Dillard, Presiding Judge. This case involves an issue of first impression in Georgia: Whether real estate brokers or agents can be held responsible for injuries sustained by a visitor on property listed and shown for sale. The short answer is possibly—but not under these circumstances. Kenneth Kidd filed suit against Metro Brokers, Inc.; Jack Scott Stanley, III; and Oliver A. Alexander,[1] individually and as the administrator of the estate of his deceased wife (Anna Loraine Kidd), who tragically passed away after falling and striking her head at a home listed for sale and shown by appellees. In the wake of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees, Kidd argues the court erred in finding (1) agents and brokers are exempt from OCGA § 51-3-1 as a matter of law; (2) the Brokerage Relationships in Real Estate Transactions Act exempts brokers and agents from tort liability as a matter of law; (3) Anna was a licensee rather than an invitee; (4) a static condition caused Anna to fall, rather than a hidden peril; and (5) a broker is not liable for the negligence of its agents. For the following reasons, we affirm.[2] A trial court may grant summary judgment when there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”[3] And we review a grant or denial of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”[4] So viewed, the record shows that on October 19, 2019, Kenneth and Anna Kidd, along with their son Adrian, accompanied their other son, Patrick, to view a home that he was considering buying. At the time, Patrick was working with Stanley to identify a home for purchase. The group arrived at 170 Heritage Way in Covington to meet Stanley and began walking through the rooms of the house, which was vacant. Stanley had not previously visited the property, and the listing agent, Alexander, was not present during the showing. While exploring the home on her own, Anna—who was then 73 years old and using a cane—missed a single step leading from a hallway down into a room that previously served as a garage. The others heard the noise of her fall and rushed to see what happened. They found Anna beginning to sit up in the middle of the room, bleeding from her right temple with the cane beside her. Anna told the others she had fallen after stepping into the room and hit her head on the floor. The step down from the hallway into the room appeared to be level with the floor in the room, and Anna had not seen the step before attempting to enter the room. Anna was able to communicate and walk back to Patrick’s car, and the family then drove her to the emergency room of a nearby hospital. Once there, Anna was taken for an MRI, but after it was completed and she was being transferred into a chair, she slipped into a coma. Anna was then transferred to the trauma center at Grady Memorial Hospital due to bleeding in her brain. She never awoke from the coma, and passed away a little less than two weeks later. On June 24, 2021, Kidd filed suit against appellees, bringing claims on behalf of Anna’s estate to recover medical and funeral expenses on the basis of appellees’ alleged negligence, as well as for loss of consortium. Almost two years later, on June 13, 2023, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that (1) Kidd’s claims failed as a matter of fact and law because they were not owners or occupiers of the property; (2) the Kidds were licensees and not invitees; (3) the property owner had nondelegable statutory duties; (4) Alexander was an independent contractor and not an employee of Metro Brokers; and (5) Stanley was not involved with the listing of the property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees in a brief order, which included no explanation as to its reasoning. This appeal by Kidd follows. 1. First, Kidd argues the trial court erred by concluding that real-estate agents and brokers are exempt from OCGA § 51-3-1 as a matter of law. We agree with the trial court that in this case neither the broker nor the relevant agents were occupiers of the subject property so as to bring them within the ambit of the statute. In a cause of action based on negligence, Kidd bears the burden of establishing four essential elements: (1) a legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct raised by the law for the protection of others against unreasonable risks of harm; (2) a breach of this standard; (3) a legally attributable causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; and, (4) some loss or damage flowing to the plaintiff’s legally protected interest as a result of the alleged breach of the legal duty.[5] Summary judgment is, of course, appropriately granted when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”[6] And when a defendant seeks summary judgment, the defendant “may do this by either presenting evidence negating an essential element of the plaintiff’s claims or establishing from the record an absence of evidence to support such claims.”[7] Importantly, a defendant who will not bear the burden of proof at trial “need not affirmatively disprove the nonmoving party’s case, but may point out by reference to the evidence in the record that there is an absence of evidence to support any essential element of the nonmoving party’s case.”[8] When this is done, a plaintiff cannot “rest on its pleadings, but rather must point to specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue.”[9] In this case, appellees contend they owed no legal duty to Anna given the foregoing circumstances and thus cannot be liable for negligence. And it is well established that the “existence of a legal duty, which can arise by statute or be imposed by decisional law, is a question of law for the court.”[10] So here, the question is whether appellees owed a duty of care to Anna under OCGA § 5131, which provides that “a person who owns or occupies land and by express or implied invitation, induces or leads others to come upon his premises for any lawful purpose, is liable in damages to such persons for injuries caused by his failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe.”[11] Our analysis begins with the terms of a listing agreement. Lyons Investments, LLC (“Lyons”), entered into a contract[12] with Alexander on behalf of Metro Brokers to list the subject house for sale.[13] The listing period was from September 20, 2019, until December 20, 2019, and the agreement indicated that any affiliated licensees who helped market or sell the property would be independent contractors—thus creating an independent-contractor relationship between Lyons and Metro Brokers.[14] Importantly, the agreement between Lyons and Metro Brokers included a provision regarding “hazardous conditions on [the] property,” which provided as follows: [Lyons] acknowledges that [it] owes a duty of reasonable care to keep the Property safe for prospective buyers and their agents who view and inspect the Property. Among other things, this includes a duty to warn such invitees of dangerous conditions that would not be obvious to an invitee. [Lyons is] encouraged to inspect the Property for hazardous conditions and correct and eliminate all such conditions. [Lyons] agrees to indemnify and hold [Metro Brokers] harmless from and against any and all claims, causes of action, suits, and damages arising out of or relating to a person or persons being injured or harmed while on the Property. The contract further placed “limits [on] the broker’s authority and responsibility” by specifying that Metro Brokers would “be held harmless by [Lyons] for any and all claims, causes of action, or damages arising out of or relating to . . . [Lyons's] negligence . . . ; and any damages or injuries occurring on the Property as a result of dangerous or defective conditions on the Property . . . .” Finally, the agreement specified that Metro Brokers would not “have any authority on behalf of [Lyons] other than what is set forth” in the contract. So, while it is true Lyons vacated the property such that no one was living in the home during the listing period, there is no evidence that Metro Brokers or Alexander undertook any obligation to exert some measure of control over the premises in the owner’s absence beyond that of marketing the property for sale and allowing entry to potential purchasers.[15] Indeed, the listing agreement did not delegate to Metro Brokers—or to any real estate agent—a duty to maintain the property, make repairs, or otherwise relieve Lyons of its duties as the property owner, notwithstanding that Lyons was not currently inhabiting the home. Instead, the contract encouraged Lyons “to inspect the Property for hazardous conditions and correct and eliminate all such conditions,” and in no way suggests that Metro Brokers or any agent were responsible for these actions. It is clear by its terms, then, that the relevant contract merely established an exclusive listing agreement by which Alexander and Metro Brokers were tasked with marketing the home for sale. And even in that limited role, Alexander needed the property owner’s consent for certain matters, including the hours during which the property could be shown. As a result, under the terms of the contract between Lyons and Metro Brokers (and, by extension, Alexander), neither Metro Brokers nor the real-estate agents involved were given control over the premises such that they could be considered occupiers who owed a duty under OCGA § 51-3-1.[16] But even beyond the listing agreement, there is no evidence Metro Brokers, Alexander, or Stanley exerted control over the property such that they could possibly be considered occupiers.[17] To be sure, this is a novel question under Georgia law. Even so, there are “open house” cases from other jurisdictions that provide helpful analytical guidance. In these decisions, several appellate courts have concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the degree of control exercised over a property by a broker or agent when an injury occurred during an open house hosted by a listing agent.[18] Significantly, during such events, the broker receives very tangible economic benefits from the relationship with the potential buyers who visit the home. The open house enables the broker to sell the house and to earn a commission. Also, . . . an open house presents a broker with an opportunity to meet and cultivate future clients. More generally, the broker can discuss other listings with visitors and thus promote his or her individual business interests. Thus, the economic benefit that a broker obtains from staging an open house extend[s] beyond the potential sale of the particular property.[19] Additionally, at an open house, potential buyers “may reasonably expect that the broker [or agent] will be familiar with the premises and would rely on the broker’s presumed familiarity with the house, including a knowledge of all of its important features and physical characteristics.”[20] And such factors would ordinarily include matters relating to home safety such as “fire or burglar alarms, locks, and the like, and, contrastingly, defects like broken steps, exposed electrical wiring, and missing or weak railings.”[21] But in this case, we are not faced with the potential liability of a broker or agent arising from an injury occurring during an open house. Nevertheless, we find the reasoning of the relied-upon foreign cases instructive because the circumstances surrounding an open house stand in stark contrast to those presented here. Indeed, it is undisputed that Anna was injured during a routine showing of the property by a buyer’s agent (Stanley) who had not previously visited the property and who was not accompanied by the listing agent (Alexander). As a result, in the absence of a contractual obligation delegated from Lyons to Metro Brokers or Alexander, as well as the absence of any facts beyond those of a routine showing during which the only agent present was there representing a potential buyer, there is no genuine issue of material fact by which a jury could consider Metro Brokers, Alexander, or Stanley to be an occupier of the land for purposes of OCGA § 51-3-1.[22] Likewise, contrary to Kidd’s assertions, we do not conclude the broker or agents were “possessors” of the land as provided for in the Restatement (Third) of Torts § 49.[23] To be clear, we do not hold that real-estate brokers and agents can never be considered occupiers of land for purposes of OCGA § 51-3-1,[24] nor does our holding today reach the question of whether, and under what circumstances, a broker or real-estate agent may be held liable for an injury occurring during an open house. Instead, we merely hold that, in this particular case, Kidd cannot establish appellees owed a duty of care under these circumstances, and summary judgment was properly granted in favor of Metro Brokers, Alexander, and Stanley. 2. Because we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the reasons delineated in Division 1, we need not address Kidd’s remaining contentions,[25] which are that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the grounds that the Brokerage Relationships in Real Estate Transactions Act[26] exempts brokers and agents from tort liability as a matter of law;[27] Anna was a licensee rather than an invitee;[28] a static condition caused Anna to fall rather than a hidden peril; and a broker is not liable for the negligence of its agents. For all these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees. Judgment affirmed. Brown and Padgett, JJ., concur.
