The doctrine of mootness is a strange creature in the universe of appellate review. Initially, “an appeal will be considered moot unless the rights of the parties will be directly affected by the determination of the appeal and the interest of the parties is an immediate consequence of the judgment.” Coleman ex rel. Coleman v. Daines, 19 N.Y.3d 1087, 1092 [2012]. In essence:

It is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that the power of a court to declare the law only arises out of, and is limited to, determining the rights of persons which are actually controverted in a particular case pending before the tribunal . . . This principle, which forbids courts to pass on academic, hypothetical, moot, or otherwise abstract questions, is founded both in constitutional separation-of-powers doctrine, and in methodological strictures which inhere in the decisional process of a common-law judiciary. Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 714–715 [1980].

“Typically, the doctrine of mootness is invoked where a change in circumstances prevents a court from rendering a decision that would effectively determine an actual controversy.” Bruenn v. Town Bd. of Town of Kent, 145 A.D.3d 878 [2d Dept 2016].

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

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