Dillard, Presiding Judge. John and Ginger Reeves appeal the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict in favor of Allstate Insurance Company on their claim for breach of its obligations under an insurance policy. The Reeveses contend the court erred in doing so when (1) they complied with the policy’s two-year limitation period in bringing their claim; and (2) the Georgia Standard Fire Policy is applicable to the policy, which they claim creates a two-year limitation period as a matter of law. For the following reasons, we affirm. A trial court may only direct a verdict if “there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, shall demand a particular verdict.”[1] If there is any evidence—even slight evidence—to support the opposing party’s case, granting a directed verdict is improper.[2] Importantly, this Court reviews the grant of a motion for directed verdict de novo, and we must construe the evidence in favor of the nonmovant.[3] And here, the trial court granted a directed verdict to Allstate based on its interpretation of an insurance policy, which is a matter of law and likewise subject to de novo review.[4] With these guiding principles in mind, we turn now to the Reeveses’ enumerated claims of error. The Reeveses owned a home in Fayetteville, which was severely damaged by a storm when trees fell on their house on March 31, 2020. At the time of the loss, the Reeveses were insured by Allstate; and after Allstate failed to pay all sums due for the loss,[5] the Reeveses filed suit against it on March 31, 2022. Specifically, the Reeveses made claims for breach of contract based on Allstate’s failure to pay for their covered losses, and they requested no less than $432,221.00 for this breach, bad-faith damages under OCGA § 33-4-6, and attorney fees. Allstate failed to answer the complaint, and on June 13, 2022, the Reeveses filed a motion for entry of default judgment against the company. On June 15, 2022, the trial court granted the default judgment as to liability. Then, on September 25, 2023, a jury trial commenced solely on the issue of damages. It was undisputed at trial—and remains undisputed on appeal—that there was no damage to the Reeveses’ home as the result of fire. At the conclusion of the case, Allstate moved for a directed verdict on several grounds, including that the Reeveses were not entitled to recover damages because they failed to timely file suit under the terms of the policy—which included a one-year suit limitation.[6] The Reeveses explicitly stated on the record that they did not contend Allstate waived or was estopped from raising the one-year suit limitation, but they instead argued that a two-year limitation applied to the case due to the policy’s fire endorsement. And because the Reeveses made no argument that Allstate waived the one-year suit limitation, the trial court concluded it had no choice but to direct a verdict as a matter of law based on its reading of the contract and relevant caselaw. The Reeveses now appeal from the trial court’s grant of the motion for directed verdict in favor of Allstate. And once again, the Reeveses maintain the trial court erred in doing so when (1) the text of the policy contains a two-year limitation period in which to file suit, with which they complied; and (2) the Georgia Standard Fire Policy is applicable to the policy, creating a two-year suit limitation period as a matter of law. We will address these contentions together. But first, we begin by briefly highlighting an argument the Reeveses do not make on appeal. They do not contend Allstate waived its right to assert the one-year-suit limitation contained in the policy by reason of the default judgment below. This is perfectly understandable. Indeed, unlike a statute-of-limitation defense (which must be properly raised or is waived), a contractual-suit limitation—such as the one at issue here—is a policy defense and not an affirmative defense that must be delineated in an answer.[7] And importantly, we have previously explained that a policy defense survives default judgment and may be asserted at a trial on damages because “while a default operates as an admission of the wellpled factual allegations in a complaint, it does not admit the legal conclusions contained therein.”[8] As our Supreme Court has rightly acknowledged, “[c]onclusions of law, and facts not well pleaded and forced inferences are not admitted by a default judgment.”[9] So, in this case, the trial court was faced with a policy defense based on the interpretation of a contract, which is purely a matter of law.[10] Turning now to the arguments that are made on appeal, the Reeveses assert that—despite their policy’s inclusion of a one-year suit limitation—the attached fire endorsement “changed the suit limitation period for ‘any claim’ under the Policy to two years.” Put another way, the Reeveses claim the fire endorsement modified the entire policy to unambiguously provide for a two-year suit limitation, and so they contend their complaint was timely filed within that time period. Alternatively, they argue the two-year period applies as a matter of Georgia law. We disagree. Under Georgia law, contracts of insurance are “interpreted by ordinary rules of contract construction.”[11] But these rules of construction only apply if the language of the contract is unclear or ambiguous in some respect.[12] If the language is “clear and unambiguous,” a court merely “enforces the contract according to its clear terms” and looks to the agreement alone for its meaning.[13] And every insurance contract “shall be construed according to the entirety of its terms and conditions as set forth in the policy and as amplified, extended, or modified by any rider, endorsement, or application made a part of the policy.”[14] Here, the Reeveses’ policy with Allstate explicitly provides that, for personal property protection, “[a]ny suit or action must be brought within one year after the inception of loss or damage.” To be sure, a separate endorsement for “Standard Fire Policy Provisions” was attached to the policy, which provides at the top of the document in boilerplate language—similar to that used on the other attached policy endorsements—that “[t]he following endorsement changes your policy” and the “form contains the provisions of the Standard Fire Policy.“[15] It further provides that “[w]henever the terms and provisions of Section I[[16]] can be construed to perform a liberalization of the provisions found in the Standard Fire Policy, the terms and provisions of Section I shall apply.” And the endorsement for the fire policy includes a two-year suit limitation as follows: “No suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity unless all the requirements of this policy shall have been complied with, and unless commenced within two years next after inception of the loss.” The Reeveses construe the foregoing language to mean that the so-called fire endorsement amended the entirety of their policy such that “any claim” within that endorsement applies to any claim for property damage—whether by fire or other cause (such as a storm). But the subject of the fire endorsement relates only to property damage caused by fire; and so by its plain language, the fire endorsement conclusively establishes that it only amends provisions of the overall policy relating to damage caused by fire.[17] The provisions of the “Standard Fire Policy” in the fire endorsement regarding the perils not included in “the policy” refer to fire, providing there is no coverage for “order of any civil authority except acts of destruction at the time of and for the purpose of preventing the spread of fire, provided that such fire did not originate from any of the perils excluded by this policy” and “neglect of the insured to use all reasonable means to save and preserve the property at and after a loss, or when the property is endangered by fire in neighboring premises.” Additionally, the fire endorsement provides that Allstate is not liable for a loss occurring “as a result of explosion or riot, unless fire ensue[s], and in the event for loss by fire only.”[18] Unsurprisingly, all of the foregoing language tracks the language of Georgia’s Standard Fire Policy regulation.[19] Additionally, the policy’s fire endorsement provides that Allstate is insuring against “all direct loss by fire, lightning and other perils insured against in this policy including removal from premises endangered by the perils insured against in this policy, except as hereinafter provided.”[20] And because the immediately preceding paragraph refers to the fire endorsement as containing provisions of “the Standard Fire Policy,”[21] the subsequent references to “policy” are to itself—the Standard Fire Policy as required by regulation.[22] In other words, a suit or action for recovery of “any claim” on the Standard Fire Policy is subject to a two-year suit limitation. So, because the overall subject of the fire endorsement is narrowly limited to property damage by fire, its suit limitation does not take precedence over the entire policy because it does not conflict with the one-year limitation applicable to other causes of damage.[23] Our reading of the relevant policy is bolstered by the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in White v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,[24] in which it concluded that the two-year statute of limitation that is applicable, by regulation,[25] to standard fire policies does not apply to other forms of coverage within the insurance contract as a matter of law, so long as the fire portion conforms to the regulation.[26] In doing so, our Supreme Court invalidated Georgia Regulation 120-2-20-.02 as having exceeded the insurance commissioner’s authority.[27] And although White concerned application of the two-year suit limitation to a claim based upon theft, nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinion suggests its reasoning would not also apply to property-damage claims arising from a cause other than fire. As a result, White not only supports our reading of the policy but also forecloses the Reeveses’ argument that their policy includes a broadly applicable two-year suit limitation as a matter of law. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting a directed verdict in favor of Allstate, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Judgment affirmed. Brown and Padgett, JJ., concur.
