The U.S. Supreme Court's latest term ended with a significant decision tightening the requirements for showing Article III standing to sue in federal court. That decision, TransUnion v. Ramirez, has widely been seen as a welcome development for defendants, particularly those facing large class actions alleging regulatory violations with hefty statutory damages. But the lasting implications of the decision are less clear, including the possibility that defendants may unwittingly find themselves defending such matters exclusively in state courts—forums many have sought to avoid. It will be important for plaintiffs and defendants alike to understand and contend with the nuances of TransUnion's reach.

Justice Kavanaugh, writing for the court, put the issue succinctly: "No concrete harm, no standing." This is so, the court held, even if Congress specifically authorized a cause of action for plaintiffs to sue and recover damages. What matters, according to the court, is that the plaintiff alleges—and later proves—that the legal violation caused a "concrete" harm. The court explained that an asserted harm is sufficiently concrete when "it has a 'close relationship' to a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts."

For TransUnion, this meant that consumers whose credit files contained inaccurate information—specifically, false alerts that their names matched those appearing on government lists of terrorists or drug traffickers—could not sue in federal court for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) unless they could prove "concrete" harm, such as actual dissemination of their credit reports to third parties. The mere risk of future harm—for example, the possibility that TransUnion might send an inaccurate report to a potential creditor—was not itself enough. Nor was it sufficient that Congress had specifically legislated minimum statutory damages for the violation.