Dillard, Presiding Judge. Following trial, a jury convicted Cashawn Barker on a charge of failure to maintain her lane of travel. In her pro se appeal, Barker contends the trial court erred in denying her (1) motion arguing that the statute of limitation barred her prosecution; (2) claim that her Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated; and (3) motion for reconsideration. For the following reasons, we affirm the denial of Barker’s motion that the statute of limitation barred her prosecution. But because the trial court’s ruling on Barker’s speedy-trial claim is insufficient to allow us to determine whether it abused its discretion in denying the motion, we vacate that ruling and remand for entry of an order including the proper findings. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict,[1] the record shows that just after midnight on January 16, 2021, a Douglas County Sheriff’s deputy on traffic patrol—and parked along Interstate 20 near the exit to State Highway 92—observed a Dodge Avenger cross over the white line marking the right side of the interstate’s emergency lane several times. As a result, the deputy activated his patrol vehicle’s blue lights to initiate a traffic stop. But rather than stop immediately on the side of the interstate, the Dodge Avenger exited onto Highway 92 and pulled into the parking lot of a gas station. The deputy followed, and upon exiting his vehicle, he approached the driver (whose license identified her as Barker) and explained why he initiated the traffic stop. The deputy then issued Barker traffic citations for failure to maintain her lane and to yield to an emergency vehicle. At the time the deputy conducted the traffic stop and issued Barker a citation, the State of Georgia—in fact the entire nation and much of the world—remained in the throes of the COVID19 pandemic. As a result, nearly a year earlier (on March 14, 2020), the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Georgia entered an order declaring a statewide judicial emergency (under OCGA § 38361), which, among other things, suspended jury trials that had not yet commenced.[2] And by January 16, 2021 (the date of the traffic stop), jury trials had not fully resumed.[3] But on March 9, 2021, the Chief Justice entered a twelfth extension of the judicial emergency order, lifting the prohibition on jury trials because “the surge in COVID19 cases that led to the suspension of jury trials [had] declined.”[4] Nevertheless, the case was delayed several times before eventually being set for a March 21, 2023 trial in the State Court of Douglas County. That day, the State filed what it characterized as an “Amended Accusation,” charging the two offenses noted in the January 16, 2021 citations and adding a charge of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer. The trial court discussed the accusation and Barker’s motion to dismiss the case based on a violation of her right to a speedy trial—which she also filed that day—with both parties, and asked Barker if she wanted a continuance in light of the new charge. But Barker—who was acting pro se—responded that she wanted to proceed. The State agreed, and the trial court recessed for the day but informed the parties the trial would proceed the next morning. The following day, March 22, 2023, the parties appeared in court, at which point, the State explained it had filed a second amended accusation to reflect that it would only be proceeding on the charge that Barker failed to maintain her lane of travel. At the same time, Barker requested the trial court dismiss this charge based, again, on her motion claiming a violation of her right to a speedy trial and on a newly filed motion that the applicable statute of limitation barred her prosecution. The court then heard argument on both of Barker’s motions before issuing an oral order from the bench denying them. Thereafter, the parties selected a jury, and trial commenced, during which the sheriff’s deputy testified about the traffic stop. In addition, the State introduced video from both the dashboard camera in the deputy’s patrol vehicle and body camera, and the State played both videos for the jury. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Barker guilty on the charge of failure to maintain her lane. One week later, Barker filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to set aside, and on April 11, 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing on her motions. During the hearing, Barker reiterated the arguments she made in her motion claiming a violation of her right to a speedy trial and her motion claiming that the statute of limitation barred her prosecution; but the trial court again denied them. This appeal follows. 1. Barker first contends the trial court erred in denying her motion that the statute of limitation barred her prosecution. We disagree. It is well established that, in criminal cases, the period of limitation “runs from the commission of the offense to the date of the indictment.”[5] And the burden is on the State to “prove that a crime occurred within the applicable statute of limitation.”[6] Needless to say, the appellate standard of review for a plea in bar asserting a statute-of-limitation defense is “a de novo review of the issue of laws.”[7] Even so, when a trial court’s ruling involves a mixed question of fact and law, we accept the trial court’s “findings on disputed facts and witness credibility unless they are clearly erroneous, but independently apply the law to the facts.”[8] In this matter, Barker was charged with failure to maintain her lane of travel in violation of OCGA § 40-6-48, which—like most traffic offenses—is a misdemeanor.[9] And OCGA § 17-3-1 (e) requires that a “[p]rosecution for misdemeanors shall be commenced within two years after the commission of the crime.” Specifically, the twoyear period in which a misdemeanor must be prosecuted “runs from the date the offense is committed until the date the original accusation is filed.”[10] But importantly, a uniform traffic citation “serves as an accusation in any court having jurisdiction over the offense, except superior court.”[11] Indeed, a prosecution “commences” when a charging instrument, “such as an accusation, indictment, or Uniform Traffic Citation (‘UTC’), is issued, and continues until there has been a final disposition of the case.”[12] Initially focusing on the two accusations the State filed just before trial (more than two years after the traffic stop), Barker argues her prosecution should have been barred. But in this matter, the prosecution commenced on January 16, 2021, when the sheriff’s deputy issued the UTC to Barker following the traffic stop, not on March 21, 2023, when the first accusation was filed, and thus, the State’s prosecution did not violate the statute of limitation.[13] Furthermore, with regard to the accusations, OCGA § 17–7–71 (f) provides: “Prior to trial, the prosecuting attorney may amend the accusation, summons, or any citation to allege or to change the allegations regarding any offense arising out of the same conduct of the defendant which gave rise to any offense alleged or attempted to be alleged in the original accusation, summons, or citation.” And whether an amendment to an accusation or indictment after expiration of the statute of limitation “broadens or substantially amends the original charge is undoubtedly an issue of law.”[14] Here, the State dismissed the first accusation, which added the charge of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer—a charge for which the deputy did not issue a citation; and it ultimately proceeded with an amended accusation, charging only a count for failure to maintain her lane. So, the amended accusation did not “commence a new prosecution, but rather, constituted a continuation of the original prosecution.”[15] Nevertheless, turning her focus to the initial citation, Barker argues that it was defective because it merely cited the statute violated without providing any additional information and failed to adequately state where the offense occurred. But here, we are precluded from considering this argument because—as demonstrated by the appellate record—Barker failed to raise this issue below and may not raise it for the first time on appeal.[16] Moreover, even if we were to consider this argument, it lacks merit. Barker is correct that “a citation—if used as a charging instrument—should provide at least a bare minimum of facts alleging how the defendant violated the Code section or at least track the language of the Code section—not just the title of the Code section—to set out all of the elements of the offense.”[17] But the citation here not only indicated that the offense was failure to maintain a lane and cited the relevant statute (OCGA § 40-6-48), it also described in the “remarks” section of the citation that the “driver hit the white line to the right three times.” In addition, and also contrary to Barker’s assertion, the citation did not just note that the offense occurred on Interstate 20 but further provided that it was within the city of Douglasville and near the exit to Highway 92. And even if the citation could be characterized as insufficient, the State’s accusation charging this offense—which as noted supra was not time barred[18]—tracked the language of the statute and alleged how Barker’s driving violated the statute. Given these circumstances, there was nothing defective about the citation—even if Barker had raised this issue below.[19] 2. Barker also maintains the trial court erred in denying her claim that her Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated. But because the trial court’s ruling on Barker’s speedy-trial claim is insufficient to allow us to determine whether it abused its discretion in denying that motion, we must vacate that ruling and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The United States Constitution guarantees that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,”[20] Similarly, the Georgia Constitution protects this same right, providing that “[i]n criminal cases, the defendant shall have a public and speedy trial[.]“[21] Of course, in ruling on a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial claim, the “analysis proceeds in two stages.”[22] First, a trial court’s threshold inquiry is “whether the interval from the accused’s arrest, indictment, or other formal accusation to the trial is sufficiently long to be considered presumptively prejudicial.”[23] And if not, “the speedy trial claim fails.”[24] But if the delay is deemed presumptively prejudicial, the trial court must consider the four factors outlined by the Supreme Court of the United States in BarkerDoggett, which guide Georgia courts in considering whether a delay violated an accused’s right to a speedy trial.”[25] As the Supreme Court of Georgia has explained, if the delay is long enough to invoke the presumption of prejudice, the trial court must balance four factors: (1) whether the delay before trial was uncommonly long, (2) whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for the delay, (3) whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and (4) whether he suffered prejudice as the delay’s result.[26] Importantly, speedy-trial claims require trial courts to “engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.”[27] And equally important, this task is “committed principally to the discretion of the trial court, and this Court has a limited role in reviewing the trial court’s decision.”[28] Indeed, we must “accept the factual findings of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous, and we must accept the ultimate conclusion of the trial court unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion, even though we might have reached a different conclusion were the issue committed to our discretion.”[29] Here, after hearing argument from both parties, the trial court issued its ruling from the bench, explaining that it was doing so under the two-part framework set out by Barker v. Wingo.[30] In doing so, the court first opined that it did not think that the length of time between the sheriff’s deputy issuing the citation to Barker (January 16, 2021) and the trial (March 22, 2023) was presumptively prejudicial, citing again to the prosecution still being well within the statute of limitation. But this assessment is belied by well-established case authority, which holds that “[a] oneyear delay is typically presumed to be prejudicial.”[31] Despite this initial finding, the trial court did not end its inquiry but rather continued its analysis of the BarkerDoggett factors. Specifically, the court subsequently found that the length of the delay was partially due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Supreme Court of Georgia’s judicial emergency orders; Barker had not asserted her right to a speedy trial until the day before trial; and she suffered no prejudice given that no witnesses were no longer available. The trial court then concluded by denying Barker’s motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds and proceeding with trial. Based on this ruling, we can infer that the trial court weighed most of these factors against Barker, but being able to draw such an inference is not sufficient. At no point in its oral order did the court explain the extent to which it weighed each factor for or against the parties. And significantly, it failed to make even a “bare conclusion about how these factors balanced against each other.”[32] But these factors must be considered together with “such other circumstances as may be relevant.”[33] Indeed, a court must weigh all four factors, “along with any other relevant circumstances, in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.”[34] Given these circumstances, as well as the trial court’s erroneous legal conclusion that the two-year delay was not presumptively prejudicial, we cannot affirm.[35] Accordingly, the trial court’s ruling must be vacated and the case remanded for the court to exercise its discretion again using properly supported factual findings and the correct legal analysis, reflected in an adequate written order.[36] 3. Finally, Barker contends the trial court erred in denying her motion for reconsideration. But given our remand of this case under our holding in Division 2, supra, we need not address this issue beyond reiterating that the trial court did not err in denying Barker’s motion that the statute of limitation barred her prosecution. For all these reasons, we affirm the denial of Barker’s motion that the statute of limitation barred her prosecution, but vacate the ruling on her speedy-trial claim and remand to the trial court for entry of a written order including proper findings. Judgment affirmed in part, vacated in part, and case remanded. Rickman and Pipkin, JJ., concur.
