Only two months after news first emerged of financial problems at Dewey & LeBoeuf, the spectre of bankruptcy looms large over the US giant. Such a course would make Dewey on many measures the largest-ever law firm collapse, signalling the end of a practice that at its peak had more than 1,300 lawyers and revenues of over $800m (£493m).

That will inevitably trigger more analysis of Dewey's fate, much of which will attempt to frame what happened in the context of a crisis facing the wider legal industry. That's largely wide of the mark; the Dewey saga is less evidence that something is rotten in the legal industry and more that something is rotten in the US legal industry, which has over the last 10 years seen a breathtaking run of failures including Howrey, Heller Ehrman, Brobeck Phleger & Harrison and Coudert Brothers.

While it would be a ridiculous overstatement to tar the bulk of US law firms with the same brush, there is unquestionably something fundamental to the law firm model practised by many non-lockstep firms that breeds instability. And it is a peculiarly American condition – there is no comparable market that has generated law firm failures on this scale. Prime villains here are the individualism of the US model and the failure to institutionalise client relationships, making firms incredibly vulnerable to a 'run on the bank' when departing partners take clients with them.

Mix that with firms assuming large fixed obligations – be they debt, office space, pension liabilities or guaranteed pay deals – and you've got a potential time bomb. Those that like to kick up the risk further ladle aggressive recruitment on top – causing yet more instability. But let's be realistic: management at too many US law firms just isn't sophisticated enough for businesses of their size, largely thanks to US lawyers' apparent disdain for professional leadership.

I've seen a lot of claims that the media brought Dewey low. Don't buy it. There are cases in which aggressive coverage can hasten a decline and that's an ethical question journalists should always be mindful of. But in Dewey's case, the firm did a remarkable job of containing a string of questionable judgement calls running back years until very recently.

When the sheer scale of Dewey's obligations rapidly became clear – together with the reality that its financial position was considerably weaker than previously thought – it was near inevitable that this wouldn't end well. The boat had already hit the iceberg, even if it was still afloat. Actually, the firm would probably have benefited from a few probing stories several years back, when it may have done some good. Robust media coverage is an imperfect regulator, but it often helps to raise governance standards by providing outside scrutiny.

Neither do I buy the narrative that debt-laden Dewey Ballantine shipped problems into the previously Eden-like LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & MacRae. The combined firm was largely run by LeBoeuf's leadership team, which had been using aggressive guaranteed pay deals for several years before the 2007 merger and stepped up such practices even at a point when it should have been clear that there was a limit to how much further its balance sheet could be pushed. This was a 'two plus two equals five' deal – only in the negative sense.

Ultimately, Dewey's turmoil is a painful reminder that bad management has a price, and it's usually paid by the staff on the ground.