On April 15, 2015, the European Commission levied formal charges against Google, the culmination of a long-simmering and politically charged investigation into the Internet giant's search practices. Despite various inquiries in recent years, the announcement marks the first time a government regulator has gone so far as to charge Google with an antitrust violation. The charges—which assert that Google abused its dominant position in the European search engine market to favor its own “vertical” services—are coupled with the launch of a formal investigation into allegations that Google currently bundles its Android mobile operating system with Google applications. The news has been met with a defiant response by Google, as well as both praise and criticism from state governments and antitrust commentators.

The recent EC decision is not the first time a prominent government agency has examined Google's potential anti-competitive behavior. In 2013, the Federal Trade Commission concluded its own investigation into Google's search practices, recognizing a pro-competitive basis for Google's prioritization of certain content. Complainants had alleged that Google utilized an algorithm specifically tailored to favor the return of Google's own content above that of competitors during an Internet search. This practice, known as “search bias,” resulted in the supposed favoring of “vertical” Google content—i.e., Google-sponsored shopping and travel searches—at Google's competitors' expense.

The FTC ultimately concluded that these design changes were aimed at improving the user experience (by offering more responsive content) and that any harm to competitors was purely incidental. Indeed, the FTC found that Google frequently conducted testing to measure the effects of these changes on consumers, as well as determining that other general search engines had embraced similar tweaks. In declining to file charges against Google, the FTC stated that to “second-guess a firm's product design decisions where plausible procompetitive justifications have been offered, and where those justifications are supported by ample evidence” would be inappropriate from an antitrust perspective.1