Mercier, Chief Judge. The mother of eight-year-old M. R. S. appeals from the juvenile court’s order denying her motion to set aside the judgment terminating her parental rights. For reasons that follow, we affirm.[1] The record shows that after the juvenile court issued its termination ruling, the mother’s trial counsel filed a notice of appeal, but failed to comply with the discretionary appeal procedures required by OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12). Sometime later, the mother obtained new counsel, who recognized the error and filed three separate motions to try to save the mother’s appeal efforts: a motion for out-of-time appeal; a motion to set aside the termination order based upon trial counsel’s post-judgment mistake; and a motion for new trial. The juvenile court denied the motions in a single order, and the mother filed an application for discretionary review of that decision. Although we granted the mother’s application, we ultimately remanded the case to the juvenile court with direction that it vacate the order denying the motions because when the court entered the order, the earlier-filed notice of appeal was still pending, depriving it of jurisdiction to act. As instructed, the juvenile court vacated its order on remand. That same day, the mother withdrew her pending notice of appeal[2] and filed renewed motions for out-of-time appeal and to set aside the judgment. The juvenile court denied and/or dismissed the mother’s motions, finding: (1) no grounds for setting aside the judgment based on mistake; (2) that it lacked authority under Cook v. State, 313 Ga. 471 (870 SE2d 758) (2022),[3] to grant an out-of-time appeal or leave to file an out-of-time discretionary application; and (3) that the previously submitted motion for new trial was not filed within 30 days of the termination order. We once again granted the mother’s application for discretionary review, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the mother raises two claims of error: (1) the trial court erred in denying her motion to set aside the termination order; and (2) the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights. Neither offers a basis for reversal. 1. (a) With respect to her first enumerated error, the mother argues that, given trial counsel’s failure to follow the proper procedure for appealing the termination order, the juvenile court should have reset the appellate timeline by setting aside the order under OCGA § 15-11-32. We disagree. Pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-32 (a), a juvenile court order “shall be set aside if: (1) [i]t appears that it was obtained by fraud or mistake sufficient therefor in a civil action; (2) [t]he court lacked jurisdiction over a necessary party or the subject matter; or (3) [n]ewly discovered evidence so requires.” According to the mother, trial counsel made “a clear and unquestioned mistake” by filing a direct appeal from the termination order, depriving her of due process and bringing this case within OCGA § 15-11-32 (a) (1). The termination order, however, was not entered as a result of trial counsel’s error. The mistake occurred after entry of the order and had no impact on the juvenile court’s decision to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The mother has not cited any authority requiring a juvenile court to set aside a judgment based on an attorney’s post-judgment appellate error. And she has pointed to no evidence that the termination order “was obtained by . . . mistake.” OCGA § 15-11-32 (a) (1) (emphasis supplied). See also Cheuvront v. Carter, 263 Ga. App. 837, 838 (589 SE2d 609) (2003) (in analyzing whether a trial court properly set aside a judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (2), “[t]he first question is whether the judgment was based upon fraud, accident, mistake, or the acts of the adverse party” ) (emphasis supplied); In the Interest of H. A. M., 201 Ga. App. 49, 49 (410 SE2d 319) (1991) (applying the predecessor statute to OCGA § 15-11-32 and noting that a motion to set aside under the juvenile code is similar to a motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d)). Again, the “mistake” in this case occurred after the entry of judgment. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to set aside. See OCGA § 15-11-32 (a) (1); In the Interest of A. M., 324 Ga. App. 512, 516-517 (4) (751 SE2d 144) (2013) (reviewing order denying motion to set aside for abuse of discretion); see also Edge v. Edge, 290 Ga. 551, 553 (2) (722 SE2d 749) (2012), disapproved of on other grounds by Voyles v. Voyles, 301 Ga. 44, 46-47 (799 SE2d 160) (2017) (“Husband cannot rely on the mistake of his own counsel as if his counsel were acting adversely to him, rather than as his representative before the court[,]” to set aside a judgment). (b) While discussing this first claim of error, the mother asserts that, notwithstanding Cook, a juvenile court may grant a parent permission to file an out-of-time appeal/application for discretionary review in a termination case where ineffective assistance of counsel has frustrated the parent’s appeal efforts. She does not, however, enumerate the denial of her motion for out-of-time appeal as error. Instead, she claims that “[t]he trial court erred in denying [her] motion to set aside an order terminating her right to parent her child when her appointed counsel was per se ineffective for filing the wrong method of appeal resulting in a denial of due process of law.” By its very terms, this claim of error involves the denial of the mother’s motion to set aside the judgment, not the separately-filed motion for out-of-time appeal. Both this Court and the Supreme Court have made clear that “an appealing party may not use [her] brief to expand [her] enumeration of errors by arguing the incorrectness of a trial court ruling not mentioned in the enumeration of the errors.” Wallace v. State, 303 Ga. 34, 3738 (2) (810 SE2d 93) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Felix v. State, 271 Ga. 534, 539 (523 SE2d 1) (1999) (“The appellate court is precluded from reviewing the propriety of a lower court’s ruling if the ruling is not contained in the enumeration of errors.”); Tyson v. Scottsdale Indem. Co., 343 Ga. App. 370, 371 n.1 (805 SE2d 138) (2017) (“[T]his Court has jurisdiction to decide only those issues fairly raised by an enumeration of error” and will not consider challenges to rulings “not mentioned in the enumeration of errors[.]“) (citation and punctuation omitted). Although the dissent acknowledges this precedent, it nevertheless urges us to reach well beyond and expand the unambiguous language of the mother’s claim of error to consider what it views as her “best and only viable argument.” This we cannot — and should not — do. Interpreting OCGA § 5-6-48 (f), our Supreme Court has explained that “[i]f the enumeration of errors fails to enumerate clearly the errors sought to be reviewed,” we must consider the appeal “where it is apparent from the notice of appeal, the record, the enumeration of errors, or any combination of the foregoing, what errors are sought to be asserted upon appeal.” Felix, 271 Ga. at 538 (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied). But in this case, the claim of error is not ambiguous or unclear. The mother explicitly enumerated as error the denial of her motion to set aside the termination order. The enumeration does not, in any way, encompass the denial of her separately-filed motion for out-of-time appeal. Accordingly, we cannot consider whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for out-of-time appeal.[4] 2. The mother also challenges the merits of the termination order, arguing that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights. In an appeal from the denial of a motion to set aside, however, “we may only consider the correctness of the order denying the motion to [set aside] the underlying judgment, but not the merits of that judgment[.]” In the Interest of H. A. M., 201 Ga. App. at 49. We thus cannot address the mother’s claim regarding the termination order. See id. Judgment affirmed. Rickman, J., concurs. McFadden, P. J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part. A24A0990. In the Interest of M. R. S., a child.
