boggs, C.J., Peterson, P.J., and Bethel and LaGrua, JJ., who dissent. McMillian, Justice, concurring. Although I concur fully in the Court’s decision concluding that this case does not fall within our equal division jurisdiction, I write separately to state that I would have retained jurisdiction over this case by exercising “our longstanding and almost-unlimited certiorari jurisdiction.” State v. Murray, 286 Ga. 258, 266 (2) (b) (687 SE2d 790) (2009) (Nahmias, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). See Ga. Const. Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. V (“The Supreme Court may review by certiorari cases in the Court of Appeals which are of gravity or great public importance.”). The issue on which the Court of Appeals divided – whether OCGA § 51-1-29.5 (c) applies to a physician who provides services while not physically within the hospital emergency department – is one of gravity and great public importance. However, I fully expect that upon return of the case to the Court of Appeals, review by the judges now currently sitting on that court, and issuance of an opinion, the losing party will seek certiorari review, at which time this Court will have another opportunity to decide this very important issue. Peterson, Presiding Justice, dissenting. The majority holds that the Court of Appeals was not equally divided (and thus we must return this case to that court) even though half of the judges would hold that the trial court must give a particular jury instruction on remand, while the other half would hold that the trial court must not give that instruction. The majority reaches this conclusion based on a reading of our caselaw that yields a rule that, for the Court of Appeals to be equally divided under the Georgia Constitution’s direction that such cases be transferred to us, the division must be about whether the trial court’s judgment must be set aside. I agree with the majority’s assessment of which of our precedents are relevant to this question. But I read those precedents to yield a different rule: the Court of Appeals is equally divided at least when there is an even division on an issue that (1) cannot be avoided and (2) on which the confusing lack of direction the even division[11] affords puts the trial court in an untenable position on remand. Because the issue on which the Court of Appeals was evenly divided here meets both criteria, I would hold that this case is an equal division case within the meaning of the Georgia Constitution. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. The provision of the Georgia Constitution that we apply today first appeared in the Constitution of 1945 and was carried forward into the Constitution of 1976 and then into our current Constitution of 1983. Although the language changed from 1976 to 1983 (and perhaps in material ways, as the majority flags), the language that is relevant to the issue the majority decides has remained materially identical throughout each of the constitutions: “an equal division of the Judges when sitting as a body…” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Par. V (the “Equal Division Provision”); accord Ga. Const. of 1976, Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. IV (“an equal division between the judges of that Court when sitting as a body.”); Ga. Const. of 1945, Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. IV (“an equal division between the Judges of that Court when sitting as a body…”). Accordingly, precedent on what constitutes an equal division under the predecessor provisions may inform the meaning of the current provision on that point. See Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179, 184-87 (II) (B) (824 SE2d 265) (2019). The majority relies on four of our precedents, two of which precede the adoption of the Constitution of 1983. The two pre-1983 cases both apply the same rule: a case in which the judges of the Court of Appeals are evenly divided on an issue does not constitute “an equal division” if other issues remain undecided and a decision on those issues might make reaching the evenly divided issue unnecessary. In Godard, although our Court included language that could be read as the majority does, the holding was the rule I see: the Constitution “does not provide for a transfer by [the Court of Appeals] to this court of any case where there is an equal division between the judges of the Court of Appeals on an isolated question in the case, and there remain for consideration and decision assignments of error whereby, if error be found that required a judgment of reversal, a consideration of the isolated question would become immaterial.” Atl. C. L. R.R. v. Godard, 211 Ga. 41, 42 (83 SE2d 591) (1954). Because the Court of Appeals in Godard had left undecided issues “where if, upon consideration, it should be determined there were erroneous rulings requiring the grant of a new trial, there would be no necessity to pass on the [evenly-divided issue],” id., the Court held that “the case as it now stands is not subject to be transferred to this court.” Id.[12] We applied the same rule the following year in Clinard. See Atl. C. L. R. Co. v. Clinard, 211 Ga. 340 (86 SE2d 1) (1955). There, the Court of Appeals was evenly divided on the general grounds and a general demurrer and did not address any of the special grounds raised that could have decided the case. Id. at 342-43. We held that Godard controlled and the case was not equally divided under the Constitution. Id. This was the state of play when the Equal Division Provision was carried forward into the Constitutions of 1976 and 1983. In 1999, we noted in dicta (and without the question being before us) that a previous decision of the Court of Appeals had not been equally divided because “the Court of Appeals was not equally divided on all questions presented…” Ford v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 270 Ga. 730, 731 n.4 (514 SE2d 201) (1999). This imprecise dicta cannot be read to change the Godard-Clinard rule that focuses on whether the Court of Appeals decided all the issues that would render unnecessary a decision on an evenly-divided issue. This is especially so given that the Ford Court cited Clinard as the only case supporting its conclusion. Finally, we arrive at Rodriguez, on which the majority rests most of its analysis. See Rodriguez v. State, 295 Ga. 362, 363-65 (1) (761 SE2d 19) (2014). The real question in Rodriguez was whether six votes dissenting from a six-judge opinion to affirm should be aggregated to yield an equal division, even though at least one of the six dissenters voted to vacate instead of reverse. See id. We held that it was proper to aggregate all of the dissenting votes. Id. I acknowledge that Rodriguez focused on whether the Court of Appeals’s judgment was equally divided, not merely issues that did not change the judgment, and so Rodriguez included considerable language that was judgment-focused. But we cannot read that language in a vacuum; we have to read it in the context of what issue was actually present in Rodriguez for our decision. And that issue was only whether a vote to vacate could be aggregated with votes to reverse for purposes of yielding an equal division. The holding that such aggregation was proper tells us nothing about what other evenly divided issues also count as equal division. Moreover, Rodriguez’s discussion of our equal-division precedent does not support the majority’s conclusion. Rodriguez said only that: We have addressed the meaning of the Equal Division clause before, and under our precedents, when the full bench of the Court of Appeals has considered every claim of error that might cause the judgment of the trial court to be set aside, and when the full bench is equally divided about whether that judgment must be set aside, there is an “equal division,” and the case must be transferred to this Court. Rodriguez, 295 Ga. at 364 (1) (footnote and citation omitted). While this statement described one set of circumstances establishing an equal division, it did not purport to hold that an equal division exists only under those circumstances. So far as I can tell, we have never construed the equal-division clause so narrowly. Until today. This conclusion is not compelled by any precedent. It is not compelled by any constitutional text. And it is inconsistent with our explanation of the Equal Division Provision’s purpose of ensuring that trial judges know what they are to do on remand. See Rodriguez, 295 Ga. at 365 n.5 (“If [the Court of Appeals's] split decision were the last word, the trial judge could not possibly be expected to know whether the motion to suppress still stood denied, and in such circumstances, the trial judge could not reasonably be expected to ‘carry into full effect in good faith’ the decision on appeal. The Equal Division [Provision] keeps a trial judge from being put into such an untenable position.” (quoting OCGA § 5-6-10; punctuation omitted)). Allowing the two competing Court of Appeals opinions to stand as the final word here puts the trial court into an untenable position on remand. The opinion authored by Judge Markle concludes that the applicability of the higher burden of proof set forth in OCGA § 51-1-29.5 (c) depends on whether the jury finds that Dr. Inthachak provided emergency medical care to Dorothy. In contrast, the opinion authored by Presiding Judge McFadden would hold as a matter of law that OCGA § 51-1-29.5 (c) does not apply in this case. Therefore, even though Presiding Judge McFadden’s opinion does not address jury instructions specifically, it would preclude the trial court from instructing a jury to apply that burden of proof in this matter — regardless of whatever contrary arguments Dr. Inthachak might raise in the future. These two positions cannot be reconciled, and cannot be avoided by deciding the case on some other as-yet- undecided ground. Because neither text nor precedent requires the majority’s conclusion, and that conclusion will inevitably place trial courts in untenable positions,[13] I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Boggs, Justice Bethel, and Justice LaGrua join in this dissent.
