Brown, Judge. In this divorce action, we granted the application for discretionary appeal of Eddie Freeman (the “Husband”) to review the trial court’s award of attorney fees under OCGA § 19-6-2 to Tabatha Freeman (the “Wife”). The Husband argues that the trial court erred in granting the fees award because, despite the statutory requirements, the trial court failed to make any findings regarding the financial circumstances of each party and awarded the fees to punish his allegedly wrongful conduct. For the following reasons, we agree that the trial court’s order failed to support the attorney fees award under OCGA § 19-6-2, and, accordingly, we vacate the award and remand the case to the trial court so that it can consider the financial circumstances of the parties and enter an order indicating that it has considered the appropriate facts. The relevant facts show that in 2021, the Wife filed a complaint for divorce against the Husband, seeking an equitable division of property, attorney fees, and short-term alimony. On the day for the scheduled final hearing, April 11, 2023, the parties reached a settlement agreement regarding the division of marital property and the other issues in the case, including an agreement that “each party shall be responsible for their own attorneys’ fees incurred in this action.” On April 17, 2023, the Wife and her counsel electronically sent the executed agreement, which contained both the Wife and her counsel’s signature, to the Husband and his counsel, indicating that they needed to sign the agreement.[1] When the Husband and his counsel failed to sign the agreement, on June 20, 2023, the Wife and her counsel again sent the executed, signed agreement to the Husband and his counsel for their signatures. The Husband and his counsel still did not sign and return the agreement and on July 17, 2023, the Wife filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, which also sought attorney fees under OCGA § 1962.[2] The Wife argued that the motion was necessary because of the Husband and his counsel’s refusal to sign the agreement; she requested that the trial court direct him to pay OCGA § 19-6-2 fees for the time incurred “working for three months to get a signature, “and also for the time expended filing the motion. Two days after the Wife filed the motion, the Husband returned the executed settlement agreement to the Wife’s attorney, and the trial court entered a final judgment and decree of divorce. In September 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the Wife’s request for attorney fees. Relying on the evidence presented at that hearing, the trial court found that the Husband’s counsel had originally contested some of the language in the final order, but had agreed to sign the agreement in May 2023. The trial court found that neither the Husband nor his counsel had executed the agreement until July 2, 2023. Additionally, the trial court concluded that the Husband, “through his counsel,” “failed to promptly execute the settlement agreement causing a delay” in the entry of the divorce decree. Based on this finding, the trial court granted the Wife’s request for attorney fees and, pursuant to OCGA § 19-6-2, ordered the Husband to pay $2,388.49 to the Wife’s lawyer. From that order, the Husband filed a timely application for discretionary appeal, seeking review of the attorney fees award. We granted that application and this appeal ensued. OCGA § 1962 (a) authorizes a trial court, in divorce and alimony cases, to award “attorney’s fees as part of the expenses of litigation[.]” Such an award may be “ made at any time during the pendency of the litigation.” OCGA § 1962 (a). Whether to award such fees is “[w]ithin the sound discretion of the court, except that the court shall consider the financial circumstances of both parties as part of its determination of the amount of attorney’s fees, if any, to be allowed against either party[.]” OCGA § 1962 (a) (1). Trial courts are required to consider the financial circumstances of the parties because the purpose of an attorney fees award under this statute is to ensure “ effective representation of both spouses in an action arising out of a divorce.” Cason v. Cason, 281 Ga. 296, 300 (3) (637 SE2d 716) (2006). See also Williams v. Cooper, 280 Ga. 145, 147 (1) (625 SE2d 754) (2006) (“an award under OCGA § 1962 depends on the financial circumstances of the parties, not their wrongdoing”); Moon v. Moon, 277 Ga. 375, 378 (6), n.4 (589 SE2d 76) (2003) (given the purpose of a fees award under OCGA § 1962, such an award cannot be “predicated upon a finding of misconduct of a party”). Given the express language of OCGA § 1962, “when awarding fees under this Code section, a trial court must make findings of fact regarding the relative financial circumstances of each party, or otherwise cause the record to show that such ha[s] been properly considered.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Rose v. Clark, 360 Ga. App. 440, 444 (3) (859 SE2d 137) (2021). See also Lockhart v. Lockhart, 361 Ga. App. 499, 503 (3) (863 SE2d 174) (2021) (“Findings of fact regarding the relative financial circumstances of each party . . . are prerequisites to an award under OCGA § 1962.”). And where a trial court fails to consider the parties’ financial circumstances before entering a fees award under OCGA § 1962, such an award must be vacated and remanded. See Cason, 281 Ga. at 300 (3); Moon, 277 Ga. at 378 (6) (remanding the case when the trial court’s order did not state the statutory basis for the attorney fees award nor contain adequate information about the parties’ financial circumstances to support an award under OCGA § 19-6-2). Here, the trial court’s order did not indicate that it considered the parties’ financial circumstances in making the attorney fees award. Furthermore, the record does not contain a transcript of the trial court’s hearing on the fees issue. Ordinarily in the absence of a transcript, we must presume that the evidence supported the trial court’s findings. Roth v. Crafton, 363 Ga. App. 254, 258 (3) (b) (870 SE2d 804) (2022). In this case, however, because the trial court’s order indicates that its attorney fees award was based, at least in part, on the Husband’s alleged wrongful conduct — i.e., his delay in executing the settlement agreement, this presumption does not apply. See generally Gold Kist v. Moody, 258 Ga. App. 486, 487 (1) (575 SE2d 509) (2002). Thus, because the order indicates that the trial court awarded fees under OCGA § 1962, at least in part to punish the Husband’s conduct, and there is no indication that the trial court considered the financial circumstances of both parties as part of its determination regarding the amount of attorney fees, we must vacate the award and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.[3] Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. Dillard, P. J., concurs, and Padgett, J., dissents.
