Doyle, Presiding Judge. These interlocutory appeals arise from a petition to quiet title filed by NoFree, LLC, regarding approximately 1,000 acres of coastal marshland in Bryan County (“the peninsula”), naming the State of Georgia and any other persons who may have an adverse claim, and contending it had title originating from the State’s grant of the property to James Shuman in 1834 (“Shuman grant”). Only the State challenged the petition. After the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court determined that questions of material fact were presented and denied the cross-motions, certifying its order for immediate review. This Court granted the parties’ applications for interlocutory appeal. In Case No. A24A0969, NoFree argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary judgment because, among other things, the boundary description in the Shuman grant was sufficient as a matter of law to convey the peninsula to Shuman (and to NoFree therefrom), and the trial court should have presumed that the Shuman grant was valid. In Case No. A24A0670, the State argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary judgment because the Shuman grant was void for a number of reasons and did not vest title in NoFree in light of the Protection of Tidewaters Act, OCGA § 52-1-1, et seq. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for the trial court to enter summary judgment for the State. We review a grant or denial of summary judgment, questions of statutory interpretation, and interpretation of contracts of conveyance de novo.[1] And we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant when reviewing an order disposing of a motion for summary judgment.[2] The record shows that NoFree filed a petition to quiet title as to all the world regarding a certain distinctively shaped piece of property near a large bend in the Ogeechee River.[3] The property is a long “balloon shaped”peninsula bounded on three sides by the river except for a narrow neck of land on the property’s southwest side connecting it to the Bryan County mainland, and the peninsula consists largely of marshland that is subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. In 2016, NoFree acquired the peninsula via a limited warranty deed.[4] In its petition, NoFree included a chain of title of 49 links, beginning with the 1834 grant from the State to Shuman. In May 1834, a State head-right warrant directed the county surveyor to survey and prepare a plat of “a tract of lands which shall contain five hundred acres in [Bryan] County” for Shuman. In September 1834, a survey plat was prepared that refers to the May 1834 warrant, which plat includes a hand-drawn sketch of the property showing a balloon-shaped peninsula with a small strip of land at the bottom; the entire peninsula is bounded on all other sides by the “Great Ogeechee River,” and it is labeled as “James Shuman 500 acres Marsh Land.”[5] In December 1834, a grant was prepared giving Shuman property described as 500 acres lying in Bryan County, “butting and bounding on all sides by vacant lands . . . [h]aving such form, slope, and marks as appear by a plat of the same hereunto annexed[.]” The 1834 plat is very similar in appearance to the modern survey of the peninsula, which is now measured to contain approximately 1,000 acres.[6] Neither the Shuman grant nor the 1834 plat contain any language dividing the peninsula (apart from land beyond the southwestern neck by the mainland) between Shuman and any other party, including the State. It is undisputed that across the Ogeechee River from the peninsula is land located in what is now Camden County and to the southwest of the peninsula is land located in Bryan County. The State challenged the quiet title petition and later moved for summary judgment. The State’s main contention was that Shuman’s grant was void on its face and did not result in NoFree’s ownership of the peninsula because the grant’s description was insufficient to convey it to Shuman. Additionally, because the peninsula consisted of marshland, it falls under the Protection of Tidewaters Act. The Act requires a current landowner of protected property to trace their ownership to a valid grant from the Crown of England or the State. Among other things, the State also maintained that the land had been set aside for the citizens of a proposed town of Georgetown or Hardwicke in 1754. The State contends that the peninsula constituted commons after a dedication to Hardwicke’s citizens, so the peninsula could not have been validly granted to Shuman in 1834. NoFree responded to the motion and filed its own cross-motion for summary judgment. Per NoFree’s request, the trial court appointed a special master to review the cross-motions for summary judgment, authorized the special master to hold an evidentiary hearing if necessary, and directed him to prepare a report and recommendation for the court. After the special master held an evidentiary hearing, he issued a report recommending that the trial court grant NoFree’s motion for summary judgment and deny the State’s motion for summary judgment. The special master found that the Shuman grant and 1834 plat were clear in their combined description of land, the title chain was sufficiently legible to establish title as passing to NoFree from the Shuman grant, and the State had failed to rebut NoFree’s evidence that the petition to quiet title should be granted. The State objected to the report, and NoFree responded. The trial court heard additional argument from the parties regarding the special master’s conclusions, the parties’ motions, and parties’ objections. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order denying the cross-motions for summary judgment.[7] The trial court explained that there were inconsistencies in the boundary language of the Shuman grant compared to the 1834 plat creating a question of fact for a jury to resolve; it also stated that other unspecified fact questions existed. The court noted that it was cognizant that this matter involves complex factual issues which necessitate the harmonious application of various bodies of law including OCGA § 44-5-13 and § 44-5-14, which allow for a presumption of a grant[,] and OCGA § 52-1-2, which requires an explicit conveyance of the beds of tidewaters and further states that grants are to be strictly construed with no presumption of an intent to part from any portion of public domain, unless clear and especial words are used to denote it. This interlocutory appeal followed our grant of the parties’ applications. 1. Generally, “[t]he title to all lands originates in grants from the Government and, since its independence, from the state.”[8] “[A] grantee of lands [from the State] takes nothing by implication [and] is confined to the terms of his grant; but every presumption is in favor of a grant.”[9] Moreover, except as to the State,[10] “[w]hen the land is subject to entry and grant, 20 years’ possession of land under a claim of right shall authorize the courts to presume a grant.”[11] In 1992, the General Assembly enacted the Protection of Tidewaters Act in which it “declar[ed] that the State of Georgia became the owner of the beds of all tidewaters within the jurisdiction of the State of Georgia as successor to the Crown of England and by the common law.”[12] The Act states that unless “title in a private party can be traced to a valid Crown or state grant which explicitly conveyed the beds of such tidewaters,” then the State holds title.[13] As noted, the interpretation of a statute is a question of law.[14] If “two statutes are in conflict, the laterenacted statute prevails over the one enacted earlier, and the more specific statute governs over the more general one.”[15] Silence on a point, however, does not constitute a conflict.[16] And all “statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be construed together, and harmonized wherever possible.”[17] 2. NoFree argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary judgment because the Shuman grant and 1834 plat were sufficient to convey title of the peninsula to Shuman and that it has established chain of title from the Shuman grant to itself. On the other hand, the State maintains that the grant description was indefinite and therefore invalid as a matter of law and that it cannot be salvaged by the evidence in the 1834 plat. Both parties contend that the trial court erred by finding that a fact question existed as to this issue. “The sufficiency of the description of property in a deed [or in this case a State grant] is a question of law for the court.”[18] This Court has “deemed deeds to be in law unambiguous, when the description in a deed is sufficient in conjunction with undisputed evidence to determine the conveyance.”[19] If “the descriptive clauses in a deed contain particular words of description, and also refer to a plat, and the plat is more definite than the particular words of description, the description by plat shall control as to the property conveyed.”[20] The description in the grant conveyed to Shuman 500 acres of land in Bryan County “butting and bounding on all sides by vacant lands . . . [h]aving such form, slope, and marks as appear by a plat of the same hereunto annexed[.]” The 1834 plat shows a bulbous portion of land bordered on three sides by the Great Ogeechee River and is clearly marked “ James Shuman 500 acres Marsh Land.”[21] Pretermitting whether the language in the plat and the grant together satisfies the exception in OCGA § 52-1-2 that requires an explicit grant of tidewater beds to a private party (here, Shuman) because of the plat’s incorporated reference to “Marsh Land,”[22] the grant is void. The peninsula as bordered by the river encompasses 1,000 acres of land.[23] Yet, the 1834 warrant instructed the surveyor to prepare a tract of lands containing 500 acres, and the Shuman grant through the incorporated plat reiterate this limit of 500 acres of marshland. It is the clearest indication in the documents of the intent of what the State attempted to grant to Shuman. And while the plat implies that the entire portion of the peninsula was granted to Shuman, he did not take a warrant for and was never granted 1,000 acres. And aside from the Ogeechee River, neither the 1834 plat nor the language of the grant contain a key or sufficient description from which it could be determined where Shuman’s 500 acres lie within the 1,000 acre peninsula.[24] Thus, this grant and plat are void for lack of an adequate description.[25] If this case had involved two private parties, perhaps possession of the entire peninsula by NoFree and its predecessors based on color of title under the Shuman grant and plat would have been enough to defeat claims to the property by other individuals because the grant would have been presumed valid.[26] But this proceeding involves the question as between the State and NoFree, and neither prescription nor adverse possession apply against the State.[27] Therefore, no presumption of validity can save the void grant in this instance.[28] Because the Shuman grant is void, NoFree cannot trace its title to a valid state grant. Therefore, the State holds title to the peninsula under the Protection of Tidewaters Act.[29] Accordingly, the trial court erred by finding that issues of fact remained for jury determination regarding title to the peninsula, and we reverse and remand for the trial court to enter judgment in favor of the State. 3. Based on the forgoing, the parties’ remaining enumerations of error are moot.[30] Judgments reversed and cases remanded with direction. Hodges, J., concurs specially and in the judgment. Watkins, J., dissents.
