McFadden, Presiding Judge. In this appeal, Jennifer Harmon asserts two claims of error: that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Progressive Premier Insurance Company of Illinois and that the trial court erred in denying Harmon’s motion to vacate that summary judgment ruling. Harmon asserted the identical claims of error in an earlier, procedurally flawed appeal, which we dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Harmon v. Progressive Premier Ins. Co. of Ill., 364 Ga. App. 809 (874 SE2d 163) (2022) (Harmon I). Our earlier dismissal has two effects upon the present case. Although we did not address the merits of her appeal, our dismissal forecloses further appellate review of the summary judgment ruling, and consequently it renders moot this appeal from the ruling on the motion to vacate. So we grant Progressive’s motion to dismiss this appeal. 1. Procedural history We set out the procedural history of this case in Harmon I, 364 Ga. App. at 809-810. In summary, it is an action for damages allegedly sustained in a car wreck. Harmon brought it against the car’s driver and, under OCGA § 33-7-11 (d), also served it on Progressive. Progressive in turn filed a cross-claim against the driver. The trial court granted summary judgment on Harmon’s claim to Progressive, holding that her failure to provide timely notice of the accident barred recovery as a matter of law. Harmon moved to vacate the summary judgment ruling, and the trial court denied that motion. Harmon then filed a notice of direct appeal in Harmon I and Progressive moved to dismiss that appeal. We granted that motion and dismissed the appeal, holding that we lacked jurisdiction for two reasons. First the appeal from the summary judgment ruling was untimely. Second the appeal from the ruling on the motion to vacate should have been pursued through the interlocutory appeal procedures because Harmon’s claim against the allegedly negligent driver remained pending below. Harmon I, 364 Ga. App. at 810-811. After the case returned to the trial court, Harmon filed a motion asking the trial court to enter a final judgment under OCGA § 9-11-54 (b). Instead, the trial court entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice, finding that his “earlier entry of summary judgment [was] on the sole matter remaining in this case [and that] there remain[ed] no issue for determination.” (The record on appeal indicates that the parties had settled the claims against the driver.) Harmon then filed a timely notice of appeal from the dismissal order. That order was a final was a final judgment, normally subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5634 (a) (1). As she did in Harmon I, Harmon enumerates as error the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Progressive and the trial court’s denial of her motion to vacate that summary judgment ruling. Progressive has moved to dismiss this appeal, arguing that because of Harmon’s previous failed effort to invoke our appellate jurisdiction, this appeal is due to be dismissed. Under a line of cases handed down by our Supreme Court, we are constrained to agree. See Massey v. Massey, 294 Ga. 163, 165 (1) (751 SE2d 330) (2013); Houston County v. Harrell, 287 Ga. 162, 163 (695 SE2d 29) (2010); Mitchell v. Oliver, 254 Ga. 112, 113 (1) (327 SE2d 216) (1985). 2. Summary judgment order Harmon had the right to immediate appellate review from the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment against her, even though that summary judgement order did not dispose of the whole case. OCGA § 9-11-56 (h). Alternatively she could have waited and appealed of right after the trial court issued a final judgment. OCGA § 5-6-34 (d). See also Mitchell, 254 Ga. at 113 (1); Roth v. Gulf Atlantic Media of Ga., 244 Ga. App. 677, 679 (1) (536 SE2d 577) (2000). In other words, “[s]he was not required to request a certificate of immediate review from the trial court under OCGA § 5-6-34 (b).” Massey, 294 Ga. at 164 (2). Harmon elected to invoke her right to an immediate appeal from the summary judgment ruling under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h). But that appeal had to be dismissed, because she did not file her notice of appeal within 30 days of the summary judgment ruling. Harmon I, 364 Ga. App. at 810. Our Supreme Court has held “that a losing party on summary judgment who puts the machinery of immediate appellate review under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) into motion, yet commits a procedural default fatal to his appeal, is foreclosed from thereafter resubmitting the matter for review on appeal of the final judgment.” Mitchell, 254 Ga. at 114 (1); Houston County, 287 Ga. at 163 (quoting Mitchell). Accord Massey, 294 Ga. at 165 (2) (recognizing the extension of that rule to immediate appeals from non-final judgments authorized under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (2)). Of course, we are bound to abide by the decisions of our Supreme Court.[1] 3. Ruling on motion to vacate The rule handed down in Mitchell, supra, does not apply directly to the order denying the motion to vacate the summary judgment ruling. As we noted in Harmon I, the order denying that motion was subject to the interlocutory appeal procedure set out at OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). Harmon I, 364 Ga. App. at 810-811. So Harmon did not have a right to an immediate appeal from that order. And so the rule handed down in Mitchell does not apply to it. See Sotter v. Stephens, 291 Ga. 79, 84 (727 SE2d 484) (2012). But although the Mitchell rule does not apply directly to the appeal from the order denying the motion to set aside, it does render that appeal moot. In light of our holding in Division 2, reversing that order would have no practical effect. So we must dismiss Harmon’s appellate challenge to that order as moot. A case is moot, among other reasons, “when it seeks to determine an issue which, if resolved, cannot have any practical effect on the underlying controversy. . . .” Barrow v. Raffensperger, 308 Ga. 660, 667 (2) (b) (842 SE2d 884) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). Even if we were to find, as Harmon alleges, that the trial court erred in denying her motion to vacate the summary judgment ruling, this resolution could not now have any practical effect on the case. Harmon’s “first direct appeal [of the summary judgment ruling] was dismissed, and with the usual consequence that the ruling[ ] of the lower court, by operation of law, stood as if affirmed. The effect of that dismissal was binding upon the trial court.” Houston County, 287 Ga. at 164 (citations and punctuation omitted). So the trial court would be “without authority to modify that [summary] judgment [ruling,] which was res judicata between the parties.” Born v. Born, 364 Ga. App. 511, 517 (1) (874 SE2d 846) (2022). For this reason, Harmon’s appellate challenge to the order denying her motion to vacate the summary judgment ruling is moot, and we must dismiss it. See Barrow, 308 Ga. at 666 (2) (b) (“A claim that is moot must be dismissed, not adjudicated.”). Appeal dismissed. Brown and Markle, JJ., concur.
