Per Curiam. We have explained before that “[t]he judiciary’s judgment will be obeyed only so long as the public respects it, and that respect will not long survive judges who act in a manner that undermines public confidence in their judgment and integrity.” Inquiry Concerning Coomer (“Coomer II”), 316 Ga. 855, 855-856 (892 SE2d 3) (2023). In this case, Douglas County Probate Court Judge Christina Peterson has been charged with a number of violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct (“CJC”), including a number of violations that the Judicial Qualifications Commission (“JQC”) says exhibited a pattern of judicial misconduct while in office. The JQC Hearing Panel found that Judge Peterson violated multiple rules in the CJC and that those violations warrant her removal from the bench. We agree that removal is warranted here. As we explain more below, the Hearing Panel found that the Director proved by clear and convincing evidence 28 of 30 counts alleging that Judge Peterson violated the CJC, and that discipline is authorized under the Georgia Constitution for 20 of those 28 counts. With respect to all 20 of those counts, we conclude that the Hearing Panel’s findings are not clearly erroneous. And we agree with, and affirm, the Hearing Panel’s conclusion that Judge Peterson’s misconduct warrants discipline with respect to 12 of them, because the Director met her burden of showing that Judge Peterson’s conduct constituted willful misconduct in office or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute. See Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VII (a).[1] The seriousness of certain of those violations, the pattern of misconduct the Director proved by clear and convincing evidence, and the adverse demeanor and credibility determinations the Hearing Panel made after observing live testimony from Judge Peterson all contribute to the conclusion we reach today. 1. Background and Procedural History Judge Peterson was admitted to the State Bar of Georgia in 2013, and on March 5, 2020, she qualified to run for the office of judge of the Douglas County Probate Court and therefore became a judicial candidate for purposes of the CJC. See Inquiry Concerning Coomer (“Coomer I’), 315 Ga. 841, 851 (885 SE2d 738) (2023). In June 2020, she won a contested primary election. She then won the general election, in which she was unopposed, and she was sworn in for a four-year term as the Douglas County Probate Court judge on December 29, 2020. In September 2021, the JQC filed formal charges against Judge Peterson alleging several violations of the CJC. The JQC amended its charges in February 2022 and again in July 2022, alleging 50 counts of misconduct.[2] The JQC Director dismissed 20 counts before and during the final hearing, which was held over the course of seven days beginning in September 2023 and concluding in February 2024, leaving 30 counts remaining for the Hearing Panel’s resolution.[3] The Hearing Panel issued a Report and Recommendation on March 31, 2024, finding that the Director had proven 28 of the 30 counts by clear and convincing evidence, but that discipline was authorized pursuant to the Georgia Constitution for only 20 of those counts.[4] In so doing, the Hearing Panel concluded that Judge Peterson had violated multiple rules in the CJC and recommended as a sanction that this Court remove her from office. Judge Peterson filed a Notice of Exceptions to the Report and Recommendation (“Exceptions”), see JQC Rule 24 (F), arguing that the Director had not sufficiently proven that she committed sanctionable conduct, and the Director filed a response to those Exceptions. 2. Analysis As discussed more below, we agree with and affirm the Hearing Panel’s conclusion that Judge Peterson’s misconduct with respect to 12 of the 20 counts (Counts 13, 28, 30-35, 37, 39-40 and 42) at issue here was proven by clear and convincing evidence and warrants discipline.[5] Those counts relate to four separate matters, which include Judge Peterson’s handling of a criminal contempt matter (Counts 31 to 34), certain aspects of her conduct toward county personnel (Counts 28 and 30), her conduct during a meeting of her neighborhood homeowner’s association (“HOA”) (Count 13), and her handling of a petition for year’s support (Counts 35, 37, 39-40, and 42). We discuss each of these four matters in turn below, applying the following analytical framework. First, we review the Hearing Panel’s findings as to Judge Peterson’s conduct with respect to each matter. “We generally review factual findings by the JQC Hearing Panel for clear error and defer to the Hearing Panel’s credibility determinations.” Coomer II, 316 Ga. at 860. See also Coomer I, 315 Ga. at 847 (explaining that “‘we give substantial consideration and due deference to the [Hearing Panel's] ability to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses who appear before it’”) (citation omitted).[6] Judge Peterson’s primary argument in her Exceptions to the Report and Recommendation is that the Hearing Panel’s factual findings as to each of the matters at issue are clearly erroneous, because the Panel either failed to credit or to expressly mention in its Report and Recommendation evidence that Judge Peterson says supported different findings. In this respect, Judge Peterson devotes dozens of pages in her Exceptions to recounting this other evidence. But we need not and do not detail most of that evidence below; although Judge Peterson is correct that some of the evidence she notes (if credited by the Hearing Panel) could have supported different findings, the record in this case does not compel those different findings. To the extent the record contains evidence that could support findings in either direction, the Hearing Panel was authorized to make the findings that it did. See Coomer II, 316 Ga. at 860-861 (rejecting a judge’s similar argument that evidence in the record could have supported different findings by the Hearing Panel, because the record did ” not compel the different findings that he prefer[red]“) (emphasis in original). After thoroughly reviewing the record and the parties’ briefing, we conclude that the findings the Hearing Panel made that are material to our ultimate conclusion in this case are not clearly erroneous, and we defer to the findings that the Hearing Panel made, as outlined below. Second, we consider whether these findings support the Hearing Panel’s conclusions that Judge Peterson’s actions, with respect to each matter, amounted to violations of the CJC rules the JQC charged. In considering whether the Director has proven violations of the CJC, “we employ a ‘clear and convincing proof standard.’” Coomer I, 315 Ga. at 847 (citation omitted). And we review the Hearing’s Panel’s legal determinations de novo. See id. As explained below, we agree with the Hearing Panel’s conclusions that Judge Peterson violated multiple rules in the CJC. Third, our review of the Hearing Panel’s findings and conclusions is necessarily conducted through the lens of the Georgia Constitution, and specifically the grounds for discipline that the Georgia Constitution authorizes. Article VI, Section VII, Paragraph VII (a) of the Georgia Constitution (“Paragraph VII (a)”) sets out five grounds for discipline: “for willful misconduct in office, or for willful and persistent failure to perform the duties of office, or for habitual intemperance, or for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute.” Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VII (a). See also Coomer I, 315 Ga. at 858. As detailed below, we agree with the Hearing Panel’s conclusion that Paragraph VII (a) authorizes discipline against Judge Peterson for the counts discussed below because the Director has met her burden of proving that Judge Peterson’s conduct with respect to each of the four matters at issue constitutes at least one constitutional basis that authorizes discipline: either willful misconduct in office or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute. See Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VII (a). We then briefly review the Hearing Panel’s findings as to the eight remaining counts (Counts 14-15, 19, 21, 38, 41, 43, and 50) that the Panel found were proven by clear and convincing evidence and warranted sanction. Although those findings are not clearly erroneous, we need not decide whether the Hearing Panel correctly concluded that Judge Peterson’s conduct as to those counts constituted violations of the CJC and warrants discipline, because affirmance of those counts is not necessary to reach our ultimate conclusion that Judge Peterson’s removal from the bench is the proper sanction in this case. Finally, after reviewing all of the conduct underlying Judge Peterson’s numerous violations of the CJC, we assess the proper sanction. On that point, we agree with the Hearing Panel that removal from office is the appropriate discipline here. See Coomer I, 315 Ga. at 847, 862 (explaining that “this Court is not well positioned to resolve the factual questions of intent that are crucial to determining whether discipline is constitutionally permitted,” but that we review “legal determinations and the ultimate outcome de novo”). We now apply the analytical framework described above, beginning with an evaluation of the counts that the Hearing Panel found were proven by clear and convincing evidence and with which we agree warrant discipline. We address first the most troubling allegation: Judge Peterson’s handling of a criminal contempt matter. (a) Handling of a Criminal Contempt Matter (Counts 31 to 34) (i) The Hearing Panel’s Findings Are Not Clearly Erroneous as to the Material Facts Pertaining to Counts 31 to 34 With respect to Counts 31 to 34, the Hearing Panel found the following facts pertaining to Judge Peterson’s handling of a criminal contempt matter. On August 2, 2021, a petitioner, who is a naturalized United States citizen but born in Thailand, filed in the Douglas County Probate Court a petition to amend her marriage- license application, which she had filed with the court in May 2016. The petitioner sought to correct the name she had listed as her father’s name on the marriage-license application. In support of her petition, the petitioner attached a copy of her birth certificate, which had been translated from Thai into English. The copy said that the document was “not recommended as a legal document.” After reviewing the petition to amend, Judge Peterson issued on August 12, 2021, a “Notice of Trial or Hearing,” which informed the petitioner that she was required to attend an in-person hearing on her petition on August 24 and that court-reporting services would be provided only if the petitioner arranged for them. The notice made no mention of any charges of contempt and did not advise the petitioner that she was entitled to have counsel present. At the hearing on the petition to amend (which was not transcribed), the petitioner presented the copy of the translated birth certificate, and Judge Peterson concluded that it was “fictitious,” “fraudulent,” and “forged.” The petitioner explained to Judge Peterson that she previously had listed her uncle’s name, rather than her father’s name, on her marriage-license application in 2016 because her father was not involved in her life and her uncle had raised her. Judge Peterson ultimately determined that the petitioner was trying to defraud the court and held her in contempt. The contempt order stated that the petitioner “willfully provided false information on the marriage application”; the court had been “alerted to the fraudulent misrepresentations on August 2, 2021 when [the petitioner] filed a Petition to Amend Marriage Record”; and the petitioner was “in blatant disregard of the laws of the State of Georgia and of this [c]ourt evidenced by her fraudulent misrepresentations to the [c]ourt via her filings with the [c]ourt.”[7] Judge Peterson sentenced the petitioner to the maximum allowable term of incarceration for contempt—20 days in jail—but allowed her to “purge” herself of the contempt order after serving two days if she paid a $500 fine. After the petitioner served two days in the Douglas County Jail and paid the $500 fine, she was released from custody. The Hearing Panel found that Judge Peterson “provided neither a firm nor a proper basis when she held [the petitioner] in contempt and, without explanation or justification, imposed the maximum term of incarceration plus a fine.” (emphasis in original). It determined that the petitioner, who testified before the Panel, was “in good faith trying to correct” what appeared to be “an innocent mistake borne out of ignorance rather than ill-intent.” The Hearing Panel noted that Judge Peterson testified that the petitioner sought to amend the marriage-license application so that her mother could emigrate from Thailand to the United States (although Judge Peterson could not explain how the amendment would assist the petitioner in obtaining emigration documents for her mother), whereas the petitioner testified that she became aware of the mistake on her marriage-license application while she was completing emigration documents for her mother and believed she should correct the application so that it would not be inconsistent with her birth certificate. The Hearing Panel expressly credited the petitioner’s testimony over Judge Peterson’s. In addition, the Hearing Panel expressly discredited Judge Peterson’s testimony that she had not concluded that the petitioner made fraudulent representations before issuing the notice of the hearing on the petition. In this respect, the Hearing Panel found that Judge Peterson “predetermined that [the petitioner] had made a ‘fraudulent misrepresentation . . . via her filings with the court on May 3rd of 2016′ before ever conducting a hearing on the matter.” The Hearing Panel noted that Judge Peterson denied making any such predetermination and testified before the Panel that she found the petitioner in contempt based on her submission of the supposedly fictitious birth certificate at the hearing on the petition, but the Panel found that testimony to be false, because it “contradict[ed] the plain language of the order,” which referred only to the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations in the marriage application. Because evidence presented at the hearing supports the Hearing Panel’s findings that are material to our ultimate conclusion, those findings, as recounted above, are not clearly erroneous. See Coomer II, 316 Ga. at 860-861.[8] (ii) Judge Peterson Violated CJC Rules 1.1, 1.2 (A), 1.2 (B), and 2.2 The Hearing Panel concluded that the Director proved by clear and convincing evidence that Judge Peterson violated CJC Rules 1.1 (Count 31), 1.2 (A) (Count 32), 1.2 (B) (Count 33), and 2.2 (Count 34) in connection with the contempt matter.[9] We agree. To begin, the Hearing Panel credited the petitioner’s testimony over Judge Peterson’s account and found that, in attempting to amend her marriage-license application, the petitioner was “in good faith trying to correct” an “innocent mistake.” After affording proper deference to that credibility determination, see Coomer I, 315 Ga. at 847, it is clear to this Court that Judge Peterson’s contempt ruling was baseless. In response to the petitioner’s good-faith effort to amend her marriage-license application so that it would not be inconsistent with her birth certificate, Judge Peterson made an unsubstantiated finding that the petitioner was somehow attempting to defraud the court, and then unjustifiably held her in contempt. Indeed, the Hearing Panel determined that Judge Peterson, in testifying before the Panel, lied about the basis for her contempt ruling when she repeatedly referenced her belief that the translated birth certificate was fraudulent, notwithstanding that her written contempt order focused only on the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations in the marriage-license application (not the birth certificate). Judge Peterson’s untruthful testimony in this respect underscores her conscious wrongdoing in determining that the petitioner had defrauded the court before issuing the notice of the hearing on the petition, because, as the Hearing Panel found, Judge Peterson purposely issued the notice without advising the petitioner that a criminal contempt charge on the allegation of fraud would be adjudicated at the hearing, so that the petitioner would be unprepared to defend herself when Judge Peterson summarily found her guilty of criminal contempt. As we explain below, these actions of misconduct evinced a willful disregard for the basic requirements of due process. It is well established that “‘[c]riminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense,’” and “‘criminal penalties may not be imposed on someone who has not been afforded the protections that the Constitution requires of such criminal proceedings.’” Intl. Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826 (114 SCt 2552, 129 LE2d 642) (1994) (citations omitted).[10] In this respect, although a judge may announce punishment summarily and without further notice or hearing when “‘contumacious conduct’” occurs in the judge’s presence and “‘threatens a court’s immediate ability to conduct its proceedings, such as where a witness refuses to testify, or a party disrupts the court,’” when the “‘alleged contumacious acts’” are committed outside the judge’s presence, due process requires that the alleged offender is entitled to “‘more normal adversary procedures.’” Ramirez v. State, 279 Ga. 13, 14-15 (608 SE2d 645) (2005) (citations omitted). See also OCGA §§ 15-934 (a) (“The judge of the probate court shall have power to enforce obedience to all lawful orders of his or her court . . . by attachment for contempt under the same rules as are provided for other courts.”); 15-1-4 (a) (1) (providing, as pertinent here, that “[t]he powers of the several courts to . . . inflict summary punishment for contempt of court shall extend only to cases of . . . [m]isbehavior of any person or persons in the presence of such courts or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice”). Thus, a person being tried for contempt related to an act committed outside a judge’s presence (also known as indirect contempt) “‘must be advised of charges, have a reasonable opportunity to respond to them, and be permitted the assistance of counsel and the right to call witnesses,’” among other things. Ramirez, 279 Ga. at 15 (quoting Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 798-799 (107 SCt 2124, 95 LE2d 740) (1987)). See also, e.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 497-498 (94 SCt 2697, 41 LE2d 897) (1974) (explaining that although a judge may, “for the purpose of maintaining order in the courtroom,” “punish summarily and without notice or hearing contemptuous conduct committed in his presence and observed by him,” “summary punishment always, and rightly, is regarded with disfavor” and “reasonable notice of a charge and an opportunity to be heard in defense before punishment is imposed are ‘basic in our system of jurisprudence’”) (cleaned up). Here, Judge Peterson’s contempt order shows that her ruling was based on the petitioner’s allegedly providing fraudulent information on her marriage-license application—conduct that necessarily happened outside Judge Peterson’s presence, since the petitioner filled out the application and submitted it to the court more than five years before being ordered to appear for a hearing— and as discussed above, the Hearing Panel discredited Judge Peterson’s testimony to the contrary.[11] Even assuming for the sake of argument that the information the petitioner initially supplied the court was fraudulent—and also assuming that filing such information could warrant a sanction of criminal contempt—the petitioner’s alleged conduct constituted indirect contempt at most, such that the petitioner was entitled to the due-process protections generally afforded to other criminal defendants. Thus, before holding the petitioner in contempt, Judge Peterson was required to advise the petitioner of the contempt charges, provide her a reasonable opportunity to respond to them, and permit her the assistance of counsel and the right to call witnesses, among other processes and protections. See Ramirez, 279 Ga. at 15. As the Hearing Panel determined, however, Judge Peterson provided the petitioner none of these foundational due-process protections before sentencing her to serve 20 days in jail. Even worse, the Panel concluded that Judge Peterson decided that the petitioner had committed fraud on the court before she issued the notice of the hearing on the petition and then purposely issued the notice in a way that failed to advise the petitioner that a criminal charge would be adjudicated at the hearing. As the Hearing Panel pointed out, the contempt order stated that Judge Peterson “was alerted to the [petitioner's alleged] fraudulent misrepresentations on August 2, 2021[,] when [the petitioner] filed a Petition to Amend Marriage Record.” Yet Judge Peterson’s notice of the hearing on the petition, which was issued 10 days after Judge Peterson “was alerted to” the alleged fraud, provided the petitioner no notice of the contempt charge, such that the petitioner could obtain counsel or meaningfully defend against the charge before she was summarily found guilty and sentenced. Noting that Judge Peterson testified that she knew the difference between direct and indirect contempt because she had previously “research[ed]” the issue, the Hearing Panel determined that Judge Peterson “ knew the procedures she employed failed to meet . . . due process requirements” when she “predetermined” that the petitioner committed criminal contempt; issued the notice of the hearing without informing the petitioner that the criminal contempt matter would be adjudicated; ambushed the petitioner at the hearing by alleging that she had committed a crime; summarily found the petitioner guilty and sentenced her; and then lied about her actions in her testimony before the Panel.[12] Given these circumstances, we have no difficulty concluding, as the Hearing Panel did, that the Director proved by clear and convincing evidence that Judge Peterson failed to “comply with the law,” in violation of CJC Rule 1.1, by failing to provide the petitioner basic due-process protections in a criminal proceeding; acted in such a manner as to severely diminish “public confidence” in the “integrity” and “impartiality of the judiciary,” in violation of CJC Rules 1.2 (A) and (B); and failed to adjudicate the contempt matter fairly, in violation of CJC Rule 2.2. See In re Judicial Qualifications Comm. Formal Advisory Opinion No. 239, 300 Ga. 291, 297 (794 SE2d 631) (2016) (explaining that former Canon 2 (A) of the CJC, which said that “‘[j]udges shall respect and comply with the law,’” “is not implicated by ‘mere decisional or judgmental errors’” but is violated by “[a] knowing and willful misapplication of the law”) (citation omitted); Inquiry Concerning Fowler, 287 Ga. 467, 468 & n.1 (696 SE2d 644) (2010) (concluding that a judge violated former Canon 2 (A) and former Canon 1, which said “‘[j]udges shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary,’” in the prior CJC, because he improperly stated on a routine basis to criminal defendants that they had the burden of proving their innocence); In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 275 Ga. 404, 405-409 & n.4 (566 SE2d 310) (2002) (determining that a magistrate judge violated former Canon 2 and former Canon 3, which required judges “‘to perform the duties of the judicial office impartially and diligently,’” of the prior CJC when he ordered a litigant to pay a fine without providing notice and a hearing, ordered another litigant to pay damages without notice and a hearing, and ordered a warrantless search without determining whether probable cause existed); Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 265 Ga. 843, 848-851 (462 SE2d 728) (1995) (concluding that a judge’s conduct in refusing to set appeal bonds to which two criminal defendants were entitled by law, issuing two bench warrants without probable cause, and forcing a criminal defendant to plead guilty without counsel violated former Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the prior CJC, and noting that the judge’s “cavalier disregard of these defendants’ basic and fundamental constitutional rights exhibit[ed] an intolerable degree of judicial incompetence, and a failure to comprehend and safeguard the very basis of our constitutional structure”); Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 94-70, 265 Ga. 326, 329 (454 SE2d 780) (1995) (holding that a judge violated former Canon 2 (A) and other canons of the former CJC by “exercis[ing] [her] contempt power in order to intimidate and coerce other elected officials”). (iii) Judge Peterson’s Conduct Constitutes Willful Misconduct in Office, Such that Discipline is Authorized Under Paragraph VII (a) of the Georgia Constitution Having determined that Judge Peterson violated CJC Rules 1.1, 1.2 (A), 1.2 (B), and 2.2, we now turn to whether the Georgia Constitution authorizes discipline for these violations. In its Report and Recommendation, the Hearing Panel found that Judge Peterson’s actions regarding this incident constituted willful misconduct in office because she acted in bad faith. See Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VII (a). The Hearing Panel’s factual findings that Judge Peterson’s conduct involved bad faith are supported by the record and are therefore not clearly erroneous. See Coomer II, 316 Ga. at 866-873. Based on those findings, we agree that Judge Peterson’s actions constituted “willful misconduct in office” and that discipline is authorized. Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VII (a).[13]“We interpret ‘willful misconduct in office’ to mean actions taken in bad faith by the judge acting in her judicial capacity.” Coomer I, 315 Ga. at 859 (citation and punctuation omitted). And as we recently explained, bad faith generally encompasses at least two characteristics: “that the duty breached by the actor was known to that actor, and that the actor was acting with some self-interest or ill will. It certainly ‘must involve something more than negligence.’” Coomer II, 316 Ga. at 866 (citation omitted). “‘[B]ad faith is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity, and implies conscious doing of wrong, and means breach of known duty through some motive of interest or ill will.’” Id. (citation omitted).[14] Here, Judge Peterson was clearly acting in her judicial capacity when she found the petitioner guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced her. And the Hearing Panel’s findings that she was acting in bad faith are supported by the evidence presented at the hearing. The Panel determined that Judge Peterson knew about the basic due-process requirements for indirect contempt proceedings, a finding that is supported by Judge Peterson’s testimony on that point. The Hearing Panel also concluded that Judge Peterson “predetermined” that the petitioner had committed criminal contempt well before she issued the notice of the hearing on the petition to amend the marriage record, yet she purposely issued the notice without informing the petitioner of any such criminal charge and then summarily sentenced the petitioner without providing her any of the fundamental due-process protections to which she was entitled. As the Hearing Panel noted, the plain language in the notice of the hearing and in the contempt order contradicts Judge Peterson’s testimony that she had not predetermined the petitioner’s guilt before she issued the notice, such that the Panel was authorized to conclude that Judge Peterson’s testimony in this respect was false and indicated that she was attempting to conceal her wrongdoing. This credibility determination by the Hearing Panel was based in significant part on its observations of Judge Peterson’s (and the petitioner’s) testimony during the hearing, and it is “the kind of finding to which we offer considerable deference.” Coomer II, 316 Ga. at 866. In sum, the Hearing Panel’s finding of bad faith with respect to Judge Peterson’s wrongful summary adjudication of the criminal contempt matter is authorized by the evidence presented at the hearing, particularly her dishonest testimony about her wrongdoing. As we have explained, although we do not expect judges to be perfect, “we can and do expect them to be honest. The judiciary has no place for dishonest persons,” as “‘[t]he judiciary’s authority . . . depends in large measure on the public’s willingness to respect and follow its decisions.’” Coomer II, 316 Ga. at 866 (citation omitted). Because Judge Peterson’s actions were not merely negligent, but painted a picture of conscious wrongdoing motivated by ill will, we agree that her actions were taken in bad faith. Thus, Judge Peterson’s conduct constitutes willful misconduct in office, such that Paragraph VII (a) of the Georgia Constitution authorizes discipline for her actions with regard to this matter. See Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. VII (a). See also Coomer II, 316 Ga. at 866-873 (holding that a judge’s violations of CJC “Rule 1.1 and/or Rule 1.2 (A),” which were not done negligently but with self- interest and showed that he could not “be trusted to handle judicial matters before him with honesty and integrity,” amounted to bad faith); In re Judicial Qualifications Commission Formal Advisory Opinion No. 239, 300 Ga. at 297 (explaining that “[a] knowing and willful misapplication of the law, of course, would amount to bad faith and thereby implicate the Code of Judicial Conduct”); Fowler, 287 Ga. at 468-472 (noting that a judge’s “ignorance of the law [wa]s inexcusable” where he “fail[ed] to grasp the basic tenets of criminal procedure to the extent that he d[id] not even understand the burden of proof in a criminal matter” and stemmed “not from unintentional mistakes or a lack of legal education, as [the judge] contend[ed], but from ‘willful misconduct in office,’” among other things). Cf. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 831 (explaining that the contempt power “uniquely is liable to abuse,” and in the context of civil contempt noting that “sanctioning the contumacious conduct . . . often strikes at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge’s temperament, and its fusion of legislative, executive, and judicial powers summons forth . . . the prospect of the most tyrannical licentiousness”) (citations and punctuation omitted). (b) Conduct Toward County Personnel (Counts 28 and 30) (i) The Hearing Panel’s Findings Are Not Clearly Erroneous as to Counts 28 and 30[15] With respect to Counts 28 and 30 (conduct toward county personnel), the Hearing Panel found as follows. By way of background, in April 2021, the Chief Judge of the Douglas County Superior Court limited Judge Peterson’s after-hours access to the Douglas County courthouse following an incident in which she allegedly improperly admitted public citizens to the courthouse without ensuring that they had undergone security screening by sheriff’s deputies. During the days in which her after-hours access to the courthouse was limited, Judge Peterson submitted three “Event Worksheets,” each of which requested three sheriffs deputies to be present at the courthouse after it was closed to the public so that she could have after-hours access. Specifically, she requested deputies to be present from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. on April 22 to 23; 5:00 p.m. to 11:59 p.m. on April 23; and 12:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. on April 25 to 26. Although these requests would necessarily require taxpayer-funded deputies to work overtime, Judge Peterson was unable to provide a particular reason why she needed to be physically present in the courthouse at those times, most of which were overnight. Although Judge Peterson argues in her Exceptions that she often worked later than regular court hours and that her testimony on that point showed that her requests for after-hours access to the courthouse (and the presence of security) were legitimate, she also admits that the requests “might not have been the most appropriate response.” The Hearing Panel expressly noted Judge Peterson’s testimony about these requests and found that Judge Peterson “never put forth a particular reason why she needed to be physically present inside the courthouse on the dates and times she requested.” In a separate event related to Judge Peterson’s treatment of courthouse personnel, the sheriff’s deputy who was scheduled to escort Judge Peterson from her chambers to her courtroom on May 11, 2021 did not arrive in Judge Peterson’s chambers on time. Believing that she would be late for court, she pushed the panic button under her desk to summon the deputy. Thinking there was an emergency in Judge Peterson’s chambers, sheriff’s deputies hurried to her chambers. When they arrived, they realized that there was no emergency. At her hearing before the Hearing Panel, Judge Peterson testified that she did not know the button was a “panic button” that was to be used only in emergencies. The Hearing Panel expressly discredited Judge Peterson’s testimony on that point. After reviewing the record and considering Judge Peterson’s Exceptions, we cannot say that the Hearing Panel’s findings as to these incidents—which are supported by record evidence—are clearly erroneous. See Coomer II, 316 Ga. at 860-861. (ii) Judge Peterson Violated CJC Rules 1.2 (B) and 2.8 (B) With respect to Count 28, the JQC charged Judge Peterson with violating CJC Rule 1.2 (B), alleging that her requests for after- hours court access and her activation of the panic button when there was no emergency were not in accordance with the “high standards of conduct” necessary to preserve the “independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary.” And with respect to Count 30, the JQC charged Judge Peterson with violating CJC Rule 2.8 (B) by failing to demonstrate “patient, dignified, and courteous” conduct to the county personnel involved in the matters discussed above.[16] Based on the findings detailed above, the Hearing Panel determined that the Director proved by clear and convincing evidence that Judge Peterson violated Rules 1.2 (B) and 2.8 (B), because her actions were not consistent with the “high standards that Rules 1.2 (B) and 2.8 (B) require of members of the judiciary.” The Hearing Panel determined that Judge Peterson “made multiple frivolous requests for middle-of-the-night courthouse access without any showing that she in fact intended to be in the building during these times—and plainly without consideration of the taxpayer expense that comes with paying multiple deputies overtime for each such demand,” and that she “abused the courthouse panic button system when, losing patience after waiting only several minutes, she accelerated her deputy escort’s arrival via that button rather than by phone or email.” The Panel found that Judge Peterson’s actions “raise grave concerns about [her] general judicial demeanor and the manner in which she treats others.” We agree with the Hearing Panel that Judge Peterson violated CJC Rules 1.2 (B) and 2.8 (B).[17] By requesting sheriffs deputies to work throughout the night so that she could have after-hours access to the courthouse (without any showing that she actually planned to be in the building, let alone work, during those wide-ranging timeframes) and using the panic button to summon a deputy to escort her to court, Judge Peterson did not demonstrate the decorum and temperament required of a judge. As discussed above, the Hearing Panel expressly found that Judge Peterson’s testimony that she did not know the button was a “panic button” that was to be used only in emergencies was “unconvincing[
