C O N C U R R I N G OPINION
For substantially the same reasons identified in its opinion, I agree with the majority that the evidence did not conclusively establish (as Boeing acknowledges it must in order for the company to prevail on appeal) that the information Boeing seeks to withhold is a trade secret. For similar reasons, but not those advanced by the majority, I likewise join in the judgment that Boeing is not entitled to have the information withheld under the exception to mandatory disclosure provided in section 552.104 of the Public Information Act (PIA). See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.104 (West 2004).
Section 552.104 excepts from mandatory disclosure “information that, if released, would give advantage to a competitor or bidder.” Id. § 552.104(a); see id. § 552.104(b) (providing that this exception applies notwithstanding section 552.022′s general requirement that the so-called “core” public information listed within that section, including “information in [a] . . . contract relating to the receipt or expenditure of public or other funds by a governmental body,” be disclosed unless “expressly confidential under other law”). Boeing insists that release of the information at issue-rental rates, allocated shares of common maintenance costs, financial incentives, minimum insurance requirements, and liquidated damages provisions under its sublease with the Port*fn1 -would “give advantage” to its “competitors” who, like Boeing, pursue large federal government contracts to service and overhaul military aircraft.*fn2 To support this claim, Boeing presented evidence that the information would enable its rivals to (1) calculate or at least estimate Boeing’s costs under the sublease through its 2018 expiration, (2) attempt to negotiate lower-cost or more lucrative arrangements to secure sites for their own operations,*fn3 (3) which, if successful, would provide them a relative advantage with respect to a key component of a company’s “overhead rate” (though, as the majority notes, not the exclusive component of the overhead rate*fn4 ) in bidding for future federal contracts, (4) which would be especially beneficial in winning these contracts because competition centers on bid price and that wages and certain other key bid components, though not all,*fn5 are fixed and standardized. Given the contingencies present in Boeing’s theory, and without additional evidence, I would hold that the evidence again falls short of conclusively demonstrating that disclosure of the information “would give advantage” to Boeing’s competitors, as required by section 552.104.
