In this inverse condemnation case, we consider whether the court of appeals erred by rendering a money judgment against the City of Houston on mineral interest owners’ regulatory takings claims. We hold that it did. Because the trial court never entered a final judgment on the jury verdict, the court of appeals’ rendition of judgment prevents the City from properly challenging the judgment. We, therefore, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case to the trial court so that it may reach final judgment and the parties may then have an opportunity to challenge that judgment.
A Houston ordinance prohibited drilling for minerals in a “Control Area” in the City’s extraterritorial jurisdiction, including near Lake Houston where the owners’ interests lie. The owners were unsuccessful in obtaining a variance in 1994, and brought regulatory takings claims in 1995, seeking damages for inverse condemnation. That suit was dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. Then, in December 1996, the City annexed the area at issue. Because their land was no longer subject to the ordinance, the owners wrote the City regarding the possibility of drilling. In 1997, however, the City amended its Control Area ordinance to include land within city limits. The owners did not seek a variance, but instead filed new regulatory takings claims. The trial court held a bifurcated trial, finding that a taking occurred, and the jury awarded damages nearing $17 million.*fn1 Before it entered final judgment, though, the trial court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment on ripeness grounds, for want of a permit or variance request, and ordered the case dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. That order is the subject of this appeal.
The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the action was ripe.*fn2 255 S.W.3d 105, 109 (Tex. App.-Waco 2007). We agree that the action was ripe, and on this issue we affirm. See Mahew v. City of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Tex. 1998) (holding that “futile variance requests or re-applications are not required” for a regulatory takings claim to be ripe); Hallco Tex., Inc. v. McMullen County, 221 S.W.3d 50, 60 (Tex. 2006) (concluding that owners’ takings claims were ripe upon enactment of an ordinance absolutely prohibiting precisely the use owners intended to make, without including potential exceptions).*fn3 Rather than remanding, though, the court of appeals rendered judgment on the jury verdict for the owners based on the trial court’s finding of liability. 255 S.W.3d at 115. However, because the trial court relied only on the jurisdictional ripeness issue in disposing of the case, it was improper for the court of appeals to render judgment on the jury verdict. Our rules provide procedures through which parties may challenge a verdict’s or judgment’s propriety. E.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 301 (motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict); TEX. R. CIV. P. 320 (motion for new trial). Remand was necessary at least to enable these further proceedings. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.3. The court of appeals circumvented these procedures by treating a motion for summary judgment on a jurisdictional issue as if it were a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 255 S.W.3d at 113, and doing so was error.
