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Reversing a trial court's refusal to dismiss a medical-malpractice case, a state appeals court has thrown out the action, ruling that the hospital's expert established the absence of proximate cause while the plaintiff's expert misstated facts and failed to address a key medical issue.

Highlighting the importance of battling experts in the early stages of medical-malpractice litigation, an Appellate Division, First Department panel decided on Tuesday to toss out a lawsuit centered on a patient's developing of an ulcer while at St. Barnabas Hospital in the Bronx.

The unanimous panel credited the St. Barnabas' expert witness repeatedly. Then, in a tightly written opinion, it laid out a number of errors it said the plaintiff's expert had made, including—as stated in the decision's final last line—the failure to establish even “the appropriate qualifications to opine on the formation of pressure ulcers.”

Higher in the decision, the panel also swiftly knocked down the plaintiff's “claim” that St. Barnabas' expert had put forward a “novel theory” medical defense for the hospital that necessitated a Frye hearing.

It was not a novel theory and, “even if it were, defendant's expert established that his theory was based on 'generally accepted scientific principles and methodology,'” the court said, citing Sadek v. Wesley and Craig v. St. Barnabas Nursing Home.

A Frye hearing involves a court test to determine scientific admissibility, by seeking to ensure that expert opinion based on a scientific technique is admissible only when that technique is accepted by a relevant scientific community as reliable.

The lawsuit, lodged in 2010 by Rafael Vargas Jr., as administrator of the estate of Gladys Vargas—the St. Barnabas patient who is now deceased—alleges that Vargas developed a severe sacral decubitus ulcer, known commonly as a bedsore or pressure ulcer, due to the hospital's negligent care, the panel wrote.

Then it stated that summary judgment dismissal of the Vargas action “was warranted because the affirmation of defendant's expert was sufficient to establish prima facie the absence of proximate cause, and plaintiff's expert's affirmation was insufficient to raise any issues of fact.”

Justices David Friedman, Judith Gische, Barbara Kapnick, Ellen Gesmer and Peter Moulton explained that St. Barnabas' expert had “opined that the ulcer was unavoidable due to the decedent's underlying comorbidities”—multiple chronic diseases or conditions—“prior development of an ulcer at the same site, and the necessity of maintaining a head-of-bed elevation of greater than 30 degrees to avoid ventilator-related pneumonia or aspiration.”

The Vargas expert, in opposition, “submitted a conclusory affirmation, which misstated the record, mischaracterized the decedent as 'relatively healthy' and minimized the significance of her many comorbidities,” the justices wrote.

The Vargas expert “also failed to address defendant's expert's assertions regarding the necessity of maintaining head-of-bed elevation of greater than 30 degrees, conflated the distinct concepts of ability to heal and avoidability, and improperly raised a new theory of liability (inadequate discharge planning) that had not been set forth in the complaint or bills of particulars.”

The panel's decision reversed Bronx Supreme Court Justice Stanley Green's 2015 dismissal of the action against St. Barnabas.

Suzanne Flanagan of The Flanagan Law Group in Huntington represented the Rafael Vargas Jr., and she could not be reached for comment. Nor could William Buckley, an attorney with Garbarini & Scher representing St. Barnabas.