Dillard, Presiding Judge. In this discretionary appeal, Scrudder, Bass, Quillian, Horlock, Lazarus & Adele, LLP (“the Firm”) challenges the trial court’s order granting attorney fees and litigation expenses under OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) to Rhonda Barken, the sole heir and administratrix of the Estate of Daniel James Barken. The Firm argues the trial court erred by (1) applying a negligence standard to sua sponte impose sanctions under OCGA § 9-15-14 (b); (2) punishing the Firm when there is a lack of evidence to support sanctions; and (3) imposing an excessive penalty not tailored to the sanctioned conduct.[1] For the following reasons, we reverse. In January 2012, Barken’s husband was struck and killed by another vehicle while driving his motorcycle in a reversible lane in Atlanta. Barken proceeded to file suit against the City of Atlanta and two public works employees: Ann Green, a traffic systems operator during the time in question, and Kevin Billups, a traffic supervisor.[2] Barken asserted the defendants failed to inspect and maintain a traffic signal governing the flow of traffic in the reversible lane, thus causing or contributing to the accident that killed her husband. The City’s law department and an outside law firm jointly represented all three defendants. During the ensuing discovery process, Barken obtained three service requests regarding malfunctioning lane lights at the relevant location. Green ostensibly created the service requests on September 14, September 15, and December 2, 2011—only months before the fatal collision. As a result, Green was later asked about these specific service requests—and service requests in general—in a 2017 deposition.[3] According to Green, a service request is an inspection notation or an initiation of service when a constituent calls the City with a concern, at which point a technician goes out to inspect the problem. If work is required (e.g., a signal bulb needs to be changed), a work order is then created; and when the work is complete, both the work order and service request are closed. As part of her job duties at the time, Green created service requests using specific computer software and then contacted the technician assigned to the relevant City quadrant to notify them of the problem (so they could inspect the issue). Green would also note in the system when the technician was contacted and then, separately, when they arrived on the scene. If the technician reported that the reported issue required work to fix it, Green would then create a work order. And Green testified that when a signal was out on a reversible lane, this was considered an emergency situation and was required to be coded that way. She was then shown the service requests relevant to this case. The first service request—from September 14th—reflected Green’s name and the unique identification number she used within the service-request software system. She responded to questions about this request as follows: Q: Does this tell you that you input information into this service request? A: It tells me that my name was utilized to create that request, yes. Q: And I know this was six years ago and I assume you don’t have any specific independent recollection sitting down to the computer on . . . September 14th and inputting any of this information here; is that correct? A: That is correct. Q: So unless somebody else logged in with your [identification] number, you assume this is information that you put into this form? A: Yes, sir. Q: The request type is TC902. Do you know what that stands for? A: TC902 represents a non-emergency request. Q: And then it says, just below that non-emergency, [']signal repair[']; correct? A: That is correct. Q: Why would TC902 non-emergency signal repair be typed in at that spot? A: I have no idea. Q: Is that something you would have made a determination about if you were creating this form? A: Absolutely not. Q: Why not? Why do you say that? A: Because this — according to the location here, it’s a lane light request. Q: So tell me why those two things don’t match up if that’s what you’re saying? A: Because according to our work practices, lane lights, especially with a bulb X or a checkmark or the LEDS that are at the location could be impeding traffic and it requires immediate attention. Green also agreed the September 14th service request indicated in the comments that the red X lane light was out, accompanied by her initials, as follows: Q: Do you know why [the request] says AMG? A: It has my initials. Q: So is that how you typically would end a comment like that? A: That’s my trademark, yes. Q: Looking at that and seeing AMG, are you at least reasonably certain that those comments were typed by you? A: I cannot say, sir. Q: You don’t know. It was either somebody using your [identification number] and signing off with your initials or it was you? Those are the two options; right? A: That is correct. Green was then asked about the September 15th service request, which she thought might be a duplicate of the previous day’s request. She testified about that request as follows: A: I wouldn’t have repeated this work twice. I would have done it once and created a work order to task the first order, [the September 14th] service request, not the second one. To me this second service request is redundant. You know, it’s duplication, so the same issue hasn’t been resolved. So it wouldn’t have been created. I wouldn’t have created a second service request for the same location with the same issue. Q: But that did happen; right? A: According to here, yes. Q: And can you tell us why that happened? A: No, sir. Despite Green’s testimony about the standard procedures for service requests and the creation of work orders, there was no indication of any work order ever being created for either of the September service requests. There also was no work order created for the December 2nd service request, though it was also coded as a non-emergency. Green further testified that it was impossible to determine from the service requests when the information was entered into the service-request software system (whether on the date of the request or at a later time)—though she later equivocated and said she would have to ask the IT department. Following Green’s deposition, Barken requested two years’ worth of time sheets for approximately 16 City employees in the traffic division. And on January 3, 2018, the City produced roughly 4,500 pages of records, including Green’s attendance records, which showed that she was not at work on September 15 or December 2, 2011—two of the three service request dates. On January 29, 2018, about three weeks after the attendance records were produced, the outside law firm that had been representing the defendants was substituted with Scrudder, Bass, Quillian, Horlock, Lazarus & Adele, LLP. More than four years after the Firm took over representation of the defendants, the case was called to trial on March 1, 2022. But just before opening statements were to begin on March 2, the Firm informed the trial court it had just become aware of a conflict that precluded it from continuing to represent all three defendants.[4] And out of concern for client confidentiality, the Firm did not give many particulars about the nature of the conflict. But when asked to estimate “a point in time” when the conflict arose, the Firm responded that “the conflict, itself, although we were unaware of it, would have arisen multiple years ago.” But the Firm did not believe the conflict predated the filing of the renewal action in 2016, and it said the information provided to it that morning was “brand new.” So, immediately after learning of the conflict, the Firm investigated its legal and ethical obligations. The Firm then requested a continuance (so each client could acquire appropriate representation), explaining that it had done its “due diligence and only became aware of this conflict, which is very, very different, just today,” and was unaware of “what could have been done previously to have found out this information beyond what we have done already” because the information it received that morning was entirely new. Nevertheless, the trial court noted that—in the absence of any information about the nature of the conflict—it was unable to determine whether withdrawal was required under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. The court then continued the case for five days and advised it would “entertain a substitution of counsel in the interim period,” though it did not intend to further continue the trial. Two days later, the Firm filed an emergency motion to withdraw, asserting—without any additional details—that, on the morning of March 2, 2022, it “learned of new information from [its] clients” giving rise to a conflict which precluded its continued representation. And when the trial resumed, the trial court held a hearing on the emergency motion, during which the Firm said only preliminary steps were taken to secure new counsel for the defendants. The Firm again refused to disclose the basis for the conflict of interest on the grounds of client confidentiality and requested to be heard by the court in camera to provide additional information. But the court refused this request, claiming that it would “create[ ] the possibility that the [c]ourt might need to be disqualified from a case that has been on my docket since 2016, and that is not going to happen.” The trial court declared a mistrial, but decided—on its own motion—to “proceed with hearing the issue of repayment of plaintiff’s expenses for preparing for trial against counsel” under OCGA § 9-15-14 (b). The trial court then opened discovery so Barken could investigate the conflict of interest and file any brief or affidavits related to the court’s motion. During this discovery process, Barken learned that—during jury selection—Green reviewed her 2017 deposition and decided to log in to her employee portal to view her attendance records for the dates in question because she was concerned about the information contained in the relevant service requests.[5] In doing so, Green realized that she was not at work on two of the three dates at issue and brought this information to the Firm’s attention. In doing so, Green relayed her belief that someone else created the service requests using her identification number and initials “to make it look as if I was at work on the days I was off.” Even so, she agreed it was possible to be absent on the days in question and still have entered information into the system when she returned at a later date. But contrary to some of her 2017 testimony, Green said in her 2022 deposition testimony that the service requests reflect “in real time” when they are initiated in the system and the initiation or creation date cannot be altered later, though other dates within a service request can be altered. Green refused to speculate as to why someone would possibly forge documents using her initials, but then suggested that it may have been another employee who did not like her. But she admitted that, prior to March 2, 2022, she had never been concerned about anyone forging documents using her information. Even so, Green explained that anyone in the department has the ability to create a service request using another employee’s unique identification number in the software system; but she did not have any idea as to who might have used her identification number on the occasions in question. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing in October 2022, and explained that the case was rescheduled for trial the following February, but that it would still proceed with considering sanctions under OCGA § 9-15-14 (b). And during the hearing, the Firm explained it interpreted Green’s 2017 deposition testimony regarding the service requests as her saying that it had been “many, many years; I don’t recollect. I’ve got some questions; this looks a little funny I’m not sure[,]” but she “ never at any point . . . said [']I don’t believe I did this. I believe somebody else did it.[']” And in support, the Firm played Green’s 2022 video deposition, during which she indicated that she had no concern someone was using her identification number to place false information in service requests until March 2, 2022. As a result, the Firm maintained it was not until Green questioned the authenticity of the service requests—the validity of which the City would rely upon in its defense—that an irreconcilable conflict arose. Nevertheless, the trial court decided to sanction the Firm, and then heard testimony from three of Barken’s attorneys as to their fees and litigation expenses. The case went on to settle that same month, after which the trial court issued its ruling on the OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) fees. In its order, the court concluded that Green’s 2017 deposition “shows that it was plainly contemplated by Ms. Green in 2017 that she was uncertain as to the origin of entries that appear to have been created under her name,” and her testimony “goes beyond mere uncertainty . . . and clearly raised a significant question as of September . . . 2017, as to whether Ms. Green created the two service requests.” The court further noted that the Firm possessed the facts and documents underlying the conflict since its entry into the case in 2018, and so the conflict “plainly could and should have been discovered prior to trial.” In ruling against the Firm, the trial court explicitly noted that the disclosure of the conflict was not what it found improper, but was instead the “overall conduct surrounding the disclosure.” Specifically, the court took issue with the Firm’s failure to timely disclose an apparent conflict to the point of a mistrial because the necessary disclosure occurred after a jury was selected. And the court ultimately concluded that the failure to disclose the conflict prior to trial “constituted a failure to act with a minimum level of diligence,” amounting to improper conduct that unnecessarily expanded the proceedings. The trial court rejected the Firm’s argument that opposing counsel needed to prepare for trial regardless of the mistrial, speculating that “it is more likely than not that all, or substantially all, of the trial preparations done in anticipation of the March 1, 2022 trial, would need to be redone, or at a minimum, carefully reconsidered and evaluated, considering the year-long delay,” and given that the defenses “have been substantially altered.” The court then awarded Barken $584,082.45, which covered all of the fees and costs associated with trial preparation and the OCGA § 9-15-14 motion. We granted the Firm’s application for discretionary review, and this appeal follows. 1. The Firm argues the trial court erred by applying a negligence standard to sua sponte impose sanctions under OCGA § 9-15-14 (b). And in a separate enumeration of error, the Firm contends there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s award. We agree the trial court’s findings of fact amount to, at most, potential negligence by the Firm and do not satisfy the standard used to award sanctions under OCGA § 9-15-14 (b)—unnecessarily expanding the proceedings through improper conduct. As our Supreme Court has explained, if a lawyer has a conflict of interest, he or she “must (at a minimum) disclose it to his client, and in some instances, he must withdraw from the representation.”[6] Indeed, under Georgia’s Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer shall not “continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the . . . lawyer’s duties to another client . . . will materially and adversely affect the representation of the client,” except if the client provides informed consent that is confirmed in writing.[7] But these rules further provide that informed consent is not permissible if, inter alia, the representation “includes the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same or substantially related proceeding.”[8] In this case, the Firm maintains that a conflict of interest arose on March 2, 2022, for which informed consent was not permissible; and because continued representation would violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, it immediately sought to withdraw. Importantly, there is no contention the Firm was not required to immediately withdraw from representation or that there was a waivable conflict of interest.[9] So, with the foregoing in mind, we turn now to OCGA § 9-15-14 (b), under which the trial court awarded fees due to the timing of the Firm’s discovery of the conflict and subsequent withdrawal. In looking to the text of OCGA § 9-15-14 (b), we necessarily begin our analysis with “familiar and binding canons of construction.”[10] And in considering the meaning of this statute, our charge is to “presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.”[11] Toward that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning,[12] consider the text contextually,[13] read the text “in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would,”[14] and seek to “avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage.”[15] In sum, when the language of a statute is “plain and susceptible of only one natural and reasonable construction, courts must construe the statute accordingly.”[16] OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) authorizes an award of attorney fees when, among other things, a party “unnecessarily expanded the proceedings through improper conduct or acted to cause delay.”[17] And an award of damages under this code section is “intended not only to sanction or deter litigation abuses but also to recompense litigants who are forced to expend their resources in contending with abusive litigation.”[18] So, when considering whether to award fees under OCGA § 9-15-14 (b), “the conduct of the party against whom an award is sought, and the conduct of that party’s counsel, are considered along with the impact of that conduct on the attorney fees incurred by the opposing party.”[19] And we review a trial court’s award of fees under Section 9-15-14 only for an abuse of discretion.[20] Here, in awarding OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) fees against the Firm, the trial court relied solely on Bircoll v. Rosenthal[21] for the proposition that the “failure to investigate and a failure to act ‘with a minimum amount of diligence’ pre-suit” supports an award of attorney fees as “improper conduct.” But Bircoll is wholly inapposite because the pre-suit failure to investigate in that case led to the plaintiffs filing suit when “they should have known that their claims had no substantial basis.”[22] And importantly, the award of OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) fees in Bircoll was based on the portion of the statute permitting such an award when “an action, or any part thereof, . . . lacked substantial justification,”[23] not on allegations of improper conduct. Even so, the trial court in this case concluded “the [Bircoll] principle requiring a minimum amount of diligence [was] applicable” because the Firm’s conduct “was improper and unnecessarily expanded the proceedings.” Specifically, the court found that the Firm failed “to disclose a conflict that they knew or should have known” prior to the point of needing to declare a mistrial when “the facts and documents that appear to underlie the conflict plainly could and should have been discovered prior to trial.” In doing so, the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) because the facts are insufficient to support an award for unnecessarily expanding the proceedings by improper conduct.[24] Once again, an award under OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) is directed at, inter alia, addressing abusive litigation or,[25] as the statute plainly says, “improper conduct.”[26] To that end, we have affirmed awards under OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) for unnecessarily expanding proceedings through improper conduct when (1) a witness disregards repeated trial court instructions to avoid mention of a particular topic in testimony;[27] (2) counsel and a party prolong litigation so as to deprive another party of property in the interim;[28] (3) a party turns “simple litigation into a complex one” by, inter alia, filing repeated motions to dismiss, sending overwhelming discovery requests, threatening criminal prosecution, and taking other actions that abuse the litigation process;[29] and (4) a public official or government entity forces a citizen into court unnecessarily.[30] Conversely, we have explained there is no improper conduct sufficient to support an award under OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) when (1) a pro se litigant operates more slowly than an attorney would in litigating a case,[31] and (2) a party maintains a defense from the outset, which results in appellate proceedings by the other party based on the trial court’s erroneous ruling as to that defense.[32] It is clear, then, from both the plain language of OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) and our caselaw that even if the Firm had discovered a conflict existed prior to March 2, 2022, this is not conduct rising to the level of warranting fees under the statute for “improper conduct.” Our conclusion might very well be different if there were evidence the Firm knew a conflict existed but deliberately waited until the day of trial to withdraw as a means of prolonging litigation, but that is not what the evidence shows or what the trial court found occurred. Additionally, and importantly, the trial court rejected the Firm’s request to hear evidence in camera as to why the conflict of interest could not have been discovered prior to March 2, 2022. In doing so, the trial court erred in suggesting that it could not hear such evidence without risking disqualification.[33] As a result, because the Firm did not engage in improper conduct as contemplated by OCGA § 9-15-14 (b), the trial court abused its discretion by awarding fees against it on this basis, and we reverse. 2. Because we conclude the trial court erred in awarding fees under OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) in Division 1, we need not address the Firm’s remaining arguments as to the amount of fees the court awarded. For all these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment as to the Firm.[34] Judgment reversed. Brown and Padgett, JJ., concur.
