A related canon, ejusdem generis teaches that general words following a list of specific words should usually be read in light of those specific words to mean something “similar.” … Applying these canons to §1519’s list of nouns, the term “tangible object” should refer to something similar to records or documents. A fish does not spring to mind—nor does an antelope, a colonial farmhouse, a hydrofoil, or an oil derrick. All are “objects” that are “tangible.” But who wouldn’t raise an eyebrow if a neighbor, when asked to identify something similar to a “record” or “document,” said “crocodile”?
Ginsburg said that to interpret “tangible object” literally—to mean any object that is tangible—would remove important context. Ginsburg wrote:
A fish is no doubt an object that is tangible; fish can be seen, caught, and handled, and a catch, as this case illustrates, is vulnerable to destruction. But it would cut §1519 loose from its financial-fraud mooring to hold that it encompasses any and all objects, whatever their size or significance, destroyed with obstructive intent. Mindful that in Sarbanes Oxley, Congress trained its attention on corporate and accounting deception and cover-ups, we conclude that a matching construction of §1519 is in order: A tangible object captured by §1519, we hold, must be one used to record or preserve information.
Justice Elena Kagan wrote the dissent. Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas joined Kagan. Kagan wrote: “This case raises the question whether the term ‘tangible object’ means the same thing in §1519 as it means in everyday language—any object capable of being touched. The answer should be easy: Yes. The term ‘tangible object’ is broad, but clear.”
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