Georgia Association of Club Executives, Inc. v. State of Georgia

Peterson, Presiding Justice. Georgia local governments have often imposed total bans on adult entertainment establishments offering the combination of nude dancing and serving alcohol. We have often upheld those bans against First Amendment challenges. See Maxim Cabaret, Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, 304 Ga. 187, 193-194 (III) (816 SE2d 31) (2018); Oasis Goodtime Emporium I, Inc., v. City of Doraville, 297 Ga. 513, 525 (3) (c) (1) (773 SE2d 728) (2015); Trop, Inc. v. City of Brookhaven, 296 Ga. 85, 88 (1) (764 SE2d 398) (2014); Chambers v. Peach County, 268 Ga. 672, 674 (2) (492 SE2d 191) (1997); Goldrush II v. City of Marietta, 267 Ga. 683, 692-693 (5) (482 SE2d 347) (1997); Gravely v. Bacon, 263 Ga. 203, 207 (2) (429 SE2d 663) (1993). In this case, the State stopped short of a total ban, imposing instead a 1% tax on gross revenue on adult entertainment establishments that choose to offer the combination of nude dancing and serving alcohol. The adult entertainment establishments raised a First Amendment challenge against the tax, and the trial court upheld it. So do we. The Georgia Association of Club Executives (“GACE”), a self- described “organization of adult entertainment clubs in Georgia,” challenges the constitutionality of a “state operating assessment” imposed by OCGA § 15-21-209 (the “Assessment” or “Tax”) on “adult entertainment establishments” as defined by OCGA § 15-21-201 (1) (A). The General Assembly passed the Assessment to create and fund the Safe Harbor for Sexually Exploited Children Fund, see OCGA § 15-21-209 (c), with the purpose of helping child victims of sexual exploitation, finding that adult entertainment establishments were a “point of access” by which individuals seeking to sexually exploit children use such establishments as a means of “locating children” to sexually exploit. Ga. L. 2015, p. 675 § 1-2. GACE makes two main arguments on appeal. First, GACE argues that the tax seeks to regulate content, is therefore content- based, and fails to meet strict-scrutiny; GACE also argues alternatively that, if intermediate scrutiny applies, the tax fails the tailoring prong of that test. Second, GACE argues that the definition of “adult entertainment establishments” relating to nude dancing is overbroad. We reject GACE’s argument that strict scrutiny applies. We assume without deciding that the Assessment is subject to intermediate scrutiny. We hold that it is content-neutral and satisfies intermediate scrutiny. We also conclude that GACE’s overbreadth challenge fails. We therefore affirm. 1. Background GACE describes itself as an “organization of adult entertainment clubs in Georgia” and asserts that its members are subject to the “state operating assessment” imposed by OCGA § 15-21-209 (a) because they are “adult entertainment establishments” as defined by OCGA § 15-21-201 (1) (A).[1] (a) The Assessment OCGA § 15-21-209 (a)^[2] says: By April 30 of each calendar year, each adult entertainment establishment shall pay the commissioner of revenue a state operation assessment equal to 1 percent of the previous calendar year’s gross revenue or $5,000.00. This state assessment shall be in addition to any other fees and assessments required by the county or municipality authorizing the operation of an adult entertainment business. The funds collected by the Assessment are deposited into the Safe Harbor for Sexually Exploited Children Fund. See OCGA § 15-21-209 (c). The money in the fund may be used “for purposes of providing care, rehabilitative services, residential housing, health services, and social services . . . to sexually exploited children” and to fund “a person, entity, or program devoted to awareness and prevention of becoming a sexually exploited child.” OCGA § 15-21-202 (c).^[3] Under OCGA § 15-21-201 (1) (A),^[4] an “adult entertainment establishment” is defined as any place of business or commercial establishment where alcoholic beverages of any kind are sold, possessed, or consumed wherein . . . [t]he entertainment or activity therein consists of nude or substantially nude persons[^[5]] dancing with or without music or engaged in movements of a sexual nature or movements simulating sexual intercourse, oral copulation, sodomy, or masturbation[.] In the bill codifying the code provisions related to the Assessment, the General Assembly made specific findings, including: [I]t is necessary and appropriate to adopt uniform and reasonable assessments and regulations to help address the deleterious secondary effects, including but not limited to, prostitution and sexual exploitation of children, associated with adult entertainment establishments that allow the sale, possession, or consumption of alcohol on premises and that provide to their patrons performances and interaction involving various forms of nudity. The General Assembly finds that a correlation exists between adult live entertainment establishments and the sexual exploitation of children. The General Assembly finds that adult live entertainment establishments present a point of access for children to come into contact with individuals seeking to sexually exploit children. The General Assembly further finds that individuals seeking to exploit children utilize adult live entertainment establishments as a means of locating children for the purpose of sexual exploitation. The General Assembly acknowledges that many local governments in this state and in other states found deleterious secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments are exacerbated by the sale, possession, or consumption of alcohol in such establishments. Ga. L. 2015, p. 675 § 1-2. The Act also stated: The purpose of this Act is to protect a child from further victimization after he or she is discovered to be a sexually exploited child by ensuring that a child protective response is in place in this state. The purpose and intended effect of this Act in imposing assessments and regulations on adult entertainment establishments is not to impose a restriction on the content or reasonable access to any materials or performances protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article I, Section I, Paragraph V of the Constitution of this state. Id. (b) Procedural History of GACE’s Challenges In November 2017, GACE filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Assessment and naming the Department of Revenue Commissioner Lynnette Riley in her individual capacity as the defendant.^[6] In its initial complaint, GACE argued that the Assessment is a “content-based tax” that is “contrary to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.” GACE sought a declaratory judgment declaring that “the tax is an unconstitutional restriction on free speech,” unconstitutionally vague, and also requested injunctive relief.^[7] The trial court entered orders in 2020 concluding that part of OCGA § 15-21-201 was void for vagueness, that part was subject to severance, and all other portions of the Assessment were constitutional and enforceable. Riley and GACE each filed notices of appeal to this Court. On appeal, this Court vacated the trial court’s orders and remanded with direction to dismiss Riley from the case on the ground that the action against Riley was moot because Riley, who had been sued in her individual capacity and was no longer the State Revenue Commissioner, “could not give GACE the relief it seeks.” Riley v. Georgia Assn. of Club Executives, 313 Ga. 364, 367 (870 SE2d 405) (2022). On remand, GACE amended its complaint to substitute Robyn Crittenden, in her individual capacity as the then- current Revenue Commissioner, as the defendant in place of Riley, and to add a claim that OCGA § 15-21-201 (1) (A) was unconstitutionally overbroad. When Frank O’Connell replaced Crittenden as Revenue Commissioner, GACE filed a third amended complaint naming O’Connell as a defendant in place of Crittenden. Both GACE and O’Connell filed motions for summary judgment based on the third amended complaint. While this litigation against the Revenue Commissioner was pending, GACE filed a separate case against the State of Georgia, in March 2022, raising the same arguments challenging the Assessment as raised in the case against the Revenue Commissioner and also asserting that the recent constitutional amendment in Article I, Section II, Paragraph V of the Georgia Constitution waived the State’s sovereign immunity “at least to all efforts to collect the [Assessment] based on [GACE]‘s member clubs’ activities that occurred on or after January 1, 2021 or that will occur in the future.”^[8] Both parties filed motions for summary judgment in this second case. In December 2023, the trial court decided both cases, granting O’Connell’s and the State’s motions for summary judgment and denying GACE’s motions. Adopting the same reasoning in both cases, the court explained that the Assessment was used to create a fund to combat sex trafficking and help victims and that “there is a well-established link between adult-entertainment establishments and prostitution.” The court concluded that intermediate scrutiny applied to its analysis of the Assessment, which “has only an incidental impact on protected expression” and is targeted at negative secondary effects of that protected expression. The court held that OCGA § 15-21-209 (a) and the Assessment passed intermediate scrutiny because “[t]hey further an important governmental interest in reducing sex trafficking and the exploitation of minors; their express purpose is unrelated to the suppression of speech; and any incidental restriction of the expressive ‘speech’ of nude dancing is no greater than essential to further the important governmental interest.” The court also concluded that OCGA § 15-21-201 (1) (A) is not overbroad. GACE filed a notice of appeal in both cases. 2. The Assessment does not impermissibly burden GACE’s speech. GACE argues that the Assessment violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution because it impermissibly burdens the protected expression of nude dancing. We hold that the Assessment is not subject to strict scrutiny because it is content-neutral and not the kind of tax to which the Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny. We assume without deciding that the Assessment is subject to intermediate scrutiny. We hold that the Assessment satisfies intermediate scrutiny. Thus, the Assessment does not impermissibly burden speech.^[9] (a) GACE bears the burden of showing that the Assessment’s alleged constitutional infirmities are “clear and palpable.” We begin by noting the heavy burden that GACE bears in asserting in Georgia courts a challenge to a state statute as unconstitutional. We presume that statutes are constitutional, and before an act of the General Assembly can be declared unconstitutional, the conflict between it and the fundamental law must be clear and palpable and this Court must be clearly satisfied of its unconstitutionality. Because all presumptions are in favor of the constitutionality of a statute, the burden is on the party claiming that the law is unconstitutional to prove it. Session v. State, 316 Ga. 179, 191 (4) (887 SE2d 317) (2023) (quoting Ammons v. State, 315 Ga. 149, 163 (3) (880 SE2d 544) (2022)). This burden applies to challenges under the United States and Georgia Constitutions alike. See Session, 316 Ga. at 191 (4) (evaluating challenge to statute under Georgia Constitution); S&S Towing & Recovery, Ltd. v. Charnota, 309 Ga. 117, 118 (1) (844 SE2d 730) (2020) (evaluating challenge to statute under Fourteenth Amendment of United States Constitution and stating that the statute could be held unconstitutional only if “the conflict between it and the fundamental law” was “clear and palpable”). (b) Because the Assessment is aimed at addressing negative “secondary effects” of establishments featuring nude dancing, rather than the content of the expression, the Assessment is content-neutral. We begin our consideration of the applicable standard under the First Amendment by noting the absence of precedent providing on-point guidance. The parties do not cite, and we have not found, ny federal appellate decision (much less from the Supreme Court) considering a First Amendment challenge to a tax on adult entertainment establishments like the one at issue here. Most cases addressing regulations of sexually oriented business, such as zoning and licensing requirements, involve complete prohibitions on the combination of nudity (or semi-nudity) and alcohol. See, e.g., Oasis Goodtime Emporium I, 297 Ga. at 525 (3) (b); Maxim Cabaret, 304 Ga. at 193-194 (III); Trop, 296 Ga. at 88 (1); Chambers, 268 Ga. at 674 (2); Goldrush II, 267 Ga. 683 at 692-693 (5); Gravely, 263 Ga. at 207 (2). And the cases addressing the First Amendment limitations on taxation since the Supreme Court’s adoption of intermediate scrutiny in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (88 SCt 1673, 20 LE2d 672) (1968), primarily relate to taxes levied against the press. See, e.g., Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (107 SCt 1722, 95 LE2d 209) (1987); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (103 SCt 1365, 75 LE2d 295) (1983). And the handful of our sister courts to address similar taxation schemes have arrived at different conclusions regarding the applicable legal framework. See Bushco v. Utah State Tax Comm., 225 P3d 153, 163-164 (Utah 2009) (analyzing constitutionality of tax under intermediate scrutiny as articulated in O’Brien); Combs v. Texas Ent. Ass., Inc., 347 SW3d 277, 288 (Tex. 2011) (same); Deja Vu Showgirls of Las Vegas, LLC v. Nev. Dep’t of Taxation, 334 P3d 392, 401-402 (Nev. 2014) (analyzing constitutionality of tax under rational basis review). At least some of the disagreement between us and the dissent is a natural byproduct of this lack of clear precedent. As relevant to this appeal, the Assessment applies to establishments where alcohol is sold and where “the entertainment or activity therein consists of nude or substantially nude persons dancing with or without music or engaged in movements of a sexual nature or movements simulating sexual intercourse, oral copulation, sodomy, or masturbation.” OCGA § 15-21-201 (1) (A). The nude dancing referenced in OCGA § 15-21-201 (1) (A) is a form of expressive conduct that is protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, although only barely. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-566 (111 SCt 2456, 115 LE2d 504) (1991) (“[N]ude dancing of the kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so.”); City of Erie v. Pap’s AM, 529 U.S. 277, 289 (120 SCt 1382, 146 LEd2d 265) (2000) (“[N]ude dancing of the type at issue here is expressive conduct, although we think that it falls only within the outer ambit of the First Amendment’s protection.”). GACE argues that the Assessment is content-based because it applies only to clubs that feature nude dancing conveying an erotic message. Specifically, GACE notes that the Assessment applies when the nude dancing is provided as “entertainment” and when nude performers are “engaged in movements of a sexual nature or movements simulating sexual intercourse, oral copulation, sodomy, or masturbation.” OCGA § 15-21-201 (1) (A). GACE argues that because the Assessment is content-based, it is subject to a strict scrutiny test, “which requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 171 (135 SCt 2218, 192 LE2d 236) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). We disagree and conclude that the Assessment is content- neutral. The principal inquiry in determining whether a legislative act is content-neutral is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. The government’s purpose is the controlling consideration. A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others. Oasis Goodtime Emporium I, 297 Ga. at 521 (3) (a) (punctuation omitted). The United States Supreme Court has explained that when an ordinance “is aimed not at the content” of adult entertainment, but “rather at the secondary effects” of establishments that feature adult entertainment, the “ordinance is completely consistent with [the] definition of ‘content-neutral’ speech regulations as those that ‘are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’” City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (106 SCt 925, 89 LE2d 29) (1986) (emphasis in original); see also Oasis Goodtime Emporium I, 297 Ga. at 521 (3) (a) (“An ordinance designed to combat the undesirable secondary effects of sexually explicit businesses is content- neutral.”). Here, the Assessment clearly fits within the category of laws that are aimed at the “secondary effects” of adult establishments featuring certain protected expression rather than at the content of the expression itself. First, the General Assembly made clear that it did not intend to regulate expression protected by the First Amendment: “The purpose and intended effect of this Act in imposing assessments and regulations on adult entertainment establishments is not to impose a restriction on the content or reasonable access to any materials or performances protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article I, Section I, Paragraph V of the Constitution of this state.” Ga. L. 2015, p. 675 § 1-2. Instead, the General Assembly explained in its legislative findings that the Assessment’s objective is to “address the deleterious secondary effects . . . associated with adult entertainment establishments that allow the sale, possession, or consumption of alcohol” by funding a “protective response” through assessments imposed on the industry responsible for those secondary effects. Id.; see also OCGA § 15-21-209 (c). Thus, because the purpose of the Assessment is to address the undesirable secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments, we assume without deciding that intermediate scrutiny applies. See, e.g., Maxim Cabaret, 304 Ga. at 192 (III) (concluding that the regulation designed to combat the secondary effects caused by the combination of alcohol and live nudity was subject to intermediate scrutiny). GACE contends that the secondary effects doctrine has “been applied exclusively in regulatory contexts, often related to land use or licensing.” Thus, GACE argues, because the Assessment is a tax and because the Supreme Court “has taken a negative, bright-line attitude toward taxation that discriminates based on protected expression,” the Assessment must satisfy strict scrutiny. But the United States Supreme Court has held that a tax “discriminat[ing] among speakers is constitutionally suspect only in certain circumstances”: (1) if it “single[s] out the press[,]” (2) “ if it targets a small group of speakers[,]” or (3) “ if it discriminates on the basis of the content of taxpayer speech.” Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444-447 (111 SCt 1438, 113 LE2d 494) (1991). GACE does not argue that the adult entertainment establishments subject to the Assessment are part of the press, and we have already concluded that the Assessment is content-neutral. As to whether the Assessment targets a small group of speakers, it is true that the Assessment applies only to certain establishments, but it applies to a significant percentage of establishments within the category of adult live entertainment establishments as a whole, not a small, select few. See Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 661 (114 SCt 2445, 129 LE2d 497) (1994) (describing regulations as “broad based, applying to almost all cable systems in the country, rather than just a select few” in concluding that strict scrutiny did not apply); see also Nat’l Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F3d 731, 740 (1st Cir. 1995) (“Under appellant’s formulation, any regulation that has an effect on fewer than all First Amendment speakers or messages could be deemed to be a form of targeting and thus subjected to strict scrutiny. Yet the Supreme Court has recognized that a municipality lawfully may enact a regulation that ‘serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression . . . even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.’” (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (109 SCt 2746, 105 LEd2d 661) (1989))). Thus, the Assessment does not fall within the three categories of taxes identified in Leathers as “constitutionally suspect,” and strict scrutiny does not apply. The Defendants, on the other hand, cite Leathers to support their contention that the Assessment does not implicate the First Amendment at all. Because we conclude that the Assessment satisfies intermediate scrutiny, we do not reach the question of whether the Assessment need satisfy only a less-exacting test. We do note, however, that at least one court to consider a similar tax held that the tax it was reviewing was subject only to rational basis review. Deja Vu Showgirls of Las Vegas, LLC, 334 P3d at 399-402 (upholding under rational basis review a tax on live entertainment with many exemptions for “family-oriented” entertainment). (c) The intermediate scrutiny test. Where “the governmental purpose in enacting the [speech- burdening] regulation is unrelated to the suppression of expression,” the regulation needs to satisfy the intermediate scrutiny test articulated in O’Brien. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 289; see also Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 189 (117 SCt 1174, 137 LE 2d 369) (1997) (describing O’Brien test as “intermediate scrutiny”); Maxim Cabaret, 304 Ga. at 192 (III) (citing O’Brien when describing intermediate scrutiny). Under O’Brien, a content-neutral law may be constitutional under the First Amendment: “[1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” 391 U.S. at 377.^[10] i. The Assessment is within the General Assembly’s Constitutional power. As to the first prong, there is no dispute that it is “within the constitutional power” of the General Assembly to impose taxes. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. I (“Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the right of taxation shall always be under the complete control of the state.”). ii. The Assessment furthers an important government interest. As to the second prong, the State has an important interest in remedying the secondary effects caused by adult entertainment establishments, and it furthered that interest by creating a fund to support sexually exploited children. But the State’s interest is not, as the dissent would have it, merely a general interest in raising revenue to combat these secondary effects. Rather, implicit within the State’s interest is an element of seeking not to burden taxpayers in general with the costs of remedying the harm that the adult entertainment industry causes. This element strikes us as clearly implicit within the structure of the challenged statute (imposing the Assessment on the adult entertainment industry) viewed in the light of the State’s findings that the secondary effects are caused by that industry. And, indeed, it appears to have struck the trial court similarly. See MSJ Order at 3130-31 (“In other words, GACE is essentially asking the state to subsidize them by covering the costs of mitigating the secondary effects of their own operations.”).^[11] Although GACE acknowledges that providing resources for sexually exploited children is an “important or substantial government interest,”^[12] it contends that the Assessment fails the O’Brien test because the legislature did not reasonably rely on evidence connecting adult entertainment establishments with child exploitation. To demonstrate “a connection between speech and a substantial, independent government interest,” the government “may rely on any evidence that is ‘reasonably believed to be relevant[.]‘” ^[13] City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438-439 (122 SCt 1728, 152 LE2d 670) (2002) (plurality opinion) (quoting City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 50-52).^[14] Although the government cannot “get away with shoddy data or reasoning,” Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438, it is not required “to prove the efficacy of the studies” it relies on. See Parker v. Whitfield County, 265 Ga. 829, 829 (1) (463 SE2d 116) (1995) (citation and punctuation omitted). “The First Amendment does not require” the State “to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by other” jurisdictions, as long as the evidence relied upon “is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that” the State seeks to address. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52. In short, “very little evidence is required” to satisfy this standard. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring). To successfully challenge the State’s evidence, GACE must either demonstrate that the State’s “evidence does not support its rationale” or “furnish[] evidence that disputes the [State's] factual findings.” Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438-439. “If [GACE] succeed[s] in casting doubt on [the State's] rationale in either manner, the burden shifts back to the [State] to supplement the record with evidence renewing support for a theory that justifies its [statute].” Id. at 439. The studies and evidence relied upon by the General Assembly to demonstrate a connection between adult entertainment establishments and child sexual exploitation are more than sufficient to satisfy the standard articulated in City of Renton and Alameda Books. For example, the study Hidden in Plain View: The Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Girls in Atlanta, Atlanta Women’s Agenda (2005) found “a strong spatial correlation between areas of adult prostitution activities and juvenile prostitution- related activities,” that “[j]uvenile truants and runaways are often found in areas with heavy adult prostitution activities,” and most notably, “a spatial association between prostitution-related activities and legal adult sex venues.”^[15] In the light of these findings, the General Assembly’s Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Minors Joint Study Commission concluded in its final report that because of the “frequent proximity between adult entertainment venues and prostitution activity . . . employment in such businesses frequently serve[s] as a stepping stone to prostitution,” and that “these businesses often serve as the very location for such illicit transactions.” Furthermore, the Commission noted that “there is a strong need for additional in-patient, as well as out-patient, services tailored to the unique needs of [child sexual exploitation] survivors,” and proposed that a “way to raise funds for additional resources would be to place a modest surcharge on patrons to adult entertainment venues, which would be specifically directed toward increased services for victims.” Thus, the evidence before the General Assembly demonstrating a connection between child sexual exploitation and adult entertainment establishments “fairly support[ed] the [State's] rationale for [the Assessment].” Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438. In response, GACE argues that these studies are flawed and do not in fact establish such a connection. Specifically, GACE contends that “[s]ome studies do not analyze adult entertainment establishments at all; some do not discuss child sex trafficking; [and] some rely on the mere rough spatial proximity between juvenile prostitution arrests and ‘adult sex venues[.]‘” But as discussed above, Hidden in Plain View explicitly analyzed the link between child sexual exploitation and adult entertainment establishments. This alone would be enough to satisfy the State’s evidentiary burden. But the General Assembly also relied upon other studies that arrived at similar conclusions. See Deconstructing the Demand for Prostitution: Preliminary Insights From Interviews With Chicago Men Who Purchase Sex, Chicago Alliance Against Sexual Exploitation (2008) (finding that 46% of men who purchased sex “indoors” did so at “strip clubs”); Adolescent Girls in Georgia’s Sex Trade: An In-Depth Tracking Study, Juvenile Justice Group (2008) (noting that researchers found that “[t]here are several small hotels and motels — typically located near strip clubs — where on any weekend night you will find the same group of 10-15 prostitutes, many of whom are young”). Nevertheless, GACE contends that any “spatial association” between adult entertainment establishments and child sexual exploitation may be the result of “past zoning” rather than any “connection to child sex trafficking.” But even if the evidence was consistent with both GACE’s zoning theory and the General Assembly’s “gateway” theory, the General Assembly was not required “to prove that its theory is the only one that can plausibly explain the data[.]“ Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 437-438. In other words, although the State “bears the burden of providing evidence that supports a link between” adult entertainment establishments and child sexual exploitation, “it does not bear the burden of providing evidence that rules out every theory for the link . . . that is inconsistent with its own.” Id. at 437. GACE also cites two studies that purport to refute any connection between child sexual exploitation and adult entertainment establishments. We doubt that either study directly refutes the General Assembly’s gateway and proximity theories derived from the evidence discussed above. But even if GACE “succeed[ed] in casting doubt on [the State's] rationale,” the burden would merely shift back to the State “to supplement the record with evidence renewing support for a theory that justifies” the Assessment. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 439. The live testimony heard by the General Assembly easily satisfies the State’s burden. See City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 289 (criticizing the dissent for “ignor[ing] Erie’s actual experience and instead requir[ing] . . . an empirical analysis”). The General Assembly heard from multiple witnesses who testified that they or victims they knew were initially trafficked through establishments like strip clubs. In response, GACE contends that the testimony “is out of date or anecdotal.” But GACE misconstrues the State’s evidentiary burden. See Daytona Grand, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, Fla, 490 F3d 860, 881 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Lollipop’s argument that the City’s evidence is flawed because it consists of ‘anecdotal’ accounts rather than ‘empirical’ studies essentially asks this Court to hold today that the City’s reliance on anything but empirical studies based on scientific methods is unreasonable. This was not the law before Alameda Books, and it is not the law now.”); see also Peek-A-Boo Lounge of Bradenton, Inc. v. Manatee County, Fla., 630 F3d 1346, 1358 (11th Cir. 2011) (“There is no precedent that bars a county from relying on studies that are not empirical in nature.”). As the trial court correctly stated, the State is not required to “prove without question that the tax will prevent sexual exploitation. Instead, the evidence need only support a reasonable belief that this modest tax will advance the State’s interests in protecting victims of child sex exploitation.” See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“As a general matter, courts should not be in the business of second-guessing fact-bound empirical assessments of city planners.”). The evidence relied upon by the General Assembly clearly meets this evidentiary standard. Accordingly, the Assessment satisfies the second prong of the O’Brien test. The State’s interest is unrelated to suppressing free expression. As to the third prong, the State’s interest in “combating the negative secondary effects associated with adult entertainment establishments” is “unrelated to the suppression of free expression.” City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 296, 301. The Assessment’s incidental burden on expression promotes the State’s interest in a way that would be achieved less effectively absent the Assessment. We begin our analysis of the fourth prong by articulating the difference in our understanding of its requirements from that of the dissent. The dissent interprets the language O’Brien used to describe its fourth prong as similar to the least-restrictive-means test of strict scrutiny: “the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [must be] no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. But more recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have made clear that reading of O’Brien is mistaken. Instead, a burden on expression subject to intermediate scrutiny satisfies the fourth prong if it “promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (citation and punctuation omitted).^[16] As the Ward Court explained, the fourth prong of the O’Brien test does not require that the challenged law be “the least restrictive or least intrusive means” of “serv[ing] the government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests[.]” Id. at 798; see also City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 301-302 (explaining that under the intermediate scrutiny test, a “least restrictive means analysis is not required”). Indeed, the Ward Court was considering a lower court’s decision that had understood O’Brien as the dissent does, and had invalidated a speech restriction under intermediate scrutiny because there were alternative ways to serve the same government interest with less burden on speech. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 798. In reversing that lower court, the Ward Court made clear that the presence of a less-restrictive way of serving the government interest was not fatal to intermediate scrutiny; “[s]o long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest, however, the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government’s interest could be adequately served by some less- speech-restrictive alternative.”^[17] Id. at 800. This is a key distinction between strict and intermediate scrutiny. See McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (134 SCt 2518, 189 LE2d 502) (2014) (explaining that an act that “must satisfy strict scrutiny . . . must be the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest”). A review of the application of O’Briens fourth prong in other cases from the United States Supreme Court and this Court illustrates what kinds of incidental restrictions on expression are permissible. For example, in City of Erie, the United States Supreme Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting nudity in public places, concluding that the requirement burdening speech — i.e., “[t]he requirement that dancers wear pasties or G-strings” — was “a minimal restriction in furtherance of the asserted government interests” and left “ample capacity to convey the dancer’s erotic message.” 529 U.S. at 301. Although there were “alternative means,” such as zoning restrictions, to address the secondary effects caused by nude dancing, the Court reiterated that the consideration of these alternatives was unnecessary because the “least restrictive means analysis [was] not required.” Id. at 301-302. Similarly, in Ward, the Court upheld a requirement that performers in a public concert venue use sound equipment provided and controlled by the city because “the city’s substantial interest in limiting sound volume is served in a direct and effective way by the requirement that the city’s sound technician control the mixing board during performances.” 491 U.S. at 800. Thus, because the “alternative regulatory methods hypothesized by the Court of Appeals reflect[ed] nothing more than a disagreement with the city over how much control of volume is appropriate or how that level of control is to be achieved . . . [t]he Court of Appeals erred in failing to defer to the city’s reasonable determination that its interest in controlling volume would be best served by” the regulation. Id. This Court has also applied the O’Brien test to evaluate whether prohibitions on the combination of nude dancing and alcohol were sufficiently tailored to further the government’s stated interest without unnecessarily burdening protected expression. See, e.g., Gravely, 263 Ga. at 207 (2); Goldrush II, 267 Ga. at 692-693 (5); Maxim Cabaret, 304 Ga. at 193-194 (III). For example, in Gravely, we upheld an ordinance banning the sale of alcohol at erotic dance establishments because it “impact[ed] only those modes of expression which, in the experience of local governments, tend to be the focal points of negative effects such as increased crime[.]” 263 Ga. at 205 (1) (citation omitted). Since Gravely, this Court has “repeatedly upheld bans on liquor sales in sexually oriented businesses as a method of decreasing the undesirable secondary effects of such businesses with minimal incidental effects on free expression.” Maxim Cabaret, 304 Ga. at 193 (III); see also Goldrush II, 267 Ga. at 692-693 (5) (“[T]he ordinance’s application is sufficiently narrowly tailored because it is limited to the modes of expression implicated in the production of negative secondary effects — those establishments that provide alcohol and entertainment requiring an adult entertainment license — thereby exempting mainstream performance houses, museums, or theaters.”). In short, when the restriction on protected expression is directly linked to the government’s objective to mitigate negative secondary effects, the O’Brien test is satisfied, even if an alternative method of accomplishing the government’s interest is available. See Oasis Goodtime Emporium I, 297 Ga. at 526 (3) (c) (2) (concluding that the ordinance prohibiting employees of sexually oriented businesses from appearing fully nude struck “a constitutionally permissible fit between the objective of reducing undesirable secondary effects and the need to protect free speech,” even though the requirement that dancers “wear at least some minimal kind of costume” while dancing imposed “more of a restriction on protected expression than prohibiting alcohol in the vicinity”).^[18] Against this backdrop of binding precedent, we conclude that the Assessment complies with the fourth prong of the O’Brien test. As the General Assembly’s legislative findings and statutory scheme show, the Assessment’s objective is to “address the deleterious secondary effects . . . associated with adult entertainment establishments that allow the sale, possession, or consumption of alcohol” by imposing an assessment on the industry responsible for those secondary effects to fund a “child protective response[.]” Ga. L. 2015, pp. 675-677 § 1-2. The State’s interest — which includes requiring the industry that “ tend[s] to be the focal point[] of negative effects” to fund the remedy for the harm it creates — is thus principally served by a targeted tax. See Gravely, 263 Ga. at 205 (1); see also Bushco, 225 P3d at 168 (“In this case, the Tax promotes the interest in providing treatment for sex offenders by raising revenue and directing that revenue towards treatment programs.”); Combs, 347 SW3d at 288 (concluding that a fee on adult entertainment establishments that serve alcohol survived intermediate scrutiny). Like the regulations at issue in City of Erie and Ward, the Assessment serves the State’s interest “in a direct and effective way,” satisfying the fourth prong of the O’Brien test. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 800; City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 300-301; see also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 297 (104 SCt 3065, 82 LE2d 221) (1984) (“None of [the] provisions [of regulation prohibiting camping in certain parks] appears unrelated to the ends that it was designed to serve.”). Moreover, it is not disputed that 100% of the Assessment goes to fund the response to the secondary effects. As Ward explained, the “[g]overnment may not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799. No portion of the burden on speech that the Assessment imposes does not serve to advance the State’s goals. GACE argues that the Assessment fails this prong because there are less burdensome ways of accomplishing the State’s interest. Specifically, GACE contends that the State’s only interest is “raising revenue to combat a particular social problem” and that “[a] broad-based tax raising the same revenue” would further that interest “without burdening expression.” But as we have already explained, GACE mischaracterizes the requirements of intermediate scrutiny and takes too narrow a view of the State’s interest. GACE’s argument that the Assessment fails this prong “because there are less burdensome ways of addressing the [S]tate’s interest” and thus “the First Amendment requires that these methods, rather than the [Assessment], be used” is simply an effort to smuggle the least restrictive means requirement from strict scrutiny into intermediate scrutiny. See Bushco, 225 P3d at 168. But as we have already explained, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that O’Brien does not require the State to adopt the least restrictive means available to serve its asserted interest to satisfy intermediate scrutiny. See City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 301-302 (“In any event, since this is a content-neutral restriction, least restrictive means analysis is not required.”).^[19] Accordingly, the availability of alternative methods for accomplishing the State’s purpose is not indicative of a poor fit between the burden on expression and the State’s interest. Furthermore, GACE’s contention that a general tax — which “would no doubt inflict burdens on a greater variety of protected expression” than the targeted tax scheme at issue here — would be less restrictive highlights its misunderstanding of the State’s interest.^[20] Bushco, 225 P3d at 168. The State’s interest is not merely a general interest in raising revenue to combat a particular harm, i.e., the sexual exploitation of children; the Assessment also furthers the State’s interest in ensuring that the industry responsible for that harm, i.e., adult entertainment establishments that serve alcohol, rather than the general public, pays for the remedy.^[21] Any other interpretation of the State’s interest would render the General Assembly’s specific findings that adult entertainment establishments are responsible for this particular harm meaningless. When the State’s interest is properly framed — as an effort to reduce the harm caused by the secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments and requiring the responsible industry to bear the cost — the close fit between the burdening of expression and the State’s interest is apparent. And, in any event, any burdens on protected expression are relatively de minimis. The Assessment does not prohibit nude dancing, regulate the content of nude dancing, restrict the time, place, or manner of nude dancing, or prohibit the combination of nude dancing and alcohol. Thus, the Assessment is less burdensome than the ordinance upheld in City of Erie, which imposed a blanket ban on public nudity.^[22] See Bushco, 225 P3d at 169 (“Since the Tax’s impact on protected expression is even less burdensome than the impact of the public nudity ordinance upheld in Erie, we determine that the Tax satisfies the ‘narrow tailoring’ prong of the O’Brien test.”). The Assessment requires adult entertainment establishments that serve alcohol and operate for a profit to pay the greater of 1 percent of the previous year’s gross revenue or $5,000. See OCGA § 15-21-209 (a). This tax is significantly less burdensome than similar taxes upheld by other courts.^[23] See, e.g., Bushco, 225 P3d at 158 (largely upholding a 10 percent tax on gross revenue). And it can be avoided entirely by not serving alcohol or not performing substantially nude. See Oasis Goodtime Emporium I, Inc., 297 Ga. at 525 (3) (b) (“Serving alcohol is not itself protected expression.”); Maxim Cabaret, 304 Ga. at 193 (III) (“[Constitutional protections are extended to speech and expression, not to profits."); Bushco, 225 P3d at 168 ("Plaintiffs can avoid the Tax, just like the businesses in Erie could avoid the ordinance, simply by having their erotic dancers use G-strings and pasties."); see also Sensations, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 526 F3d 291, 299 (6th Cir. 2008) ("The prohibition of full nudity has been viewed as having only a de minimis effect on the expressive character of erotic dancing."). Thus, the Assessment "leaves ample capacity to convey [a] dancer’s erotic message,” City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 301, and leaves GACE’s members “free to express themselves as they wish through dance or otherwise.”^[24] Oasis Goodtime Emporium I, 297 Ga. at 525 (3) (c) (1). In short, like the dozens of other laws, regulations, and ordinances restricting the combination of nudity and alcohol upheld by this Court and the United States Supreme Court, the Assessment satisfies intermediate scrutiny.^[25] 3. GACE’s overbreadth claim fails. GACE concludes with a brief argument that the Assessment is overbroad because the definition of “adult entertainment establishment” under OCGA § 15-21-201 (1) (A) contains several vague terms. GACE argues that even though it is not specifically raising a vagueness challenge (the statute is not vague as to GACE’s members), an overbreadth challenge may nevertheless use the vagueness of statutory terms in arguing that a statute reaches a substantial amount of protected activity by third parties. GACE argues that the Assessment could apply to venues that feature traditional shows with risque content or host entertainers known for wearing revealing attire that would qualify as “substantially nude” under OCGA § 15-21-201 (1) (A), as well as hotels or movie theaters (those that serve alcohol) where movies with sexual content is available. We conclude that GACE has not met its burden of establishing that the statute is overbroad. Under the United States Supreme Court’s First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, “a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech,” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (128 SCt 1830, 170 LE2d 650) (2008), even if it may constitutionally be enforced against the plaintiff. The doctrine “seeks to strike a balance between” “the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law that deters people from engaging in constitutionally protected speech” and the concern that “invalidating a law that in some of its applications is perfectly constitutional . . . has obvious harmful effects.” Id. Application of the overbreadth is “strong medicine” that should be employed “sparingly and only as a last resort.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (93 SCt 2908, 37 LE2d 830) (1973). Because the doctrine is not to be “casually employed,” a challenger must show that a statute’s overbreadth is “substantial, not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Williams, 553 U.S. at 292-293 (citation and punctuation omitted). Thus, to succeed on an overbreadth challenge, a challenger “bears the burden of demonstrating, from the text of the law and from actual fact, that substantial overbreadth exists.” Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 122 (123 SCt 2191, 156 LE2d 148) (2003) (citation and punctuation omitted). As an initial point, as we have concluded above, the Assessment has a plainly legitimate sweep (its application to GACE’s members). And GACE makes no argument relative to establishments that “consist of” nude dancing, which are those businesses that make up GACE’s organization. All that is at issue here, then, is their argument that the definitions of “consists of’ and “substantially nude” are overbroad. Although these terms may be imprecise, GACE has not shown that any overbreadth is “substantial” relative to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep. Ordinarily, the first step in assessing an overbreadth claim is to construe the challenged statute to understand the full extent of its effect on protected expression. See Scott v. State, 299 Ga. 568, 570 (1) (788 SE2d 468) (2016). But we need not do so comprehensively here. GACE’s overbreadth argument focuses exclusively on a single aspect of the definition of “adult entertainment establishment” contained in OCGA § 15-21-201 (1). The challenged part of the definition provides that an establishment qualifies (and thus other provisions of the Act then subject it to the Assessment) if “[t]he entertainment or activity therein consists of nude or substantially nude persons dancing with or without music or engaged in movements of a sexual nature or movements simulating sexual intercourse, oral copulation, sodomy, or masturbation[.]” OCGA § 15-21-201 (1) (A). GACE argues that “ substantially nude” is very broad, that “consists of” and “movements of a sexual nature” are vague, and together those result in a statutory scope that reaches far more constitutionally protected speech than is permissible. In other words, because “consists of’ is undefined, it could reach any entertainment that includes any portion of substantial nudity (e.g., a hotel where a customer can purchase alcohol and rent a movie that includes some nudity). But in context, “consists of is not nearly as vague as GACE argues, and this dooms the entirety of GACE’s argument. An adult entertainment establishment is subject to the Assessment if its entertainment “consists of” nudity or substantial nudity. “Consists of generally means “to be composed, made up, or formed [of].” See Webster’s Deluxe Unabridged Dictionary, 389 (2d ed. 1983); Camp v. Williams, 314 Ga. 699, 702 (2) (a) (879 SE2d 88) (2022) (the ordinary meaning of statutory text can be determined from a review of dictionary definitions as well as a broader consideration of context and history”). When used in a statute like this one, “consists of” describes an exhaustive list of essential components. In this sense, “consists of’ is very limiting. See Berryhill v. Ga. Community Support & Solutions, 281 Ga. 439, 441 (638 SE2d 278) (2006) (noting that the word “include,” when used in statutes, had traditionally introduced a nonexhaustive list, but is “now widely used for consists of,” which when “[u]sed in this limiting sense,” introduces “an exhaustive list of all of the components or members that make up the whole” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Thus, for the definition to apply, the entertainment or activity must be composed substantially of “nude or substantially nude persons” doing very specific things. The statute is not triggered by entertainment or activity that could include some amount of nudity or substantial nudity. Instead, it applies only to establishments where a material or essential part of the entertainment or activity offered therein is made up of nude or substantially nude activity. We need not decide precisely how much nude or substantially nude activity be present for entertainment to qualify; the statute makes clear enough that it must be the essential component of the entertainment offered by an establishment, and not merely an ancillary component or one of many options. This commonsense understanding of the term necessarily excludes virtually all of GACE’s examples, because where the activity is not a material part of the establishment’s business, some marginal activity of “substantial nudity” would not trigger the statute. Because the nude or substantially nude activity must be the essential component of the entertainment offered, GACE cannot show that the text of OCGA § 15-21-201 (1) (A) is substantially overbroad. Nor can it show “from actual fact” that the statutory definition is substantially broad. GACE has raised many hypothetical situations of impermissible applications of the Assessment, but that is, by itself, insufficient to render a statute overbroad. See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 800 (“It is clear . . . that the mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.”). GACE points to no evidence in the record showing that the Assessment has been applied to mainstream venues or establishments. Significantly, as noted by the trial court, the definition of “adult entertainment establishments,” including the definition of “substantially nude,” is very similar to definitions used by, among others, the City of Atlanta, Fulton County, DeKalb County, and Cobb County.^[26] There is no indication that these definitions have ever been applied in an overbroad manner. See Cheshire Bridge Holdings v. City of Atlanta, 15 F4th 1362, 1375, 1377-1378 (11th Cir. 2021) (the risk that the definition of “adult entertainment establishment” was overbroad was not substantial relative to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep, especially where there was no evidence that the statute had been applied impermissibly as suggested by the plaintiffs). As a result, GACE has not met its burden of showing “from actual fact, that substantial overbreadth exists.” * Because the Assessment imposed on “adult entertainment establishments” as defined in OCGA § 15-21-201 (1) (A) satisfies intermediate scrutiny under O’Brien and is not overbroad, GACE’s First Amendment claims fail. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order denying summary judgment to GACE and granting summary judgment to Defendants. Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren, J., who dissents, and Pinson, J., disqualified. Warren, Justice. The sexual exploitation and trafficking of children is a scourge on society. It is appropriate for the General Assembly to address such harms by exercising its lawful authority, and I am glad it has sought to do so. But the question this Court is faced with today is not whether these harms exist; they undoubtedly do. The question we must decide is whether the General Assembly’s chosen method of addressing these harms is a lawful exercise of its authority—and in particular, whether it violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because I would conclude that it does, I respectfully dissent. 1. The State’s asserted interest in passing the Assessment is to provide services to child victims of sexual exploitation—not to financially burden a particular industry in service of that policy objective—and the Assessment must pass intermediate scrutiny based on that interest. (a) I disagree with the majority opinion’s characterization of the State’s interest in this case. And because assessing whether a regulation furthers a government entity’s “important or substantial” interest is an integral part of the O’Brien intermediate-scrutiny test that I believe applies (and the majority opinion only assumes applies), it is no surprise that we reach different conclusions about the constitutionality of the Assessment. As relevant to this appeal, the Assessment applies to a limited group of establishments that are defined in part by the expression they showcase: establishments where “the entertainment or activity therein consists of nude or substantially nude persons dancing with or without music or engaged in” particular movements, OCGA § 15­21-201 (1) (A), and in which alcohol is sold. The nude dancing performed in the clubs that are members of GACE and that is referenced in OCGA § 15-21-201 (1) (A) has been held by the United States Supreme Court to be a form of expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565­566 (111 SCt 2456, 115 LE2d 504) (1991) (“[N]ude dancing of the kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so.”); City of Erie v. Pap’s AM, 529 U.S. 277, 289 (120 SCt 1382, 146 LEd2d 265) (2000) (“[N]ude dancing of the type at issue here is expressive conduct, although we think that it falls only within the outer ambit of the First Amendment’s protection.”). See also Gravely v. Bacon, 263 Ga. 203, 205 (429 SE2d 663) (1993) (“Nude dancing is protected expression under the free speech clause[] of . . . the United States . . . Constitution[].”). It follows that by imposing a “special” financial burden based on the showcasing of nude dancing, the State, via the Assessment, imposes a burden on expression that is protected by the First Amendment. The Assessment is therefore subject to some level of judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 641 (114 SCt 2445, 129 LE2d 497) (1994) (“Because the must-carry provisions impose special obligations upon cable operators and special burdens upon cable programmers, some measure of heightened First Amendment scrutiny is demanded.”). I agree with the majority opinion that the Assessment is content-neutral and that the secondary-effects doctrine—a doctrine the United States Supreme Court created to assess laws and ordinances that are “aimed not at the content” of adult entertainment, but “rather at the secondary effects” of establishments that feature adult entertainment, City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (106 SCt 925, 89 LE2d 29) (1986) (emphasis in original)—controls the First Amendment constitutional analysis here.^[27] But I part ways with the majority opinion insofar as it assumes, without deciding,^[28] that intermediate scrutiny applies.^[29] See Maj. Op. at 19. In light of the Assessment’s content neutrality and aim at secondary effects, I conclude that the intermediate scrutiny test articulated in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (88 SCt 1673, 20 LE2d 672) (1968), applies. See City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 289 (explaining that if “the governmental purpose in enacting the regulation is unrelated to the suppression of expression, then the regulation need only satisfy the ‘less stringent’ standard from O’Brien for evaluating restrictions on symbolic speech”); Maxim Cabaret, Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, 304 Ga. 187, 191-192 (816 SE2d 31) (2018) (“This Court and the U.S. Supreme Court have held repeatedly that ordinances designed to combat the negative effects of sexually oriented businesses on the surrounding community are to be evaluated as ‘content-neutral’ regulations, which are subject to intermediate scrutiny.”).^[30] Where the majority opinion and I veer even further apart is in the application of the O’Brien test. In particular, I disagree with the majority opinion’s characterization of the State’s interest in enacting the Assessment—especially because that characterization disregards that the State has made clear in numerous ways exactly what its interest is. Moreover, by recasting the State Defendants’ stated interest in this case, the majority opinion has not given full effect to the test the United States Supreme Court has said must be applied in cases like this. And the majority opinion has instead endorsed an intermediate-scrutiny analysis that legitimizes governmental interests—even unstated governmental interests— that come perilously close to targeting protected expression. (b) Under O’Brien’s intermediate-scrutiny test, a regulation is constitutional under the First Amendment if, among other things, it “furthers an important or substantial government interest” and the restriction on expression is “no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” 391 U.S. at 377. The majority opinion describes the State’s interest in enacting the Assessment as twofold. First, the majority opinion cites the text of the Act enacting the Assessment to show that the State has evinced an interest in “‘address[ing] the deleterious secondary effects . . . associated with adult entertainment establishments that allow the sale, possession, or consumption of alcohol’” and in funding “‘a child protective response.’” Maj. Op. at 41 (citing Ga. L. 2015, p. 675 § 1-2). I readily agree that the State has expressed an interest in addressing the sexual exploitation of children and that this interest is “important or substantial.” See Ga. L. 2015, pp. 675 § 1-2 (“[I]t is necessary and appropriate to adopt uniform and reasonable assessments and regulations to help address the deleterious secondary effects, including but not limited to, prostitution and sexual exploitation of children, associated with adult entertainment establishments that allow the sale, possession, or consumption of alcohol on premises and that provide to their patrons performances and interaction involving various forms of nudity.”); id. (“The purpose of this Act is to protect a child from further victimization after he or she is discovered to be a sexually exploited child by ensuring that a child protective response is in place in this state.”). And to serve that interest, the State created the Safe Harbor for Sexually Exploited Children Fund, which may be used “for purposes of providing care, rehabilitative services, residential housing, health services, and social services . . . to sexually exploited children” and to fund “a person, entity, or program devoted to awareness and prevention of becoming a sexually exploited child.” OCGA § 15-21-202 (c). All of this is clear from the Act and statute creating the Assessment. But the majority opinion goes on to infer a second State interest. It does so in a way that I do not view as supported by the General Assembly’s stated purpose or by United States Supreme Court precedent performing intermediate scrutiny analysis under O’Brien. In this regard, the majority opinion asserts that the State has an unsaid “important or substantial” interest in “imposing an assessment on the industry responsible for those secondary effects.” Maj. Op. at 41. See also id. at 24 (“[I]mplicit within the State’s interest is an element of seeking not to burden taxpayers in general with the costs of remedying the harm that the adult entertainment industry causes.”); id. (“This element strikes us as clearly implicit within the structure of the challenged statute.”); id. at 41 (“The State’s interest . . . includes requiring the industry that ‘tend[s] to be the focal point[] of negative effects’ to fund the remedy for the harm it creates[.]“); id. at 45 (characterizing this second interest as “ensuring that the industry responsible for that harm, i.e., adult entertainment establishments that serve alcohol, rather than the general public, pays for the remedy”). In so doing, the majority opinion has imputed on the State an interest that it has not itself asserted, in a way that is both novel and troubling. (c) The record shows that the State has not asserted the second interest the majority opinion infers. The State has not asserted an interest in “ensuring that the industry responsible for that harm, i.e., adult entertainment establishments that serve alcohol, rather than the general public, pays for the remedy”—not in the Act, not in its appellate briefs, and not at oral argument before this Court. Instead, the Act expressly states: “The purpose of this Act is to protect a child from further victimization after he or she is discovered to be a sexually exploited child by ensuring that a child protective response is in place in this state.” Ga. L. 2015, p. 675.^[31] See also OCGA § 15-21-202 (c) (explaining that the money raised by the Assessment may be used “for purposes of providing care, rehabilitative services, residential housing, health services, and social services . . . to sexually exploited children” and to fund “a person, entity, or program devoted to awareness and prevention of becoming a sexually exploited child”). Thus, in the one place where the General Assembly expressed its purpose in enacting the Assessment, it stated that it did have an interest in “protect[ing] a child from further victimization after he or she is discovered to be a sexually exploited child by ensuring that a child protective response is in place in this state”—and it did not state that it had an interest in either directing the financial burden of its goals to the industry it determined was associated with child sexual exploitation or in shielding other taxpayers from the financial burden of funding the Safe Harbor Fund. The majority opinion asserts that it can infer this secondary purpose of “ensuring that the industry responsible . . . pays for the remedy” and “seeking not to burden taxpayers in general” from the “structure” of the Assessment itself, given that the General Assembly designed the Assessment to apply to adult entertainment establishments and—at least according to the majority opinion—made findings in the Act creating the Assessment “that adult entertainment establishments are responsible for this particular harm.” Maj. Op. at 24, 45-46. But see Ga. L. 2015, p. 675 § 1-2 (“The General Assembly finds that a correlation exists between adult live entertainment establishments and the sexual exploitation of children.”) (emphasis added).^[32] And the majority opinion asserts that failing to infer such an interest would render the General Assembly’s findings “meaningless.” Maj. Op. at 45-46. However, we need not glean from these findings an unstated governmental purpose to give them meaning: the General Assembly’s findings serve the important purpose of showing that the Assessment is intended to address negative secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments featuring certain protected expression, rather than aimed at suppressing the protected expression itself. And indeed, the majority opinion underscores this point in its discussion of O’Briens second prong, in which it considers the evidence presented to the General Assembly to support its specific findings that there is a connection between adult entertainment establishments and child sexual exploitation. Maj. Op. at 26-34. These findings demonstrate that although the Assessment pertains to a specific type of expression (nude dancing), the General Assembly’s reason for this targeting was not a desire to suppress the expression, but rather a desire to address negative secondary effects that result from it. And in any event, these findings do not override the General Assembly’s stated purpose in enacting the Assessment: to provide services to children who have been sexually exploited and to prevent further sexual exploitation of children. Likewise, the State Defendants^[33] have never asserted on appeal that holding adult entertainment establishments—and only such establishments—financially responsible for sexually exploited children was itself an “important or substantial” government interest. Instead, in their brief to this Court, the State Defendants describe the State’s interest as “combatting child sex trafficking,” “combatting the sexual exploitation of children,” and “protecting victims of child sex exploitation.” It is true—as the majority opinion points out—that in oral argument before this Court, an attorney for the State Defendants stated that “the State is trying to mitigate the negative social effects caused by these businesses. The narrow tailoring is that it is taxing the businesses that are associated with that negative social impact.” Maj. Op. at 45 n.21 (emphasis added). The majority opinion errs, however, by recasting this statement as the State’s interest (the second prong of the O’Brien test), when the State’s own lawyer made clear that it pertained to efforts the State made to tailor the restriction on expression caused by the Assessment (the fourth prong of the O’Brien test). And that latter explanation—that the statement pertains to narrow tailoring—makes good sense; after confirming the State’s interest in “mitigat[ing] the negative social effects” of child sexual exploitation, the State’s lawyer had to then go on to explain just how the restriction on expression was narrowly tailored to serve that State interest. Indeed, one of the State Defendants’ main arguments on appeal—both in appellate briefing and in oral argument—is that the Assessment is narrowly tailored to serve the State’s interest of protecting victims of child sexual exploitation because the Assessment affects only the businesses associated with the negative secondary effects. The State Defendants do not argue—as the majority opinion concludes—that the State has an “important or substantial” interest in taxing a particular industry or a defined subset of businesses. Additionally, the interest asserted by the majority opinion is novel to the parties in this case, and it is notable that the trial court did not conclude that the State had such an interest.^[34] Instead, the trial court, pointing to the expressed interest of the General Assembly and the characterizations of that State interest made by the State Defendants, concluded that the Assessment “further[s] an important governmental interest in reducing sex trafficking and the exploitation of minors,” “promote [s] the important governmental interest in providing protection and rehabilitation of victims of child sex trafficking and child sexual exploitation by raising revenue and directing that revenue towards such programs,” and “advances Georgia’s interest in combatting the sexual exploitation of children with the proceeds of the Safe Harbor Fund.”^[35] In sum, I do not agree that the State has proffered “imposing an assessment on the industry responsible for those secondary effects” as the substantial interest the Assessment serves, and I do not think it is legally supported to infer or otherwise supply for the State a substantial interest in this context, where we are applying O’Brien and the State has expressly offered a substantial interest that satisfies the second prong of that test. See, e.g., City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 289 (considering “the governmental purpose in enacting the regulation”); Goldrush II, 267 Ga. at 692 (considering “the stated purpose of the ordinance amendment”).^[36] 2. In determining whether a regulation passes intermediate scrutiny, the majority opinion points to no other court that has characterized an “important or substantial”governmental interest in the way the majority opinion has. In crafting the State interest in this case, the majority opinion has cited no binding authority from the United States Supreme Court (or persuasive authority from other courts) that either provides a governmental interest different from the one asserted by the government when applying the O’Brien test or characterizes a State’s interest in the way the majority opinion does here. To that end, the majority opinion asserts that the State has an “important or substantial” governmental interest in “ensuring that the industry responsible for that harm, i.e., adult entertainment establishments that serve alcohol, rather than the general public, pays for the remedy.” But as far as I can tell, no other state or court has framed a state’s interest this way. To the contrary, the “important or substantial” governmental interests discussed in United States Supreme Court precedents applying O’Brien generally are framed in terms of alleviating or mitigating a problem, including mitigating secondary effects of certain protected expression—but not in terms of financially targeting a particular industry, even to serve an otherwise legitimate policy goal. See, e.g., City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 296 (“The asserted interests of regulating conduct through a public nudity ban and of combating the harmful secondary effects associated with nude dancing are undeniably important.”); City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 50, 52 (describing the substantial governmental interest served by the zoning ordinance as “preserv[ing] the quality of urban life”); Ward, 491 U.S. at 796-797 (“We think it also apparent that the city’s interest in ensuring the sufficiency of sound amplification at bandshell events is a substantial one. The record indicates that inadequate sound amplification has had an adverse effect on the ability of some audiences to hear and enjoy performances at the bandshell. The city enjoys a substantial interest in ensuring the ability of its citizens to enjoy whatever benefits the city parks have to offer, from amplified music to silent meditation.”); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296 (104 SCt 3065, 82 LE2d 221) (1984) (“It is also apparent to us that the regulation narrowly focuses on the Government’s substantial interest in maintaining the parks in the heart of our Capital in an attractive and intact condition, readily available to the millions of people who wish to see and enjoy them by their presence.”); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 67 (126 SCt 1297, 164 LE2d 156) (2006) (“Military recruiting promotes the substantial Government interest in raising and supporting the Armed Forces.”); Members of City Council of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 816-817 (104 SCt 2118, 80 LE2d 772) (1984) (noting the city’s “esthetic interest in avoiding ‘visual clutter’”); McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 486-487 (134 SCt 2518, 189 LE2d 502) (2014) (“[R]espondents claim that the Act promotes public safety, patient access to healthcare, and the unobstructed use of public sidewalks and roadways. Petitioners do not dispute the significance of these interests. We have, moreover, previously recognized the legitimacy of the government’s interests in ensuring public safety and order, promoting the free flow of traffic on streets and sidewalks, protecting property rights, and protecting a woman’s freedom to seek pregnancy-related services.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). See also, e.g., Maxim Cabaret, 304 Ga. at 193 (addressing a challenge under the United States and Georgia Constitutions and explaining that “attempting to preserve the quality of urban life and reducing criminal activity and preventing the deterioration of neighborhoods” are “important government interests”) (cleaned up); Gravely v. Bacon, 263 Ga. 203, 205 (429 SE2d 663) (1993) (addressing the United States and Georgia Constitutions and explaining: “Gravely does not dispute that the Smyrna ordinance furthers the important government interests in reducing criminal activity and protecting the deterioration of neighborhoods engendered by adult entertainment establishments”). Even the two state supreme courts that have upheld under intermediate scrutiny taxes or fees similar to the Assessment (and which the majority opinion cites as persuasive authority) do not characterize the state’s interest in the way the majority opinion does here. See Bushco v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 225 P3d 153, 167 (Utah 2009) (“[T]he record supports the conclusion that the Tax is directed toward the substantial state interest of providing treatment for sex offenders, with the twin goals of rehabilitation and prevention of future offenses. It is also clear that the Tax furthers that interest by raising revenue that is specifically directed toward sex offender treatment programs.”); id. at 168 (“In this case, the Tax promotes the interest in providing treatment for sex offenders by raising revenue and directing that revenue towards treatment programs.”); Combs v. Texas Ent. Ass’n, Inc., 347 SW3d 277, 288 (Tex. 2011) (“The State has an important interest in reducing the secondary effects of adult businesses.”).^[37] 3. The majority opinion’s characterization of the State’s interest undermines O’Brien’s four-prong test and creates potential work-arounds for government entities to target protected expression. As discussed above, the O’Brien’s test includes four prongs: “[1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” 391 U.S. at 377. Importantly, the second prong asks what that government’s interest is, and the fourth prong asks the distinct question of how the State achieves that interest. By concluding that the government has a “substantial or important” interest in ensuring that a negative secondary effect is mitigated in a certain way, the majority opinion collapses these distinct inquiries, merging the “what” question in the second prong with the “how” question of the fourth. And by treating the targeting of the establishments that are engaging in protected expression as an “important or substantial” governmental interest, the majority opinion also fails to give full consideration to O’Briens third prong. My concern about the majority opinion’s failure to give meaning to all parts of the test is not merely formalistic; the separate parts of the test each serve an important function in the test the United States Supreme Court has articulated to ensure that the protections enshrined in the First Amendment are safeguarded in contexts like these. To illustrate why this is important, consider the governmental interest asserted in this case by the General Assembly and the State Defendants—which is also the governmental interest the trial court validated below. There is no dispute that the State has a legitimate interest in “protect[ing] a child from further victimization after he or she is discovered to be a sexually exploited child by ensuring that a child protective response is in place in this state,” in “protecting victims of child sex exploitation,” and in “providing protection and rehabilitation of victims of child sex trafficking and child sexual exploitation by raising revenue and directing that revenue towards such programs.” In fact, like the parties challenging regulations in many of the cases cited above, GACE has not disputed that the interest offered by the State is “important or substantial.” But it seems more likely that GACE would dispute that the State has an “important or substantial” interest in protecting children from sexual exploitation and providing them services by levying taxes against adult entertainment establishments.^[38] Whatever legitimate interest the State has in helping child victims of sexual exploitation (an interest no one disputes), I cannot say that interest necessarily remains “important or substantial” when extended to “ensuring that the industry responsible for that harm, i.e., adult entertainment establishments that serve alcohol, rather than the general public, pays for the remedy.”^[39] Maj. Op. at 45. Indeed, that version of a governmental interest sounds alarmingly close to a State asserting that it has an interest in targeting expression that is the cause of the secondary effect (here, nude dancing)—an interest that the General Assembly and the State Defendants have (wisely) disclaimed here.^[40] By clouding the question of what the State’s interest is with how the State effectuates that interest, the majority opinion does not fully grapple with whether the government interest at issue in this case is truly an “important or substantial” governmental interest that is “unrelated to the suppression of free expression.” See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.^[41] That is why the governmental interest question should remain separate from the question of whether the restriction on speech is narrowly tailored here. If we conclude that the State has an interest in accomplishing a policy objective (such as providing services to child victims of sexual exploitation) in a certain manner (such as by taxing adult entertainment establishments), then of course the tailoring requirement is met: the only way to serve the specific interest of taxing clubs featuring nude dancing is to tax those clubs. Allowing this maneuvering in determining the State’s interest thus renders the tailoring question essentially nugatory: if the governmental interest includes not only addressing a societal ill, but also addressing it in a specific way, a court can always shape the governmental interest in a way that ensures the regulation is narrowly tailored—even when the government entity has not couched its interest in this way, and even when the governmental interest, if couched in that way, would veer towards targeting expression or speech. I see no evidence in O’Brien, or in the precedents from the United States Supreme Court and this Court applying O’Brien, that casting or re-casting a State’s interest in this way is permissible. This concern is exacerbated where, as here, “‘very little evidence is required’” for a state legislature to connect protected expression and a negative secondary effect. See Maj. Op. at 28 (quoting Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). This low evidentiary standard, coupled with the majority opinion’s conclusion that the government can have a “substantial or important” interest in imposing financial burdens on a particular industry—even an industry that involves protected expression— could lead to government entities levying taxes so severe that it could eliminate a disfavored industry (and its protected expression) altogether. On this point, the majority opinion articulates no limiting principle that would prohibit a tax or assessment far greater than the one at issue in this case; that would prevent a government entity from targeting for complete elimination protected expression through a tax or assessment of the type in this case; or that would prevent government entities from taxing other businesses, groups, or individuals who engage in disfavored—but protected—expression in an effort to eliminate that speech or expression altogether. And the government would be permitted to do so based solely on the type of anecdotal testimony and attenuated findings the majority opinion acknowledges meet the bare-minimum evidentiary standard in this case.^[42] By framing the State’s interest in enacting the Assessment in this way, the majority opinion paves the way for a work-around of the O’Brien test that would allow state legislatures and other government entities to target protected expression by framing their interest in enacting a tax as including the government’s chosen method of targeting certain businesses with that tax. This cuts at the very core of the First Amendment’s protection to prevent the government from suppressing or eliminating disfavored expression and speech. 4. The State’s interest in passing the Assessment, when properly viewed, fails O’Brien’s fourth prong. (a) Rather than blazing the trail that the majority opinion does, I would conclude that the “important or substantial” governmental interest in passing the Assessment is what the General Assembly says it was: to “protect a child from further victimization after he or she is discovered to be a sexually exploited child by ensuring that a child protective response is in place in this state.” Ga. L. 2015, p. 675, § 1-2. See also OCGA § 15-21-202 (c) (establishing a fund created by the Assessment to be used “for purposes of providing care, rehabilitative services, residential housing, health services, and social services . . . to sexually exploited children” and to fund “a person, entity, or program devoted to awareness and prevention of becoming a sexually exploited child”). And when the State’s interest is viewed in this way, the Assessment fails the fourth prong of O’Brien’s intermediate-scrutiny test because it is not narrowly tailored to serve the asserted government interest. (b) I begin my analysis of the fourth prong by following United State Supreme Court precedent and articulating the final prong of O’Briens intermediate scrutiny test as the United States Supreme Court articulated it in O’Brien and later cases following O’Brien: a regulation does not violate the First Amendment “if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” 391 U.S. at 377. See also, e.g., City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 301 (describing “[t]he fourth and final O’Brien factor” as “that the restriction is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the government interest”); Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 662 (same).^[43] This means that there must be a “close fit” between the burdening of expression and the government purpose, McCullen, 573 U.S. at 464, and that a “substantial portion of the burden” on expression must serve to advance the government’s goals, Ward, 491 U.S. at 798-799. In other words, expression cannot constitutionally be burdened if that burden is not furthering the government interest. This test allows some burden on expression (i.e., an incidental effect) as long as the burden itself serves the government’s important, non-expression- related purpose. (c) Cases engaging in an analysis of O’Briens fourth prong show that the burden on expression must serve the important or substantial governmental interest asserted. In O’Brien, the Court held that a law prohibiting the destruction of draft cards was constitutional, holding as to the tailoring question: “We perceive no alternative means that would more precisely and narrowly assure the continuing availability of issued Selective Service certificates than a law which prohibits their wilful mutilation or destruction.” 391 U.S. at 381. Similarly, in Ward, the Court held constitutional a requirement that performers in a certain public concert venue use sound equipment provided and controlled by the city because “the city’s substantial interest in limiting sound volume is served in a direct and effective way by the requirement that the city’s sound technician control the mixing board during performances. Absent this requirement, the city’s interest would have been served less well.” 491 U.S. at 800. In Members of City Council of City of Los Angeles, the United States Supreme Court examined whether and how burdens on expression imposed by an anti-billboard ordinance and an anti- leaflet ordinance served the governmental interests in explaining why the anti-billboard ordinance was constitutional but the anti- leaflet ordinance was not. See 466 U.S. at 810. The Court explained that the anti-billboard ordinance was sufficiently tailored to serve the government interest in “avoiding visual clutter” because “it is the tangible medium of expressing the message [i.e., the billboards] that has the adverse impact on the appearance of the landscape,” so an ordinance prohibiting billboards “responds precisely to the substantive problems which legitimately concern[] the City” and “curtails no more speech than is necessary to accomplish its purpose.” 466 U.S. at 810. By contrast, the anti-leaflet ordinance meant to address littering was unconstitutional because “an antilittering statute could have addressed the substantive evil without prohibiting expressive activity,” and the anti-leaflet rule “gratuitously infringed upon the right of an individual to communicate with a willing listener.” Id. Likewise, in McCullen v. Coakley, the United States Supreme Court held that a law creating a buffer zone around abortion clinics to “ensur[e] public safety outside abortion clinics, prevent[] harassment and intimidation of patients and clinic staff, and combat[] deliberate obstruction of clinic entrances” was unconstitutional because it “burden[ed] substantially more speech than necessary to achieve the Commonwealth’s asserted interests.” 573 U.S. at 490-491. The Court explained that Massachusetts had “available to it a variety of approaches that appear capable of serving its interests, without excluding individuals from areas historically open for speech and debate,” such as providing for criminal punishment of “[a]ny person who knowingly obstructs, detains, hinders, impedes, or blocks another person’s entry to or exit from a reproductive health care facility.” Id. at 491, 494. (d) Against this backdrop of binding precedent, I conclude that the Assessment fails the fourth prong of O’Briens test because the burden on protected expression does not serve the interest of providing services to child victims of sexual exploitation. In particular, I cannot say that the element of the Assessment that burdens expression—that is, its specific application to adult entertainment establishments showcasing the protected expression of nude dancing—serves the stated government interest of providing services to help sexually exploited children. Unlike in O’Brien, where prohibiting the expressive activity of destroying a draft certificate “precisely and narrowly assure[d] the continuing availability” of the certificates, 391 U.S. at 381, or in Ward, where mandating the use of certain sound equipment served the city’s interest in limiting sound volume “in a direct and effective way,” 491 U.S. at 800, there is no “precise” or “direct” connection between burdening protected speech (i.e., nude dancing) and providing “care, rehabilitative services, residential housing, health services, and social services” for “sexually exploited children.” See OCGA § 15-21-202 (c). Moreover, there is no indication that the State would provide services to sexually exploited children or engage in preventative efforts less effectively if those services and prevention programs were funded by a generally applicable tax, rather than one directed at establishments featuring certain types of protected expression. Compare Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 67 (holding that the State’s interest in raising and supporting the armed forces would be served “less effectively” without a law requiring that they be given equal access to campus recruiting). And the United States Supreme Court has explained that general revenue taxes do not raise the same kind of First Amendment concerns as those raised by taxes that, by definition or in practice, burden a specific kind of expression. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 460 U.S. at 586 (explaining that the interest of “the raising of revenue,” “[s]tanding alone, . . . cannot justify the special treatment of the press, for an alternative means of achieving the same interest without raising concerns under the First Amendment is clearly available: the State could raise the revenue by taxing businesses generally, avoiding the censorial threat implicit in a tax that singles out the press”).^[44] The majority opinion asserts that considering whether the State could serve its interest without burdening expression at all “is simply an effort to smuggle the least restrictive means requirement from strict scrutiny into intermediate scrutiny.” Maj. Op. at 43. And it is, of course, true that the intermediate-scrutiny requirements for tailoring (i.e., “if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of [the governmental] interest,” O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377), at least partially resemble the more stringent strict-scrutiny requirements (i.e., whether “the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest,” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 171 (135 SCt 2218, 192 LE2d 236) (2015)). But any complaint about the similarities (or perhaps lack of dissimilarities) between those two tests should be directed at the United States Supreme Court, and not at applications of the intermediate-scrutiny test as that Court articulated it with respect to questions of federal constitutional law. And it is that intermediate scrutiny test that I apply here, evaluating whether “the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of [the governmental] interest,” O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, not whether the Assessment is “the least restrictive or least intrusive means” of “serv[ing] the government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests,” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799. In service of that analysis, I note that the State could serve its interests without burdening any expression to illustrate that the Assessment’s restriction on protected expression, even if it seems minimal at first blush, is “greater than is essential to the furtherance of the State’s interest. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. See also id. at 381 (“We perceive no alternative means that would more precisely and narrowly assure the continuing availability of issued Selective Service certificates than a law which prohibits their wilful mutilation or destruction.”); McCullen, 573 U.S. at 490-494 (2014) (concluding that the regulation failed the final prong of intermediate scrutiny because the state had “available to it a variety of approaches that appear capable of serving its interests, without excluding individuals from areas historically open for speech and debate”). That is the question that O’Brien articulates, and it is the question I have asked in conducting an intermediate-scrutiny analysis under O’Brien here.^[45] Like the government entities imposing the anti-leaflet tax discussed in Members of City Council of City of Los Angeles, see 466 U.S. at 810, and the buffer zone in McCullen, see 573 U.S. at 490­494, the governmental entity here (the State) has available to it another way to serve its interest of providing services to child victims of sexual exploitation without imposing any burden on protected expression. And that leads me to the conclusion that the Assessment imposes an “incidental restriction” on “First Amendment freedoms” that is “greater than is essential to the furtherance of’ the State’s interest of providing services for sexually exploited children, and that the Assessment fails the fourth prong of the O’Brien intermediate-scrutiny test. See 391 U.S. at 377. * Because the Assessment as imposed on “adult entertainment establishments” defined in OCGA § 15-21-201 (1) (A) does not survive intermediate scrutiny under O’Brien, I would conclude that it violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. I would therefore reverse the trial court’s order denying summary judgment to GACE and granting summary judgment to the Defendants.