Dillard, Presiding Judge. Following trial, a jury convicted Justin Hewett on one count of child molestation and one count of sexual battery as a lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, Hewett challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, and he further contends the trial court erred in failing to rule that the convictions were mutually exclusive, failing to find that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, and failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on simple battery as a lesserincluded offense of child molestation. For the following reasons, we affirm. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict,[1] the record shows that in 2019, Hewett—who was 17 years old at the time—lived with his grandparents.[2] And during this time period, two of Hewett’s younger cousins—four-year-old L. C. and her twin brother—frequently came over to the grandparents’ home to visit and occasionally spend the night on the weekends. On March 6, 2019, L. C. was at the grandparents’ home to spend the night (without her brother). And at some point that afternoon, L. C. came out of Hewett’s room—where he was playing video games—and told her grandmother that Hewett had just touched her “no-no,” which was the term she used to refer to her vagina. The grandmother immediately went into Hewett’s room to confront him about L. C.’s allegation, but Hewett claimed that he may have accidentally touched her privates while helping pull up her pants. And in light of Hewett’s response, the grandmother took no further action at that time, and L. C. spent the night as planned. The next morning, L. C.’s mother went to the grandparents’ home to pick up her daughter. And shortly after she entered the home, L. C., unprompted, repeated her allegation that Hewett touched her “no-no” the previous day. The grandmother quickly admitted L. C. told her about the incident right after it happened, and that when she confronted Hewett, he claimed he accidentally touched L. C. while they were engaging in horseplay. The mother then went into Hewett’s room to confront him, at which point Hewett repeated his explanation that he accidentally touched L. C. during horseplay, after which he brusquely left his room. Subsequently, L. C.’s mother took her daughter home, but she noticed that L. C. seemed unusually quiet and clingy. An later that evening, after L. C. took a shower, she provided more details about the incident, claiming that Hewett pulled down her pants and placed his finger in her “no-no.” Based on this additional information, L. C.’s father contacted law enforcement; and the next day, L. C.’s mother took her to a local child-advocacy center for a forensic interview. But during that interview, L. C. did not repeat her outcry; and that same day, she underwent a physical examination, which neither confirmed nor excluded the possibility of sexual abuse. At the conclusion of the examination, however, as the nurse examiner reminded L. C. that no one should touch her privates, she spontaneously replied that Hewett had done so. Approximately one week later, after being advised of his rights, Hewett agreed to an interview with law enforcement. In the interview, Hewett relayed to the investigator what he initially told his grandmother and L. C.’s mother—that he may have accidentally touched L. C.’s private area while engaging in horseplay. But then he admitted this was not truthful and told the investigator that L. C. came out of his bathroom with her pants tangled up, and in trying to help her pull them up, he accidentally poked her privates, causing her to say “ow.” The investigator then asked why he changed his story, and Hewett replied that he was scared. Following the interview, the investigator placed Hewett under arrest. The State charged Hewett, via indictment, with one count of child molestation and one count of aggravated sexual battery. The case then proceeded to trial, during which the State presented the foregoing evidence, including a video recording of Hewett’s interview with law enforcement. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Hewett guilty of both charged offenses. Hewett then filed a motion for new trial, arguing, inter alia, that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The trial court held a hearing on the matter, during which Hewett’s former counsel and his grandmother testified. When the hearing concluded, the trial court took the issue under advisement, but it ultimately denied Hewett’s motion for new trial. This appeal follows. 1. Hewett first contends the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. We disagree. When a criminal conviction is appealed, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the appellant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence.[3] Significantly, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not “weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility, but only determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.”[4] The jury’s verdict will be upheld, then, so long as there is “some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State’s case.”[5] Bearing these guiding principles in mind, we turn to Hewett’s specific challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. The version of OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (1) applicable at the time of the subject incidents provided that “[a] person commits the offense of child molestation when such person . . . [d]oes any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person . . . .”[6] And the applicable version of OCGA § 16-6-22.1 (b) provided that “[a] person commits the offense of sexual battery when he or she intentionally makes physical contact with the intimate parts of the body of another person without the consent of that person.”[7] In this matter, Count 1 of the indictment charged Hewett with child molestation by alleging that on March 6, 2019, he “then and there did commit an immoral and indecent act to [L. C.], a child under the age of 16 years, with the intent to arouse and satisfy the sexual desires of himself by touching said child’s vagina with his finger . . . .” Count 2 charged Hewett with aggravated sexual battery by alleging that on March 6, 2019, he “then and there did intentionally penetrate the sexual organ of [L. C.] with his finger, a foreign object, without the consent of said person . . . .” Here, the State presented evidence that Hewett touched L. C.’s vagina with his finger; and when confronted, provided conflicting accounts of how the incident occurred. Of course, the victim’s testimony alone is “sufficient to sustain a conviction.”[8] As a result, given L. C. and the outcry witnesses’ testimony, the evidence was sufficient to support Hewett’s convictions on charges of child molestation and sexual battery.[9] Nevertheless, Hewett argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the State failed to disprove that the touching was accidental or to prove it was done to satisfy his sexual desires. Put another way, he claims the State failed to prove he possessed the requisite intent. But intent, which is a mental attitude, is “commonly detectable only inferentially, and the law accommodates this.”[10] And while a person is not presumed to “act with criminal intention, intent is a question of fact to be determined upon consideration of the words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted.”[11] In this case, the jury heard Hewett’s assertion that his touching of L. C.’s privates was accidental, and the trial court instructed the jury on the law regarding intent and accident, explaining that a person cannot be found guilty of any crime committed by accident. As a result, whether Hewett’s intentions were innocent as he claimed, or were instead to arouse his own sexual desires as found by the jury, was peculiarly a question of fact for determination by the jury[,] and even when a finding that the accused had the intent to commit the crime charged is supported by evidence which is exceedingly weak the verdict will not be set aside on that ground.[12] Given these circumstances, the jury could certainly infer that Hewett possessed the requisite intent, and therefore, the evidence sufficiently supported his convictions.[13] 2. Hewett also claims the trial court erred in failing to rule that the child-molestation and sexual-battery convictions were mutually exclusive and, thus, invalid. Again, we disagree. The term “mutually exclusive” generally applies to two guilty verdicts that “cannot legally exist simultaneously”;[14] and in such cases, when “it is both legally and logically impossible to convict on both counts, a new trial should be ordered.”[15] So, when verdicts are mutually exclusive, a guilty verdict on “one count logically excludes a finding of guilt on the other.”[16] Indeed, when convictions are mutually exclusive, it is insufficient to merely set aside the lesser verdict, because to do so is to “speculate about what the jury might have done if properly instructed, and to usurp the functions of both the jury and trial court.”[17] Judgments entered upon such verdicts, then, are void.[18] Turning to the particular offenses at issue, we begin by looking to the statutory language for each. And in doing so, we necessarily begin our analysis with “familiar and binding canons of construction.”[19] Suffice it to say, in considering the meaning of a statute, our charge is to “presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.”[20] Toward that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning,[21] consider the text contextually,[22] read the text “in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would,”[23] and seek to “avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage.”[24] Put somewhat more concisely, when the language of a statute is “plain and susceptible of only one natural and reasonable construction, courts must construe the statute accordingly.”[25] Here, the applicable iteration of OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (1) provided that a person commits child molestation when he “[d]oes any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person[.]” And the applicable version of OCGA § 16-6-22.1 (b) provided that “ [a] person commits the offense of sexual battery when he or she intentionally makes physical contact with the intimate parts of the body of another person without the consent of that person.” And when comparing these two statutes, it is readily apparent that sexual battery requires proof of a fact that the offense of child molestation does not: lack of consent. Additionally, the offense of child molestation requires proof of a fact that the offense of sexual battery does not: the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person.[26] Even so, Hewett argues his sexual-battery conviction means, logically, that the jury found he did not possess the requisite intent to arouse or satisfy his sexual desires to support a child molestation conviction. But this inferential leap falls short, as the applicable sexual-battery statute requires no specific mindset at all, but rather, only an intent to complete the physical contact. Needless to say, possessing such general intent in no way precludes also having the specific intent to satisfy one’s sexual desires. And in fact, multiple guilty verdicts for “the same conduct that are based on varying levels of mens rea are not mutually exclusive.”[27] Accordingly, the trial court did not err in declining to rule that Hewett’s convictions were mutually exclusive. 3. Hewett further contends the trial court erred in denying his claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present impeachment evidence on his behalf. Yet again, we disagree. It is well established that to evaluate Hewett’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington,[28] which requires him to show that his trial counsel’s performance was “deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different.”[29] Importantly, should a defendant “fail to meet his burden on one prong of this twoprong test, we need not review the other prong.”[30] As a result, this burden, “though not impossible to carry, is a heavy one.”[31] Indeed, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct falls within the broad range of reasonable professional conduct, and a criminal defendant must overcome this presumption.[32] In fact, the reasonableness of counsel’s conduct is “examined from counsel’s perspective at the time of trial and under the particular circumstances of the case[.]“[33] And decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if “they were so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed such a course.”[34] So, unless clearly erroneous, this Court will “uphold a trial court’s factual determinations with respect to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel; however, a trial court’s legal conclusions in this regard are reviewed de novo.”[35] With these guiding principles in mind, we turn to Hewett’s specific claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Hewett maintains his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate if L. C. had a penchant for dishonesty and that if he had done so, he could have presented testimony from L. C.’s grandmother (who—as noted supra— was also his grandmother, as well as his adoptive mother) and her brothers that she was often dishonest. Hewett further argues counsel had no strategic reason for not presenting such evidence. And indeed, the grandmother testified during the hearing on Hewett’s motion for new trial that L. C. often exaggerated about her brothers picking on her. The grandmother further testified that one of L. C.’s brothers told her that “[L. C.] lies all the time.” But setting aside any questions as to what extent the grandmother’s testimony would have even been admissible at trial, Hewett’s contention that his counsel’s failure to present such evidence was not based on any strategy is belied by the record. During the hearing on Hewett’s motion, trial counsel testified that his defense theory was that L. C. was too young to understand the difference between an accidental touching and a sexually inappropriate one, and that her mother—who apparently had been the victim of sexual abuse at some point in her past—was the only person aggressively pushing the more damaging details.[36] Trial counsel further testified that although he did not recall specifics, he recalled there may have been some statements from family members concerning L. C.’s lack of honesty, but added that his “theory of defense would not have attacked the child.” And when pushed on this issue, trial counsel reiterated that his strategy was to show L. C. did not understand the difference between an accidental and inappropriate touching. Given our review of the record, Hewett cannot show that trial counsel’s affirmative, strategic decision not to attack L. C.’s credibility “was so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made the same decision.”[37] To the contrary, trial counsel’s strategy was perfectly reasonable in light of Hewett admitting to accidentally touching L. C.’s privates to his grandmother, L. C.’s mother, and during his interview with law enforcement. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Hewett’s ineffective-assistance claim.[38] 4. Finally, Hewett contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on simple battery as a lesserincluded-offense of child molestation. Once again, we disagree. Prior to trial, Hewett submitted written charge requests, which included a request that the jury be instructed on sexual battery as a lesser-included-offense for both the child molestation and aggravated sexual battery charges. And during the charge conference, Hewett reiterated that request, and the trial court obliged, instructing the jury that it could find Hewett guilty of sexual battery as a lesser-included-offense for either of the offenses charged in the indictment. Nonetheless, Hewett argues the trial court erred by not also instructing the jury on simple battery as a lesser-included-offense of child molestation. But as Hewett concedes on appeal, there was no request for such a charge nor did he object when the trial court failed to provide it. Given these circumstances, our review of this claim of error is significantly constrained. Indeed, under OCGA § 17-8-58, “[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.”[39] The failure to do so precludes “appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects the substantial rights of the parties.”[40] In such cases, the proper inquiry is whether “the instruction was erroneous, whether it was obviously so, and whether it likely affected the outcome of the proceedings.”[41] Here, because Hewett failed to object to the trial court’s jury instructions, our review is limited to consideration in this regard.[42] And as we have repeatedly emphasized, satisfying the plainerror standard is “difficult, as it should be.”[43] The burden of establishing plain error, then, “falls squarely on the defendant.”[44] Importantly, this Court does not have to “analyze all elements of the plainerror test [when] an appellant fails to establish one of them.”[45] Turning to the offense on which Hewett argues the jury should have been instructed, OCGA § 16-5-23 (a) provides: ”A person commits the offense of simple battery when he or she either: (1) Intentionally makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with the person of another; or (2) Intentionally causes physical harm to another.” But Hewett cites to no case authority to support his argument that a charge on simple battery was required in this instance. Of course, this failure is hardly surprising. This Court has questioned whether simple battery can ever be a lesser-included-offense to child molestation as a matter of law.[46] And of course, an error cannot be plain when there is “no controlling authority on point”;[47] and an error is not plain under current law if “a defendant’s theory requires the extension of precedent.”[48] Needless to say, Hewett’s theory that the jury should have been charged on simple battery as a lesser-included-offense of child molestation “would require an extension of, if not a departure from, existing case law.”[49] As a result, the trial court’s failure to provide such an instruction here cannot be characterized as plain error.[50] For all these reasons, we affirm Hewett’s convictions and the denial of his motion for new trial. Judgment affirmed. Brown and Padgett, JJ., concur.
