The state Court of Appeals ruled Tuesday that the state did not violate the compensation clause of the New York Constitution by reducing its contributions to judges' health insurance premiums, thereby reversing a lower court's decision.

The lawsuit, Bransten v. State of New York, filed by 13 sitting and retired Supreme Court justices and two judicial associations in 2012 was a result of a 2011 budget issue that allowed legislators to lower the state's contributions toward health insurance premiums for state employees. The reductions in the state's contributions to employees' health insurance premiums were part of an effort to avoid layoffs amid a budget crisis. The affected workers were promised job security in exchange for contributing more toward their health insurance premiums.

In 2014, the Appellate Division, First Department, ruled that the reduced contribution “increased the amounts withheld from judicial salaries [and] constitutes an unconstitutional diminution of judicial compensation.”

In a per curiam opinion decided Tuesday, No. 67, the state's highest court concluded that the state's contribution “is not judicial compensation protected from the direct diminution by the compensation clause, and the reductions in contributions do not have the effect of singling out the judiciary for disadvantageous treatment.”

The state's health care contributions are not “part of a judicial salary or a permanent remuneration for expenses necessarily incurred in fulfillment of judicial obligations,” the court said.

During oral arguments in October, the state argued that the reduction of its contributions didn't violate the constitutional ban because it “did not directly affect any constitutionally protected compensation.” Meanwhile, the Supreme Court justices claimed that compensation includes wages, benefits and anything of value that an employer provides.

The opinion states, “for plaintiffs, the compensation would include even those items that have an indisputably indirect impact on salary, as, for example, parking privileges, discounts in a cafeteria, or even free coffee and bagels in a communal kitchen. As these examples illustrate, adopting a plaintiffs' position renders meaningless 'compensation' as a constitutional term of art. It would also leave us without any standard by which to guide future decisions.”

Alan Klinger of Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, the attorney for the respondent justices, did not immediately return a call seeking comment.

While concurring with the opinion overall, Justice Mark Dillon—who was one of three Appellate Division justices vouched into the oral arguments in October—said the state's contribution toward the cost of health care premiums provided to judges and justices is part of the paid compensation that falls within the protective provision of the state's constitution. But he said that while the terms salary and compensation are related, they “are not one and the same,” Dillon said. The 1894 state constitution refers to compensation as a “broad umbrella term” and uses the word salary as a component under the compensation umbrella, he later stated.

“The compensation clause would be irrelevant to the state's health care insurance contributions if the controlling constitutional language merely guaranteed that no judicial 'salary' be diminished during jurists' term in office. However, the presence of the broader term 'compensation' in the compensation clause casts a wider net that includes more than mere salary,” Dillon wrote.

Dillon argued that the state's contribution toward the health care premiums of participating members of the judiciary should become part of compensation within the “protective cocoon” of the compensation clause.

The sitting and retired Supreme Court justices and two judicial associations who filed the lawsuit “failed to satisfy their burden that the reduction from the state's contribution represents any net reduction of the value of the benefit to current and former members of the judicial branch.”

Associate Judge Rowan Wilson agreed with Dillon that health care benefits are compensation. But in a separate, concurring opinion, Wilson said that the appeal “fails for a simple reason.” The complaint by the plaintiffs “does not seek a declaration that the regulations that were” enacted as a result of the Civil Service Law are unconstitutional, Wilson said. “In moving for summary judgment, plaintiffs reiterated their request for a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional; they did not assert that the regulations were,” he added.

Despite the fact that the plaintiffs are Supreme Court justices doesn't “entitle them to any laxer pleading standard than we can afford other litigants,” Wilson wrote. “They did not seek a declaration that the regulations were unconstitutional, did not amend their complaint, and did not move to conform the pleadings to the proof.”

Wilson questioned whether the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

“The alleged diminution in compensation arises not from the statute, but from the subsequent regulations, at 4 NYCRR 73.3 (b) and 73.12. Jurisdiction was asserted under CPLR 5601 (b) (2), which permits a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals from Supreme Court 'where the only question involved on the appeal is the validity of a statutory provision of the state or of the United States,'” he wrote.

“It is unclear why we have permitted a direct appeal from Supreme Court here, and passed on the constitutionality of the regulations. Whatever the reason, our decision today creates an amorphous jurisdictional portal, which may open for others in the future,” Wilson concluded.

Associate Judges Jenny Rivera, Eugene Fahey, Michael Garcia and Justices Erin Peradotto and Robert Mulvey, who were vouched in, all concurred with the per curiam opinion. Dillon, who was vouched in concurred with the decision in his own opinion, and Wilson concurred in a separate opinion. Chief Judge Janet DiFiore and Judges Leslie Stein and Paul Feinman took no part.

The state Court of Appeals ruled Tuesday that the state did not violate the compensation clause of the New York Constitution by reducing its contributions to judges' health insurance premiums, thereby reversing a lower court's decision.

The lawsuit, Bransten v. State of New York, filed by 13 sitting and retired Supreme Court justices and two judicial associations in 2012 was a result of a 2011 budget issue that allowed legislators to lower the state's contributions toward health insurance premiums for state employees. The reductions in the state's contributions to employees' health insurance premiums were part of an effort to avoid layoffs amid a budget crisis. The affected workers were promised job security in exchange for contributing more toward their health insurance premiums.

In 2014, the Appellate Division, First Department, ruled that the reduced contribution “increased the amounts withheld from judicial salaries [and] constitutes an unconstitutional diminution of judicial compensation.”

In a per curiam opinion decided Tuesday, No. 67, the state's highest court concluded that the state's contribution “is not judicial compensation protected from the direct diminution by the compensation clause, and the reductions in contributions do not have the effect of singling out the judiciary for disadvantageous treatment.”

The state's health care contributions are not “part of a judicial salary or a permanent remuneration for expenses necessarily incurred in fulfillment of judicial obligations,” the court said.

During oral arguments in October, the state argued that the reduction of its contributions didn't violate the constitutional ban because it “did not directly affect any constitutionally protected compensation.” Meanwhile, the Supreme Court justices claimed that compensation includes wages, benefits and anything of value that an employer provides.

The opinion states, “for plaintiffs, the compensation would include even those items that have an indisputably indirect impact on salary, as, for example, parking privileges, discounts in a cafeteria, or even free coffee and bagels in a communal kitchen. As these examples illustrate, adopting a plaintiffs' position renders meaningless 'compensation' as a constitutional term of art. It would also leave us without any standard by which to guide future decisions.”

Alan Klinger of Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, the attorney for the respondent justices, did not immediately return a call seeking comment.

While concurring with the opinion overall, Justice Mark Dillon—who was one of three Appellate Division justices vouched into the oral arguments in October—said the state's contribution toward the cost of health care premiums provided to judges and justices is part of the paid compensation that falls within the protective provision of the state's constitution. But he said that while the terms salary and compensation are related, they “are not one and the same,” Dillon said. The 1894 state constitution refers to compensation as a “broad umbrella term” and uses the word salary as a component under the compensation umbrella, he later stated.

“The compensation clause would be irrelevant to the state's health care insurance contributions if the controlling constitutional language merely guaranteed that no judicial 'salary' be diminished during jurists' term in office. However, the presence of the broader term 'compensation' in the compensation clause casts a wider net that includes more than mere salary,” Dillon wrote.

Dillon argued that the state's contribution toward the health care premiums of participating members of the judiciary should become part of compensation within the “protective cocoon” of the compensation clause.

The sitting and retired Supreme Court justices and two judicial associations who filed the lawsuit “failed to satisfy their burden that the reduction from the state's contribution represents any net reduction of the value of the benefit to current and former members of the judicial branch.”

Associate Judge Rowan Wilson agreed with Dillon that health care benefits are compensation. But in a separate, concurring opinion, Wilson said that the appeal “fails for a simple reason.” The complaint by the plaintiffs “does not seek a declaration that the regulations that were” enacted as a result of the Civil Service Law are unconstitutional, Wilson said. “In moving for summary judgment, plaintiffs reiterated their request for a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional; they did not assert that the regulations were,” he added.

Despite the fact that the plaintiffs are Supreme Court justices doesn't “entitle them to any laxer pleading standard than we can afford other litigants,” Wilson wrote. “They did not seek a declaration that the regulations were unconstitutional, did not amend their complaint, and did not move to conform the pleadings to the proof.”

Wilson questioned whether the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

“The alleged diminution in compensation arises not from the statute, but from the subsequent regulations, at 4 NYCRR 73.3 (b) and 73.12. Jurisdiction was asserted under CPLR 5601 (b) (2), which permits a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals from Supreme Court 'where the only question involved on the appeal is the validity of a statutory provision of the state or of the United States,'” he wrote.

“It is unclear why we have permitted a direct appeal from Supreme Court here, and passed on the constitutionality of the regulations. Whatever the reason, our decision today creates an amorphous jurisdictional portal, which may open for others in the future,” Wilson concluded.

Associate Judges Jenny Rivera, Eugene Fahey, Michael Garcia and Justices Erin Peradotto and Robert Mulvey, who were vouched in, all concurred with the per curiam opinion. Dillon, who was vouched in concurred with the decision in his own opinion, and Wilson concurred in a separate opinion. Chief Judge Janet DiFiore and Judges Leslie Stein and Paul Feinman took no part.