Dillard, Presiding Judge. Following a jury trial, Justin Finnegan appeals several convictions and his sentence for offenses involving kidnapping, drug possession, and domestic violence. Specifically, Finnegan argues that (1) as to the kidnapping charge, his trial counsel was ineffective for requesting a defense-of-others jury instruction, rather than an “omnibus-justification” charge; and (2) the trial court erred by imposing separate sentences for two separate counts containing identical allegations—except for the dates on which the crimes occurred. For the following reasons, we affirm Finnegan’s convictions, but vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing in a manner consistent with this opinion. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict,[1] the record shows[2] that in 2019, Finnegan met S. B. online, and eventually, he asked if she wanted to meet him to smoke marijuana. S. B. agreed, and she then went to Finnegan’s home where he lived with his father and brother. Once she arrived, Finnegan and S. B. “smok[ed] weed, snort[ed] Xanax, and [had] sex.” According to S. B., she “never really left [his house] after that.” And during her time there, S. B., Finnegan, and Finnegan’s brother regularly did drugs together. On June 17, 2021, S. B. decided to leave Finnegan’s house and “get high somewhere else.” So, she ordered an Uber and attempted to hide her phone from Finnegan to keep him from discovering her plan. But Finnegan did find out and he refused to let her leave the house when the Uber arrived. S. B. then went into “panic mode” and repeatedly attempted to go up the stairs and leave through the front door; but Finnegan followed her and “pushed [her] back in the house.” After he did so, S. B. went back down the stairs and tried to leave through a sliding glass door; but once again, Finnegan prevented her from doing so. Indeed, every time S. B. came close to exiting the house or was able to do so, Finnegan “would [push] her back in.” And each time S. B. was able to get outside of the home, Finnegan “would tackle [her] from behind and just stay on top of [her].” According to S. B., she wanted to leave because she was going to another man’s house to buy drugs, and she needed to get away from Finnegan. One time, S. B. almost made it to the Uber, but Finnegan was able to pull her back into the house yet again. And once inside, Finnegan got on top of S. B., and she began screaming. Presumably, the Uber driver called 911; but in any event, police officers arrived and told Finnegan and S. B. to open the front door or they would kick it down. Finnegan complied, and let the officers inside the home. Then, after discovering drugs, police obtained a search warrant, and ultimately, arrested both S. B. and Finnegan. Later, Finnegan was charged, via indictment, with kidnapping, possession of a schedule II controlled substance, violating a family-violence order (two counts), aggravated assault family violence, false imprisonment, possession of methamphetamine, and simple battery family violence. Following trial, Finnegan was convicted of the foregoing offenses.[3] Finnegan then filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied after a hearing. This appeal follows. 1. Finnegan argues his trial counsel was ineffective for requesting a jury instruction on defense of others under OCGA § 16-3-21 instead of an “omnibus-justification” charge under OCGA § 16-3-20 (6).[4] We disagree. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a claimant must show “both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced [him].”[5] And as to deficient performance, a claimant must show that “his attorney performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.”[6] Importantly, when reviewing counsel’s performance, we apply a “strong presumption that counsel’s representation was within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable professional assistance.”[7] Indeed, in order to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the performance of his counsel, a claimant “must prove a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”[8] With the foregoing in mind, we turn to Finnegan’s specific claim of error. At trial, Finnegan’s counsel requested a defense-of-others jury instruction, under OCGA § 16-3-21,[9] as to the kidnapping charge, and that request was denied.[10] And during the motion-for-new-trial hearing, Finnegan’s counsel agreed there was a “problem” with the defense-of-others instruction because that statute applies only when an imminent threat is involved; and no such threat existed when Finnegan kidnapped S. B. As a result, Finnegan now argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an “omnibus-justification” jury instruction under OCGA § 16-3-20 (6).[11] But Finnegan abandoned this claim by failing to support it with citations to the record or any legal authority.[12] Indeed, although Finnegan—in the two pages he devotes to this claim—recites the basic standard of review for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel contentions under Strickland, he fails to provide any meaningful argument as to the specific the facts of this case or statute at issue.[13] Finnegan further argues that he was justified in violently attempting to prevent S. B. from leaving his home because he believed that he was saving her from another potentially dangerous situation—i.e., meeting someone she did not know to obtain drugs in exchange for sex. But again, he provides no record citations to evidence presented at trial to show that was her plan; and in any event, he cites no legal authority establishing that—even if his belief were correct—it would warrant a justification defense under OCGA § 16-3-20 (6). In fact, Finnegan provides no legal authority as to the circumstances under which that statute applies. Finally, it strains credulity to accept Finnegan’s contention that he was justified in preventing S. B. from engaging in potentially dangerous conduct by violently attacking her. As we have previously explained, an appellant abandons a claim of error when he provides only citations to the most basic legal authority but no Georgia law to support his specific claim of error.[14] Suffice it to say, mere conclusory statements are “not the type of meaningful argument contemplated by our rules.”[15] Simply put, by failing to make any meaningful legal argument or provide record citations to support this claim of error, Finnegan abandoned his argument that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in any respect.[16] 2. Next, Finnegan argues the trial court erred by imposing separate sentences for two counts in the indictment that made identical allegations except for the range of dates on which the crime was committed. The State agrees, and binding precedent requires that we do so as well. Both Counts 4 and 5 of Finnegan’s indictment charged him with violating a family-violence order. Specifically, Count 4 alleged that Finnegan between the 7th day of August, 2021, and the 12th day of August, 2021, in Cherokee County, Georgia, did then and there, knowingly and in a nonviolent manner violate a criminal family violence order, to wit: an order of pretrial release issued as a result of an arrest for an act of family violence, such order having been issued against said accused, which restricted him from any contact with [S. B.], by having direct in person contact with [S. B.], contrary to the laws of this State, the good order, peace, and dignity thereof. And the language in Count 5 is identical to that in Court 4, except for the range of dates on which the offenses allegedly occurred. And as noted supra, Count 4 alleged Finnegan violated a family-violence order between August 7, 2021, and August 12, 2021, while Count 5 alleged that he did the same between August 15, 2021, and October 20, 2021. As rightly acknowledged by the State, under these circumstances, Georgia law prohibits the trial court from imposing separate sentences for each count unless the alleged dates are material to the allegations. So, if the counts in an indictment are “identical except for the dates alleged, and the dates were not made essential averments, only one conviction can stand.”[17] Moreover, neither party has suggested that the dates alleged in Counts 4 and 5 were material or essential to the charge that Finnegan violated a family-violence order. And those counts in the indictment did not indicate the range of dates at issue were material to the charges.[18] As a result, under these circumstances, the trial court erred in imposing separate sentences for Counts 4 and 5. Consequently, we vacate Finnegan’s sentence and remand for resentencing in a manner consistent with this opinion. For all these reasons, we affirm Finnegan’s convictions, vacate his sentence, and remand for resentencing in a manner consistent with this opinion. Judgment affirmed, sentence vacated in part, and case remanded for resentencing. Brown and Padgett, JJ., concur.
