This summer, the tenure of Link-laters' emblematic corporate chief David Cheyne will come to an end after five eventful years.

At many law firms, that would mean little as the head of corporate is often no more than an ambassadorial role or an administrative job that few deal-makers covet.

But Cheyne is not only one of the UK's best known transactional lawyers but also the man viewed – along with managing partner Tony Angel – as the face of the new Linklaters. And the new Link-laters is a very different beast from its previous incarnations.

Change was almost inevitable. Back in 2000, Linklaters was expanding across Europe with seemingly unstoppable momentum. The once ground-breaking Linklaters & Alliance was to produce major mergers in Germany, Belgium and Sweden – a process combined with investment in France, Asia and the US.

But by 2002 – when the firm conceded it was actively targeting an annual staff turnover rate of 20%, often via managed exits – it was clear the tide had turned. Such shifts were undoubtedly related to the 1998 appointment as managing partner of Angel, who swiftly overhauled the way the firm appraised partners and lawyers.

Angel's efforts are partly seen as a reaction to the style of the previous executive team of Terence Kyle and Charles Allen-Jones, who, despite a reputation for robust, even aggressive, management, largely avoided systematic partner appraisals. As such, 'mowing the lawn', the euphemism for maintaining a lockstep with regular managed exits, had not yet taken hold at Silk Street.

As Angel says: "If you go back 10 years, lockstep was seen as a very soft system. Lockstep is a good thing, [but] you need a high level of performance across the firm – carrying passengers is not something you can do in this world."

Linklaters remains coy over the number of enforced exits it has made in recent years. But its part-nership currently hovers around 470, against 500 in May last year.

And while the technocratic new managing partner ushered in a rigour towards performance, Cheyne soon matched Angel's zeal in reshaping the firm's much-vaunted corporate practice after replacing Anthony Cann in the role in July 2000.

The signature of Cheyne's lead-ership has been the development of a small band of energetic, talented corporate partners. This group was often at the younger end of the firm's partnership, like Charlie Jacobs and Jeremy Parr.

At the same time, a number of partners judged to be under-performing came under pressure to raise their game. This approach is generally acknowledged to have been necessary, although many question the tactics employed. One former partner comments: "There were a number of problems with the department, which [Cheyne] sorted out. But he has not addressed the need for coverage of clients by a broad range of partners."

By general consensus, such an approach was married to a sensible reorganisation of the practice, which has coped well with abrupt shifts in international strategy and the collapse of Linklaters' core European M&A market.

But even admirers concede Cheyne authored a 'one of us' culture, while more bitter ex-partners speak of an inner circle of star performers who have been disproportionately favoured.

One oft-repeated observation is encapsulated by a partner at a rival firm: "You tend to see the same people on deals. You wonder what the other people who are not household names are doing."

Likewise, Cheyne's confident, even combative style is regarded to have had its impact on morale. But if the bottom line is results, Linklaters' performance in international M&A over the past five years puts gripes over Cheyne's style into context.

At the very least, the firm has held its market position in public M&A in Europe and Asia, consistently topping the major deal rankings. In many minds, Linklaters has edged ahead of Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer. And this despite its old rival's supposedly allconquering tie-up with Bruckhaus Westrick Heller Loeber, and Linklaters' high profile failure to secure mergers with (now former) allies De Brauw Blackstone West-broek and Gianni Origoni Grippo & Partners. And it seems Linklaters is slowly filling the one glaring hole in its practice, its absence at the quality end of the private equity market.

As one senior Ashurst partner comments: "They are not always happy because they have some strong characters [but] I have never come across a weak Link-laters corporate partner."

In this context, Cheyne's successor, David Barnes, inherits an unusually strong position, although candidates were reportedly not queuing up to step into the role.

The appointment of Barnes, whose clients include BT, Sainsbury's, HSBC and Jardine Matheson, certainly promises a different style. Not only has Barnes a considerably lower profile, both inside and out-side the firm, he is also a more consensual figure. Barnes may lack his predecessor's charisma. But he is viewed as a more political animal than Cheyne, who often appeared, at least by Linklaters' standards, something of a maverick.

Barnes is largely forecasting more of the same, aside from obvious moves to plug Continental gaps in the Netherlands and Italy.

But partners at the firm have indicated that the previous emphasis on under-performance is shifting with, if anything, corporate expected to grow under Barnes.

Such changes in style will be significant for Linklaters, not only because corporate is still viewed as the heart of the firm but because some will wonder the extent to which the firm is now re-positioning after the relentless focus on performance of recent years.

Any broader shift will depend, in part, on the successor to senior partner Cann, whose term comes to an end next year, and the future of Angel, who is half way through his second management term.

Arguably as important will be the continuing role of Linklaters' talented team of senior managers who comprise its executive committee, the firm's core management team. The body, which is chaired by Angel and includes the head of corporate and the firm's other two major practice streams, finance and commercial, is seen to have imposed more direction on the firm since its inception in 2002.

Finance head Giles White, who has presided over the rise and rise of Linklaters' finance brand, is tipped as a contender to succeed Cann as senior partner. Nick Eastwell, who leads the capital markets group, would also be a popular choice for the managing partner role when Angel steps down in 2007.

The wild card could be Cheyne himself, who is viewed as a possible contender for senior partner, although his reputation would make him a controversial choice. Angel, likewise not a universally popular figure, is yet to rule himself out for the senior partner role.

Perhaps the biggest question the management team will need to ask is: what does Linklaters want to achieve aside from a continuing focus on processes and performance? While securing a major merger in New York has receded as an option, the firm now cites bolstering its US business as top priority, though it has still avoided hiring US corporate laterals. Likewise, hopes are high for its current push in Japan.

What is certain is that there will be pressure from significant sections of the partnership for a return to traditional partnership values, which will be all the more pressing if the firm cannot improve its partner profits. Worryingly, current indications are that the firm is not going to post a substantial increase on its current average partner profits of £674,000 this year.

The paradox for Linklaters is that its current management team – which inherited a mixed legacy – has delivered substantial results in a very challenging environment, even if at considerable cost to its partnership ethos. But continual churning of its partner-ship cannot be sustained indefinitely. Linklaters still seems unsure what to put in its place.