McFadden, Presiding Judge. This appeal challenges a child custody modification order. Because the trial court failed to make appropriate findings of fact as requested, the order is vacated and the case is remanded with direction that the court make sufficient findings. 1. Facts and procedural posture John Faulkner and Cassandra Cotes are the parents of two minor children, J. D. F. and K. R. F. Pursuant to a 2019 consent order and parenting plan, Faulkner and Cotes, who were not married, shared joint legal custody of the children, Cotes was awarded primary physical custody of the children, and Faulkner was granted visitation rights. In 2021, Faulkner and Cotes filed competing petitions for modification of child custody. Cotes’ petition was dismissed, while an evidentiary hearing was held on Faulkner’s petition. Before the close of evidence at the hearing, counsel for Cotes requested that the trial court make findings of fact in its final order. Approximately three months after the hearing, the trial court entered its final custody order. The court found, among other things, that the parents do not communicate effectively with each other; that Cotes had hindered communication between Faulkner and the children; and that the biggest issue was Cotes keeping Faulkner informed about what was going on with the children and allowing him to communicate freely with them. The court concluded that Cotes’ withholding communication between Faulkner and the children, along with the failure of the parents to communicate meaningfully with each other, constituted material changes in circumstances since the initial custody order. But the court concluded that it was in the children’s best interests for primary physical custody to remain with Cotes because none of her “questionable behavior . . . outweighs the children’s need for continuity and consistency in their lives.” Faulkner appeals. 2. Sufficiency of the findings of fact Faulkner asserts that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact as required by OCGA §§ 19-9-3 and 9-11-52 (a). We agree. We have explained that once a party has invoked OCGA § 1993 (a) (8), the trial court is required under that code section and OCGA § 9-11-52 (a) not only to recite findings of fact, but also to explain how those facts support its separate conclusions. OCGA § 1993 (a) (8) provides in pertinent part: If requested by any party on or before the close of evidence in a contested hearing, the permanent court order awarding child custody shall set forth specific findings of fact as to the basis for the judge’s decision in making an award of custody including any relevant factor relied upon by the judge as set forth in paragraph (3) of this subsection. Such order shall set forth in detail why the court awarded custody in the manner set forth in the order. See also OCGA § 91152 (a) (“in all nonjury trials in courts of record, the court shall upon request of any party made prior to such ruling, find the facts specially and shall state separately its conclusions of law”); VanVlerah v. VanVlerah, 359 Ga. App. 577, 579 (1) (a) (859 SE2d 546) (2021) (“OCGA § 91152 (a) applies to contested family law cases”). Findings of fact and conclusions of law enable the parties to specify the errors the trial court purportedly made, and enable the appellate court to review the judgment adequately and promptly. . . . [T]he trial judge is to ascertain the facts and to state not only the end result of that inquiry but the process by which it was reached. A bare statement of what the court considered in reaching its conclusions is not a recitation of how those facts give support to or what constitutes the separate conclusions. Gelin v. Welch, 368 Ga. App. 375, 375-377 (890 SE2d 156) (2023) (citations and punctuation omitted) (emphasis added). In this case, a timely request for findings of fact was made and the trial court’s order includes such findings, most of which concern the parents’ lack of communication. But although the order sets out three pages of findings, it does not explain how the facts it credited support its conclusion or show the process by which it reached that conclusion. See In the Interest of D. S., 212 Ga. App. 203, 204 (441 SE2d 412) (1994) (“The facts found must support the conclusions reached. A bare statement of some facts considered does not show that those facts support the conclusions so as to comply with § 91152 (a). . . .”) (citation omitted), overruled in part on other grounds, In the Interest of J. P., 267 Ga. 492, 493 (480 SE2d 8) (1997). The order states that the court reviewed the criteria set forth in OCGA § 19-9-3 (a) (3), which sets out a non-exclusive 17-item list of factors a court may consider in determining the best interests of a child. But the order does not specify which factors it considered or analyze their application to this case. Instead the order holds that notwithstanding the mother’s “questionable behavior, none of this behavior rises to a level where it outweighs the children’s need for continuity and consistency in their lives.” Children’s need for stability is on the statutory list of factors trial courts “may consider.” See OCGA § 19-9-3 (a) (3) (G) (“[t]he importance of continuity in the child’s life and the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity”). But the trial court’s holding includes no factual findings about these children’s need for continuity and stability. It does not weigh that need against its case-specific findings. Indeed it says nothing at all about the needs of these particular children that support its best interests conclusion. Compare Haskell v. Haskell, 286 Ga. 112, 113 (1) (686 SE2d 102) (2009) (award of custody to father supported by evidence of “the child’s close relationship with his father, continued use of the same speech therapist, and other evidence related to stability, continuity, and the child’s adjustment to relocation”). There are no clear findings of fact about whether Cotes has provided a stable, satisfactory environment for the children or the desirability of maintaining continuity by the children remaining in Cotes’ home environment. Indeed, the court’s most pertinent findings on this issue seem to contradict its ultimate conclusion since the court found that Faulkner “has more structure and routine in his house than” Cotes and the “children need structure, routines and discipline.” The court also found that the Guardian ad Litem recommended that physical custody be changed to Faulkner, and a review of that recommendation reveals that it included the guardian’s opinion that this continuity factor did not favor Cotes because of the number of times she had moved. This is not to say that the trial court’s ultimate conclusion was erroneous. But “we [also] cannot say that the trial court’s factual observation[s] . . . satisfied the requirements of OCGA § 91152 (a) or OCGA § 1993 (a) (8). . . . [Indeed,] it is unclear from the order . . . [how] the factual finding[s were relevant] to its determination. ” Cockerham v. Cockerham, 359 Ga. App. 891, 896-897 (2) (860 SE2d 163) (2021). See Moore v. Farmers Bank of Union Point, 182 Ga. App. 94, 95 (1) (354 SE2d 692) (1987) (“the findings of fact and separate conclusions of law contained in the order” should “disclose to this court the steps by which the trial court reached its ultimate conclusion on each factual issue”), overruled on other grounds, Underwood v. Underwood, 282 Ga. 643, 644 (1) (651 SE2d 736) (2007). While the trial court’s order . . . reflects a conscientious effort to fulfill its obligation to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is nonetheless fatally flawed because it fails to [make findings of fact that show how it reached its ultimate conclusion].We therefore must vacate the final order and remand this case with direction that the juvenile court prepare appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law and enter a new judgment, after which another appeal may be made. In light of this holding, we do not reach the . . . remaining enumerations of error. Gelin, supra at 377 (citations and punctuation omitted). Finally, if the trial court considered specific factors other than continuity in making its best interests determination, it should have said so. Once OCGA § 19-9-3 (a) (8) was invoked, the parties were entitled to an order “set[ing] forth specific findings of fact as to the basis for the judge’s decision in making an award of custody including any relevant factor relied upon by the judge as set forth in paragraph (3) of this subsection.” Id. It was not enough to recite that the court reviewed the criteria listed in OCGA § 19-9-3 (a) (3). Rather, all factors the court relied on in making the best interests determination must also be specified and tied to pertinent findings of fact. Otherwise, contrary to the claim of the dissent, which in effect repeats the trial court’s error, this court is prevented from conducting a meaningful review of the trial court’s best interests conclusion. Judgment vacated and remanded with direction. Mercier, C. J., concurs. Rickman, J., dissents. A24A1073. Faulkner v. Cotes.
