Per Curiam. This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and recommendation of Special Master Daniel S. Reinhardt, who recommends that Respondent Cheryl Joyce Braziel (State Bar No. 275115) receive a two-year suspension with a condition on reinstatement for her misconduct in relation to negotiations with lienholders during the settlement of a personal injury case, in connection with which she violated Rules 1.15 (I) (b),[1] 1.15 (I) (c),[2] and 4.1[3] of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”), found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d).[4] The maximum sanction for a single violation of any of these Rules is disbarment. Braziel, a member of the State Bar of Georgia since 2007, is currently under administrative suspension for failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements. Having carefully reviewed the record, we agree that a two-year suspension with a condition is the proper sanction for Braziel’s misconduct in this matter, with the two-year suspension to begin only after her current administrative suspension is lifted. See Bar Rule 8-108 (setting out procedures for reinstatement following administrative suspension for failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements). In a formal complaint filed in 2021, the State Bar charged Braziel with several violations of the GRPC, including Rules 1.15 (I) (b), 1.15 (I) (c), and 4.1. After a hearing, the Special Master concluded that Braziel violated Rules 1.15 (I) (c) and 4.1 and found facts demonstrating that Braziel violated Rule 1.15 (I) (b).[5] Neither Braziel nor the State Bar filed exceptions to or requested review by the State Disciplinary Review Board. The facts, as found by the Special Master and supported by the record, show that Braziel was retained to pursue a personal injury claim for a client who was injured in July 2016 in an automobile collision in Texas, for which he received treatment at a hospital in Texas.[6] The client continued to receive medical treatment after he was released from the hospital, but he did not have health insurance. Shortly thereafter, the hospital executed a notice of hospital lien as to the client’s medical expenses. Additionally, the Office of the Texas Attorney General Child Support Collections Unit (“Texas Attorney General”) sent a notice of lien to Braziel reflecting that the client owed child support (“child support lien”). Braziel attempted to negotiate the amount of the liens with the hospital and the Texas Attorney General. The hospital offered to settle its lien for $5,425, but Braziel did not accept the offer on her client’s behalf. The Texas Attorney General agreed to reduce the amount of the child support lien to $0, relying on Braziel’s representation that the client would not receive any portion of the personal injury settlement with the at-fault driver. In August 2017, Braziel settled the client’s personal injury claim with the at-fault driver’s insurance company for $31,440. After receiving the settlement check, Braziel presented the client with a settlement statement, which the client signed. The statement indicated that the client would receive a total disbursement of $10,743.76, the balance of the hospital lien was $5,425, the child support lien had a zero balance, and other liens were being paid off. However, Braziel did not notify the Texas Attorney General or the hospital about the settlement; she did not pay the child support lien; and she did not satisfy the hospital lien until September 2019, after the hospital’s attorney filed a grievance with the State Bar. Based on these facts, we agree with the Special Master that Braziel violated Rule 1.15 (I) (c) because she did not promptly give notice of her receipt of the settlement funds to either the hospital or the Texas Attorney General and she did not promptly satisfy the negotiated liens. We further agree that Braziel violated Rule 4.1 in the course of negotiating the amount of the child support lien to zero, when she advised the Texas Attorney General that the client would receive nothing from the settlement. Additionally, Braziel admitted she violated Rule 1.15 (I) (b) by her failure to satisfy the child support lien out of the settlement proceeds. Looking to factors in mitigation and aggravation, see American Bar Association Standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”),[7] we accept the Special Master’s factual finding that Braziel “has been cooperative,” which may be considered in mitigation. See ABA Standard 9.32 (e) (cooperative attitude toward disciplinary proceeding may be mitigating factor). We also agree with the Special Master that Braziel’s prior disciplinary history is an aggravating factor. See ABA Standard 9.22 (a) (prior disciplinary offense may be aggravating factor).[8] See In the Matter of Braziel (“Braziel I”), 306 Ga. 385 (830 SE2d 730) (2019) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline and imposing public reprimand for failure to adequately supervise nonlawyer employee). Having carefully reviewed the record and considered the applicable ABA Standards, we agree with the Special Master that, given Braziel’s prior disciplinary history and the lack of significant mitigating factors, our cases support the imposition of a two-year suspension with reinstatement conditioned upon her participation in the State Bar’s Law Practice Management Program for Braziel’s violations of Rules 1.15 (I) (b), 1.15 (I) (c) and 4.1. See, e.g., In the Matter of Van Johnson, 313 Ga. 151, 152-154 (868 SE2d 794) (2022) (imposing six-month suspension where attorney with no prior disciplinary history filed petition for voluntary discipline, admitting various violations of GRPC, including in connection with settling client’s personal injury case and failing to pay medical providers funds they were entitled to, where there were substantial mitigating circumstances and where reinstatement was conditioned on participation in Law Practice Management Program); In the Matter of Veach, 310 Ga. 470, 471-473 (851 SE2d 590) (2020) (imposing an 18-month suspension where attorney with no prior disciplinary history filed petition for voluntary discipline, admitting violations of Rules 1.15 (I) (b), 1.15 (II) (b), and 8.4 (a) (4) for misconduct including failing to disburse money to a lienholder and where there were significant mitigating circumstances); In the Matter of Berry, 310 Ga. 158, 158-159 (848 SE2d 71) (2020) (disbarring attorney, who was in default and had prior disciplinary history, where attorney agreed to resolve medical lien upon settlement of personal injury claim but failed to do so and misappropriated funds that he was supposed to remit to a medical provider); In the Matter of Nicholson, 299 Ga. 737, 737-738, 740-742 (791 SE2d 776) (2016) (disbarring attorney, who was in default, for violating Rules 1.15 (I) (b), 4.1 (a), 8.4 (a) (4), and 9.3 where attorney executed false affidavit and subsequently failed to satisfy hospital lien and where there were aggravating factors and no mitigating circumstances of significant weight). Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that Cheryl Joyce Braziel is suspended from the practice of law in Georgia for two years, with reinstatement conditioned upon her participation in the State Bar’s Law Practice Management Program.[9] At the conclusion of the two- year suspension, Braziel may seek reinstatement by demonstrating to the State Bar’s Office of General Counsel that she has met the condition on reinstatement. If the State Bar agrees that the condition has been met, it will submit a notice of compliance to this Court, and this Court will issue an order granting or denying reinstatement. Braziel is reminded of her duties under Bar Rule 4-219 (b). Two-year suspension with condition. All the Justices concur.
