Dillard, Presiding Judge. The trial court granted Solo Cup Operating Corporation’s motion to dismiss this wrongful-death action,[1] holding that it was barred by the Georgia Workers’ Compensation Act. For the following reasons, we reverse.[2] The undisputed facts show that Solo manufactures single-use products for food and beverage packaging at a plant in Conyers—e.g., the ubiquitous red Solo cup. On December 13, 2019, the decedent—Taurus Andrews, who worked at the plant—discovered a small bag containing several identification cards in a men’s restroom. Andrews turned the bag over his supervisor, who then took it to another supervisor. That supervisor returned the bag to Camron Golden, who also worked at the factory. Prior to that day, Andrews and Golden were not acquainted with one another. Once the bag was returned to him, Golden discovered that $400 was missing. He asked who recovered the bag, and a supervisor told him it was Andrews. Golden then confronted Andrews, who denied taking the money. But Golden was unconvinced by this denial, and he told other employees he believed Andrews had stolen his money. Golden then retrieved a handgun and shot Andrews at the plant, tragically killing him.[3] Deborah Simmons—Andrews’s mother and legal heir—filed a wrongful-death action against Solo and other defendants, alleging that Solo negligently hired and retained Golden and negligently failed to keep its premises safe. Solo filed a motion to dismiss,[4] arguing the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the action was barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act (“WCA”). Following extensive briefing, a period of limited discovery, and a motion hearing, the trial court granted Solo’s motion to dismiss. The court then directed the entry of final judgment as to Solo.[5] This appeal follows. 1. Simmons first contends the trial court erred in concluding that the WCA’s exclusivity bar is a question of subject-matter jurisdiction. This claim is not properly before us. As a general principle, the WCA is the exclusive remedy for a worker or next of kin who sustains an “injury” arising out of and in the course of employment.[6] Beginning with Kellogg Co. v. Pinkston,[7] this Court has held that the exclusivity bar is an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction.[8] Simmons asserts this Court’s decisions in Kellogg and its progeny are wrongly decided, contrary to other decisions from this Court[9] and the Supreme Court of Georgia,[10] and should be disapproved or overruled. In Solo’s original motion to dismiss (filed in March 2022), Solo argued the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Simmons’s claims were barred by the WCA. Over the next 18 months, despite filing several different responses, Simmons never claimed the exclusivity bar was not an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction or that Kellogg and its progeny were wrongly decided. Rather, Simmons consistently maintained the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction because her claims fell outside of the WCA.[11] Suffice it to say, this Court may refuse to review issues not raised in the trial court;[12] and for good reason—fairness to the trial court and parties “demands that legal issues be asserted in the trial court.”[13] So, because this issue was not raised below, we leave for another day the resolution of this interesting—but unpreserved—claim of error.[14] 2. In a related claim of error, Simmons contends the trial court erred in holding that she bore the burden of proving the WCA did not apply because the exclusivity bar is an affirmative defense. Aside from general allegations that Solo could not meet its burden of showing the WCA applied, Simmons similarly did not raise this issue in the trial court below, and we will not consider it for the first time on appeal.[15] 3. Turning to the merits of the trial court’s ruling, Simmons contends the trial court erred in granting Solo’s motion to dismiss because her tort claims are not barred under the WCA. We agree. As an initial matter, this case comes to us in a somewhat unusual procedural posture. A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under OCGA § 91112 (b) (1) can “allege either a facial challenge, in which the court accepts as true the allegations on the face of the complaint or a factual challenge, which requires consideration of evidence beyond the face of the complaint.”[16] Such a motion “may be heard and determined before trial[.]“[17] And at such a hearing, factual issues “shall be determined by the trial court[,]” and they “ will be reversed only where the evidence demands a contrary finding[.]“[18] When the trial judge conducts a hearing on a motion to dismiss . . . ,” the court’s findings are “tested by the any evidence rule.”[19] But importantly, when a defendant asserts a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists,”[20] and we review the grant of such a motion de novo.[21] Turning to the WCA, as a general matter, this statute is the exclusive remedy for a worker or next of kin who sustains an “injury” arising out of and in the course of employment.[22] Further, whether an injury “arises out of and in the course of employment is generally a mixed question of law and fact,”[23] and these two prerequisites are “independent and distinct[.]“[24] And while the WCA is intended to have broad application,[25] there are exceptions to this sweeping coverage.[26] As relevant here, if the willful act of a third person is “directed against an employee for reasons personal to such employee, then there is not a covered injury[.]“[27] Further, in order to determine if the assault occurred for reasons personal to the employee, we consider whether “the injuries of which the employee complains (1) arose out of and (2) in the course of his employment.”[28] If both of these conditions are met, any tort claims are barred by the exclusive-remedy provisions of the WCA; on the other hand, if either condition is not met, then the injury arose from “reasons personal” to the employee, and the plaintiff’s tort claims are not barred.[29] In this case, Simmons concedes that Anderson’s killing arose “in the course of” his employment. Even so, she contends this killing did not “arise out of” Anderson’s employment, but rather, for “reasons personal” to him.[30] And as pertinent here, the “arising out of” prerequisite “deals with causation.”[31] Specifically, the words “arising out of” mean “there must be some causal connection between the conditions under which the employee worked and the injury which he received[,]” and the “ causative danger must be incidental to the character of the employment, and not independent of the relation of master and servant.”[32] On the other hand, the definition “excludes an injury which can not fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause, and which comes from a hazard to which the workmen would have been equally exposed apart from the employment.”[33] So, to be considered an injury arising out of employment, it must “either be caused by activity the employee engaged in as part of his or her job, or the injury must result from some special danger of the employment.”[34] Indeed, in cases where an employee is injured in a physical altercation with another person occurring on the job but stemming from personal animosity, his injuries will nevertheless be considered compensable under the [WCA] if it is shown that the animosity arose from reasons related to the employee’s performance of his workrelated duties. Conversely, if the animosity giving rise to the assault stemmed from reasons not related to the injured employee’s performance of his work, then his injuries will not be considered compensable under the [WCA].[35] As a result, while we review the trial court’s factual findings for any evidence,[36] it remains the “responsibility of this Court to review the legal framework within which the factfinder operated, and thus to define what ‘arising out of’ employment means as a matter of law.”[37] Here, the trial court found Solo had human-resource policies and procedures—discussed during new-hire orientation—regarding the company’s values of honesty, integrity, and cleanliness, which required Andrews to turn over Golden’s lost or mislaid bag. Employees were also instructed to promptly report any suspected illegal or unethical behavior. Additionally, the court pointed to evidence that Andrews mentioned to another employee that he looked inside of the bag and “the thought was” Golden was involved in some kind of fraud. And based on this evidence, the trial court concluded Andrews was required by Solo’s policies to turn over Golden’s lost or mislaid bag. The trial court also noted that, on the day of the shooting, Golden texted the following messages: “I found out who bought the bag back”; “[Solo] just ain’t doin s***[.] I talk to the [person.] I done rob & stole so much [I know] when a [person] Guilty and he Guilty . . .”[38] And to a different individual, Golden texted: “I talked 2 the [person] who brought the bag back 2 the supervisor & I instantly knew his b*tch a** took it”; and later, “I can’t live here [no more] a [person] stole my money . . . & I shot his . . . a**. . . .” So, based on the foregoing, the trial court reasoned that prior to the date in question, there was no animosity between Golden and Andrews, but—upon discovering that his money was missing—Golden became angry with Andrews because he was the person who brought the bag to a supervisor. Continuing, the trial court explained that “[w]hile Golden’s animosity was personal, between himself and Andrews, the animosity arose because of what Andrews was required to do as an employee of [Solo]—turn in the bag to a supervisor.” In the trial court’s view, Golden’s anger toward Andrews arose from the performance of his job duties—i.e., turning in Golden’s mislaid bag. We disagree. Returning a bag to its rightful owner, whether in compliance with one’s work rules or merely as a proverbial Good Samaritan,[39] does not often incur wrath. And here, there is no evidence Golden was angry because Andrews turned in the bag. Notably, although two other employees—both supervisors—were also involved in the return of Golden’s bag, there is no evidence Golden targeted them. Rather, the evidence—as found by the trial court—shows that Golden was angry at Andrews because he believed Andrews stole money from him. So, because any alleged theft was entirely unrelated to Andrews’s performance of his work, we find—as a matter of law—that the WCA does not apply here.[40] Even so, Solo contends the positional-risk doctrine applies in this case. This doctrine holds that “an accidental injury arises out of the employment when the employee proves that his work brought him within range of the danger by requiring his presence in the locale when the peril struck, even though any other person present would have also been injured irrespective of his employment.”[41] Thus, although being assaulted is “not an obvious part of most jobs, the [WCA] compensates for injuries in cases where an employee is assaulted or killed if there is a nonpersonal, causal connection to the work.”[42] We are likewise unpersuaded by this contention. As previously noted, Andrews’s death resulted from a personal matter: Golden’s belief that Andrews stole money from him. This case, then, stands in stark contrast from the positional-risk decisions relied upon by Solo, in which the injured or killed worker was essentially an innocent bystander and not attacked for reasons personal to the worker.[43] Indeed, we have held that [w]here the injury would have occurred regardless of where the employee was required to be located, and results from a risk to which the employee would have been equally exposed apart from any condition of the employment, there is no basis for finding a causal connection between the employment and the injury, and no basis for compensation under the positional[-]risk doctrine.[44] So, given the particular facts of this case (as found by the trial court), we conclude that Andrews was killed for reasons personal to him, such that his injury was not covered by the WCA.[45] Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting Solo’s motion to dismiss. Judgment reversed. Brown and Padgett, JJ., concur.
