The 2016-2017 Term of the Court of Appeals and the four Appellate Division departments produced a number of significant evidence decisions. Most of these decisions have previously been discussed by this columnist¹ and other New York Law Journal columnists.² This column and the next one will focus on a handful of evidence decisions which are also deserving of comment due to their practical impact upon the trial of civil and criminal cases and which might otherwise be overlooked by the bench and bar due to their less-heralded nature.

'Molineux'

New York's Molineux rule, applicable in both civil and criminal actions, provides that when evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts committed by a person is offered for the purpose of raising an inference that the person is likely to have committed the crime charged or the act in issue, the evidence is inadmissible. People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 291-93 (1901). However, where the evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is offered for a non-conformity or non-propensity purpose which is relevant in the action, the evidence may be admissible. Id. at 293-94.³ Which side of the line drawn by Molineux offered evidence fell on was in issue in two interesting cases.

In Mazzella v. Beals, 27 N.Y.3d 694 (2016), an action for medical malpractice and wrongful death, plaintiff alleged that defendant doctor caused decedent's suicide by failing to properly prescribe and monitor decedent's medications and by failing to adequately diagnosis his worsening condition. At trial, evidence of a consent order between defendant and the New York State Office of Professional Medical Conduct concerning defendant's negligent treatment of 12 other patients by reason of his failure to adequately monitor and evaluate them after prescribing medications was admitted. The claimed basis for its admission was that it was relevant on the issue of negligence and causation. The Court of Appeals held the consent order should not have been admitted, and accordingly set aside the jury verdict for plaintiff.

The court noted the inference readily apparent from the consent order, namely, defendant was a serial pill pusher, oblivious to the health and safety of those in his care, and a danger to his patients, including decedent. The court initially held its obvious purpose was a conformity or propensity purpose which ran afoul of the Molineux exclusionary rule. Id. at 709. It then held none of the Molineux non-conformity purposes were applicable. Id. at 710. Lastly, the court emphasized that even if there were some possible relevance that could be attributed to the consent order, such relevance was outweighed by the “obvious” undue prejudice of his repeated violations of accepted medical standards.” Id.