Warren, Justice. This case presents the question of whether a unit-of- prosecution analysis or a required evidence analysis should be applied to determine the question of merger as to one count of aggravated child molestation and two counts of child molestation. As both parties now concede, unit-of-prosecution analysis applies to the question of whether the two counts of child molestation merge and required evidence analysis applies when considering the merger of aggravated child molestation and child molestation. Because the Court of Appeals did not analyze correctly the merger question presented in this case, we vacate that part of the Court of Appeals’s judgment and remand the case to the Court of Appeals to reconsider the merger question applying the correct analysis.[1] 1. In August 2015, Tony Shropshire was indicted for aggravated child molestation, two counts of child molestation, incest, and first-degree cruelty to children. At a trial in February 2017, evidence was presented that one night in 2001, Shropshire put his fingers and penis on his five- or six-year-old niece’s vagina and licked her vagina.[2] The jury found Shropshire guilty of all counts, and the trial court sentenced him to serve life in prison for aggravated child molestation and consecutive sentences of 20 years for each count of child molestation, 50 years for incest, and 20 years for cruelty to children. Shropshire filed a motion for new trial, which was denied. Shropshire appealed, arguing, among other things, that he should not have been convicted of child molestation because those two counts should have merged into the aggravated child molestation conviction. The Court of Appeals applied a unit-of-prosecution analysis to the convictions to answer this question and concluded that the two child molestation counts merged into the aggravated child molestation conviction because the three acts alleged—”touching [the victim's] vagina with his tongue, finger, and penis”—were “‘part of a single course of conduct occurring in a relatively short time frame.’” Shropshire v. State, 365 Ga. App. 653, 662-663 (878 SE2d 562) (2022) (citation omitted). The court vacated Shropshire’s convictions and sentences for aggravated child molestation and child molestation and remanded the case for the trial court to convict and resentence Shropshire on only the single count of aggravated child molestation. See id. at 663. The State petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari and we granted the petition, posing the following question: Should a unit-of-prosecution analysis, as opposed to a required-evidence analysis, be applied to evaluate whether child molestation merges into aggravated child molestation? See generally Scott v. State, 306 Ga. 507 (832 SE2d 426) (2019); Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211 (636 SE2d 530) (2006).[3] 2. “‘Merger’ refers generally to situations in which a defendant is prosecuted for and determined by trial or plea to be guilty of multiple criminal charges but then, as a matter of substantive double jeopardy law, can be punished—convicted and sentenced— for only one of those” criminal charges. Scott, 306 Ga. at 509. A unit-of-prosecution analysis, which “requires careful interpretation of the criminal statute at issue to identify the unit of prosecution— the precise act or conduct that the legislature criminalized,” should be applied to determine whether “multiple counts of the same crime” merge. Scott, 306 Ga. at 509 (citation and punctuation omitted, emphasis in original). By contrast, a required evidence analysis, which considers whether each crime “requires proof of a fact which the other does not,” applies to a merger analysis “where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions.” Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211, 215 (636 SE2d 530) (2006). See also Scott, 306 Ga. at 509 (“Merger analysis often involves counts charging two different crimes. As this Court has made clear, that is the context in which Drinkards required evidence test is applied.”) (emphasis in original).[4] Here, Shropshire was found guilty of one count of aggravated child molestation and two counts of child molestation. Because the two counts of child molestation charge the same crime, a unit-of- prosecution analysis should be applied to determine if Shropshire’s two counts of child molestation merge. See Scott, 306 Ga. at 510 (remanding the case for the Court of Appeals to “apply the unit of prosecution for child molestation” to determine if Scott’s four counts of child molestation merged). However, child molestation and aggravated child molestation are different crimes. Compare OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (defining child molestation) with § 16-6-4 (c) (defining aggravated child molestation).[5] Thus, a required evidence analysis, rather than a unit-of-prosecution analysis, should be applied when considering whether those different crimes merge. See Drinkard, 281 Ga. at 215. The Court of Appeals erred in applying a unit-of-prosecution analysis rather than a required evidence analysis in determining whether Shropshire’s child molestation counts merged into his aggravated child molestation conviction.[6] We therefore vacate that part of the Court of Appeals’s judgment and remand the case to that court to apply the correct analysis to determine the merger of the aggravated child molestation and two child molestation counts. Judgment vacated in part, and case remanded. All the Justices concur.
