The Notice to Admit and Medical Malpractice Defense
Medical Malpractice Defense columnist John L.A. Lyddane writes: The notice to admit will remain as a tool among others to be used in preparing the defense as cases approach resolution. The trial courts will be faced with issues resulting from its use, however infrequently.
March 16, 2018 at 02:45 PM
8 minute read
The space constraints on this column do not allow for a full recitation of the elements of §3123 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, which govern the Notice to Admit. However, the full text may be found in CPLR Article 31, included as a disclosure device. A close look reveals characteristics which take the Notice to Admit well beyond the devices familiar to practicing attorneys and trial judges.
On its face, this device should be more popular than it has been in defending medical malpractice claims. Often it becomes apparent that a particular case will need to be tried and attention then turns to how the defense will be presented before a jury. Evidentiary foundation issues with photographs, diagrams, or copies of medical records from out-of-state medical facilities no longer in operation, are not uncommon. Why then is this device so infrequently used?
The statutory framework seems clear enough. The device is not permitted to be used to secure admissions on the central issues of the case, but may be useful to assure that the complete evidentiary basis for the defense is able to be placed before the jury with minimal uncertainty, expenditure of time, and associated cost. However, the device is fairly unique, attorneys and judges do not appear to be comfortable with it in use, and the relatively few decisions that address its use do little to help promote its use.
A Unique Device
There are several unique factors about the notice to admit that seem to contribute to its unpopularity. First of all, discovery devices in general are oriented toward the securing of evidence but the notice to admit is oriented toward the use of evidence at trial. In most medical malpractice cases, the experienced defense attorney knows upon reading the bill of particulars what the universe of necessary discovery should be and her initial discovery demands will be sufficient to obtain most of what will be needed.
The notice to admit does not produce evidence helping to define the liability claim or evaluate the scope of recoverable damages at the initial phase of discovery. In fact, the notice to admit is not meant to be used until the importance of a particular piece of evidence has been established and there is a “reasonable belief” that the matters as to which admissions are sought are free from substantial dispute. Marguess v. City of New York, 30 A.D.2d 782, aff'd 28 N.Y.2d 527 (1971). That point will usually come well after the court has outlined the scope of discovery at the preliminary conference.
The notice to admit is not a discovery device which is even appropriate at the earlier juncture. It may take other devices to secure the document or photograph in issue, and depositions to establish their importance to the defense and whether there is a dispute as to their authenticity or admissibility. Falkowitz v. Kings Highway Hospital, 43 A.D.2d 696 (2d Dept. 1973). Whether there is a possible dispute worthy of a notice to admit may not be apparent during discovery. Uniquely, this device is available up to 20 days before trial, long after the filing of the certificate of readiness has limited the use of other discovery devices. Hodes v. City of N.Y., 165 A.D.2d 168 (1st Dept. 1991).
The utility of the notice to admit after discovery is nominally closed is statutory and unconditional. The courts have defined the notice to admit as a device whose sole function is to expedite the trial by eliminating the need for a party to prove what is easily provable and should not be in dispute. Taylor v. Blair, 116 A.D.2d 204 (1st Dept. 1986). Counsel is free to wait until the close of discovery and it is apparent that the case will be tried before even considering where this “discovery” device will be employed.
Another unique feature of this device is its ability to resolve an issue, even a minor issue, for the purposes of the particular case. The issue is not considered to be resolved outside the case itself (see CPLR §3123(b) and Leveski v. Hydraulic Elevator, 243 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)) but an admission in response to a notice to admit has more conclusive effect than an arguably equivalent admission secured from a party at deposition (Groeger v. Col-Les Orthopedic Assoc., 136 A.D.2d 952 (4th Dept. 1988)). The trial attorney for the defendant will need to have a backup plan for the admission he believes he has from the depositions, which plan is arguably not needed for the admissions secured pursuant to a notice to admit.
If the recipient does not respond within 20 days of service, the subject matter of the notice to admit may be conclusively admitted, which also renders it unique. Carlson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 35 A.D.2d 351 (2d Dept. 1970). Those who feel that this is a harsh result have company on the bench. Courts have allowed such admissions to be withdrawn or amended. See CPLR §3123(b) and Cazenovia College v. Patterson, 45 A.D.2d 501 (3d Dept. 1974). In other cases, courts have held that the notice was not appropriately employed at the outset such that no sanctions were imposed and the notice and lack of response were without any legal consequence. See Marguess, 30 A.D.2d 782.
In responding to a notice to admit, the form of the response is also important. Whereas a party may deny knowledge “upon information and belief” in response to a pleading, this has been found to be inappropriate in responding to a notice to admit. Rosenfeld v. Vorsanger, 5 A.D.3d 462 (2d Dept. 2004). The responding party is required by CPLR §3213 to make reasonable inquiry into the subject matter before responding and is not permitted to avoid an admission by ignoring reasonably accessible information. Definitions of “reasonable inquiry” will of course vary. It is a matter of debate when an attorney for a party may respond to a notice to admit herself in lieu of a direct response by her client, adding to its unique character. Elrac v. McDonald, 186 Misc.2d 830 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County, 2001).
The notice to admit is likewise the only discovery device in the CPLR with self-contained sanctions that transcend the usual concepts regarding recovery of costs and legal fees. Where a party has put the adversary to its proof with an unreasonable denial of a requested admission, CPLR 3123(c) requires the Court to assess the costs and reasonable attorneys fees of proving the subject matter. Belfer v. Dictograph Products, 275 App. Div. 824 (1st Dept. 1949). Regardless of which party has prevailed on which issues at trial, with timely application to the trial court, costs and fees are recoverable.
The Value of the Notice to Admit
The relatively unique, arcane, and uncertain nature of the notice to admit should not inhibit its appropriate use. Its value becomes obvious where a case is moving toward resolution and the defense has to take into account the evidentiary issues which will determine the outcome of specific claims.
Clearly matters which will be the subject of expert testimony should not be included in a notice to admit. Berg v. Flower Fifth Ave. Hosp., 102 A.D.2d 760 (1st Dept. 1984). On the other hand, whether a medical artist's rendering, a photograph, or other graphic or demonstrative image is representative of what seeks to be portrayed could best be resolved by notice to admit. This allows the defense attorney to use the image in examining witnesses on the plaintiff's case in chief before she is able to produce the witness or witnesses who could provide a formal foundation for the exhibit. As an alternative, the exhibit could be used “subject to connection” but where subsequent limitations are placed on its use, earlier testimony regarding the image is called into question.
Where treatment of the patient was documented in a medical facility in another jurisdiction and that facility has been merged into obscurity by the relentless appetite of corporate medicine, it may be difficult to produce a copy of the treatment records with the type of certification which will guarantee admissibility. Rather than placing the complicated issue before a trial judge who has other concerns in an ongoing trial, a notice to admit could eliminate any issue and lend predictability to the flow of evidence.
Conclusion
The notice to admit will remain as a tool among others to be used in preparing the defense as cases approach resolution. The trial courts will be faced with issues resulting from its use, however infrequently. The cases on point suggest that this is an area of uncertainty, but where the notice to admit is appropriately used and fair notice is given to the adversary of the need to respond and the consequences of an improper denial, this device should be of value to the defense of the medical malpractice case.
This content has been archived. It is available through our partners, LexisNexis® and Bloomberg Law.
To view this content, please continue to their sites.
Not a Lexis Subscriber?
Subscribe Now
Not a Bloomberg Law Subscriber?
Subscribe Now
NOT FOR REPRINT
© 2025 ALM Global, LLC, All Rights Reserved. Request academic re-use from www.copyright.com. All other uses, submit a request to [email protected]. For more information visit Asset & Logo Licensing.
You Might Like
View AllThe Unraveling of Sean Combs: How Legislation from the #MeToo Movement Brought Diddy Down
When It Comes to Local Law 97 Compliance, You’ve Gotta Have (Good) Faith
8 minute readTrending Stories
- 1'If the Job Is Better, You Get Better': Chief District Judge Discusses Overcoming Negative Perceptions
- 2It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times
- 3Class Action Accusing Dave's Killer Bread of Mislabeling Protein Contents Cleared to Continue, Judge Rules
- 4SEC Files Lawsuit Against Elon Musk Over Untimely Twitter Ownership Disclosure
- 5Survey Finds Majority of Legal Professionals Still Intimidated by AI Despite Need to Streamline Mounting Caseloads
Who Got The Work
J. Brugh Lower of Gibbons has entered an appearance for industrial equipment supplier Devco Corporation in a pending trademark infringement lawsuit. The suit, accusing the defendant of selling knock-off Graco products, was filed Dec. 18 in New Jersey District Court by Rivkin Radler on behalf of Graco Inc. and Graco Minnesota. The case, assigned to U.S. District Judge Zahid N. Quraishi, is 3:24-cv-11294, Graco Inc. et al v. Devco Corporation.
Who Got The Work
Rebecca Maller-Stein and Kent A. Yalowitz of Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer have entered their appearances for Hanaco Venture Capital and its executives, Lior Prosor and David Frankel, in a pending securities lawsuit. The action, filed on Dec. 24 in New York Southern District Court by Zell, Aron & Co. on behalf of Goldeneye Advisors, accuses the defendants of negligently and fraudulently managing the plaintiff's $1 million investment. The case, assigned to U.S. District Judge Vernon S. Broderick, is 1:24-cv-09918, Goldeneye Advisors, LLC v. Hanaco Venture Capital, Ltd. et al.
Who Got The Work
Attorneys from A&O Shearman has stepped in as defense counsel for Toronto-Dominion Bank and other defendants in a pending securities class action. The suit, filed Dec. 11 in New York Southern District Court by Bleichmar Fonti & Auld, accuses the defendants of concealing the bank's 'pervasive' deficiencies in regards to its compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act and the quality of its anti-money laundering controls. The case, assigned to U.S. District Judge Arun Subramanian, is 1:24-cv-09445, Gonzalez v. The Toronto-Dominion Bank et al.
Who Got The Work
Crown Castle International, a Pennsylvania company providing shared communications infrastructure, has turned to Luke D. Wolf of Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani to fend off a pending breach-of-contract lawsuit. The court action, filed Nov. 25 in Michigan Eastern District Court by Hooper Hathaway PC on behalf of The Town Residences LLC, accuses Crown Castle of failing to transfer approximately $30,000 in utility payments from T-Mobile in breach of a roof-top lease and assignment agreement. The case, assigned to U.S. District Judge Susan K. Declercq, is 2:24-cv-13131, The Town Residences LLC v. T-Mobile US, Inc. et al.
Who Got The Work
Wilfred P. Coronato and Daniel M. Schwartz of McCarter & English have stepped in as defense counsel to Electrolux Home Products Inc. in a pending product liability lawsuit. The court action, filed Nov. 26 in New York Eastern District Court by Poulos Lopiccolo PC and Nagel Rice LLP on behalf of David Stern, alleges that the defendant's refrigerators’ drawers and shelving repeatedly break and fall apart within months after purchase. The case, assigned to U.S. District Judge Joan M. Azrack, is 2:24-cv-08204, Stern v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc.
Featured Firms
Law Offices of Gary Martin Hays & Associates, P.C.
(470) 294-1674
Law Offices of Mark E. Salomone
(857) 444-6468
Smith & Hassler
(713) 739-1250