Pinson, Justice. Henry Lenard Johnson was convicted by a jury of malice murder and other crimes in connection with shooting and killing two people.[1] On appeal, pro se, he contends that the trial court erred by dismissing an untimely statutory demand for a speedy trial filed by his former counsel rather than considering whether his right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated.[2] He says that the statute that sets out the procedure for making a speedy trial demand under state law, OCGA § 17-7-171, “regulates the speedy trial matter differently from” the Sixth Amendment, so that statute is “preempted” by the Sixth Amendment. Put another way, Johnson appears to contend that the demand statute’s deadline for filing a speedy trial demand conflicts with the Sixth Amendment’s right to a speedy trial, and so the trial court should have considered whether his Sixth Amendment speedy trial right was violated instead of dismissing his statutory demand. Johnson’s claim fails. The demand statute is “in aid and implementation of the State constitutional right to a speedy trial.” State v. Varner, 277 Ga. 433, 434 (589 SE2d 111) (2003) (emphasis added) (cleaned up). That statute “provides no assistance in relation to the federal constitutional right to a speedy trial.” Henry v. State, 263 Ga. 417, 418 (434 SE2d 469) (1993). So when a trial court dismisses a statutory speedy trial demand as untimely, it does not preclude the defendant from seeking to vindicate his Sixth Amendment speedy trial right. See Johnson v. State, 300 Ga. 252, 256-258 (2)-(3) (794 SE2d 60) (2016) (affirming the denial of the defendant’s statutory demand for a speedy trial as untimely but remanding for the trial court to enter an order with findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the defendant’s demand for a speedy trial under the federal constitution); Haisman v. State, 242 Ga. 896, 898 (2) (252 SE2d 397) (1979) (noting that Georgia’s former speedy trial demand statutes, Ga. Code Ann. §§ 27-1901 and 27-1901.1, afforded the defendant a “means of asserting one’s right to a speedy trial after indictment” but that the defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial that attached at arrest). Absent a demonstrated conflict with the Sixth Amendment, Johnson’s argument that his untimely demand under OCGA § 17-7-171 should have been treated as a timely assertion of his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment fails. See Castillo-Solis v. State, 292 Ga. 755, 763 (5) (740 SE2d 583) (2013) (setting out possible bases for federal preemption, including direct conflict, conflict with the “purposes and objectives” of Congress, and “field” preemption) (citation and punctuation omitted). And because Johnson never asserted his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment, the trial court did not otherwise err in not considering such a speedy trial claim on the merits. Cf. Johnson, 300 Ga. at 256-258 (2)-(3) (remanding for the trial court to address the alleged violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial where the defendant filed a speedy trial demand invoking both OCGA § 17-7-171 and the Sixth Amendment, which the trial had court dismissed as untimely on statutory grounds alone). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
