So after just the seven years of claims that he is leaving White & Case, Maurice Allen finally confirmed that he is to head for Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer along with fellow banking heavyweight Mike Goetz.

It's an understatement to say White & Case-watchers were not surprised; the intensity of rumours regarding the US firm's most high-profile UK lawyer had picked up over the last two years. But it was in January when the claims for the first time appeared to be something more substantive than standard City gossip.

In essence, well-informed outsiders said Allen and Goetz were sufficiently disenchanted with White & Case's central management and the level of recognition the London office was receiving that they were looking to move and had held informal talks with Freshfields, Linklaters and Herbert Smith. Internal indications by February were that there were issues of concern but such a move was still unlikely before the summer, with the hope being that various bones of contention could yet be resolved.

Events took a sudden turn for the unexpected when Freshfields – a firm that hardly ever hires laterally in London, let alone at this level – managed to put together a deal within days of the talks going public on 10 March. To many, Freshfields looked an unlikely home for the pair given the downsizing of its finance practice during its turbulent 2006 partnership restructuring (there is a logic to the hires but that's a whole other article). But the final announcement of their move to the magic circle firm on 14 March brought the bruising episode, which has brought occasionally hyperbolic claims regarding a supposed state of outright rebellion in London, to a close.

The obvious question as the dust settles is what impact the affair will have on White & Case's City arm, which until recently looked like it could do no wrong, having managed spectacular growth over the last three years. After all, to lose two excellent partners so identified with your success in circumstances that call into question the strategy of the firm is, in isolation, patently not a good thing.

And due credit should be given to the departing pair. Allen's unique profile and career trajectory (Clifford Chance to Weil Gotshal, then Weil – via an internal bust-up – to White & Case in 2000) has meant that he always attracted more than his fair share of sniping. But it is clear that Allen and Goetz have delivered in spades for the US firm, with White & Case in seven years building a 32-partner finance practice in London and securing a string of key banking appointments.

The firm achieved this via a sustained investment push that nurtured energetic, entrepreneurial lawyers and built a practice worth $235.7m (£120m) in 2007. It was a dramatically different strategy to that attempted by many US law firms in London, partly because it put a premium on utilising local lawyers' talents and market insight rather than attempting to graft on an external culture.

While other American firms still wrestled with the concept of the banking panel in Europe, White & Case secured regular instructions and close City links with a host of institutions, among them Deutsche Bank, ABN Amro, BNP Paribas, Goldman Sachs, Lehman and JP Morgan and several major UK banks.

The City practice, which now boasts 81 partners, has also been successful outside banking, with corporate making dramatic improvements over the last two years and the firm building a very credible contentious practice, which this month received a boost with the hire of Lovells arbitration head Phillip Capper.

And there is no doubt that Allen (pictured right) and Goetz deserve substantial credit for these successes. Indeed, despite initially making an odd pairing – the more reserved Goetz was cut from different cloth to the gregarious sports fanatic Allen – the pair became close colleagues and an effective team. Indeed, in many ways his work at White & Case has proved Allen's vindication, disproving critics that argued that a career built on his early success at CC had long been sustained by spin.

Papering over some great big cracks
Yet for all its recent success – and White & Case has consistently out-performed its rather modest billing in recent years – it is fair to say the New York-based global giant has issues regarding its direction and identity yet to be resolved three decades on from the launch of its ground-breaking international push.

On one hand, the firm's roots and much of its cultural heritage remain in New York and America's project finance market. Yet much of the firm's growth over the last 15 years has come outside its US heartlands, with the firm having built a highly-effective network through western Europe and the world's key emerging markets.

Likewise, practice growth has often come in acquisition finance, structured products and securities, practices suited to more nimble and entrepreneurial lawyers than the staid world of projects. Corporate has also seen substantial growth, with the firm often being at its most effective when leveraging its network of excellent practices in central and eastern Europe.

Such tensions between the old White & Case and the new had simmered for a long time but had been made manageable by the combination of successful expansion and the personal clout of two of the firm's long-time leaders. The first of these, James Hurlock, led the firm from 1980 to 2000, becoming one of the longest-serving leaders of a major US law firm. Hurlock championed White & Case's then-unusual international expansion and this strategy and willingness to expand outside its comfort-zone practice areas was continued by his replacement as managing partner, Duane Wall. Wall was a confirmed Anglophile, having been one of the first partners the firm stationed in London in the 1970s. Likewise, as a White & Case veteran, he was able to easily bridge the different constituencies within the fast-changing firm.

By common agreement, the tensions that burst into the open earlier this month were most directly stoked by the election of Wall's replacement in 2007. After a widely open initial nominations process the election essentially soon became a two-horse race between global co-head of banking Eric Berg and Moscow chief Hugh Verrier. Berg was closely associated with the kind of banking and securities expansion that defined the firm's recent years and was also viewed as a natural ally to Allen, Goetz and the London office in general.

In comparison, Verrier's track record as an energy and infrastructure specialist was seen by some to have detached him from the firm's more recent engines of growth. This may seen a perverse perception, as Verrier has been with the firm for 24 years and made his reputation tightening up the management and performance of foreign branches in Ankara and Moscow – exactly the kind of exotic expansion that has marked out the firm in recent years. He also sat on the firm's central board. Nevertheless, to some banking and securities lawyers he was seen as a remote, stiff figure more associated with a projects and infrastructure-driven view of the firm that would have been more accurate a decade ago.

In short, it is clear that Berg and Verrier represented two very different visions of White & Case and many assumed that Berg's more progressive view would prevail. This assumption apparently extended to Berg himself, who is said to have been bitterly disappointed when it was announced in August that Verrier had won the newly-cast role of chairman following the partnership vote.

Berg's disappointment was shared by some others, especially in the banking practice and major offices like London, Paris and Frankfurt, who regarded Verrier's election as a step backwards. In this view, the firm had plumped for a consensus candidate that appealed to partners who would be under pressure to change their ways should a more ambitious, securities-driven White & Case emerge, as Berg's candidature promised.

The best comparison in recent management elections would be CC's 2001 election of Peter Cornell, a vote from a ruffled partnership against the more robust candidature of Peter Charlton. But while Cornell promised a more inclusive form of leadership, he was a natural diplomat and communicator – skills which Verrier's many admirers would not say play to his natural strengths.

And worse, having been so long working in smaller branch offices, it is accepted by all sides that the early months following Verrier's appointment saw him hunker down to get his head round the entire business. This contributed to an internal lack of profile, further aggravating the sense of dislocation. This was perhaps most prominent in London, where partners had been used to the regular presence and contact with Wall, who frequently spent a week or more every month in the UK; it was a running joke that an email to Wall would be immediately returned despite his prodigious workload. This contact also meant that White & Case's London partners, especially in banking, once felt they had management's ear.

In contrast, critics of Verrier complain that his low profile meant few knew what his vision represented. Supporters say, quite credibly, that this misunderstands the man's style. Verrier is viewed by those that know him as a man of utmost integrity, who likes to play it straight and takes a considerable amount of time evaluating situations before he acts. Moving quickly on gut instinct does not play to Verrier's natural inclinations. There is, however, an admission that the early months of his chairmanship were too low key for the good of a firm in need of leadership.

Sensible changes to White & Case's management after Wall stepped down probably contributed to the discord between central management and some of its larger European offices. Those governance reforms saw the full-time role of chairman complimented by a newly-created four-strong executive committee.

The initial line-up of Verrier, New York partners Tony Khan and Dimitrios Drivas and Turkey-based Asli Basgoz appeared, on one reading, to be a snub to the successful western European offices. However, at least one senior London partner was sounded out regarding an appointment to the body last year but declined due to an unwillingness to give up client work. It is unclear if anyone in the firm's banking and capital markets team was approached.

Yet given the clear ambivalence among City partners to giving up coal-face lawyering, it appears likely that what was more damaging was the failure of any UK partner to win a place on the elected eight-member partnership committee, the part-time body responsible for deciding on compensation and the appointment of new partners. At various stages no less than six London partners were identified as contenders for the body: litigators John Bellhouse and Alistair Graham; projects heavyweight Philip Stopford; head of corporate Peter Finlay; and Allen and Goetz. Yet none were to secure places in the open vote. This did not help matters, given London's strategic importance to the business, representing as it does more than 15% of White & Case's turnover.

The London perspective – countdown to departure
It would be wrong to overstate the aforementioned issues but the partnership committee vote did bring to the surface tensions regarding the development of the London office. The firm has repeatedly debated whether to have a strong executive figure for London in recent years – without ever resolving the matter. And while lawyers like Stopford and Finlay have been strongly involved in central management (they currently sit on central committees handling work allocation and risk respectively), it seems apparent that a disconnection has been allowed to develop between corporate and projects on one side – practices viewed as more naturally aligned with White & Case 'establishment' – and the more freewheeling figures in banking and capital markets. This is underlined by the curious structure that separates the projects department from the banking team.

The flipside of this, as has been pointed out by exasperated London partners dismayed by the more hyperbolic claims regarding the London office's supposed uprising, is that White & Case has built much of its success in the Square Mile by letting local lawyers just get on with it. The firm, which has been known to dismissively refer to US referrals as "import/export business", estimates that just 5%-10% of its business comes via the States. In contrast to most US law firms, this is also the kind of place where very little has to be run past central management, a factor which contributes to its can-do gusto. The counter-argument to those arguing that London needs more management representation is that such processes and centralisation have had very little to do with the office's success.

Further complicating the internal dynamics is a relationship between head-office in New York and London that on occasion is downright ambivalent. After all, they represent to world's two leading financial centres but while London has been an undoubted success, even the most on-message White & Case partners concede the entrepreneurial drive that runs across its UK practice does not generally extend to the more conservative New York practice.

Given the success of White & Case at cracking one of the most competitive legal markets in the world and the continued struggle to upgrade the firm's New York practice (the firm is still characterised as 'a donut' by sniping NY rivals, referring to its supposed empty centre), the scope for friction between the precocious offspring and more pedestrian parent is obvious.

Other issues that have been highlighted by London lawyers are concerns over junior partners' pay, which – despite the firm's increases in profitability – have been sorely tested by dramatic rises in comparable numbers from UK law firms and the prolonged slump in the dollar. While White & Case, which operates a meritocratic pay system, can match top London rates for its senior equity partners, the concern is that it is losing ground at the junior end. And that fear is shared by more than just the banking team.

Currently the firm pays its new UK salaried partners (dubbed 'contract partners') in the region of £250,000, though this figure is understood to vary considerably in individual cases (and one recruiter claims to have seen deals below £200,000). Junior equity partners are pegged directly to the firm's dollar-based profit centre, which means, according to one partner, that newly-promoted equity partners are in line to start on around $650,000 (£328,000).

Given the collapse in the dollar, the argument goes that this undermines the firm's appeal to talented junior partners compared to sterling-based locksteps that will typically offer more certainty and better pay in the short-term. This issue has become more pressing given the dramatic increases in the profitability of the London practice, up 19% in 2007 to average $1.53m (£780,000) per UK equity partner. With London near to matching the firm-wide partner profits average, the long period in which the firm has effectively subsidised the drawings of UK equity partners looks set to end very soon.

The firm moved to recognise this issue last year when it introduced what was dubbed a 'dollar protection plan', which superseded an outdated scheme that had been in operation since the mid-1990s. The scheme is designed to allow for a one-off payment to help offset long-term currency movements. At the behest of senior equity partners, the scheme, which made its first payment in December 2007, was designed explicitly to protect junior partners at the expense of high-drawing equity partners.

The scheme was received as a welcome gesture, though there is a limit to the protection that the firm can offer partners in the UK without fundamental reform of its remuneration structure. Yet while pay is undoubtedly a factor in recent tensions in London, it is yet to become a critical issue and was apparently only a secondary contributor to the departures of Allen and Goetz.

Other clues to their dissatisfaction can be gleaned from the firm's business plan for London, which was put forward in November. The plan essentially revolved around upping investment in corporate, which currently constitutes a 15-partner practice in London, and further internationalising its City business by transferring more of its key lawyers to important emerging market offices. The firm has since acted on that by announcing the transfer of four London partners to offices in the Middle East and Russia (though only one, structured finance specialist Simon Morgan, heralds from the banking/capital markets team).

On one reading, this constitutes an understandable break with the five-year run of heavy investment in banking, which has forged one of the largest finance teams in the City. Yet ironically, this strategy supports one of the key priorities for the City banking practice: the call for London finance lawyers to play a stronger role in key emerging markets.

The reason for this apparent contradiction is that some banking lawyers felt that, while the concept of building on emerging markets enjoyed wide support, in reality office politics and local resistance was slowing down moves to make it happen. Some also argued that the emerging markets push was too often sidelining banking in favour of projects, energy and infrastructure. It is easy to see how, with the absence of the easy communication the banking team had enjoyed with Wall, this issue has taken on more significance than it is probably worth.

The other major reason for the departures is rather more prosaic: Allen was bored. As a lawyer who by his own admission thrives on building things, his work at White & Case was largely done. With the plan of restyling the banking practice along international lines not materialising at the hoped-for pace, there was little for Allen left to do with a team fast-approaching critical mass and stuffed full of rising stars.

In contrast, Freshfields' underweight and overhauled banking practice offered the unique opportunity to build again – but with an established brand. Goetz, having become close friends with Allen, was always likely to move with him, though actually it was Goetz's relationship with Freshfields chief executive Ted Burke that provided the initial impetus for the move.

Life without Maurice (but with Eric)
The exit having been confirmed on Tuesday 11 March after a meeting of White & Case's banking and capital markets team, the pair left on Friday 14 March, with far less animosity than many outside observers would have concluded from some of the coverage.

But returning to the original question: how much damage has the episode done to White & Case in London? In terms of clients and the team as a unit, the answer is, in itself, very little. With such a deep bench of good lawyers – among them Chris Kandel, Rachel Hatfield, Magdalene Bayim-Adomako, Antonia Rawlinson, David Barwise and Rob Matthews – the departing partners are the first to admit that the firm has talent to spare and that it is probably the ideal time for such lawyers to take a more leading role. As successful leaders, the departing pair have built in their own succession.

This was to a certain extent illustrated by the appointment of younger partners to head the finance group, with Kandel and Bayim-Adomako being appointed to lead the bank finance sub-team and Rawlinson appointed to spearhead client development within the group. The line-up, alongside current sub-heads for capital markets, insolvency and structured finance, will constitute the new team to run the practice after the departures of Allen and Goetz. There is also a sense of relief that the issue over Allen and Goetz's intentions, which had come to dog the practice over the last six months, has been finally resolved.

And while it would be surprising if some banking work did not migrate to Freshfields, White & Case has already largely institutionalised its links with major clients. Take the Deutsche Bank relationship, built up under Goetz's oversight to be worth around £10m in 2007 – the firm advises the bank across all product lines and has a range of partners managing the relationship, including Kandel, Rawlinson, Bayim-Adomako and Matthews. In addition, it seems the pair is more focused on building at Freshfields than they are on transferring business.

But aside from limiting the damage, more positively the episode has presented a golden opportunity for White & Case to address issues long unresolved. Key to that is bridging and reconciling the two visions of the firm, something that Verrier had shown insufficient attention to in the hectic months after his appointment. As such, White & Case must resolve just how ambitious it wants to be, including how much it wants to continue playing the 'lifestyle' card in comparison to some of its more driven rivals.

In this context, Berg's role would look to be crucial. Not because he needs to be drafted in to 'shore up' the practice, as the team is already way past needing that kind of support. But having at one point being cited as a possible mover with Allen and Goetz, by all indications he has reconciled himself to his election disappointment and is now intent on taking the firm forward.

Even on a purely symbolic level, that should be important for a firm that has sustained too little communication between its core constitutencies. Providing that dialogue can be maintained – and a few lessons learned on both sides – White & Case should continue to be one of global law's most distinctive success-stories.

Conversely, failure to seize this opportunity and prevent the departures of younger partners would look to be an entirely unforced error from which the firm will not so easily recover next time.