Del. Courts Highlight Risk of 'Void' Provisions in Alternative Entity Agreements
These decisions highlight the powerful effect, and potentially unintended consequences, of using a “void” provision in the governing documents of Delaware alternative entities.
March 06, 2019 at 09:15 AM
6 minute read
In two opinions decided in February 2018, CompoSecure v. CardUX, (Del. Ch. Feb. 1, 2018, revised Feb. 12, 2018), and In re Oxbow Carbon Unitholder Litigation, (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery held that certain actions were not ultra vires under the limited liability company agreements at issue and were thus capable of ratification under Delaware common law. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court subsequently reversed the lower court decision in CompoSecure and cited the lower court's ratification decision in Oxbow approvingly. The decisions in CompoSecure and Oxbow seemingly turned on a narrow issue: whether or not the limited liability company agreement expressly provided that an action not taken in compliance with its terms was “void.” When read together, these decisions highlight the powerful effect, and potentially unintended consequences, of using a “void” provision in the governing documents of Delaware alternative entities.
CompoSecure involved a contractual dispute arising out of CompoSecure's agreement to pay CardUX, an affiliate of one of CompoSecure's managers, a commission on certain sales of its metal credit card products. CompoSecure's limited liability company agreement contained two provisions that allegedly were not complied with when CompoSecure entered into the agreement. The first provision, the “Related Party Provision,” required special approval for transactions between CompoSecure and related parties, such as CardUX; the second, the “restricted activities provision,” provided that certain activities would be “void and of no force or effect whatsoever” if they did not receive certain prior board and member approvals.
CompoSecure filed suit in the Court of Chancery, arguing that despite performing under the sales agreement for a time, the agreement was void because CompoSecure had not obtained the necessary approvals under the related party provision and the restricted activities provision. The Court of Chancery disagreed, holding that CompoSecure's failure to comply with its own limited liability company agreement at most rendered the agreement voidable and that CompoSecure had effectively ratified the contract by performance. The Court of Chancery's analysis focused primarily on the related party provision, but it indicated that it would have reached the same result under the restricted activities provision, assuming that it applied.
In CompoSecure v. CardUX, (Del. Nov. 7, 2018), the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Chancery's analysis with respect to the related party provision, but ultimately reversed and remanded the case for further consideration as to whether the restricted activities provision applied to the contract. The Supreme Court distinguished the two provisions on the basis that the restricted activities provision included express language not found in the related party provision, specifically that acts subject to the provision would be “void” if the necessary approvals were not obtained. The Supreme Court stated that ordinarily a contract would be voidable for failing to comply with a contractual provision, but the use of the term “void” in the restricted activities provision was a “game-changer” that would trump the common law rule and render the sales agreement void and incapable of being ratified by CompoSecure's subsequent performance if it applied.
Oxbow involved a dispute between the members of Oxbow Carbon regarding, among other things, whether certain members had been properly admitted in accordance with Oxbow's limited liability company agreement. The Court of Chancery held that, even assuming for purposes of its analysis that the proper procedures had not been followed to admit the members, the plaintiffs were barred by laches from challenging the admission of the members in question because the relevant parties had notice of their purported admission and treated them as valid members for years. Notably, the Court of Chancery also based its decision, in part, on the fact that the admission provision did not require that admissions not in accordance with the provision would be “void.” In Oxbow Carbon & Minerals Holdings v. Crestview-Oxbow Acquisition, (Del. Jan. 17, 2019), the Supreme Court did not directly address the admission issue, but did cite approvingly the Court of Chancery's “well-reasoned analysis” of the laches issue, which in turn had been predicated on the Court of Chancery's finding that the admission of the members was at most voidable and not void.
The Court of Chancery in Oxbow indicated that “when dealing with LLCs, Delaware courts have not approached membership determinations with the same strict eye for formalities” as they have when analyzing the validity of stock issuances by a Delaware corporation. Despite indications to the contrary in Oxbow, it seems clear from the Supreme Court's opinion in CompoSecure that Delaware courts may require strict adherence to such formalities even in the alternative entities context where the limited liability company agreement expressly provides that actions not taken in accordance therewith are “void.”
While these cases could be viewed as merely examples of holding the parties to the terms of their agreement, liberal use of “void” provisions in a limited liability company agreement could lead to unintended consequences and harsh results. For example, if the limited liability company agreement in Oxbow had included a “void” provision with respect to member admissions, then the Delaware courts, in keeping with the Supreme Court's reasoning in CompoSecure, may have been required to unwind years of transactions and distributions made by Oxbow to those that had reasonably believed that they were in fact members. Indeed, in the absence of an effective means to ratify acts subject to a “void” provision (even by court order), Delaware courts may in the future be in the unenviable position of invalidating acts in the alternative entities context even where doing so would lead to inequitable results.
The Delaware legislature has adopted Sections 204 and 205 of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware to provide Delaware corporations and other adversely effected parties with a statutory means to ratify defective corporate acts that would otherwise be void under Delaware law. But no such statutory “fix” is currently available for Delaware alternative entities. As a result, alternative entities should carefully consider whether to include provisions declaring actions “void” in their limited liability company agreements, and should be aware of the risk that the failure to strictly adhere to such a provision could result in a defective act that cannot be properly ratified under current Delaware law.
Nathaniel J. Stuhlmiller ([email protected]) is an associate at Richards, Layton & Finger. He focuses his practice on transactional matters involving Delaware corporations, including mergers and acquisitions, corporate governance and corporate finance.
This content has been archived. It is available through our partners, LexisNexis® and Bloomberg Law.
To view this content, please continue to their sites.
Not a Lexis Subscriber?
Subscribe Now
Not a Bloomberg Law Subscriber?
Subscribe Now
NOT FOR REPRINT
© 2025 ALM Global, LLC, All Rights Reserved. Request academic re-use from www.copyright.com. All other uses, submit a request to [email protected]. For more information visit Asset & Logo Licensing.
You Might Like
View AllChancery: Common Stock Worthless in 'Jacobson v. Akademos' and Transaction Was Entirely Fair
5 minute readThe Importance of Contractual Language in Analyzing Post-Closing Earnout Disputes
6 minute readDelaware Supreme Court Upholds Court of Chancery’s Refusal to Blue Pencil an Unreasonable Covenant Not to Compete
4 minute readTrending Stories
- 1Uber Files RICO Suit Against Plaintiff-Side Firms Alleging Fraudulent Injury Claims
- 2The Law Firm Disrupted: Scrutinizing the Elephant More Than the Mouse
- 3Inherent Diminished Value Damages Unavailable to 3rd-Party Claimants, Court Says
- 4Pa. Defense Firm Sued by Client Over Ex-Eagles Player's $43.5M Med Mal Win
- 5Losses Mount at Morris Manning, but Departing Ex-Chair Stays Bullish About His Old Firm's Future
Who Got The Work
J. Brugh Lower of Gibbons has entered an appearance for industrial equipment supplier Devco Corporation in a pending trademark infringement lawsuit. The suit, accusing the defendant of selling knock-off Graco products, was filed Dec. 18 in New Jersey District Court by Rivkin Radler on behalf of Graco Inc. and Graco Minnesota. The case, assigned to U.S. District Judge Zahid N. Quraishi, is 3:24-cv-11294, Graco Inc. et al v. Devco Corporation.
Who Got The Work
Rebecca Maller-Stein and Kent A. Yalowitz of Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer have entered their appearances for Hanaco Venture Capital and its executives, Lior Prosor and David Frankel, in a pending securities lawsuit. The action, filed on Dec. 24 in New York Southern District Court by Zell, Aron & Co. on behalf of Goldeneye Advisors, accuses the defendants of negligently and fraudulently managing the plaintiff's $1 million investment. The case, assigned to U.S. District Judge Vernon S. Broderick, is 1:24-cv-09918, Goldeneye Advisors, LLC v. Hanaco Venture Capital, Ltd. et al.
Who Got The Work
Attorneys from A&O Shearman has stepped in as defense counsel for Toronto-Dominion Bank and other defendants in a pending securities class action. The suit, filed Dec. 11 in New York Southern District Court by Bleichmar Fonti & Auld, accuses the defendants of concealing the bank's 'pervasive' deficiencies in regards to its compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act and the quality of its anti-money laundering controls. The case, assigned to U.S. District Judge Arun Subramanian, is 1:24-cv-09445, Gonzalez v. The Toronto-Dominion Bank et al.
Who Got The Work
Crown Castle International, a Pennsylvania company providing shared communications infrastructure, has turned to Luke D. Wolf of Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani to fend off a pending breach-of-contract lawsuit. The court action, filed Nov. 25 in Michigan Eastern District Court by Hooper Hathaway PC on behalf of The Town Residences LLC, accuses Crown Castle of failing to transfer approximately $30,000 in utility payments from T-Mobile in breach of a roof-top lease and assignment agreement. The case, assigned to U.S. District Judge Susan K. Declercq, is 2:24-cv-13131, The Town Residences LLC v. T-Mobile US, Inc. et al.
Who Got The Work
Wilfred P. Coronato and Daniel M. Schwartz of McCarter & English have stepped in as defense counsel to Electrolux Home Products Inc. in a pending product liability lawsuit. The court action, filed Nov. 26 in New York Eastern District Court by Poulos Lopiccolo PC and Nagel Rice LLP on behalf of David Stern, alleges that the defendant's refrigerators’ drawers and shelving repeatedly break and fall apart within months after purchase. The case, assigned to U.S. District Judge Joan M. Azrack, is 2:24-cv-08204, Stern v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc.
Featured Firms
Law Offices of Gary Martin Hays & Associates, P.C.
(470) 294-1674
Law Offices of Mark E. Salomone
(857) 444-6468
Smith & Hassler
(713) 739-1250