Since the Founding, the doctrine of standing has assured that the federal courts "decide only the rights of individuals," Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803), avoid hypotheticals, and refrain from issuing advisory opinions. A formidable guardian of separation of powers, standing confines the Article III branch to exercising the judicial power alone, while concomitantly prohibiting any incursions into the realms of the Legislative and Executive Branches.

While recent decades have seen many iterations of the doctrine, its essential maxim remains unchanged: To stand before a federal jurist, the plaintiff must demonstrate that she has suffered a concrete and particularized injury, said harm was likely caused by the defendant, and a court can redress the alleged injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). And a bare five years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court refined this axiom by placing emphasis upon standing's absolute requirement of a "concrete and particularized injury," as distinguished from a mere statutory violation. Spokeo v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340-41 (2016).