A Second Circuit panel ruled Wednesday that General Motors did not admit liability for a wrongful death claim stemming from its faulty ignition switch crisis when it accidentally cited language from a decade-old contract dating back to its 2009 bankruptcy.

A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said GM's "mistaken" citation from the outdated sales agreement did not qualify as a binding concession, and joined other circuit courts in holding that such a "judicial admission" would require a formal statement that is "intentional, clear and unambiguous."

"Bearing in mind this rule, we cannot say that New GM's mistaken citation of language from a non-operative agreement … constitutes a judicial admission that New GM in fact assumed the liabilities set forth in language found in the non-operative agreement," the panel wrote in an 11-page per curiam opinion.

Second Circuit Judges Dennis Jacobs, Robert D. Sack and Peter W. Hall ll participated in the decision.

The ruling upheld an earlier decision by a Manhattan federal judge who ruled GM had not admitted liability for wrongful death claims when it referenced, twice in separate court filings, language from a superseded agreement, which stated that the restructured company would be responsible for "accidents, incidents or other distinct and discreet occurrences" occurring after June 2009.

Benjamin Pillars, whose wife died after her car crashed allegedly due to her car's faulty ignition switch, had argued that the "distinct and discreet" language could include his wrongful death claim and that GM was bound by its supposed admission throughout the proceedings.

GM was represented by Richard Godfrey and Andrew B. Bloomer of Kirkland & Ellis in Chicago, as well as Erin Murphy and C. Harker Rhodes from the firm's Washington, D.C., office. The ruling also listed Arthur Steinberg, David Fine and Scott Davidson of King & Spalding as counsel for the company.

Pillars was represented by Russell C. Babcock, an appellate lawyer from Saginaw, Michigan.

The Second Circuit explained that, in order to qualify as a judicial admission, the statement had to be one of fact, and not a legal conclusion. But "inherent inconsistencies" between the outdated agreement and the new contract showed that GM's mistake did not meet its new standard.

"Because New GM's erroneous citation of language from a non-operative agreement was not an intentional, clear, and unambiguous statement of fact, we hold that it did not constitute a judicial admission," the court said.

In a footnote, the judges also expressed "serious reservations about calling a description of liabilities an assumed 'fact' rather than a legal conclusion," but said it was not required to reach that issue in its ruling.

An attorney for GM did not immediately respond Wednesday to an email seeking comment on the decision. Pillars attorney could not be reached for comment.

The case was captioned Pillars v. General Motors.

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