Dillard, Presiding Judge. The State appeals the trial court’s grant of Devdan Yearwood-Cabbel’s third amended motion to suppress evidence, as well as the denial of its motion for reconsideration of that ruling. Specifically, the State argues the trial court (1) erred by failing to follow this Court’s instruction in a prior appeal to issue an order on remand clarifying the basis for its initial denial of Cabbel’s motion to suppress; (2) was not authorized to grant the motion as a discovery sanction for its failure to produce certain evidence; and (3) erred in finding Cabbel had standing to challenge the search as an “invited guest” at the residence searched. For the following reasons, we affirm.[1] As an initial matter, both parties provide parts of the procedural history of this case, but neither recites the underlying facts accompanied by record citations. Needless to say, it is not the function of this Court to “cull the record on behalf of a party in search of instances of error.”[2] To the contrary, the burden is on the party alleging error to “show it affirmatively in the record.”[3] But as discussed infra, this case was previously before us, and we issued an unpublished opinion remanding it with direction.[4] And while the State “adopts” its brief from the prior appeal (in which it was the appellee), it also notes that our opinion in Cabbel I “contains a more-than-sufficient recitation of the underlying facts of the case and procedural history so far.” As a result, for context, we glean the following facts from our opinion in Cabbel I. The record shows that a detective with the Gwinnett County Police Department applied for a warrant to search James Robertson’s residence.[5] And in support of the application, the detective submitted an affidavit detailing his investigation into a series of car break-ins and other crimes.[6] The affidavit also explained why he believed evidence of those offenses would be found in Robertson’s house, including a stolen firearm, ammunition, and personal belongings of the victims.[7] In addition to the affidavit, the detective gave sworn oral testimony before a magistrate judge in support of the war]rant application.[8] Thereafter, the magistrate judge issued a search warrant for Robertson’s residence.[9] Unlike the detective’s affidavit, the warrant did not contain a description of the specific items to be searched for and seized there.[10] And although the warrant form included a box for a “list of certain property, items, articles, [and] instruments to be searched for and seized,” it only contained the following: “The residence of James Robertson (DOB 03.30.2003) located at 4114 Waters End Ln., Snellville, GA 30039. A single family home inside Gwinnett County.”[11] Significantly, the warrant did not incorporate the detective’s affidavit and application.[12] During the search, the detective and other police officers encountered Cabbel and other individuals and seized incriminating items, including items allegedly linking Cabbel to an armed robbery under investigation.[13] The detective completed an inventory of the seized items, in which he noted that he “left a copy of the warrant, together with the receipt of the seized person(s), property, items, articles, [and] instruments” with Robertson’s uncle.[14] Subsequently, the detective prepared a photographic lineup that included an image of Cabbel, and the armed-robbery victim identified him as one of the perpetrators.[15] Cabbel was then arrested (along with a co-defendant), and charged with armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.[16] After he was arrested, Cabbel spoke to detectives in a recorded interview.[17] Later on, Cabbel filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search, arguing the search of Robertson’s residence was unconstitutional on several grounds—including that the warrant was fatally defective on its face because it “fail[ed] to describe with some degree of specificity . . . the items to be searched for and seized.”[18] Cabbel sought suppression of all items seized as “fruits of the search,” including the items listed in the detective’s inventory.[19] Additionally, Cabbel filed separate amended motions, alleging the robbery victim’s identification of him and his custodial statement to detectives were “fruit of the poisonous tree” of the unconstitutional search and should be excluded at trial.[20] The trial court held a hearing on the matter, during which the State argued, inter alia, that Cabbel lacked standing to challenge the validity of the search warrant because he did not live or stay overnight at Robertson’s residence.[21] Cabbel testified that, at the time of the search, he had been staying overnight at Robertson’s home for a few days and had a bag of clothes there.[22] But on cross-examination, Cabbel admitted that he lived in Suwanee, Georgia; he had not been staying or living with Robertson; and his mother dropped him off at Robertson’s home on the day of the search.[23] Following Cabbel’s testimony, the trial court stated, “I’m not a hundred percent sure that the law is particularly clear, but at this point in time, based on what I’ve heard, . . . I’m going to find that [Cabbel] does have standing to challenge the search.”[24] The trial court then asked Cabbel’s counsel to prepare an order to that effect, but apparently no such order was ever entered.[25] As to the merits of the case, the State introduced into evidence the search warrant, the detective’s application and affidavit, and the inventory form he filled out at the scene.[26] And during the hearing, the detective conceded that the warrant did not list the property to be searched for and seized from the residence and was not incorporated into his warrant application.[27] The detective confirmed that he left a copy of the search warrant and inventory list with Robertson’s uncle, but he could not recall whether he also left a copy of the warrant application and affidavit.[28] Ultimately, the trial court issued a summary order denying Cabbel’s motion to suppress.[29] But in the order, the trial court did not include any findings of fact and did not mention Cabbel’s separate motions seeking exclusion of the photographic-lineup identification and his custodial statements.[30] Cabbel appealed, and in Cabbel I, this Court determined it could not ascertain from the record or the trial court’s order whether it reconsidered its oral pronouncement that Cabbel had standing to challenge the search.[31] Indeed, the Cabbel I Court noted that it could not determine whether the trial court denied Cabbel’s motion to suppress for lack of standing or on the merits.[32] Given this uncertainty, we vacated the trial court’s order denying Cabbel’s motion to suppress and remanded the case with direction that the trial court issue a new order clarifying the specific factual findings and legal conclusions forming the basis for denying Cabbel’s motion.[33] Upon remand, Cabbel amended his suppression motion three times, and ultimately, the trial court granted his third amended motion in a detailed order.[34]The trial court first found that Cabbel had standing to challenge the validity of the search because he was a “regular overnight guest” at Robertson’s home, and he had stayed there two or three nights prior to the 9:00 a.m. execution of the warrant. As to the merits of the case, the trial court found that the search warrant was improper on its face because it did not describe with some degree of specificity the places to be searched and items to be searched and seized. Following the trial court’s ruling, the State filed a motion for reconsideration. Specifically, the State contended, inter alia, that the trial court failed to follow the Cabbel I Court’s order to clarify its prior ruling, claiming that our prior opinion did not “contemplate that [the trial court] would adopt a new position in the order on remand.” According to the State, the “extreme sanction of evidentiary suppression should not be applied before [the] case goes to a jury.” Nevertheless, the trial court declined to reconsider its ruling that suppression of evidence was warranted. The trial court acknowledged this Court’s instruction to clarify its ruling (which it did), but found it had discretion to consider Cabbel’s motion anew and grant it. This appeal by the State follows.[35] In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court generally must “(1) accept a trial court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous, (2) construe the evidentiary record in the light most favorable to the factual findings and judgment of the trial court, and (3) limit its consideration of the disputed facts to those expressly found by the trial court.”[36] But this Court reviews de novo the trial court’s “application of law to the undisputed facts.”[37] Bearing these guiding principles in mind, we turn to the State’s claims of error. 1. Addressing the State’s third argument first, it contends the trial court erred in finding Cabbel had standing to challenge the search as an “invited guest” at the residence such that he had a privacy interest in the area searched. We disagree. In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, the threshold question is whether the defendant has “standing to challenge the seizure of the evidence.”[38] Of course, in accordance with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,[39] a search warrant in Georgia may issue “only upon facts sufficient to show probable cause that a crime is being committed or has been committed.”[40] And because Fourth Amendment rights are “personal, a defendant may move to suppress evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure only when his own rights were violated.”[41] Indeed, as a general rule, a person who is “aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person’s premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.”[42] Finally, the burden is “on the one claiming a violation of Fourth Amendment rights to demonstrate that [he has] standing to contest such violation, i.e., that he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises searched or the property seized.”[43] Here, although Cabbel did not own, rent, or live in the residence searched, the trial court found he had standing to challenge the search as a regular overnight, invited guest in the home—i.e., he had stayed there two or three nights prior to the 9:00 a.m. execution of the warrant. In this regard, the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that “[a] person . . . may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in a house in which the person is an overnight guest; however, one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not claim [Fourth Amendment protection].”[44] Similarly, like a householder, the registered guest of a hotel room has “an expectation of privacy in that room.”[45] And whether this same protection applies to a guest of a homeowner is determined “based on the status of the guest.”[46] But if the guest is only a “casual visitor, as opposed to an overnight guest, the guest does not have the same expectation of privacy as the [homeowner].”[47] Needless to say, this is a fact-based inquiry and one falling squarely within the purview of the trial court, and we will not disturb its findings in this regard unless they are clearly erroneous.[48] As previously mentioned, the trial court found Cabbel had a reasonable expectation of privacy in Robertson’s home because he was a regular overnight guest—he had been staying at the residence for a few days prior to the execution of the search warrant and had clothes and other personal items with him at the time. The State disagrees and argues at length that the evidence did not support the trial court’s findings. But at the hearing on the motion to suppress, Cabbel testified that he had been staying in Robertson’s home for three or four days prior to the execution of the search warrant. Further, Cabbel testified that, at the time, he had a “bag full of clothes and shoes” and toiletries in Robertson’s home. Even so, the State notes that Cabbel told law enforcement he had not stayed overnight there. Additionally, the State claims that there was no evidence Cabbel was in Robertson’s home with his permission. But there was evidence the two men went to school together and Cabbel stayed overnight in the home regularly in a designated room; and no evidence suggested Robertson ever reported him to police as an unwelcome intruder. There was, then, at least some evidence that Cabbel was a welcomed guest in Robertson’s home. Regardless, on appeal from a motion to suppress, the evidence is “viewed in a light most favorable to upholding the trial court’s judgment.”[49] So, to the extent there was conflicting evidence as to whether Cabbel was a welcomed overnight guest in Robertson’s home for several days preceding the search, it was the trial court’s duty to “resolve conflicts in the evidence, and its findings of credibility and fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous.”[50] And here, construing the evidence in favor of the trial court’s factual findings (which we are bound to do), its determination that Cabbel had standing to challenge the search warrant was not clearly erroneous.[51] 2. The State also argues the trial court erred by failing to follow this Court’s instruction in Cabbel I to clarify its initial cursory ruling denying Cabbel’s motion to suppress.[52] Again, we disagree. Specifically, the State contends that—given our express instruction in Cabbel I to clarify its earlier order summarily denying Cabbel’s motion to suppress evidence—the trial court erred in reconsidering and granting the motion upon remand. But the denial of a pretrial suppression motion—an interlocutory evidentiary ruling—is “subject to review by the presiding judge ex mero motu.”[53] And as a result, the trial court may, “within its sound discretion, consider anew a suppression motion previously denied.”[54] In Cabbel I, this Court did not address the merits of whether the trial court’s initial denial of Cabbel’s suppression motion was erroneous, and nothing in the opinion prohibited that court from exercising its discretion to alter its ruling before the final judgment. Instead, we simply found the trial court’s cursory order was insufficient to establish its reasoning for the denial. This Court’s only instruction was for the trial court to clarify its decision; and the State does not claim the court’s order fails to adequately explain its decision to grant Cabbel’s motion. Indeed, upon remand (after reconsidering the motion anew), the trial court issued a detailed six-page order granting Cabbel’s motion to suppress evidence with a clear explanation of its reasons for doing so (along with supporting legal authority). Specifically, as explained in Division I supra, the trial court correctly found Cabbel had standing to challenge the search of Robertson’s home. The court also explained its ruling that the warrant was improper on its face because it failed to “describe with some degree of specificity the places to be searched and items to be searched for and seized.” So, even setting aside the merits of those rulings, the State’s claim that the trial court failed to issue a new order clarifying the basis for its ruling on Cabbel’s interlocutory motion is belied by the record.[55] 3. Lastly, the State argues the trial court was not authorized to grant a motion to suppress evidence as a “type of discovery sanction for [its] failure to tender a recording of the magistrate’s pre-issuance hearing.” Once again, we disagree. Contrary to the State’s argument, it is evident from the trial court’s order that it granted Cabbel’s motion on the merits because the search warrant was “improper on its face” due to a lack of specificity. And while the court summarily found as an alternative basis for its ruling that the State’s failure to produce certain evidence was a “fatal defect,” it never suggested that it granted Cabbel’s motion as a sanction on the State for failing to produce evidence.[56] Regardless, the evidentiary issues are irrelevant, as the State does not challenge the trial court’s ruling that Cabbel satisfied that burden because the warrant was improper. As a result, we do not address that issue and presume the trial court’s ruling in this regard was correct.[57] For all these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s grant of Cabbel’s motion to suppress evidence and its denial of the State’s motion for reconsideration. Judgment affirmed. Rickman and Pipkin, JJ., concur.
