This month, we discuss Littlejohn v. City of New York, where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the intersection of the McDonnell Douglas evidentiary framework and the “plausibility” pleadings standard announced in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.1 In the decision, written by Judge Christopher Droney and joined by Judges Pierre Leval and Gerard Lynch, the court reconciled the heightened pleading standards outlined in Iqbal with the McDonnell Douglas evidentiary standard and held that, to the extent that the McDonnell Douglas framework relaxes the factual showing required for plaintiffs to defeat a summary judgment motion, it likewise relaxes the facts needed to be pleaded under Iqbal to survive a motion to dismiss.

The court also clarified the scope of Title VII protected activity under the opposition clause in §704(a) of the Civil Rights Act,2 holding that the clause protects certain activities of all employees, even if their job duties include monitoring and investigating complaints of discrimination. The opposition clause specifies that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because she “opposed” a discriminatory action or policy. 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-3(a).

In so ruling, the court held that the plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded disparate treatment under Title VII as against her employer, the City of New York, and under §§1981 and 1983 as against her direct supervisor. The court vacated the district court's judgment as to those claims, affirmed the dismissal of all other claims and remanded the case to the district court.

Background

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating in compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment on account of an employee's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.3 Sections 1981 and 1983 create causes of action for race-based employment discrimination based on disparate treatment and/or hostile environment.4McDonnell Douglas v. Green, decided in 1973, set forth the elements of establishing a prima facie case for a Title VII claim of discriminatory treatment. As subsequently refined, these requirements have been consistently characterized as “not onerous” or “minimal,” in keeping with the court's reasoning that fairness required that a plaintiff alleging discrimination be protected from early-stage dismissal before a defendant employer has put forth the reasons for the adverse employment action in question.5 This burden-shifting framework is also used to evaluate disparate treatment claims arising under §§1981 and 1983.6